Lewis v. Entrekin et al

Filing 72

MEMORANDUM OPINION - The court GRANTS Officer Johnson's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 60 ). The court WILL ENTER judgment as a matter of law in favor of Officer Johnson and against Mr. Lewis on Mr. Lewis's deliberate indifference claim. The court will enter a separate final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion. Signed by Judge Annemarie Carney Axon on 6/18/2020. (KEK)

FILED
2020 Jun-18 PM 04:28
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER LAMONT LEWIS, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CLARENCE THOMAS “TOMMY” )
JOHNSON,
)
)
Defendant.
)

Case No. 4:16-cv-00254-ACA

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on Defendant Clarence Thomas Johnson’s
motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Christopher Lamont Lewis’s
deliberate indifference claim. (Doc. 60).
Mr. Lewis was an inmate at the Etowah County Detention Center. Officer
Johnson injured Mr. Lewis’s hands when he kicked Mr. Lewis’s food tray flap
closed while Mr. Lewis’s arms were resting on the flap. Mr. Lewis did not receive
medical treatment for his injuries until three and a half hours later.
Proceeding pro se, Mr. Lewis filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that Officer Johnson used excessive force and denied him medical
care. (Doc. 1; Doc. 11).

Mr. Lewis’s case proceeded through this court’s special report process for
prisoner pro se § 1983 cases alleging violations of constitutional rights. (See Doc.
14). The magistrate judge to whom this action was assigned construed Officer
Johnson’s special report as a motion for summary judgment (doc. 23), and Mr.
Lewis responded to the motion (doc. 27).
The magistrate judge entered a report recommending that the court deny
Officer Johnson’s motion for summary judgment as to both of Mr. Lewis’s claims.
(Doc. 28).

Officer Johnson objected to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation.

(Doc. 29).

The undersigned reviewed Officer Johnson’s

objections, and the court accepted in part and rejected in part the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. (Doc. 40). The court concluded that Officer
Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Lewis’s excessive force claim,
and the court granted Officer Johnson’s motion for summary judgment as to that
claim. (Doc. 40 at 1–8). But the court found that questions of fact precluded
summary judgment on the issue of whether Officer Johnson was deliberately
indifferent to Mr. Lewis’s serious medical need. (Doc. 40 at 8–11). The court did
not address whether the constitutional right was clearly established because Officer
Johnson did not object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on
that ground. (Id. at 11).

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Because the court’s special report process limits traditional discovery
available to litigants in regular civil cases, the court allowed the parties to engage
in additional pretrial discovery and appointed counsel for Mr. Lewis. (See January
16, 2019 & April 12, 2019 minute entries; Docs. 41, 45, 46, 50, 52). Based on
discussions with counsel during a November 13, 2019 telephone conference about
what the additional discovery had revealed, the court permitted Officer Johnson to
file another motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 54).
Officer Johnson argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Mr.
Lewis’s deliberate indifferent claim. The court agrees. Because the evidence fails
to show that Officer Johnson violated a clearly established right, the court
GRANTS Officer Johnson’s motion for summary judgment. The court WILL
ENTER judgment as a matter of law in favor of Officer Johnson and against Mr.
Lewis on Mr. Lewis’s deliberate indifference claim.
I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On a motion for summary judgment, the court “draw[s] all inferences and

review[s] all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Lewis’s deliberate indifference claim arises out of an incident at the
Etowah County Detention Center on January 26, 2016. Around 12:30 or 12:45 that
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afternoon, Officer Johnson brought Mr. Lewis’s food tray to his cell, opened the
cell door flap, and left the food tray on the flap. (Doc. 16-2 at ¶¶ 15-16). Mr.
Lewis refused to remove the food tray until Officer Johnson radioed a Sergeant to
bring Mr. Lewis his asthma inhaler that Mr. Lewis had requested from Officer
Johnson earlier in the day. (Doc. 16-2 at ¶ 18; Doc. 27 at 4, ¶ 20). Officer Johnson
grabbed the tray, placed it on the floor outside the cell, and returned to secure the
cell door flap. (Doc. 16-2 at ¶¶ 21-24). Officer Johnson could not close the cell
door flap because Mr. Lewis had extended his arms out on the flap and refused to
move them until Officer Johnson radioed the Sergeant regarding the inhaler. (Doc.
16-2 at ¶ 24).
Mr. Lewis continued to ignore Officer Johnson’s orders, so Officer Johnson
told Mr. Lewis that he was “going to attempt to force [the hatch] closed by kicking
it.” (Doc. 16-4 at 2). According to Officer Johnson, Mr. Lewis responded, “go
ahead and try.” (Doc. 16-2 at ¶ 27; Doc. 16-4 at 2). Officer Johnson “took the toe
of [his] left foot and tried to force the hatch closed from the underside position of
the flap,” but he could not close the flap due to the pressure of Mr. Lewis’s arms.
(Doc. 16-2 at ¶ 27).

According to Mr. Lewis, Officer Johnson “kicked and

stomped” his hands and fingers and “viciously kicked the bottom of the . . . tray
flap with the plaintiff’s hands still attached, repeatedly attempting to force the
hatch close[d], causing serious skin lacerations and swelling of the hands and
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wrists.” (Doc. 11 at 3-4). According to Mr. Lewis’s sworn allegations, he was
“cut, lacerated, beat up, [and] bruised.” (Doc. 11 at 11).
Officer Johnson left Mr. Lewis’s cell unit, but he returned about 15 minutes
later to do another security check. (Doc. 11 at 8, 10; Doc. 16-2 at ¶ 29). That is
when Mr. Lewis declared a medical and psychological emergency because his
hands and wrists were swollen, and he was “bleeding like a stuck pig.” (Doc. 27
at 5; see also Doc. 11 at 10). Mr. Lewis requested medical attention, and Officer
Johnson told Mr. Lewis that “he does not do well with demands from inmates.”
(Doc. 11 at 11). Officer Johnson also told Mr. Lewis, “Looks a little swollen.
That’s not enough blood for a medical emergency.” (Doc. 27 at 5). Officer
Johnson instructed Mr. Lewis to fill out a medical request slip. (Doc. 16-2 at ¶
35).
Two other officers checked on Mr. Lewis around 3:15 p.m. (about two and
a half hours after Mr. Lewis was injured) and took him to the medical unit. (Doc.
16-5 at 2; Doc. 16-5 at 2; Doc. 27 at 6). 1 A nurse examined Mr. Lewis a little
after 4:00 p.m. (three and a half hours after the injury) and found a one centimeter
cut on the side of his right hand with a small amount of dried bloody drainage.

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Those officers claim that Mr. Lewis injured himself by demonstrating for them how
Officer Johnson had kicked the tray flap by “slamming it repeatedly against his own hands”
causing both of Mr. Lewis’s hands to bleed. (Doc. 16-5 at 2; Do. 16-6 at 2). Mr. Lewis denies
that he injured himself. (Doc. 27 at 6). The court must construe this dispute in Mr. Lewis’s
favor and must accept Mr. Lewis’s testimony that he did not injure himself.
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(Doc. 63-1 at 72). The nurse also documented a “small horizontal abrasion”
across Mr. Lewis’s knuckles on his left hand with a “scant” amount of dried
bloody drainage. (Id.). Mr. Lewis had “[s]trong, equal grip strength” and good
range of motion. (Id.). The nurse found no edema, erythema, or bruising. (Doc.
63-1 at 72). She cleaned and bandaged Mr. Lewis’s cuts, prescribed ibuprofen,
ordered x-rays, and released Mr. Lewis to his cell. (Id.).
X-rays of Mr. Lewis’s hands taken one week after the incident involving
Officer Johnson were normal, and doctors made no additional treatment
recommendations at that time. (Doc. 63-1 at 69–70).
Because Mr. Lewis kept complaining of pain, the jail medical staff referred
him to an orthopedic specialist. (Doc. 63-2 at 8). Dr. Blackstock saw Mr. Lewis
on May 4, 2016, about three months after the incident involving Officer Johnson.
(Id.). Mr. Lewis complained of wrist pain. (Id.). Dr. Blackstock found that Mr.
Lewis’s right wrist had “some limited motion” which Dr. Blackstock “did not
believe [was] a new issue.” (Doc. 63-2 at 8). Mr. Lewis had pain with flexion of
the left wrist but full range of motion, and no swelling or bony abnormalities.
(Id.). X-rays revealed “a very small amount of degenerative changes.” (Id.).
During a follow up visit with Dr. Blackstock on May 25, 2016, Mr. Lewis
had full range of motion in both wrists, and Tinel and Phalen tests were negative.
(Doc. 63-2 at 5). On June 25, 2016, Mr. Lewis saw Dr. Blackstock again and
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complained that was he not improving. (Doc. 63-2 at 4). Mr. Lewis refused an
injection. (Id.). Dr. Blackstock changed Mr. Lewis’s anti-inflammatories, and he
discussed stretching exercises with Mr. Lewis. (Id.).
By August 2016, Dr. Blackstock had released Mr. Lewis from his care, and
by October 2016, Dr. Blackstock fired Mr. Lewis as a patient. (Doc. 63-1 at 58,
66–67).
II.

DISCUSSION
Mr. Lewis claims that Officer Johnson’s three and a half hour delay in

providing care for his injuries violated his constitutional rights. 2 Officer Johnson
seeks summary judgment on Mr. Lewis’s deliberate indifference claim on the basis
that he is entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity shields government
officials acting within their discretionary authority from liability unless the
officials ‘violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
2

Neither party has cited evidence or advanced argument regarding whether Mr. Lewis
was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time Officer Johnson injured his hands.
Therefore, it is unclear whether Mr. Lewis asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim or an Eighth
Amendment claim. Nevertheless, Mr. Lewis’s status is immaterial to the court’s analysis
because “the minimum standard for providing medical care to a pre-trial detainee under the
Fourteenth Amendment is the same as the minimum standard required by the Eighth Amendment
for a convicted prisoner; both the right to due process and the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment are violated by a government official’s deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.” Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1997),
overruled in part on other grounds by LeFrere v. Quezada, 588 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2009).

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reasonable person would have known.’” Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1249
(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “An
official who asserts entitlement to qualified immunity must first establish that she
or he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Alcocer v. Mills,
906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). “Once the official makes that showing, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is
inappropriate.” Id.
The court previously found, and the parties do not dispute, that Officer
Johnson was carrying out duties associated with his employment as a Correctional
Officer at the Etowah County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 40 at 2; see generally Docs.
61, 68, 71). Therefore, to overcome Officer Johnson’s qualified immunity defense,
Mr. Lewis must “establish both that the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutionally protected right and that the right was clearly established at the time
of the misconduct.” Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. The court may consider in any
order whether Mr. Lewis has satisfied his burden. Id.; see Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges of the district courts and the courts of
appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light
of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).

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Mr. Lewis’s claim does not survive summary judgment because the facts,
construed in the light most favorable to Mr. Lewis, do not demonstrate that the
right to medical care any sooner than Mr. Lewis received it was clearly established.
Mr. Lewis asserts that “it is clearly established that prison officials cannot be
deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical condition.” (Doc. 68 at 16).
This generalized proposition is not the relevant inquiry. Rather, in the context of
qualified immunity, the court considers “what an objectively reasonable official
must have known at the pertinent time and place; that is, we are examining whether
it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation [the defendant officer] confronted.” Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557,
563 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations and emphasis omitted).
A plaintiff may demonstrate that a right is clearly established in one of three
ways: “(1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the
constitutional right . . . ; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution,
statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right . . . ; or (3) conduct
so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total
absence of case law.” Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288,
1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009). Mr. Lewis does not articulate which approach he claims
proves that the law was clearly established. (See Doc. 68 at 15–16). Mr. Lewis
has not cited, and the court has not located, case law with indistinguishable facts
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clearly establishing a constitutional right. In addition, Mr. Lewis has not argued
that Officer Johnson’s actions are so egregious that a constitutional right was
clearly violated in the absence of analogous case law.

Therefore, the court

examines broad principles in case law that provide relevant guidance. Under this
approach, “every objectively reasonable government official facing the
circumstances would know that the official’s conduct did violate federal law when
the official acted.” Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 979 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations
omitted).
To establish that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant[’s] deliberate
indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the
plaintiff’s injury.” Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 273–74 (11th Cir. 2013).
The inquiry is both objective and subjective. Id. at 274. First, a plaintiff must
show “an objectively serious medical need.” Id.

“[A] serious medical need is

considered one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).
In either case, “the medical need must be one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1243. Second, a plaintiff must show “that
the official acted with deliberate indifference, i.e., the official subjectively knew of
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and disregarded the risk of serious harm, and acted with more than mere
negligence. Gilmore, 738 F.3d at 274.
In addition, to prevail on a constitutional claim for “immediate or emergency
medical attention,” as Mr. Lewis has alleged here, the evidence must show
“medical needs that are obvious even to a layperson because they involve lifethreatening conditions or situations where it is apparent that delay would
detrimentally exacerbate the medical problem. In contrast, delay or even denial of
medical treatment for superficial, nonserious physical conditions does not
constitute” a constitutional violation. Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d
1176, 1187–88 (11th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730 (2002).
In the Eleventh Circuit, “[a]t a high level of generality, certain aspects of the
law have been established.” Youmans, 626 F.3d at 564. For example, both long
and short delays can constitute a constitutional violation, depending on the nature
of the injuries and the reason for the delay. See Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265,
1273–74 (11th Cir. 2005) (a fourteen-minute delay, when plaintiff was
unconscious and not breathing, is deliberate indifference), abrogated on other
grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015); Harris v. Coweta Cty.,
21 F.3d 388, 393–94 (11th Cir. 1994) (a several week delay in treating a painful
hand condition created a genuine issue of material fact about deliberate
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indifference). And delays of only a few hours for treatment for bleeding cuts can
establish deliberate indifference in certain situations. See Aldridge v. Montgomery,
753 F.2d 970, 972–73 (11th Cir.1985) (a two-and-one-half-hour delay in treating a
bleeding cut when the evidence showed “that the cut was at least one and a half
inches long, that it required six stitches, that there was blood on the floor and on
[plaintiff’s] coat and shirt,” and that officers waited “for a detective to tell them
what to do” was deliberate indifference).
However, other delays under different circumstances may be excusable. See
Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007) (a two hour delay in
providing stitches to a puncture wound after applying a temporary bandage to
allow officers time to book the plaintiff did not amount to deliberate indifference);
Hill, 40 F.3d at 1190–92 (four hour delay for stomach pain, vomiting blood, and a
dried blood “smear” in underwear while officers fed other inmates was not a
constitutional violation).
Applying these principles to the present case, the court finds that it was not
clearly established that in January 2016, a three and a half hour delay in treatment
for the injuries that Mr. Lewis suffered violated his constitutional rights. Based on
Aldridge, Officer Johnson would have been on notice that a two and a half hour
delay for cuts that bled continuously, that left a pool of blood on the floor, and that
required six stiches was a violation of constitutional rights. But this case is not
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Aldridge. There is no evidence that Mr. Lewis’s cuts bled continuously, and in
fact, his medical records indicating small amounts of dried blood around his
wounds suggest the opposite. And Mr. Lewis required no stitches.
In the light most favorable to Mr. Lewis, the evidence shows that after
Officer Johnson kicked the food trap on his arms, he declared a medical and
psychological emergency and requested treatment for cuts, bruises, and swelling,
which according to Mr. Lewis left him “bleeding like a stuck pig.” (Doc. 27 at 5;
see also Doc. 11 at 10). However, the evidence is undisputed that Mr. Lewis
suffered a one centimeter cut on one hand and abrasions to his knuckles on the
other. (Doc. 63-1 at 72). There is no evidence in the record about how long Mr.
Lewis’s hands bled after the initial injury or how much blood was present. But
when he saw the nurse just hours later, both hands showed only “small” or “scant”
amounts of dried blood. (Doc. 63-1 at 72). In addition, Mr. Lewis’s hands were
not swollen or bruised, and he had good range of motion. The nurse cleaned and
bandaged his hands and prescribed over the counter pain reliever. (Id.).
Under the circumstances of this case, the court cannot find that pre-existing
law put Officer Johnson on notice that a failure to immediately remove Mr. Lewis
from his cell for medical treatment for a one centimeter cut and small lacerations
that were accompanied by “small” or “scant” amounts of dried blood and that
required only bandaging and pain reliever violated a constitutional right. See
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Youmans, 626 F.3d at 566 (granting qualified immunity because it was not clearly
established in 2010 that a four hour delay in providing care for “several cuts and
abrasions” to an inmate’s “head, face, shoulder, elbow, and hand” accompanied by
“some visible blood” and diagnoses of multiple contusions violated the inmate’s
constitutional rights).
III.

CONCLUSION
The court GRANTS Officer Johnson’s motion for summary judgment.

(Doc. 60). The court WILL ENTER judgment as a matter of law in favor of
Officer Johnson and against Mr. Lewis on Mr. Lewis’s deliberate indifference
claim.
The court will enter a separate final judgment consistent with this
memorandum opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this June 18, 2020.

_________________________________
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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