Watkins v. Goodyear Pension Plan
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 4/26/2018. (JLC)
FILED
2018 Apr-26 PM 02:30
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
LOYD WATKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOODYEAR PENSION PLAN,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
) Case No.: 4:17-CV-461-VEH
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
INTRODUCTION
This case arises from an ERISA dispute over the terms of a pension plan (the
“Plan”). Before the Court is Defendant Goodyear Pension Plan’s (“Goodyear”)
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (the “Motion”). (Doc. 13). Plaintiff Loyd
Watkins (“Watkins”) responded to the Motion. (Doc. 16). Goodyear replied. (Doc.
24). Accordingly, this Motion is ripe for review.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
The Plan is a "pension plan" as that term is defined in ERISA. 29 U.S.C.
§1002(2)(A). The Plan expressly designates the "Pension Board" to administer the
Plan:
The administration of the Plan shall be by a Pension Board of five
officers and/or employees of the Company, at least three of whom shall
be officers. Members of the Pension Board shall be responsible to the
Board of Directors of the Company. The Pension Board shall have the
authority to elect its own chairman and secretary and to appoint an
administrator of the Plan to whom the powers of the Pension Board may
be specifically delegated. The Pension Board may adopt by-laws and
regulations for the administration of the Plan not inconsistent therewith.
Any act or decision of the Pension Board shall require the concurrence
of a majority of its members.
(Stipulated Administrative Record (“SAR”) (Doc. 10) at 34).2 The Plan vests the
Pension Board with discretionary power over every facet of Plan administration:
1
The facts set out herein are gleaned, in substantial part, from the facts proffered by the
parties. To the extent that a party has proffered a fact which is not disputed, it has been included
without citation. To the extent that a fact proffered by a party was disputed by another party, the
Court first examined the proffered fact to determine whether the evidence cited in support of that
fact actually supported the fact as stated. If it did not, the fact was not included. If it did, the
Court then looked to whether the evidence cited in support of the dispute actually established a
dispute. If it did not, the Court presented the fact, with citation to the evidence supporting the fact
as proffered. If the cited evidence was disputed by contrary evidence, the evidence was viewed,
as this Court must, in the light most favorable to the non-movant, with citation to such
supporting evidence. If more explanation was needed, the Court included that information in an
appropriate footnote. Some facts proffered by the parties, which the Court deemed irrelevant
and/or immaterial, may have been omitted. Further, as necessary, the Court may have included
additional facts cast in the light most favorable to the non-movant.
2
The Court uses the Bates style numbering at the bottom, right-hand side of the pages in
the SAR. Otherwise, the Court uses the page numbering supplied by CM/ECF.
2
The Pension Board shall have all such power and authority as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Plan, including discretionary
power and authority to interpret and construe the Plan and to resolve
any disputes arising thereunder subject to the provisions of Paragraph
8 and 9 of this Article II and the power and authority expressly
conferred upon it herein. The Pension Board shall have authority to
grant such pensions or other benefits as are provided under the Plan and
to take such further action as it shall deem advisable in the
administration of the Plan in accordance with its terms.
(SAR at 34)(emphasis added). The Pension Board and the ERISA Appeals Committee
("EAC") are one and the same body and are interchangeable. (Affidavit of Shawn
Breon “Breon Aff.” at p. 2, ¶3 (Exhibit 1 of Evidentiary Submission)). Other than the
name, there is no distinction between the EAC and the Pension Board. (Exh. 1 at p.
2, ¶¶3-5). They are not different bodies and do not act independently of one another.
(Exh. 1 at p. 2, ¶4). The Plan's administrative review process consists of two levels:
the first level of review is conducted by the "Benefits Review Committee" with the
second and final level of review conducted by the EAC/Pension Board. (SAR at 910 & 26-28; Exh. 1 at p. 2, ¶¶5-6).
Loyd Watkins, age 86, is a 33 year employee of Goodyear who retired on June
18, 1991. (Doc. 16 at 1 ¶1); (Doc. 24 at 2 ¶1). At the time of his retirement and
commencement of pension benefit, Watkins was married to First Wife (Inez
Watkins). (SAR at 3-5). Watkins and First Wife signed the “1950 Pension
Plan--Notice to Pension Board of Election of Optional Method of Pension Payment”
3
(“Election Form”) on June 19, 1991. (Id. at 4-5). The Watkins’ signatures on the
Election Form were witnessed by a Goodyear representative, Bettie R. Williams. (Id.
at 5).3 The Election Form sets out five options (i.e., Options A, B, and C, Special 50%
Joint and Survivor Option, and No Option) for the retiree and spouse to consider. (Id.
at 4-5). The chosen option is identified by checking the box that appears next to that
option on the form. (Id.). On Watkins’ Election Form, the box next to “Option B
(50%)” was checked on the first page of the form. (Id. at 4). No other box was
checked on the form. (Id. at 4-5).
Option B is the 50% joint and survivor option, which provides a benefit for the
retiree’s surviving spouse described in part as follows:
(2) After the first 60 monthly pension payments have been made, a
reduced monthly pension shall be payable to me [i.e., the retiree] for
life.
(3) After my death, (but only if my death occurs after the Option
becomes effective) my spouse, as Contingent Annuitant, shall receive
monthly payments in an amount equal to one-half of such reduced
amount as would have been paid to me had I been then living, with such
payment to continue during the lifetime of my spouse.
(Id. at 4). In the Election Notice at Option B, Watkins designated First Wife as
“my spouse”. (Id.).
3
Watkins argues that “[t]he Plan representative suppressed the Plan provision” at issue,
but does not cite to the record. (Doc. 16 at ¶5).
4
Effective July 1, 1991, Watkins began receiving from the Plan an unreduced
monthly pension benefit payment (in the amount of $910.00) under Option B. (Id. at
6). In July 1996, after receiving 60 unreduced monthly payments, in accordance with
the terms of Option B, Watkins’ monthly pension benefit payment was reduced to
$773.77 for the remainder of his life. (Id. at 4, 6).
On July 1, 1991, when he began receiving his Plan benefit, Watkins was
married to First Wife. (Id. at 1, 5, 26). First Wife died on August 21, 2014. (Id. at 1,
26). On May 25, 2015, Watkins married Second Wife (Bobbie F. Watkins). (Id.).
On January 4, 2016, Goodyear received a letter from Watkins requesting that
Second Wife be allowed to receive a survivor pension benefit if Watkins predeceased
Second Wife. (Id. at 1-2). Goodyear’s Benefits Review Committee (“BRC”) reviewed
Watkins’ request. (Id. at 9-10). Shawn Breon, Goodyear’s Manager Benefit
Operations, on behalf of the BRC, sent Watkins a letter dated March 4, 2016
informing Watkins that the BRC had reviewed his request to make Second Wife his
surviving spouse, and that the request was denied. (Id.).4 In that letter, Breon wrote,
in relevant part:
The [BRC] determined that after the death of your spouse, Inez Watkins,
4
As a result of choosing Option B, Watkins’s pension was reduced $136/month for life
and remains at a reduced level, even though the contingent beneficiary provision is not available
to his current wife. (Doc. 16 at ¶13); (Doc. 24 at ¶13).
5
no survivor pension benefit is payable to your current spouse, Bobbie,
because you were not married to Bobbie on July 1, 1991[,] when your
pension payment commenced.
...
You retired from Goodyear-Gadsden under the 1950 Pension Plan on
July 1, 1991. At the time of your retirement, you elected (with spousal
consent by Inez Watkins) Option B-50% Joint and Survivor Option for
your spouse, Inez G. Watkins…. Our records indicate that this spouse,
Inez Watkins, died on August 21, 2014[,] and you later married Bobbie
F. Watkins on May 25, 2015. You and your current spouse, Bobbie,
were not married on the date your pension payments commenced, July
1, 1991, and therefore, Bobbie does not satisfy the eligibility
requirements [in the Plan] and no survivor pension benefit is payable to
her.
(Id. at 9). Breon notified Watkins of his right to appeal this determination to the
EAC/Pension Board. (Id. at 10).Watkins responded, by counsel, by letter dated June
24, 2016, in which counsel wrote, among other things:
12. There is a conflict between Option B, as signed by Loyd Watkins,
and the 1950 Pension Plan, creating an ambiguity.
13. Since Option B included no provision for the spouse dying before
the employee, Plaintiff should be entitled either to full pension or
entitled to add his current spouse as a contingent beneficiary on his
pension plan.
14. Loyd Watkins reasonably relied on the wording of Option B as
presented to him at retirement.
(Id. at 13); (see also Watkins’s Affidavit) (“I reasonably relied on Option B as
6
presented at the time I signed up for my pension.”).5
The EAC/Pension Board met on December 7, 2016 to consider Watkins’
appeal. (SAR at 14-16). Attorney Allenstein participated in that appeal meeting by
phone. (Id.). On December 7, 2016, Attorney Allenstein submitted to the
EAC/Pension Board by email an unsigned statement from Watkins, which was
considered in deciding the appeal. (Id. at 14-18, 26).
According to the EAC/Pension Board, in relevant part:
At the December 7th meeting, the Committee heard Mr. Watkins’ appeal
regarding his request to replace his deceased spouse, Inez G. Watkins,
with his current spouse, Bobbie F. Watkins, with respect to the survivor
pension benefit elected by Mr. Watkins under The Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Company 1950 Pension Plan (the “1950 Pension Plan”). The
Committee has considered Mr. Watkins’ appeal in light of the 1950
Pension Plan’s terms and the administrative record.
Mr. Watkins retired from Goodyear-Gadsen (sic) with a pension benefit
under the 1950 Pension Plan that commenced on July 1, 1991. He
elected Option B – 50% Joint and Survivor Option as the form in which
his benefit would be paid. The form of pension benefit required the
consent of his spouse at the time, Inez G. Watkins, and the record
reflects that Inez G. Watkins consented to this form of benefit. The
record further reflects that Inez G. Watkins died on August 21, 2014,
5
In his affidavit, Watkins says that he “was not given any information other than the form
to sign” and “[i]f [he] had been informed that if [his] current wife died, there would be no
contingent beneficiary and my pension would still be reduced, [he] would not have chosen
Option B.” (Watkins Affidavit at 1). As Watkins has not submitted any argument to the Court
(and his complaint is devoid of the legal theory he believes entitles him to relief), he has not
sufficiently raised an issue saying why this matters. Further, Watkins has not alleged that he
actually requested a copy of the “instruments under which the plan is established or operated.”
See 29 U.S.C. §1024(b)(4).
7
and that Mr. Watkins married Bobbi (sic) F. Watkins on May 25, 2015.
Article V, section 2(c) of the 1950 Pension Plan states:
“Upon the Employee’s death after his reduced pension has commenced
or, if earlier, (i) after he has attained normal retirement age but before
his retirement from the service of his Employer, or (ii) after his
retirement under conditions entitling him to a pension under Paragraph
1 of Article III, his retirement after attainment of age 55 under
conditions entitling him to a pension under Paragraph 3 of Article III or
his termination of employment after attainment of age 55 under
conditions entitling him to a pension under Paragraph 2 of Article III,
monthly payments equal to one-half of the Employee’s reduced pension
shall be continued to his surviving spouse for the life of such surviving
spouse; provided, that the Employee and such surviving spouse were
married throughout the one-year period ending on the date of his death
and were married on the date his pension payments commenced.”
You have taken the position… that there is a conflict between Option B
– 50% Joint & Survivor Option, as signed by [Watkins] on June 19,
1991, and the terms of the 1950 Pension Plan, and that an ambiguity is
therefore created. You further claim that because Option B included no
provision for the spouse dying before the employee, Mr. Watkins should
be entitled either to a full pension or should be able to add his current
spouse as a contingent beneficiary with respect to his pension benefits.
(Id. at 26) (emphasis omitted). Based on the Plan’s terms and the facts, the
EAC/Pension Board found:
…The terms of the 1950 Pension Plan provide that a survivor benefit
will be paid following the Employee’s death only if the Employee was
married to such spouse on the date his pension payments commenced.
Mr. Watkins was not married to Bobbie F. Watkins on the date his
pension payments commenced.
The terms of the 1950 Pension Plan provide no exception for payment
8
to any spouse other than the spouse of the Employee who was both
married to the employee for the year preceding his death and was his
spouse on the date his pension payments commenced. Inez G. Watkins
was the spouse designated by Mr. Watkins for the purpose of the
survivor benefit, and it is not possible under the terms of the 1950
Pension Plan, for any individual other than Inez G. Watkins to be the
recipient of survivor benefits because she was the person married to him
on the date his pension payments commenced.
(Id. at 27). Concerning Attorney Allenstein’s ambiguity argument, the EAC/Pension
Board concluded:
The Notice of Election of Optional Method of Pension Payment in
which Mr. Watkins designates Inez G. Watkins as his contingent
annuitant does not conflict with the terms of the 1950 Pension Plan
because there is no mention in the Notice of any payment to any
individual other than the designated Contingent Annuitant, who was
Inez Watkins. In fact, paragraph (3) of Option B states that “After my
death, (but only if my death occurs after the Option becomes effective)
my spouse, Contingent Annuitant, shall receive monthly payments in an
amount equal to one-half of such reduced amount as would have been
paid to me had I been then living, with such payment to continue during
the lifetime of my spouse.” Inez G. Watkins was named as “Spouse” just
a few lines below this statement. Further, the amount of the annuity
under Option B was determined based on the joint lives of Mr. Watkins
and Inez G. Watkins, according to a variety of actuarial assumptions,
including life expectancy. It is not possible to substitute another life for
the joint annuitant in this situation. An ambiguity is not created merely
because Option B does not list every possible scenario with respect to
a contingent annuitant and there is no conflict between the terms of the
1950 Pension Pan and the Notice of Election of Option B.
(Id.). Concerning Watkins’ assertion that Goodyear had not explained Option B to
him well enough, the EAC/Pension Board found:
9
The Company has a well-established process and procedures in place at
Goodyear-Gadsen (sic) for explaining pension benefit options. The
Committee found it more credible that the normal policies and
procedures were followed at Goodyear-Gadsen (sic), than Mr. Watkins’
claim that the options weren’t explained to him at the time he elected
Option B.
(Id.). Ultimately, concerning Watkins’ appeal, the EAC/Pension Board
concluded:
The terms of the 1950 Pension Plan are clear in that only the spouse who
was married to the Employee at the time his pension commences shall
be entitled to the survivor benefit. To interpret the 1950 Plan any other
way would create a benefit payment that is contrary to the terms of the
1950 Pension Plan. Therefore, the Committee finds that because Bobbie
F. Watkins was not married to Mr. Loyd Watkins on the date his pension
payments commenced, no survivor pension benefits will be payable to
her following Mr. Watkins death, and the denial of such benefits is
upheld. Further, the Committee finds that Mr. Watkins is not entitled to
a refund of any amount attributable to the reduction in the monthly
pension payment for the joint and survivor form of pension payment.
Although Inez G. Watkins predeceased Mr. Watkins, the reduction for
the joint and survivor option applies for the whole life of Mr. Watkins.
(Id. at 27-28). In its December 16, 2016 decision letter, the EAC/Pension Board
informed Watkins that he could file suit under ERISA to seek judicial review of
the final denial decision. (Id.). On February 20, 2017, based on the EAC/Pension
Board’s final denial of Watkins’ appeal, Watkins filed suit in Etowah County Circuit
Court, which the Plan then removed to this Court. (Doc. 1).
10
III.
STANDARDS
A.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved
in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th
Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
“Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to ‘come forward with specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” International Stamp Art, Inc. v.
U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).
B.
ERISA
ERISA does not contain a standard of review for actions brought under §
1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit eligibility determinations. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-09, 109 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1989) (“Although it is a
11
‘comprehensive and reticulated statute,’ ERISA does not set out the appropriate
standard of review for actions . . . challenging benefit eligibility determinations.”).6
Moreover, the case law that has developed over time governing such standards has
significantly evolved. A history of the transformation of these principles is useful to
understanding the presently applicable framework for evaluating § 1132(a)(1)(B)
ERISA challenges.
In Firestone, the Supreme Court initially established three distinct standards
for courts to employ when reviewing an ERISA plan administrator’s benefits
decision: “(1) de novo where the plan does not grant the administrator discretion; (2)
arbitrary and capricious where the plan grants the administrator discretion; and (3)
heightened arbitrary and capricious where the plan grants the administrator discretion
and the administrator has a conflict of interest.” Capone v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 592
F.3d 1189, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Buckley v. Metro. Life, 115 F.3d 936, 939
(11th Cir. 1997) (discussing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115)). In Williams v. Bellsouth
Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds
by Doyle v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2008), the
Eleventh Circuit fleshed out the Firestone test into a six-step framework designed to
6
ERISA provides “a panoply of remedial devices” for participants and beneficiaries of
qualifying benefit plans. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985).
12
guide courts in evaluating a plan administrator’s benefits decision in ERISA actions.
When the Eleventh Circuit created the Williams test, the sixth step of the sequential
framework required courts reviewing a plan administrator’s decision to apply a
heightened arbitrary and capricious standard if the plan administrator operated under
a conflict of interest. See id. The Eleventh Circuit later modified this step in response
to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S.
105, 115-17 (2008), which concluded that a conflict of interest should be weighed
merely as “one factor” in determining whether an administrator abused its discretion.
See Doyle v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“As we now show, Glenn implicitly overrules and conflicts with our precedent
requiring courts to review under the heightened standard a conflicted administrator’s
benefits decision.”).
The Eleventh Circuit’s latest iteration of the Firestone standard-of-review
framework is found in Blankenship v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 849 (2011):
(1) Apply the de novo standard to determine whether the claim
administrator’s benefits-denial decision is “wrong” (i.e., the court
disagrees with the administrator’s decision); if it is not, then end the
inquiry and affirm the decision.
(2) If the administrator’s decision in fact is “de novo wrong,” then
determine whether he was vested with discretion in reviewing claims;
13
if not, end judicial inquiry and reverse the decision.
(3) If the administrator’s decision is “de novo wrong” and he was
vested with discretion in reviewing claims, then determine whether
“reasonable” grounds supported it (hence, review his decision under the
more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard).
(4) If no reasonable grounds exist, then end the inquiry and reverse the
administrator’s decision; if reasonable grounds do exist, then determine
if he operated under a conflict of interest.
(5) If there is no conflict, then end the inquiry and affirm the decision.
(6) If there is a conflict, the conflict should merely be a factor for the
court to take into account when determining whether an administrator’s
decision was arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 1355.7 All steps of the analysis are “potentially at issue” when a plan vests
discretion to the plan administrator to make benefits determinations. See id. at 1356
n.7. Conversely, then, where a plan does not confer discretion, the court simply
applies the de novo review standard established by the Supreme Court in Firestone.
See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (“[W]e hold that a denial of benefits challenged under
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan
gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”).
7
“In ERISA cases, the phrases ‘arbitrary and capricious’ and ‘abuse of discretion’ are
used interchangeably.” Blankenship, 644 F.3d at 1355 n.5.
14
IV.
ANALYSIS
Goodyear moves for summary judgment by arguing that the EAC/Pension
Board came to the right decision. (Doc. 15 at 17). Watkins replied to Goodyear;
however his reply consisted of solely a statement of facts and two exhibits. (Doc. 16
at 1-4).8 There is no argument section. (See generally id.). The Court will not fill in
the gaps for Watkins. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that:
We will not address this perfunctory and underdeveloped argument. See
Flanigan's Enters., Inc. v. Fulton County, Ga., 242 F.3d 976, 987 n. 16
(11th Cir.2001) (holding that a party waives an argument if the party
“fail [s] to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support” of
the argument); Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1576 (7th
Cir.1987) (stating that an argument made without citation to authority
is insufficient to raise an issue before the court).
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1287 n.13 (11th Cir. 2007). This makes
sense because “[u]nder the adversary system . . . the Court does not serve as counsel's
law clerk.” Federal Ins. Co. v. County of Westchester, 921 F. Supp. 1136, 1139
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
The first task for the Court to accomplish is to determine what exactly Watkins
wants and how he intends to get there. His complaint, originally filed in state court,
8
Watkins filed a Motion for Extension of Time To File another response, but that
request was too late and did not give a good cause for an extension of time. (Docs. 19, 20).
However, just two days after the Court denied Watkins’s request, in blatant disregard of the
Court’s decision, he filed another response anyway. (Doc. 21).
15
lacks specificity. (Doc. 1-1). It states that it is asking for equitable relief. (See id. at
1). It states that “[it] is governed by ERISA 29 U.S.C. §1132,” but it gives no
indication of whether it is being brought under section (a)(1)(B) or (a)(3). (See id. at
6). The Complaint ends as follows:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for equitable relief of either Loyd
Watkins receiving his full pension after the death of his first wife, Inez
Watkins, or alternatively allowing Loyd Watkins’[s] current wife to be
the contingent beneficiary as requested by plaintiff.
(Id.). The fact that it is asking for equitable relief makes it seem as if the Complaint
is brought under (a)(3), but the fact that Watkins is asking for “his full pension”
makes it seem as if it is brought under (a)(1)(B). Goodyear seems to think it is
brought under (a)(1)(B). (See Doc. 15 at 18-23). That is a reasonable assumption, but
it is not entirely clear because the Complaint is so vague. The Court seriously doubts
this Complaint would have withstood a 12(b)(6) challenge and certainly not a 12(e)
motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 12(e). Goodyear should have availed themselves
of these options and perhaps have avoided this litigation entirely. How the parties
were able to conduct discovery without actually knowing what precise theory
Watkins was proceeding on is beyond the Court’s ability to speculate.
As far as the Court can tell, Watkins is attempting to bring some form of
equitable estoppel claim. This is a “very narrow common law doctrine.” See Jones v.
16
American General Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1065, 1069 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing
sources). It “is available where the plaintiff can show that (1) the relevant provisions
of the plan at issue are ambiguous, and (2) the plan provider or administrator has
made representations to the plaintiff that constitute an informal interpretation of the
ambiguity.” Id. “‘[A]mbiguity exists if the policy is susceptible to two or more
reasonable interpretations that can fairly be made, and one of these interpretations
results in coverage while the other results in exclusion.’” Tippitt v. Reliance Standard
Life Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Shahpazian v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 388 F.Supp.2d 1368, 1375 (N.D.Ga.2005)). “[E]quitable
estoppel is not available to plaintiffs in cases involving oral amendments to or
modifications of employee plans governed by ERISA because ERISA specifically
addresses these issues.” Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.
1990). However, it can apply to interpretations of an ERISA plan. See id. Since the
court in Jones applied §1132(a)(1)(B) to these sorts of claims, that is what the Court
will do here as well. See Jones, 370 F.3d at 1069.9
The Court begins by evaluating this Motion under the de novo standard. As was
9
Additionally, the Court notes that Watkins’ primary requested relief is “receiving his
full pension.” (See Doc. 1-1 at 6). This is a request for benefits, something that §1132(a)(1)(B) is
designed for. See 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B). Further, “ERISA simply does not permit a plaintiff
to pursue an equitable claim when an adequate remedy to pay benefits exists.” Kirby v. American
United Life Ins. Co., No. 4:16-cv-776-VEH, 2016 WL 5118265, *4 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 21, 2016)
(Hopkins, J.).
17
stated, Watkins has to show that the Plan is ambiguous and that there was a
representation about this ambiguity. See Jones, 370 F.3d at 1069. He fails on both
counts.
First, the Plan is not ambiguous. As far as the Court can parse Watkins’s
response, it appears that his entire argument is that “[t]here is a conflict between
Pension Plan Option Plan (Ex. 2) with Option B, as signed by Loyd Watkins, and
Article V, Section 2(c) of the 2013-2017 Pension. (Ex. 2).” (Doc. 16 at ¶14). The
Court does not find a conflict between Option B and Article V, Section 2(c). Option
B is silent on whether a new spouse can be substituted in. (SAR at 4). To accept
Watkins’ argument would be to essentially say that every time the Plan provides more
detail10 to a notification of election it creates an ambiguity. That is a bridge the Court
is unwilling to cross. To the extent both parties seem to agree that Article V controls,
it merely gives further details to what is only a two-page notice.
Even if Article V did not control the outcome here, Watkins still has not shown
that the Plan is ambiguous regarding whether he can substitute in a new spouse. The
Court notes that the Plan has a provision whereby a contingent annuitant can be
10
And, it is indeed more detail because the notification is silent on the issue as it pertains
to Option B. This is different from a situation where the notification said that spouses could be
freely substituted in, but the Plan had different terms. That is a conflict, not merely additional
detail.
18
added or changed. (SAR at 52). Specifically, the Plan states that:
After an Employee has elected . . . Option B . . . such Option may be
changed, or a different Contingent Annuitant designated, only with the
consent of the Pension Board.
(Id.) (emphasis added). Obviously, the Pension Board never consented to allow
Watkins to add his new spouse as a “different Contingent Annuitant.”11 This makes
sense when the following is taken into account. According to the Pension Board, the
amount of the benefit Watkins (and his spouse upon his death) would receive is based
upon “a variety of actuarial assumptions, including life expectancy.” (SAR at 27).
This is supported by the plain text of the Plan. (SAR at 51).12 In other words, it
appears to the Court that Goodyear paid Watkins benefits based on certain
assumptions made back in 1991; changing the contingent annuitant could open them
up to further payments over a whole new lifetime to a contingent annuitant that they
11
Also obviously, Watkins knew about this requirement, since he wrote and requested
that consent.
12
The Plan states:
If an Employee elects any of the foregoing Options, the actuarial value of all
monthly payments to be made, after such Option becomes effective, to him, his
Contingent Annuitant . . . shall be equivalent to the actuarial value, at the time
such Option becomes effective, of the total amount of monthly pension which
thereafter would have been payable under the Plan if no Option had been elected,
taking into account the age of the Employee and, where applicable, the age of his
Contingent Annuitant.
(SAR at 51) (emphasis added).
19
neither knew of, nor predicted, at the time Watkins elected Option B.
Second, Watkins has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
a Plan representative gave an informal representation of the alleged ambiguity. His
affidavit alleges that he was given the notice form to sign, and nothing else. (See Doc.
16-1 at 1). However, being given a form to sign to alert the company of the election
of a plan is not being given an interpretation of a specific question regarding that
Plan. Watkins later stated that “[w]hen this issue first came up, personnel at the union
hall assured me that my second wife would be entitled to be added as a contingent
beneficiary.” (Id. at 2). However, there is no indication that “personnel at the union
hall” are Plan representatives with some authority through which they can interpret
the contractual provisions. Further, as far at the Court can tell, this issue first came
up in 2014, after Watkins’s first wife passed away. That means that even if people at
the union hall were somehow Plan representatives (and assuming that relying on what
they said was reasonable), Watkins cannot argue that he relied on their 2014
representations when he elected Option B in 1991. In conclusion, Watkins has failed
to raise any developed argument to convince the Court that Goodyear was de novo
wrong.
Even if Goodyear was de novo wrong, it is due to be affirmed under arbitrary
and capricious review. The plan clearly grants the Pension Board discretion. (SAR
20
at 34) (granting the Pension Board “discretionary power and authority to interpret and
construe the Plan and to resolve any disputes arising thereunder”). That means that
the arbitrary and capricious standard applies. See Blankenship, 644 F.3d at 1355.
Watkins has given the Court no reason that Goodyear’s actions were arbitrary and
capricious. (See Doc. 16 at 1-5). Accordingly, under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, the decision of the Pension Board is due to be affirmed.
V.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court GRANTS summary judgment to the Goodyear
Pension Plan.
DONE and ORDERED this the 26th day of April, 2018.
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge
21
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?