Uddin v. Hassell et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 2/25/2016. (KEK)

FILED
2016 Feb-25 PM 02:26
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
NASIR UDDIN,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN SCOTT HASSELL, et al.,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: 4:15-cv-02067-MHHJHE

MEMORANDUM OPINION
On November 16, 2015, petitioner Nasir Uddin filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). When he filed his petition,
Mr. Uddin, a native of Bangladesh, was incarcerated at the Etowah County
Detention Center, in the custody of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). In his petition, Mr. Uddin alleges that he is being illegally
detained by ICE pending his deportation to Bangladesh. He seeks release from
ICE custody. On February 9, 2016, Mr. Uddin was released from ICE custody
pursuant to an Order of Supervision. (Doc. 11, 11-1). Respondents have filed a
motion to dismiss the action as moot because Mr. Uddin no longer is in ICE
custody. (Doc. 11). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion and
will dismiss the action as moot.

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the
consideration of “cases or controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The doctrine
of mootness is derived from this limitation because “an action that is moot cannot
be characterized as an active case or controversy.” Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997). A case is moot and must be dismissed if a
court can no longer provide “meaningful relief.” Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906,
913 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

The Court can no longer provide

meaningful relief in this case because Mr. Uddin no longer is in ICE custody – the
very relief that he requested in his habeas petition. Therefore, Mr. Uddin’s petition
is moot, and the Court must dismiss the petition unless an exception to the
mootness doctrine applies.
There are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) collateral
consequences and (2) “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982).
Neither exception applies here. The collateral consequences exception does not
apply because there are no “disabilities or burdens which may flow” from the
custody that Mr. Uddin challenges. See Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237. The exception
for events “capable of repetition, yet evading review” does not apply either. Mr.
Uddin has been released from custody, and it is unlikely that the circumstances that
gave rise to Mr. Uddin’s custody will happen again. See Weinstein v. Bradford,

423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (holding that the “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” exception applies when (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to
be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.). Because Mr. Uddin’s petition is moot, the Court will dismiss this action.
Based on the foregoing, the Respondents’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 11), is
GRANTED. A separate order will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this February 25, 2016.

_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE