Armstrong et al v. Boaz, City of et al

Filing 185

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Annemarie Carney Axon on 2/27/2019. (TLM, )

FILED
2019 Feb-27 PM 12:15
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION

ROBIN ZAK ARMSTRONG, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
QUENTIN SCOTT, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 4:16-cv-01065-ACA

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Robin Zak Armstrong and Timothy-Brian Armstrong, proceeding
pro se, filed this unlawful detention action after they were arrested at a driver’s
license checkpoint operated by the Boaz City Police Department. The Plaintiffs
allege that they were unlawfully detained after Boaz City Police Officers Quentin
Scott and Brandon Hester failed to bring them before a magistrate judge for a
probable cause determination immediately after their arrests. On July 24, 2017, the
court (Hopkins, J.) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the third-amended complaint. (Doc. 81 at 59–60). As a result of the
court’s ruling, the only remaining claims in this action are: (1) Mrs. Armstrong’s
unlawful detention claim against Officer Hester (Count VII) and (2) Mr.
Armstrong’s unlawful detention claim against Officer Scott (Count XII). (Id.).

This matter is currently before the court on the Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment. (Doc. 148; Doc. 149). The motions have been fully briefed
and the issues are ripe for review. (Doc. 150; Doc. 157; Doc. 160). For the
reasons explained below, the court WILL GRANT the Defendants’ motions.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Baas v. Fewless, 886 F.3d 1088, 1091
(11th Cir. 2018). Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal
interpretation by the courts, “a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden
under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as
to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment.” Brown v.
Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990).
II.

FACTS
The court previously set forth the procedural history of this action in its

memorandum opinion and order denying the Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend
their complaint.

(Doc. 168).

The court incorporates the procedural history

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contained in that opinion and provides the following summary necessary to address
the current motion.
On May 28, 2016, the Boaz Police Department operated a driver’s license
checkpoint at the intersection of County Road One and Double Bridges Road.
(Doc. 46 at 34). The purpose of the checkpoint was to target uninsured motorists
and unlicensed drivers. (Doc. 151-5 at 59). That afternoon, at approximately 3:08
p.m., a white Ford truck entered the checkpoint driven by Mr. Armstrong.
(Doc. 46 at 34; Doc. 151-2 at 6). Mrs. Armstrong accompanied Mr. Armstrong in
the front passenger seat. (Id.).
At the checkpoint, Officer Michael Hempel approached Mr. Armstrong’s
vehicle and asked for his driver’s license. (Doc. 46 at 34; Doc. 151-5 at 59). In
response, Mr. Armstrong explained that he did not need a driver’s license because
“he was a man [acting] in his private capacity and that he was not using the public
roads for any commercial activity.” (Doc. 46 at 11, 34). Officer Hempel activated
his body cam and proceeded to ask Mr. Armstrong for other identifying
information including his name, social security number, and date of birth. (Id. at
34). Mr. Armstrong provided only his first and last name. (Id.).
Officer Hempel went to his patrol car to run this information, but was unable
to determine whether Mr. Armstrong held a valid driver’s license. (Id.). Officer
Hempel then returned to Mr. Armstrong’s vehicle accompanied by Officer Quentin
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Scott and advised Mr. Armstrong that he was required to have a driver’s license
while operating a motor vehicle on the public roadways. (Doc. 46 at 15, 34). At
this point, Mrs. Armstrong began to record the officers with a video camera and
stated “that sounds like a threat.” (Id. at 34).
Officer Hempel told Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong that he was “not there to play
games” and ordered Mr. Armstrong to exit the vehicle. (Id.). Mr. Armstrong
refused to follow Officer Hempel’s orders and asked permission to reach for his
wallet. (Id.). Out of concern for his safety, Officer Hempel explained that he
“would rather [Mr. Armstrong] not reach for anything” and asked him to exit the
vehicle a second time. (Doc. 46 at 34). Mr. Armstrong again refused to vacate the
vehicle, telling Officer Hempel to “hold on a second.” (Id.). Officer Hempel
opened the driver’s side door, unfastened Mr. Armstrong’s seatbelt, and removed
him from the vehicle. (Id.). Once Mr. Armstrong was outside of the vehicle,
Officer Hempel placed him under arrest for obstructing a government operation.
(Id.). Officer Scott escorted Mr. Armstrong to the backseat of his police cruiser.
(Doc. 46 at 34–35).
After Mr. Armstrong was taken into custody, Officer Hempel directed his
attention to Mrs. Armstrong. (Id. at 35). Officer Hempel explained that Mrs.
Armstrong could leave with the vehicle if she presented a valid driver’s license.
(Id.). Mrs. Armstrong refused to provide Officer Hempel with her license and
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continued to film the officers with her video camera. (Id.). Without another driver
available to remove the vehicle, Officer Hempel called for a tow truck and told
Mrs. Armstrong that the vehicle would be impounded. (Doc. 46 at 35). When
Officer Hempel opened the driver’s side door to retrieve the keys, Mrs. Armstrong
pushed his hand away from the ignition and claimed “it was her private property.”
(Id.). Officer Hempel directed Mrs. Armstrong to step out of the vehicle and
placed her under arrest for obstructing a government operation. (Id.).
Officer Scott drove the Armstrongs to the Boaz City Jail. (Doc. 151-6 at
11). On the way, Mr. Armstrong asked Officer Scott to bring him directly before a
magistrate judge for a probable cause hearing. (Doc. 46 at 16; Doc. 151-8 at 10,
26). Officer Scott informed Mr. Armstrong that the magistrate’s office was closed
for the holiday weekend and estimated it could take seventy-two hours to fulfill his
request. (Doc. 151-5 at 36–37; Doc. 151-8 at 10, 26; Doc. 46 at 31).
When the Armstrongs arrived at the jail, they were directed to Officer
Brandon Hester for booking.

(Doc. 151-5 at 22).

Officer Hester began the

administrative booking and intake procedures with Mrs. Armstrong at 4:28 p.m.
(Doc. 151-2 at 15). Mrs. Armstrong requested that Officer Hester take her before a
magistrate judge, but was also told it could take up to seventy-two hours to go
before the magistrate judge because of the holiday weekend. (Doc. 46 at 13, 24–
25). Unsatisfied with this response, Mrs. Armstrong refused to cooperate in the
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booking process. (Id. at 13, 35; Doc. 151-1 at 3). As a result, Officer Hester
placed Mrs. Armstrong in a holding cell and informed her that she would not be
released from custody until she “answered [his] questions and provided
fingerprints and photographs.” (Doc. 46 at 39). Less than one hour later, Mrs.
Armstrong agreed to comply with Officer Hester and completed all of the
necessary booking procedures. (Id.).
While Mrs. Armstrong was confined in the holding cell, Officer Hester
turned his attention to Mr. Armstrong. (Doc. 151-2 at 21). Officer Hester began
processing Mr. Armstrong’s booking information at 5:50 p.m.

(Id.).

Mr.

Armstrong answered Officer Hester’s screening questions, and allowed the officers
to obtain his photograph and fingerprints. (Doc. 151-1 at 3). By 6:42 p.m., Mr.
and Mrs. Armstrong completed all necessary booking procedures and were
released from the Boaz City Jail after posting a $500 surety bond. (Doc. 151-1 at
3, 6, 8; Doc. 151-2 at 15, 21; Doc. 151-3 at 6–8).
III.

DISCUSSION
Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong claim that the Defendants violated their right to be

brought directly before a magistrate judge, as required under Alabama law. They
also allege the officers’ threat that a probable-cause hearing would not be held for
seventy-two hours following their arrests constitutes a violation of their rights
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants argue
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they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these remaining claims because
the Plaintiffs are unable to establish that Officers Scott and Hesters’ conduct
amounted to a violation of either their constitutional rights or federal law as
required under § 1983. Additionally, the Defendants argue they are entitled to
qualified immunity because the law does not clearly establish the right to be free
from the threat of a prolonged detention. The court will address each of the
Plaintiffs’ claims in turn.
A. Claims under § 1983 for violation of state law
Plaintiffs allege that Officers Scott and Hester were required to bring them
before a magistrate judge for a probable cause determination immediately after
their arrests. To establish a cause of action under 42 U.S.C § 1983, Mr. and Mrs.
Armstrong must show: (1) that Officers Scott and Hester deprived them of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) acted under
the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In support of their
claim, the Armstrongs allege that the officers violated Ala. Code §§ 32-1-4 and 325-310 by “failing to . . . secure a probable cause hearing for [Plaintiffs], despite the
fact that the law states that any arrestee must be immediately taken to the nearest
court having jurisdiction.” (Doc. 157 at 3–4). However, because this claim is
predicated on state law as opposed to an alleged violation of a federal right, it
necessarily fails to state a claim under § 1983.
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The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “[s]ection 1983 does not create a
remedy for every wrong committed under the color of state law, but only for those
that deprive a plaintiff of a federal right.” Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272,
1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698–99 (1976)). And,
there is no federal right to be brought immediately before a magistrate judge for a
probable cause determination. Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57
(1991) (“[w]here an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause
determination within 48 hours . . . the burden shifts to the government to
demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary
circumstance.”). Therefore, while a violation of Ala. Code §§ 32-1-4 and 32-5-310
may give rise to a state tort claim, it does not support a claim under § 1983.
In the absence of a deprivation of a federal right, the court WILL GRANT
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on Mr. and Mrs. Armstrongs’ §
1983 unlawful detention claims.
B. Claims under § 1983 for a Fourth Amendment violation
Plaintiffs also contend that Officers Scott and Hester violated their Fourth
Amendment rights by failing to bring them directly before a magistrate judge for a
probable cause determination. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary
judgment on the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment wrongful detention claims because
Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong were in custody for less than forty-eight hours.
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It is well established that “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty
following arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). The Eleventh
Circuit has held that “[d]etention of a suspect beyond forty-eight hours without a
determination of probable cause violates an individual’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment, and if the determination is made within forty-eight hours of arrest,
the complaint must prove that his determination was unreasonably delayed.” Case
v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
at 56). Therefore, Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong must prove that their short detention
was unreasonably delayed.
In this case, Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong were arrested at 3:08 p.m. for
obstructing a government operation, began the booking process at the Boaz City
Jail ninety minutes later, and were released from jail after posting bond at 6:42
p.m. (Doc. 151-2 at 15–19, 21–25). The three and a half hours they spent in
custody is well within the forty-eight hour requirement. The Armstrongs have not
shown the existence of any facts or made any arguments that their detention was
unreasonably delayed during the three and a half hours they were in custody. In
fact, the only evidence suggesting any delay in the booking process was caused by
Mrs. Armstrong, not Officers Scott and Hester. Under the facts of this case,
Officers Hester and Scott are entitled to summary judgment because there is no
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constitutional requirement that the police “provide a probable cause hearing
immediately upon taking [Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong] into custody and completing
booking procedures,” and the Armstrongs have failed to otherwise demonstrate
that their time in custody was unreasonably delayed. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53–
54; see also Eslinger, 555 F.3d at 1330.
Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT summary judgment for Defendants
on the Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment wrongful detention claims.
C. Threat to commit a Fourth Amendment violation
Plaintiffs also claim that Officers Scott and Hester violated their Fourth
Amendment rights by threatening to hold them in jail for up to seventy-two hours
without a judicial probable cause determination.

Officers Scott and Hester

maintain that, even if they committed a constitutional violation by threatening to
violate the Armstrongs’ constitutional rights, they are qualifiedly immune from
suit.
Officers Hester and Scott argue they are entitled to qualified immunity
because the alleged right to be free from threats of a possible constitutional
violation was not clearly established at the time Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong were
arrested. “Qualified immunity offers complete protection for individual public
officials performing discretionary functions ‘insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
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person would have known.’” Sherrod v. Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir.
2012) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In this case, it is
undisputed that Officers Hester and Scott were acting within the scope of their
discretionary authority when they informed the Armstrongs that a magistrate may
be unavailable for seventy-two hours. Consequently, the burden shifts to the
Armstrongs to establish that Officers Scott and Hester violated their constitutional
rights and that the rights involved were “clearly established” at the time of the
putative conduct. Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2012). In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court is permitted to decide which of
these two prongs should be addressed first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009).
Because the Armstrongs’ “complaint is one ‘in which it is plain that a
constitutional right [was] not clearly established,’ the court’s analysis begins and
ends with the second inquiry of the test for qualified immunity. Loftus v. ClarkMoore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237).
The determination of whether a federal right is clearly established is case specific;
the question is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable [state official] that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Loftus, 690 F.3d at 1204
(citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002)).

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In order for the Armstrongs to show that the constitutional violation was
clearly established, they must demonstrate: (1) “that a materially similar case has
already been decided, giving notice to the police;” (2) “that a broader, clearly
established principle should control the novel facts in this situation;” or (3) “this
case fits within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates [the]
constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d
1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005)). Additionally, the Armstrongs “must point to law as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Supreme Court of
[Alabama]” to show that the constitutional violation was clearly established.
Keating, 598 F.3d at 766. If the Armstrongs cannot demonstrate that the right was
clearly established using any of these three ways, then the officers are entitled to
qualified immunity.
The Armstrongs fail to present, and the court has not been able to find, any
binding precedent—or broad principle—establishing that the mere threat of a
constitutional violation is in itself a constitutional violation. And, the Armstrongs
do not argue that Officer Hester and Scotts’ conduct obviously violated the
Constitution.

Accordingly, because the Armstrongs have failed to prove that

Officer Hester and Scotts’ verbal threats violated a well-established federal right,
the court WILL GRANT summary judgment for Defendants on this claim.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court WILL GRANT the Defendants’

motions for summary judgment and WILL enter judgment as a matter of law. The
court will enter a separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this February 27, 2019.

_________________________________
ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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