Jenkins v. United States of America

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn on 1/24/18. (SAC )

FILED
2018 Jan-24 PM 04:41
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
QUINTIN RICARDO JENKINS,
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent,

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Case No. 4:15-CV-8003-SLB
Crim. Case No. 4:09-CR-0267-SLB-HGD

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is currently pending before the court on petitioner Quintin Ricardo Jenkins’s
Motion to Vacate. (Doc. 1, crim. doc. 37.)1 The Government has filed a Response and
Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 6.) Jenkins did not file a reply to the Government’s Response and
Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the Government’s
Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted and Jenkins’s Motion to Vacate will be dismissed as
untimely filed. In the alternative the court finds that Jenkins’s Motion to Vacate is due to be
denied on its merits and his petition is due to be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are set forth in Jenkins’s Plea Agreement –

1

Citations to documents in the court’s record in petitioner’s Motion to Vacate appear
as “(Doc. __).” Citations to documents in the court’s record in the criminal proceedings
against petitioner, Case No. 4:09-CR-0267-SLB-HGD, appear as “(Crim. Doc. __).” Page
number citations refer to the page numbers assigned to the document by the court’s CM/ECF
electronic filing system.

On June 15, 2009, at approximately 9:05 am, Quintin Ricardo Jenkins
entered the Colonial Bank located at 401 Broad Street in Gadsden, Etowah
County, Alabama wearing blue jeans, a polo shirt, and glasses. Jenkins
approached a bank teller and handed her a note that read, “This is a bomb.
Give me all your money. I have the remote in my hand.” After viewing a
black object resembling a remote in Jenkins[’s] hand, the teller adhered to his
request and placed all the money from her teller drawer along with bait money
and a dye pack in a bag before handing the bag to Jenkins. After taking
approximately $6,412.00 in United States Currency from the teller, Jenkins
walked out the front door of the bank and drove away in a maroon van.
Agent Garnett of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reviewed the
surveillance photographs from the bank robbery and subsequently released
these images of the suspect and a description of the maroon van used in the
bank robbery to the local Gadsden, Alabama media. After the surveillance
photographs from the bank were published, multiple people, including
Jenkins’[s] wife, mother and uncle, called and notified law enforcement that
Jenkins was the suspect depicted in the photograph. Jenkins’[s] wife also
confirmed that Jenkins drove a maroon van identical to the getaway vehicle
seen driven by the Colonial Bank robber. Agent Garnett reviewed Jenkins
photograph in a law enforcement database and positively identified him as the
same individual in the bank surveillance photographs.
Law enforcement received information that Jenkins was staying at a
location in Huntsville, Alabama with a female friend. Agents with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation went to the location and were met by Jenkins. When
approached by the agents, Jenkins stated that he knew agents were there
because he had robbed the bank. During the search incident to arrest, law
enforcement found a bag and a wallet in Jenkins[’s] possession containing dye
stained money from the bank robbery. Jenkins was taken into custody and
transported to the local jail.
(Crim. doc. 27 at 2-3.) At the plea colloquy, Jenkins testified that these facts were
“substantially correct.” (Crim. doc. 38 at 16-18.)
On July 1, 2010, the United States filed a single-court Indictment against Jenkins,
which charged him as follows:

2

That on or about the 15th day of June, 2009, in Etowah County, within
the Northern District of Alabama, the defendant,
QUINTIN RICARDO JENKINS,
did knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully, by force, violence and
intimidation take from the person and presence of another, money, that is
United States currency, belonging to and in the care, custody, control,
management and possession of Colonial Bank, the deposits of which were then
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and in committing said
offense, did assault or put in jeopardy the life of another person by the use of
a dangerous weapon, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections
2113(a) and (d).2
(Crim. doc. 8 [footnote added].)

2

Section 2113(a) and (d) state:

a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain
by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to,
or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit
union, or any savings and loan association . . .
...
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.
...
(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined
in subsection[ ] (a) . . . of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy
the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) and (d).
3

Following the Indictment, Jenkins’s counsel requested, and was granted, funds for the
purpose of obtaining an independent psychological evaluation. (Crim docs. 10 and 11.) The
court also ordered an examination of Jenkins by a forensic psychologist. (Crim. doc. 24.)
The forensic psychologist reported –
On August 19, 2009, Quentin Ricardo Jenkins was interviewed and
assessed in accordance with a Court Order signed by the Honorable Harwell
G. Davis, III, Magistrate Judge of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama. Jenkins has been charged with Bank Robbery.
Jenkins remained cooperative and sufficiently attentive for completion
of the evaluation. Given his level of cooperation and the availability of
collateral data the following opinions are rendered with a reasonable degree
of psychological certainty.
The defendant reportedly has a history of psychiatric intervention
commencing around twenty-five years ago and he has been diagnosed with
Schizoaffective Disorder. Presently, he is prescribed psychotropic medication
for treatment of this disorder and he was psychiatrically stable at the time of
this evaluation. The defendant's history also is remarkable for criminal
activities, mainly robbery[,] for which he has been incarcerated.
With regard to his competence to stand trial it is my opinion that
Jenkins is aware of his charge and the allegations against him. Similarly, he
has a good understanding of the potential consequences of his legal situation,
roles of courtroom participants and of common court related procedures
including plea bargaining process. Notably, Jenkins has been involved ;n
court-related procedures previously and apparently without difficulty. During
this evaluation he claimed to be willing to work with counsel and anxious to
proceed with the disposition of his case. He demonstrated no difficulty in
communicating and provided a personal version of the alleged incident that
was logical and coherent. His ability to serve in such role will be dependent
on continued compliance with prescribed medication.
As to his mental state at the time of the alleged offense it is my opinion
that despite history of a serious mental illness Mr Jenkins was at the time in
question[,] and in regard to the specific behaviors in question, able to
4

understand and appreciate the nature and wrongfulness of his actions and
could distinguish right from wrong.
(Crim. doc. 26 at 7.) Following the filing of this report, Jenkins notified the court of his
intention to plead guilty pursuant to a Plea Agreement.
At the Plea Colloquy, the court discussed the forensic psychologist’s report and
Jenkins’s mental state:
[THE COURT:] Let me ask you, Mr. Tuten, [defendant’s counsel]
based on your interaction with your client, do you agree with [the forensic
psychologist’s] assessment?
MR. TUTEN: Well, Judge, I'm certainly not a doctor, but I do agree
with the assessment.
THE COURT: And let me ask more specifically, do you agree with her
assessment that he is competent now to enter a plea of guilty and to assist you
in his defense should he decide to go to trial?
MR. TUTEN: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: That's really the only questions I think I want to ask
you.
...
THE COURT: . . . [B]ased on [the forensic psychologist’s] report and
defendant's counsel's belief that he is able to assist him in his defense and that
he is competent to enter this plea of guilty, [the court finds] that [Jenkins] is,
in fact, competent to enter his plea of guilty.
...
THE COURT: Within the past 72 hours, have you taken or received
any medication, drugs or narcotics?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
5

THE COURT: Could you tell me what those are?
THE DEFENDANT: Haldol and Cogentin.
...
THE COURT: Haldol, is that an antipsychotic? What is that medicine?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Tell me what you understand it to be.
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I have a sleeping disorder, and it helps with
the sleeping disorder and paranoia.
THE COURT: And the other medication as well?
THE DEFENDANT: Side effects.
...
THE COURT: Cogentin does what again?
THE DEFENDANT: For side effects.
THE COURT: Side effects of the Haldol?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Is there anything about either of those medications, Mr.
Jenkins, that would cause you to be unable to appreciate what you're doing
here today, pleading guilty to a serious felony offense?
THE DEFENDANT: No. They help me.
(Crim. doc. 38 at 4, 10, 12-13.)
At sentencing, defense counsel argued that Jenkins was competent but “his capacity
to fully appreciate the consequences of his actions [was] diminished in some way” by his
6

mental illness. (Crim. doc. 39 at 6.) He noted Jenkins was “not a problem” when he took
his medication, but he quickly “went down hill” when he did not take his medication. (Id.
at 7.) Noting that his compliance with his medication could not be guaranteed and his history
of violent crimes, the court held, “I can’t go along with your request [for a low-end Guideline
sentence] here. I think looking at [Jenkins’s] history, and I'm not disputing that he has
mental issues, but I think the government's recommendation [of 216 months] is reasonable.”
(Id. at 8, 14.) The court sentenced Jenkins to 216 months imprisonment and held that “a
lengthy sentence of this nature is needed to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant. [Jenkins’s sentence is] adequate to deter criminal conduct by him,” and “the
history and characteristics of the defendant to me warrant this kind of a sentence.” (Id. at
15.) The court did not consider Jenkins’s race in determining the appropriate sentence.
The court entered its Judgment in this case on April 28, 2010. (Crim. doc. 32.) In his
Plea Agreement, Jenkins waived his rights to appeal and to collaterally challenge his
conviction and sentence, (crim. doc. 27 at 5-7); he did not file a direct appeal of his
Judgment. Therefore, the Judgment in this case became final on May 12, 2010.
The deadline for filing a Motion to Vacate pursuant to § 2255 was May 12, 2011. See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)(“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under [28
U.S.C. § 2255]. The limitation period shall run from the latest of – (1) the date on which the
judgment of conviction becomes final . . . .”). On March 22, 2011, Jenkins filed a “Motion
for Extension of Time to File § 2255,” (crim. doc. 34), and a “Motion to Proceed In Forma

7

Pauperis,” (crim. doc. 35).3 He asked the court to provide him a transcript of his sentencing
proceedings and a copy of his Judgment without cost and to extend the one-year deadline for
filing a § 2255 Motion to Vacate to allow him time to receive and review these documents.
The court denied the Motions on March 31, 2011, noting that “a federal inmate is not entitled
to a free transcript to aid in preparation of a § 2255 petition,” and, “[i]f the records, once
obtained after the filing of any § 2255 motion through the Government’s response, disclose
possible grounds for additional claims, a collateral challenge may be timely amended to
assert any new claims.” (Crim. doc. 36 at 1-2.) Jenkins did not timely file a § 2255 Motion
to Vacate.
On February 6, 2015, almost five years after the Judgment in this case was entered,
Jenkins filed the instant § 2255 Motion to Vacate. (Doc. 1; crim. doc. 37.) He contends that
he is entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year deadline because “he has not sat on his
rights[,] but due to his mental impairment he has been competently unable to assert them, and

3

Jenkins signed the Motions on March 22, 2011. The court deems the Motions filed
on this date pursuant to the prison mailbox rule.
“Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed
filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v.
McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009). “Absent evidence to the
contrary,” [the court] “assume[s] that [the prisoner’s filing] was delivered to
prison authorities the day he signed it.” Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d
1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).
Daker v. Comm'r, Georgia Dep't of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied
137 S. Ct. 1227 (2017).
8

could not have brought this petition any earlier.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 5.) He contends that he is
entitled to immediate release on the grounds that –
1. Petitioner Quintin Ricardo Jenkins was convicted upon an
involuntary and unconstitutional [plea] of guilty to the indictment that charged
him with one (1) count of bank robbery in violation of Title 18 of the United
States Codes Section 2113(a).
2. Petitioner appeared in Court and was appointed an attorney. He had
and has an extensive mental health history and was suffering from a major
mental illness when proceedings were instituted. His lawyer did not accurately
present this to the Court and failed to explore insanity at the time of the
[offense] and petitioner was, in fact, not guilty of the charge based on this
valid defense and but . . . for his lawyer’s unprofessional and ineffective
assistance, he would [have] presented the issue and been acquitted by the
Court under 18 U.S.C. section 4243.
3. The Court imposed an 18 year sentence upon petitioner who, under
18 U.S.C. Section 4241 should [have] been committed to the custody of the
Attorney General because there was a reasonable basis to believe that he may
not [have] been competent to stand trial and able to assist counsel and a
psychiatric evaluation was mandatory and counsel should [have] filed a motion
for such and his not so doing denied petitioner of a fair trial and effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and for that reason his plea is void and conviction invalid.
4. Petitioner now comes before the Court with an unjust sentence of 18
years. The sentence is excessive in that he was sentenced to more
imprisonment based on race, not the crime. 18 years is excessive because
[C]aucasian defendants charged with a simple, harmless [“]note[”] robbery are
not given anywhere near 18 years. This is discriminatory punishment imposed
by the Court. The Court should have imposed a sentence of no more than Five
(5) years.
(Id. ¶¶ 1-4, 6.)

9

In response to Jenkins’s Motion to Vacate, the Government argues that the Motion is
due to be dismissed as time-barred and that Jenkins’s claims are without merit. (See
generally doc. 6.)

III. DISCUSSION
A. MOTION TO DISMISS
Jenkins alleges, “This motion comes late and beyond the one year time limitation but
petitioner hereby invokes the doctrine of equitable tolling and asks the Court to apply it to
the circumstances presented. Petitioner asserts he has not sat on his rights but due to his
mental impairment he has been competently unable to assert them, and could not have
brought this petition any earlier.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 5.) The Government has moved to dismiss
Jenkins’s Motion to Vacate as untimely filed. (See doc. 6 at 6.) For the reasons set forth
below, the court finds that the Motion to Vacate is due to be dismissed as untimely filed.
Jenkins contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling based on his mental
impairment. “As a general matter, equitable tolling pauses the running of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute
of limitations when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary
circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134
S. Ct. 1224, 1231-32 (2014)(citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). “To be
entitled to equitable tolling, [Jenkins] must show [both] ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his

10

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and
prevented timely filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007)(quoting Pace, 544
U.S. at 418).
Jenkins contends that he could not timely file his Motion to Vacate because of his
mental impairment.
To prevail on such a claim in this context, a petitioner must first make a
“factual showing of mental incapacity,” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327,
337 (2007), but, even then, “mental impairment is not per se a reason to toll
a statute of limitations.” Hunter, 587 F.3d at 1308. Rather, a petitioner is
required to establish that a mental impairment “prevented him from
understanding his rights and obligations under [§ 2255] and acting upon them
in a timely fashion.” Id. at 1309. That is, a petitioner must make a showing
sufficient to demonstrate that “a causal connection exists between his mental
incapacity and his ability to file a timely [§ 2255] petition.” Id.at 1310; see
also Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 549
U.S. 327 (2007). Finally, a petitioner with a mental impairment must also
demonstrate that he acted with “an appropriate degree of diligence for
someone in his situation.” Myers v. Allen, 420 Fed. Appx. 924, 927 (11th Cir.
2011)(quoting Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Thomas v. State of Alabama, No. CV 14-S-1984-W, 2016 WL 5724697, at *2–3 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 30, 2016). Therefore, “To justify equitable tolling, [Jenkins] would have to show that
extraordinary circumstances existed throughout the period.” Harris v. United States, 627
Fed. Appx. 877, 881 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1831 (2016). “A conclusory
claim that a petitioner's mental health contributed to his failure to file a timely federal habeas
corpus claim does not justify the equitable tolling of the limitation period.” Nichols v. Upton,
No. 1:08-CV-2822-TWT, 2009 WL 1545828, *5 (N.D. Ga. May 29, 2009)(citing Lawrence
v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 549 U.S. 327 (2007); United States
11

v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 2004); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1145 (10th Cir.
2001))(emphasis added); see also Thomas, 2016 WL 5724697 at *2-3 (“Petitioner's
generalized assertions that he has a mental impairment for which he has taken medication
and received treatment fail to support either that any such impairment actually caused him
to be unable to file his federal habeas petition on time, or that he has acted with reasonable
diligence

for

someone

in

his

circumstances.”);

Foreman

v.

Jones,

No.

2:14-CV-0785-RDP-JEO, 2015 WL 5607725, *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 3, 2015)(“Foreman’s
generalized allegation that he is being treated for schizophrenia fails to support either that
his mental impairment actually caused him to be unable to file his federal habeas petition on
time or that he has acted with reasonable diligence for someone in his circumstances.”),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-CV-785-RDP-JEO, 2015 WL 5580160 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 22, 2015).
Moreover, the record belies Jenkins’s conclusory allegation that he has been unable
to file his Motion to Vacate despite reasonable diligence. The record establishes that Jenkins
has a severe mental impairment, Schizoaffective Disorder, that, historically, has been
controlled effectively with medication. (Crim. doc. 26 at 7; crim. doc. 39 at 5, 7.)
On June 15, 2010, following his conviction and sentence, Jenkins was sent to MCR
– McCreary USP, where “[h]is psychological stability for custody [was] judged to be
FAVORABLE.” (Doc. 6-6 at 1 [emphasis in original].) He continued to be psychologically
stable until he stopped taking his medication sometime around September 7, 2010. (Id. at

12

4-5.) At that time, he “began to decompensate,” becoming “increasingly agitated, paranoid
and delusional.” (Id. at 5-7.) He resumed taking his medications and his condition
stabilized. (Id. at 15.)
Jenkins began refusing his medications, again, on March 19, 2011. (See id. at 29),
slightly less than two months before the May 12, 2011, deadline for filing his Motion to
Vacate. On or about March 22, 2011, he filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to File

§

2255,” (crim. doc. 34), and a “Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,” (crim. doc. 35), 51
days before the deadline for filing his Motion to Vacate. These Motions were denied on
March 31, 2011. (Crim. doc. 36.) By April 1, 2011, Jenkins’s mental condition had
deteriorated to the point he was placed in the Special Housing Unit. (Doc. 6-1 at 1; doc. 6-6
at 32.)
While in the Special Housing Unit, Jenkins’s “behavior continued to deteriorate.”
(Doc. 6-1 at 1.) As a result, he was given an injection of Haldol and transferred to U.S.
Medical Center for Federal Prisoners Springfield for a mental health evaluation. (Id.) He
arrived at Springfield on April 20, 2011, (id. at 4), 22 days before the deadline for filing his
Motion to Vacate. At this time, Jenkins was found to be “acutely psychotic and gravely
disabled.” (Id. at 5.) He received anti-psychotic medications and steadily improved. (Id.)
From June 2011 until August 2013 –
Jenkins [was] generally . . . compliant with psychiatric medication. When he
was on a therapeutic dose of anti-psychotic medication, the inmate presented
as cheerful. He maintained a clean room and showered regularly. He ate his

13

meals regularly and slept normally. He routinely attended outside recreation.
Staff did not observe him engaging in any unusual behaviors.
(Id.)
The court finds that during this two-year period, Jenkins’s mental impairment was not
an “extraordinary circumstance” that prevented the filing of a Motion to Vacate. Lawrence,
549 U.S. at 336.
In August 2013, Jenkins again stopped taking his medications and “[h]is mental status
immediately began to deteriorate.” (Id. at 5-6.) Thereafter, he was “sporadically compliant
with psychiatric medication.” (Id. at 6.) Sometime between October 2013 and June 2014,
a court issued a civil-commitment order, and Jenkins received “treatment with involuntary
anti-psychotic medication.” (Id.) “His mental status improved dramatically after he began
taking psychiatric medication regularly.” (Id. at 7.)
He filed the instant Motion to Vacate on February 2, 2015. (Doc. 1.)
Based on his mental health records, the court finds significant periods of time during
which Jenkins’s mental status was not an “extraordinary” condition that stood in his way and
prevented the filing of his Motion to Vacate. Lawrence, 549 U.S. at 336. On the deadline
for filing, May 12, 2011, the record shows that Jenkins was in a psychotic state, which the
court assumes was an extraordinary condition that prevented him from filing his Motion to
Vacate despite reasonable diligence.4 However, this condition existed only until June 2011

4

The court has assumed that Jenkins’s deteriorating mental state was a circumstance
beyond his control even though the record is clear that his mental incapacity was the result
14

and, until August 2013, the record shows that Jenkins’s mental condition was stable and not
an impediment to his filing a Motion to Vacate. Therefore, the court finds tolling of the
statute of limitations is warranted only for a period of 60 days or until July 12, 2011. Jenkins
has offered no argument or evidence to show why he was unable to file his Motion to Vacate
during this period.
The court finds Jenkins has not proven that his mental condition prevented him from
filing this Motion to Vacate during the entire period before February 2, 2015. See Lawrence,
421 F.3d at 1226-27; Doe v. United States, 469 Fed. Appx. 798, 800-01 (11th Cir. 2012);
Myers, 420 Fed. Appx. at 927-28; Fox v. McNeil, 373 Fed. Appx. 32, 34 (11th Cir. 2010).
Therefore, his Motion to Vacate was untimely filed and the Government’s Motion to
Dismiss, (doc. 6), will be granted.
B. MERITS OF THE MOTION TO VACATE
1. Section 2255 Standard
“[A] § 2255 movant ‘bears the burden to prove the claims in his § 2255 motion.’”
Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th Cir. 2017)(quoting Rivers v. United
States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015); other citations omitted). “Relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow
compass of other injury that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if
condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Bryant v. United States, No. 5:07-

of his voluntary refusal to take his psychiatric medication.
15

CR-0205-SLB-PWG, 2014 WL 519619, *7 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 10, 2014)(quoting Richards v.
United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988) and citing LeCroy v. United States, 739
F.3d 1297, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014) and Greene v. United States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th
Cir. 1989))(internal quotations and citations omitted).
When a habeas petitioner has been convicted based on a plea of guilty and he makes
“statements under oath at a plea colloquy, ‘he bears a heavy burden to show his statements
were false.’”

Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir.

2014)(quoting United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988)(per curiam)). His
“solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Id. (quoting
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977)). Also his guilty plea waives all but certain,
well-defined claims:
After a criminal defendant has pleaded guilty, he may not raise claims relating
to the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights occurring prior to the entry
of the guilty plea, but may only raise [1] jurisdictional issues, United States v.
Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1149, 124
S. Ct. 1146, 157 L. Ed.2d 1042 (2004), [2] attack the voluntary and knowing
character of the guilty plea, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S. Ct.
1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973); Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997
(11th Cir.1992), or [3] challenge the constitutional effectiveness of the
assistance he received from his attorney in deciding to plead guilty, United
States v. Fairchild, 803 F.2d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir.1986). In other words, a
voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person who has
been advised by competent counsel may not be collaterally attacked. Mary v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). A guilty plea must therefore stand unless
induced by misrepresentation made to the accused person by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel. Mary, 467 U.S. at 509, quoting, Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). If a guilty plea is induced through
threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises, the defendant cannot be said
to have been fully apprised of the consequences of the guilty plea and may
16

then challenge the guilty plea under the Due Process Clause. Mary, 467 U.S.
at 509. See also Santo Bello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. CT. 495, 30 L.
Ed. 2d 427 (1971).
Caceres v. United States, No. 13-22901-CIV, 2014 WL 5761112, *8 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5,
2014). “The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is
subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly
incredible.” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74.
2. Discussion
In the alternative, the court finds that Jenkins’s Motion to Vacate is due to be denied
because his claims are without merit.
a. Incompetency
Jenkins contends:
The Court imposed an 18 year sentence upon petitioner who, under 18
U.S.C. Section 4241[,]5 should [have] been committed to the custody of the

5

Section 4241(a) states:

At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior
to the sentencing of the defendant, or at any time after the commencement of
probation or supervised release and prior to the completion of the sentence, the
defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing
to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court shall grant
the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from
a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent
that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). “If . . . the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
17

Attorney General because there was a reasonable basis to believe that he may
not [have] been competent to stand trial and able to assist counsel and a
psychiatric evaluation was mandatory and counsel should [have] filed a motion
for such and his not so doing denied petitioner of a fair trial and effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution6 and for that reason his plea is void and conviction invalid.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 3 [footnote added].)
The standard for determining whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial
or plead guilty is well settled –
Whether a defendant is not competent to plead guilty (or stand trial)
depends on “whether [a defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.” Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995)
quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824
(1960). Not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates that the
defendant is incompetent; rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability
to assist counsel or understand the charges. Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d
1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005).
Rivera-Benito v. United States, 657 Fed. Appx. 933, 934-35 (11th Cir. 2016).
Jenkins’s counsel filed a Motion for a Hearing to Determine Defendant’s
Competency, (crim. doc. 21), and Notice of Intent to Assert Insanity Defense and Introduce
Expert Testimony, (crim. doc. 22). Jenkins was provided funds for a psychological
examination, (crim. docs. 10 and 11), although the results of this examination are not in the
defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the
defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
6

Jenkins’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel is discussed infra.
18

record. However, the court notes that Jenkins has not alleged that this examination
demonstrated he was incompetent to stand trial or that he was guilty but insane at the time
of the offense. The court ordered Jenkins to undergo an examination by a forensic
psychologist.

(See crim. doc. 24.)

According to the court-ordered psychological

examination, Jenkins was “able to understand and appreciate the nature and wrongfulness
of his actions [at the time of the offense] and could distinguish right from wrong.” (Crim.
doc. 26 at 7.) Also, the examination showed that Jenkins was competent to stand trial, but
his competence was “dependent on continued compliance with prescribed medication.” (Id.)
At the time he entered his plea and when he was sentenced, Jenkins was
psychologically stable on prescribed medications. The court determined that he was
competent and that his plea was knowing and voluntary. Jenkins’s arguments to the contrary
are unsupported by his conclusory allegations and the record.
Therefore, in the alternative, the court denies Jenkins’s Motion to Vacate based on his
alleged incompetency as without merit.

b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Jenkins argues, “His lawyer did not accurately present [his extensive mental-health
history and the fact that he was suffering from a major mental illness when proceedings were
instituted] to the Court and failed to explore insanity at the time of the [offense] and
petitioner was, in fact, not guilty of the charge based on this valid defense.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 2.)

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He argues that “but . . . for his lawyer’s unprofessional and ineffective assistance, he would
[have] presented the issue and been acquitted by the Court under 18 U.S.C. section 4243.”7
(Id. [footnote added].) The court disagrees.
“[T]he two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
Pursuant to Strickland, “An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and [he must show] that the deficiency
prejudiced the defense.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)(citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
“A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional
judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the

7

Under [§ 4243], a defendant found [not guilty only by reason of insanity] is held in
custody pending a court hearing, which must occur within 40 days of the verdict. [18 U.S.C.]
§ 4243(c). At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determines whether the defendant
should be hospitalized or released. §§ 4243(d), (e).” Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573,
577 (1994). Section 4243 does not define the insanity defense. Section 17 defines the
“insanity defense;” it states:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant,
as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect
does not otherwise constitute a defense.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a).
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identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.” Id. at 690. “An attorney’s responsibility is to investigate and to evaluate his
client’s options in the course of the subject legal proceedings and then to advise the client
as to the merits of each.” Stano, 921 F.2d at 1151. In this case, Jenkins claims that his
lawyer was ineffective because he failed to have him evaluated and failed to explore an
insanity defense.
“In order to demonstrate prejudice from his lawyer's failure to have him evaluated,
[petitioner] has to show that there was at least a reasonable probability that a psychological
evaluation would have revealed that he was incompetent to stand trial.” Alexander v.
Dugger, 841 F.2d 371, 375 (11th Cir. 1988)(citing Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356,
1367 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073 (1986)); see also Richitelli v. United
States, No. 09-60229-CR, 2014 WL 12703109, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2014). The results
of the court-ordered evaluation show that Jenkins was neither insane at the time of the
offense nor incompetent to stand trial. Jenkins has not shown at least a reasonable
probability that another evaluation showed otherwise or would have shown otherwise.
Also, contrary to Jenkins’s allegations, his counsel investigated his mental health
history, sought a psychological evaluation, filed notice of his intent to assert an insanity
defense, and considered the results of the court-ordered evaluation. (Crim. docs. 10, 19-22,
Doc. 6-7 at 2-3.) The court finds that Jenkins has failed to allege sufficiently deficient
performance as everything he alleges counsel failed to do the record indicates counsel did.

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Moreover, the results of the court-ordered psychological examination showed that Jenkins
was competent to stand trial and that he was not insane at the time he committed the bank
robbery. Jenkins offers only conclusory allegations to the contrary.
Therefore, the court finds that Jenkins has not established deficient performance or
prejudice resulting from his attorney’s alleged deficient performance. Thus, in the alternative
to dismissal of Jenkins’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as time barred, the court
finds that Jenkins’s claim is due to be denied as without merit.
c. Race Discrimination
Jenkins argues that his sentence is “unjust” and excessive based on his race. (Doc.
1 ¶ 4.) He states:
The sentence is excessive in that he was sentenced to more imprisonment
based on race, not the crime. 18 years is excessive because [C]aucasian
defendants charged with a simple, harmless [“]note[”] robbery are not given
anywhere near 18 years. This is discriminatory punishment imposed by the
Court. The Court should have imposed a sentence of no more than Five (5)
years.
(Id.)
Contrary to his assertion, Jenkins was not convicted of a “simple” and/or “harmless”
note robbery. He was convicted of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a)
and (d). Subsection (d) states: “Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any
offense defined in subsection[ ] (a) . . . of this section, assaults any person, or puts in
jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C.
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§ 2113(d)(emphasis added). In his Plea Agreement, Jenkins admitted that he told the teller
during the robbery that he had a bomb and showed her a remote. Even though he had only
a TV remote and he did not have an actual bomb, Jenkins’s actions are sufficient to satisfy
the “dangerous weapon or device” element of subsection (d). United States v. Hanna, 191
Fed. Appx. 921, 922, 923-24 (11th Cir. 2006)(“Hanna argues that the evidence was
insufficient to convict her of armed bank robbery because a remote control detonating device
for a bomb is not a ‘dangerous weapon’ under the federal armed bank robbery statute. . . .
That argument fails.

When Hanna brandished a [fake] remote control device, after

threatening to use such a device to detonate a bomb in the bank, she committed the same
offense and caused the same harm as if she had brandished the bomb that she threatened to
detonate.” (citing McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16, 18 & n.3 (1986); United States
v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 709 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Cooper, 462 F.2d 1343,
1345 (5th Cir.1972))).
The statutory maximum under § 2113(d) is not more than 25 years. Based on
Jenkins’s criminal history and the fact that the instant offense carried a statutory maximum
sentence of 25 years, his offense level was determined to be 34, USSG § 4B1.1(b)(B), less
three levels for acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level of 31. Because he was
considered a career offender, his criminal history category was determined to be VI. See
U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(b). Thus, the Guideline range for imprisonment was 188 to 235 months.

23

The court sentenced Jenkins to 216 months, 19 months below the high end of the Guideline
range.
In this case, the court explicitly and expressly denies that Jenkins’s race was
considered. The violent nature of this crime and Jenkins’s extensive criminal history were
the determinative factors of his Guideline range and the court’s determination of his
appropriate sentence within that range – not his race. Therefore, in the alternative, Jenkins’s
claim that the sentence imposed was based on his race is denied as without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Vacate, filed by petitioner Quintin Ricardo
Jenkins, (doc. 1; crim. doc. 37), is due to be denied and the Government’s Motion to Dismiss,
(doc. 6), is due to be granted. An Order denying the Motion to Vacate, (doc. 1), granting the
Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 6), and dismissing Jenkins’s habeas petition will be entered
contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, provides, “The district court
must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” The applicant for § 2255 relief “cannot take an appeal unless a circuit justice or
a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).”
Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). And, the “certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

24

§ 2253(c)(2)(emphasis added).

To make a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right, the applicant must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether
(or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner
or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)(citations and internal quotations omitted).
Jenkins’s habeas petition is time-barred and without merit based on binding Eleventh
Circuit precedent; reasonable jurists could not disagree. He has not demonstrated that the
issues he raises are reasonably debatable and/or deserve encouragement to proceed further.
Therefore, issuance of a certificate of appealability is not warranted in this case.
DONE this 24th day of January, 2018.

SHARON LOVELACE BLACKBURN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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