Wise v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge Staci G Cornelius on 3/30/18. (MRR, )

FILED
2018 Mar-30 PM 12:05
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
KATHERINE ASHLYNNE WISE,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
COMMISSIONER,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 4:17-cv-00185-SGC

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Katherine Ashlynne Wise appeals from the decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying
her application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). (Doc. 1). Plaintiff
timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the
Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). For
the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
I.

FACTS, FRAMEWORK, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff was seventeen years old at the time she filed her SSI application;

she was twenty at the time of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ's") decision.
(See R. 52-53). Plaintiff has a high school education and speaks English; she has
1

The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
(Doc. 10).

no work experience. (R. 52).

A previous application for SSI benefits was

adjudicated in Plaintiff's favor when she was a child; she was awarded benefits
until she turned eighteen. (R. 36). Plaintiff filed the instant application on June
26, 2013, alleging a disability onset of August 1, 2007, due to rheumatoid arthritis
and lupus. (Id.; R. 222).
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The
first step requires a determination whether the claimant is performing substantial
gainful activity ("SGA").

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).

If the claimant is

engaged in SGA, he or she is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the
claimant is not engaged in SGA, the Commissioner proceeds to consider the
combined effects of all the claimant's physical and mental impairments. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and
must meet durational requirements before a claimant will be found disabled. Id.
The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch,
440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant's impairments are not severe,
the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise,
the analysis continues to step three, at which the Commissioner determines
whether the claimant's impairments meet the severity of an impairment listed in 20
2

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairments fall within this category, the claimant will be
found disabled without further consideration. Id. If the impairments do not fall
within the listings, the Commissioner determines the claimant's residual functional
capacity ("RFC"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
At step four the Commissioner determines whether the impairments prevent
the claimant from returning to past relevant work.

20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing
past relevant work, he or she is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the
claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step,
at which the Commissioner considers the claimant's RFC, as well as the claimant's
age, education, and past work experience, to determine whether he or she can
perform other work. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the
claimant can do other work, he or she is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not
engaged in SGA since her application date. (R. 38). At step two, the ALJ found
Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: rheumatoid arthritis;
undifferentiated connective tissue disease; Raynaud's Syndrome, and lupus. (R.
38-39).

3

At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments meeting or medically equaling any of the listed
impairments. (R. 39-41). Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined
Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b)
with the following limitations:
[T]he claimant can sit at least two hours without interruption and a
total of at least six hours over the course of an eight-hour workday.
The claimant can stand and/or walk at least two hours without
interruption and a total of at least six hours over the course of an
eight-hour workday. The claimant cannot climb ropes, poles,
scaffolds or ladders. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and
stairs. The claimant can frequently use her upper extremities for
reaching overhead, pushing, pulling, handling and fingering. The
claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel and crouch. The
claimant cannot crawl. The claimant can occasionally work in
humidity, wetness, and extreme temperatures. The claimant can
occasionally work in dusts, gases, odors and fumes. The claimant
cannot work in poorly ventilated areas. The claimant cannot work at
unprotected heights. The claimant cannot work with operating
hazardous machinery. The claimant can occasionally work while
exposed to vibration. The claimant can occasionally operate
motorized vehicles. The claimant can respond appropriately to the
public; however, the claimant is limited to work activity that does not
require interaction with the public (due to fear of possible infection
and not mental impairment).
(R. 41).
At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (R.
52). Because the Plaintiff's RFC did not allow for the full range of light work, the
ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") in finding a significant

4

number of jobs in the national economy Plaintiff can perform. (R. 52-53). The
ALJ concluded by finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 53).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a

narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App'x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). A court gives
deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are
supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal
conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless, a court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210
(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir.
2004)). "The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers
to act with considerable latitude, and 'the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding
from being supported by substantial evidence.'" Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177,
1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar.
5

Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if a court finds that the proof
preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, it must affirm if the decision is
supported by substantial evidence.

Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin v.

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
No decision is automatic, for "despite th[e] deferential standard [for review
of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its entirety to
determine the reasonableness of the decision reached." Bridges v. Bowen, 815
F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th
Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is grounds for
reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the Commissioner's decision should be reversed and

remanded because the ALJ did not afford substantial weight to the February 2,
2015 opinion of Dr. David McLain, Plaintiff's long-time treating rheumatologist.
(Doc. 11 at 3-9). Plaintiff notes Dr. McLain is a specialist who consistently treated
Plaintiff since 2007. (Id. at 5). The opinion on which Plaintiff relies is a Physical
Capacities Evaluation form completed by Dr. McLain. On that form, Dr. McLain
opined Plaintiff: (1) could occasionally lift five pounds and frequently lift one
pound; (2) could sit for four hours and stand or walk for two hours during an eighthour workday; (3) would need to lie down for twenty minutes at a time during the
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day; (4) would need to take ten minute breaks every hour, in addition to typical
morning, afternoon, and lunch breaks; (5) should avoid exposure to dust, fumes,
gasses, extreme temperatures, humidity, and environmental pollutants; (6) could
rarely—meaning up to 5% of an eight-hour workday—operate motor vehicles; (7)
could never push or pull using arm and/or leg controls, climb stairs or ladders,
balance, perform gross or fine manipulation, bend, stoop, reach, or work around
hazardous machinery; and (8) would be absent more than four days each month.
(R. 563). Dr. McLain based his opinion of Plaintiff's restrictions on her "severe
rheumatoid arthritis, lupus, and severe joint swelling and pain." (Id.).2
The opinion of a claimant's treating physician is entitled to substantial or
considerable weight absent a showing of good cause to the contrary. Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). Failure to articulate the reasons
for giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician is reversible error. Id.
Good cause exists where a treating physician's opinion: (1) is not supported by the
evidence; (2) is contradicted by the evidence; or (3) is conclusory or inconsistent

2

The record includes additional letters written by Dr. McLain, which the ALJ addressed. (R. 4950). First, Dr. McLain wrote several letters between 2008 and 2012, opining that Plaintiff should
receive home schooling. (R. 530-33). The ALJ noted these letters covered a timeframe when
Plaintiff was found to be disabled as a child and further noted Plaintiff successfully returned to
school by 2013. (R. 49). The ALJ also addressed two opinions from Dr. McLain submitted in
June and September 2014. (R. 49-50). Both opinions note Plaintiff's diagnoses and medications,
state Plaintiff's response to medication was not as positive as hoped, and summarily opine
Plaintiff was "totally disabled from any employment." (R. 477-78). The ALJ properly found Dr.
McLain's 2014 opinions were unsupported by objective findings and opined on an issue reserved
to the Commissioner. See SSR 96-5p.
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with the doctor's own medical records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41. While the
ALJ can "reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a
contrary conclusion . . . the ALJ is required [] to state with particularity the weight
he gives to different medical opinions and the reasons why."

McCloud v.

Barnhart, 166 F. App'x 410, 418-19 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Bloodsworth v.
Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983); Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278,
279 (11th Cir. 1987)). Furthermore, the ALJ must explain why an opinion is
inconsistent with the medical record; he or she cannot simply make a conclusory
pronouncement that the opinion is inconsistent with evidence of record. See Bell v.
Colvin, No. 15-0743, 2016 WL 6609187 at *4 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2016). While
opinions from one-time examiners are not entitled to any particular deference, they
can—when consistent with the medical record—be used to discount inconsistent
opinions from treating physicians. See McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619
(11th Cir. 1987); Fries v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 196 F. App'x 827, 833-34
(11th Cir. 2006).
The ALJ afforded "some but not great weight to" Dr. McLain's opinion. (R.
50). The ALJ offered several justifications for affording Dr. McLain's opinion less
than substantial weigh. First, the ALJ noted the opinion was "not fully consistent
with the objective findings described in Dr. McLain's most recent examination in
September 2014." (Id.). While crediting Dr. McLain's specialty and his long
8

treating relationship with Plaintiff, the ALJ concluded his opinion was based on
Plaintiff's subjective complaints relating to "flare-ups rather than objective
evidence describing the most she could do." (Id.). In this regard, the ALJ noted
Dr. McLain's opinion conflicted with the consultative examination findings of Dr.
Hisham Hakim and the clinical findings of Dr. Steven Jones. (Id.). Finally, the
ALJ also noted Dr. McLain's opinion conflicted with Plaintiff's reports of daily
activities, including that she could drive and had been able to return to school.
(Id.). Each rationale the ALJ articulated to justify affording less weight to Dr.
McLain's opinion is addressed in turn.
First, the ALJ relied on inconsistencies between the extreme limitations
described in Dr. McLain's opinion and his findings during his previous
examination of Plaintiff. (R. 50). Specifically, the ALJ noted that Dr. McLain's
September 29, 2014 examination revealed "'normal' findings in most areas except
for those related to her joints." (R. 50). Dr. McLain's clinical notes reveal Plaintiff
had tenderness in 34 joints and swelling in 20 joints, mostly in her hands and feet.
(R. 567). While Plaintiff complained of "incapacitating" pain, Dr. McLain noted
her overall appearance and level of distress were "normal." (R. 564, 567). Dr.
McLain also noted Plaintiff's: (1) cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine were
"normal"; (2) neck, respiratory, and cardiovascular exams were "normal"; (3)
musculoskeletal exam revealed good alignment in the spine with no scoliosis,
9

tenderness, or deformity; (4) shoulders and elbows demonstrated "no tenderness,
swelling, effusion, or limitation to range of motion"; and (5) balance and gait were
"normal." (R. 567-68). The ALJ accurately described the foregoing findings from
Dr. McLain's September 29, 2014 examination. (R. 46, 50).
There is also support for the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. McLain's opinion was
based on Plaintiff's subjective complaints during "flare-ups" of her symptoms. Dr.
McLain's clinical notes from an August 26, 2013 visit noted joint pain and/or
swelling in Plaintiff's lumbar spine, shoulders, elbows, wrists, hands, right hip,
knees, and right foot. (R. 428). At other times, Plaintiff's hands, feet, shoulders,
and ankles were positive for joint pain. (R.491, 498, 505, 513). But Dr. McLain
consistently noted Plaintiff's thoracic spine, cervical spine, and reflexes were
normal, that she exhibited no motor sensory deficits, and that she appeared well
nourished and well developed. (R. 428, 498, 505, 512). Crucially, the ALJ noted
that, from October 2013 through March 2014, Dr. McLain found Plaintiff was in
"no acute distress." (R. 490, 497, 504, 512; see R. 46). From January through
March 2014, Dr. McLain's physical exams revealed joint pain or tenderness, but
swelling was limited to the right knee. (R. 498, 505, 512). Accordingly, there is
support in the record for the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. McLain's opinion was based
on Plaintiff's complaints during flare-ups of her conditions rather than objective
observations.
10

The ALJ's treatment of Dr. McLain's opinion is also supported by other
evidence in the record. The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff's various diagnoses,
complaints, and medical treatments. (R. 44-46).3 However, the ALJ found the
medical record contained contradictory information concerning the severity of
Plaintiff's conditions. For instance, in November 2013, Plaintiff visited Children's
Hospital of Alabama for "horrible" back pain. (R. 338-45). While medical staff
noted tenderness in Plaintiff's lower back, physical examination and x-rays
revealed no abnormalities. Plaintiff was treated with Lortab and discharged in an
"improved" condition. (Id.; see R. 44). Plaintiff returned nearly four months later
complaining of difficulty breathing; medical providers noted Plaintiff was in mild
distress.

(R. 310-37).

However, while physical examination revealed joint

tenderness, swelling, and poor distal perfusion, her pulmonary exam revealed no
acute distress and imaging showed no acute abnormalities. (R. 312, 325, 328-37;
see R. 44-45). Plaintiff was diagnosed with trouble breathing, joint pain, and
shortness of breath, and released in "stable" condition. (Id.).
The ALJ also noted the limitations imposed by Dr. McLain's opinion
conflicted with the results of the consultative examination performed by Dr.
3

The ALJ noted Plaintiff's diagnoses included: (1) lupus; (2) rheumatoid arthritis; (3) diffuse
connective tissue disease; (4) hypothyroidism; (5) Raynaud's syndrome with ulcers and scars; (6)
diarrhea; (7) joint pain in the pelvic region, right hip, and lower leg; (8) vitamin D deficiency; (9)
mixed connective tissue disease; (10) polymyositis; (11) fibromyalgia; (12) right bundle branch
block; (13) myalgia and myositis; and (14) finger blisters. (R. 46).
11

Hakim. (R. 50). Dr. Hakim examined Plaintiff on September 15, 2014, noting the
symptoms of which she complained. (R. 535-43).4 As to muscle strength and
tone, Dr. Hakim's physical examination revealed: (1) "adequate" flexion,
extension, and range of motion in Plaintiff's neck with tenderness in the trapezius
muscles, worse on the right; (2) tenderness in the occipital nerve worse on the
right; (3) a 20% decrease in lateral rotation; (4) normal cardiovascular findings; (5)
"normal" muscle tone; (6) adequate strength in the upper extremities, including
"5/5 in the biceps, triceps, and brachkradialis;" (7) "adequate" strength in the lower
extremities; and (8) hand grip strength of 10 kg on the right and 7 kg on the left.
(R. 535). Dr. Hakim's musculoskeletal examination revealed Plaintiff: (1) had a
steady gait; (2) could squat ten times normally; (3) could balance and walk on her
heels and toes without difficulty; (4) could bend forward normally, although she
had to bend her knees; (5) demonstrated a negative straight leg raise bilaterally; (6)
had full range of motion in her wrist with discomfort, but no erythema; (7) had
erythema in her fingers and toes; (8) could "hop on both legs individually and
together;" and (9) had normal sensation to pinpricks in her upper and lower
extremities. (Id.). Dr. Hakim's impression was that Plaintiff had experienced a

4

Plaintiff contends "Dr. Hakim failed to acknowledge the diagnoses of rheumatoid arthritis and
undifferentiated connective tissue disease." (Doc. 11 at 4). However, Dr. Hakim's evaluation
includes a diagnosis of lupus, notes elevated rheumatoid factors, and acknowledges Plaintiff
suffered from arthritis. (R. 535-36). Additionally, Plaintiff does not argue any particular legal
consequences would follow Dr. Hakim's alleged failure to note all of her diagnoses.
12

"recent flare up" of her Lupus, which appeared "to be in somewhat of an
intermission stage." (Id.).
Based on the results of his examination, Dr. Hakim completed a form
regarding his opinion of Plaintiff's ability to perform work-related activities. (R.
538-42). Dr. Hakim opined Plaintiff could: (1) frequently lift and carry up to 10
pounds; (2) occasionally lift and carry up to 20 pounds; (3) never lift or carry more
than 20 pounds. (R. 538). As to the ability to sit, stand, and walk, Dr. Hakim
opined Plaintiff could: (1) sit continuously for two hours and for a total of five
hours per workday; (2) stand continuously for one hour and for a total of two hours
per workday; (3) walk continuously for two hours and for a total of three hours per
workday; and (4) walk without the use of a cane. (R. 539). As to use of her hands
and feet, Dr. Hakim opined Plaintiff could: (1) continuously reach, handle, finger,
and feel with both hands; (2) frequently push and/or pull with both hands; and (3)
frequently use foot controls with either foot.

(Doc. 540).

As to postural

limitations, Dr. Hakim opined Plaintiff could: (1) frequently balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl; (2) occasionally climb stairs and ramps; and (3) never climb
ladders or scaffolds. (R. 541). As to environmental limitations, Dr. Hakim opined
Plaintiff could tolerate: (1) frequent exposure to driving, dust, odors, fumes,
pulmonary irritants, extreme cold, extreme heat, and vibrations; (2) occasional

13

exposure to moving mechanical parts, humidity, and wetness; (3) no exposure to
unprotected heights; and (4) exposure to moderate noise levels. (R. 542).
The ALJ afforded Dr. Hakim's opinion "significant, but not great weight."
(R. 51). In doing so, the ALJ found Dr. Hakim's opinion was consistent with his
examination findings. (Id.). While noting Dr. Hakim's opinion was not entirely
consistent with Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ found it "support[ed] the ultimate decision
reached and [] is not inconsistent with the objective findings." (Id.). The ALJ also
noted Dr. Hakim's observations and opinion contradicted the more significant
limitations expressed in Dr. McClain's opinion. (R. 50). In particular, the ALJ
observed Dr. McLain's conclusion that Plaintiff could never squat was contradicted
by Plaintiff's ability to squat ten times during Dr. Hakim's consultative
examination. (Id.). Likewise, the ALJ noted Dr. McLain's opinion that Plaintiff
could never bend forward was undermined by Plaintiff's ability to bend normally—
albeit with bent knees—during Dr. Hakim's consultative examination. (Id.).5
Next, the ALJ found Dr. McLain's opinion was contradicted by the August
1, 2014 examination findings of Dr. Jones. (R. 50). While noting Plaintiff's
multiple diagnoses, Dr. Jones observed Plaintiff was in no acute distress. (R. 553).
5

The ALJ also afforded significant weight to the August 28, 2013 opinion of the State agency
physician, Dr. Richard Whitney. (R. 51). Dr. Whitney did not examine Plaintiff, but he
reviewed the medical records available at the time and opined she could perform a limited range
of light work activities. (R. 103-05). While noting Dr. Whitney did not have access to the full
medical record, and finding his opinion was not entirely consistent with Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ
found Dr. Whitney's opinion "support[ed] the ultimate decision" and added credence to Dr.
Hakim's opinion. (R. 51).
14

Dr. Jones, who saw Plaintiff following her reports of heart palpitations, concluded
her chest and neck exams were unremarkable and the pulmonary exam revealed
unlabored, clear respiration. (Id.). Dr. Jones advised Plaintiff to quit smoking. (R.
554). The ALJ correctly noted these examination findings did not support Dr.
McLain's opinion.
The ALJ also noted Dr. McLain's opinion was undermined by Plaintiff's
self-reported activities of daily living. (R. 50). The ALJ noted Plaintiff reported
the ability to: (1) maintain some personal care; (2) drive; (3) shop for clothes in
stores; (4) handle her finances; (5) watch television; (6) attend church services; (7)
prepare microwave meals and cereal; (8) do laundry; (9) load the dishwasher; and
(10) travel outside the home several times a week to visit family members. (R.
237-40, 249, 256-57; see R. 42-44). The ALJ noted Plaintiff's testimony that she
needs assistance with her daily activities. (R. 44). Plaintiff further testified she is
able to drive and she spends a typical day watching television and helping her
mother with housework. (R. 74, 77). Plaintiff tries to attend church on a regular
basis but typically misses Sunday services once a month. (R. 77). Plaintiff's
friends typically visit her; she usually does not travel to friends' houses. (Id.).
As previously noted, there is good cause to discount the opinion of a
claimant's treating physician where the opinion: (1) is not supported by the
evidence; (2) is contradicted by the evidence; or (3) is conclusory or inconsistent
15

with the doctor's own medical records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41. Here, the
ALJ's conclusion that Dr. McLain's opinion was undermined by his previous
examination findings is supported by substantial evidence. Likewise, the ALJ did
not err by concluding the extreme limitations posited by Dr. McClain were the
product of Plaintiff's subjective complaints concerning the severity of her
symptoms during flare-ups. The ALJ also did not err in concluding Dr. McLain's
opinion was inconsistent with, and undermined by, Dr. Hakim's opinion,
particularly where the ALJ found Dr. Hakim's opinion was consistent with his
examination findings and the record as a whole.

Fries, 196 F. App'x at 833-34;

Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005-06 (11th Cir. 1986) (ALJ did not err in
discounting treating physician's opinion that was contradicted by consultative
examiner's opinion). The same is true to the extent the ALJ found contradictions
between Dr. McLain's opinion and the clinical findings of Dr. Jones. Finally, the
ALJ did not err in concluding Plaintiff's daily activities contradicted the extreme
limitations imposed by Dr. McLain. While not dispositive, a claimant's activities
may be considered to show limitations are not as severe as alleged. 20 C.F.R. §
416.929(c)(3)(i); Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1212; Hughes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. 486 F.
App'x 11, 14 (11th Cir. 2012) (claimant's self-reported activities undermined
treating physician's opinion regarding ability to function).

16

In discounting Dr. McLain's opinion regarding Plaintiff's abilities, the ALJ
noted internal inconsistencies with Dr. McLain's treatment record and other
medical records, contradiction with Dr. Hakim's opinion—an opinion consistent
with Dr. Hakim's and Dr. Jones's examination findings—and inconsistencies with
Plaintiff's self-reported abilities. Taken together, these factors represent substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ's decision. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in
affording less than substantial weight to Dr. McLain's opinion.
The foregoing contradictions noted by the ALJ also provide substantial
evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's testimony regarding the
severity of her symptoms was not entirely credible. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (ALJ permitted to discredit subjective testimony of
pain if he or she articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so); (see R. 46).
When the credibility of a claimant's testimony is at issue, "[t]he question is not . . .
whether the ALJ could have reasonably credited testimony, but whether the ALJ
was clearly wrong to discredit it." Werner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App'x
935, 938-39 (11th Cir. 2011).
IV.

CONCLUSION
Upon review of the administrative record and considering all of Plaintiff's

arguments, the undersigned finds the Commissioner's decision is supported by

17

substantial evidence and is in accord with applicable law.

Accordingly, the

Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed. A separate order will be entered.
DONE this 30th day of March, 2018.

______________________________
STACI G. CORNELIUS
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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