Yates v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 3/1/2019. (KAM)

FILED
2019 Mar-01 PM 12:29
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
SEBRINA YATES,

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Claimant,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

Case No. 4:17-cv-1192-JEO

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Sebrina Yates appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for
Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 1). 1 Yates timely
pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies, and the decision of the
Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). For
the following reasons, the court 2 finds this decision is due to be reversed and
remanded for further consideration.

1

References herein to “Doc(s). __” are to the document numbers assigned by the Clerk of the
Court to the pleadings, motions, and other materials in the court file, as reflected on the docket
sheet in the court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system.
2

The action was originally assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the court’s general order of reference dated January 2, 2015. The
parties have consented to an exercise of plenary jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. (Doc. 9).
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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Yates was forty-eight years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. (R. 46,

424).3 She has a high school education and past work experience as a machine
operator and metal fabricator. (R. 440-41). Yates applied for a period of disability
and DIB on July 25, 2013. (R. 424-25). She alleged disability beginning on
March 15, 2013, due to bipolar I disorder, diabetes, back injury, anxiety, heart
disease, overactive bladder, hypertension, and manic depression. (R. 439). Her
applications were initially denied on October 4, 2013, and she requested a hearing
before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (R. 256-82, 283-315). After the
hearing, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled and issued an unfavorable decision on
September 22, 2015. (R. 20-52). The Appeals Council denied Yates’ review
request on May 12, 2017. (R. 1-7). This case is now properly before the court.
II.

STATUORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the

regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The
first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is performing substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity, he or she is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If

3

References herein to “R.__” are to the administrative record found at Docs. 6-1 through 6-23.
2

the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner
proceeds to the second step to consider the combined effects of all the claimant’s
physical

and

mental

impairments.

20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1520(a)(4)(ii),

416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments must be severe and must meet certain
durational requirements before a claimant will be found disabled. Id. The decision
depends on the medical evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340,
1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments are not severe, the analysis
stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis
continues to step three, at which the Commissioner determines whether the
claimant’s impairments meet the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If
the impairments fall within this category, the claimant will be found disabled
without further consideration. Id. If the impairments do not fall within the listings,
the Commissioner determines the claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
416.920(e).
At step four the Commissioner determines whether the impairments prevent
the claimant from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, he
or she is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot perform
past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, at which the
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Commissioner considers the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age,
education, and past work experience, to determine whether he or she can perform
other work. Id.; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant
can do other work, he or she is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Yates had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 15, 2013, the alleged onset
date. (R. 26). At step two, the ALJ found Yates suffered from the following
severe impairments: anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, chronic pain syndrome,
obesity, history of lumbar disc disease, and cholelithiasis. (R. 26).
At step three, the ALJ found Yates did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments meeting or medically equaling any of the impairments
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 38). Before proceeding to
step four, the ALJ determined Yates had the residual function capacity to perform
light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) which allows occasional stooping
and crouching but: (1) no pushing or pulling of the lower extremity; (2) the
claimant should work in a temperature controlled environment; (3) the claimant
should work with or around things as opposed to the general public; and (4) the
claimant should not perform work requiring her to meet production goals. (R. 40).
In reaching this opinion, the ALJ considered Yates’ symptoms, the opinion
evidence, and the medical record. (R. 40).
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Because the ALJ determined Yates was unable to perform any past relevant
work at step four, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert in finding
a significant number of jobs in the national economy Yates can perform. (R. 4647). Thus, Yates was found not to be disabled at step five of the five-step
sequential evaluation process. (R. 48).
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is a

narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) 4 (citing Crawford
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). A court gives
deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are
supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal
conclusions. See Miles v. Charter, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless, a court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206,
1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2004)). “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision
4

Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not considered binding
precedent; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
5

makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’”

Parker v.

Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting). Indeed,
even if a court finds that the proof preponderates against the Commissioner’s
decision, it must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles,
84 F.3d at 1400.
However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard
[for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its
entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v.
Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct
legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Brown v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635
(11th Cir. 1984).
IV.

DISCUSSION
Yates asserts the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and

should be reversed and remanded. More specifically, Yates makes the following
arguments: (1) the ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical opinion evidence; (2)
the ALJ has a documented history of bias; (3) the ALJ did not accurately state
Yates’ limitations when providing the vocational expert with hypotheticals; and (4)
the Appeals Council improperly denied her request for review based on additional
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evidence. (Doc. 7 at 27-56). The court deems remand necessary regarding the first
issue and, as such, does not address the remaining issues raised by Yates.
Social Security regulations provide that, in considering what weight to give
any medical opinion (regardless of whether it is from a treating or non-treating
physician), the Commissioner should evaluate: the extent of the examining or
treating relationship between the doctor and patient; whether the doctor’s opinion
can be supported by medical signs and laboratory findings; whether the opinion is
consistent with the record as a whole; the doctor’s specialization; and other factors.
See 20 C .F.R. § 404.1527(d); see also Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075
(11th Cir. 1986) (“The weight afforded a physician’s conclusory statements
depends upon the extent to which they are supported by clinical or laboratory
findings and are consistent with other evidence as to claimant’s impairments.”).
When evaluating a disability claim, it is well settled that an ALJ is required to state
with particularity the weight he gave the different medical opinions and the reasons
therefor. Sarfaz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). The opinion of a
one-time examiner, i.e., non-treating doctors, is not entitled to deference or special
consideration. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1160 (stating that the opinion of a doctor
who examines a claimant on only one occasion is not entitled to great weight).
Here, both consulting mental health doctors, Dr. Christopher Randolph, a
psychiatrist, and Dr. June Nichols, a clinical psychologist, opined that Yates had
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limitations that would significantly interfere with her ability to work. Specifically,
Dr. Randolph reported that Plaintiff stated she quit her job because “her boss made
her nervous.” (R. 760). Further, she reported that she “[i]solates to home,” “feels
overwhelmed by feelings,” feels “that everyone is out to get her,” experiences poor
sleep and “impaired concentration and energy.” (R. 759, 760). Yates “alluded to
hallucinations and described these as ‘seeing shadows.’” (R. 759). Dr. Randolph
diagnosed Yates with recurrent major depression and stated that although he did
“not see any impairment in reality testing that would warrant a psychiatric
disability, . . . due to her avoidance and stated paranoia, she would not be
employable.” (R. 760).
Dr. June Nichols diagnosed Yates with mixed bipolar disorder with
psychotic features and panic disorder without agoraphobia. (R. 782). Dr. Nichols
noted she was anxious, with reduced energy and anhedonia 5 and “confirmed crying
episodes.” (R. 780, 782). She noted Yates’ “quick mood swings, hyperirritability,
and aggression,” in addition to the tendency to be distracted.

(R. 783).

Additionally, Dr. Nichols took into account Yates’ statements that she “see[s]
shadows but [doesn’t] hear voices” and that she experiences panic attacks when
she goes to a new place. (R. 782). To combat this, Yates stated that she “tr[ies] to
shop at the same store.”

(R. 782).

Dr. Nichols opined that Yates “suffers

5

Merriam-Webster dictionary defines anhedonia as “a psychological condition characterized by
inability to experience pleasure in normally pleasurable acts.”
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symptoms of anxiety that result in panic attacks, but the greatest difficulties appear
related to the cycling caused by the bipolar disorder.” (R. 783). Dr. Nichols
concluded that Yates’ “ability to relate interpersonally and withstand the pressures
of everyday work is compromised due to the nature of her current symptom” and
that the “anxiety and panic attacks would markedly interfere with concentration,
persistence, and pace.” (R. 783).
The ALJ gave “minimal weight” to the opinions of Dr. Randolph and Dr.
Nichols. (R. 45). His stated reasons for assigning minimal weight to these two
opinions were because Yates “has not exhibited marked or extreme restrictions in
activities of daily living,” as evidenced by her ability to “care for her grandchildren
and pets independently.”

(R. 45).

The ALJ also noted that Yates’ use of

Facebook, talking on the phone, and interacting with family members were
inconsistent with the medical opinions. 6 (R. 46).
The reasons stated by the ALJ in assigning minimum weight to the opinions
of Dr. Randolph and Dr. Nichols are not supported by substantial evidence. The
ALJ’s reliance on Yates’ ability to interact with family members, the use of
Facebook, and ability to take care of her dogs to support his conclusion is a stretch,
at best. The record indicates that Yates experiences difficulty in interacting with
6

Additionally, the ALJ refers to Yates’ history of sporadic drug use and cites a treating doctor’s
opinion that the drug use “contributed to her mental status.” (R. 43). That being said, later in the
opinion, the ALJ states that “drug and/or alcohol abuse is not material to this decision.” (R. 44).
As such, the court does not consider Yates’ history of occasional drug use as a reason for
discrediting the consultative doctor opinions.
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both her husband and daughter because they ridicule her; in addition, she
sometimes feels an urge to hurt her husband and others but does not. (R. 624, 628,
858, 867).

While she stated that she enjoys seeing her grandchildren, such

interaction is vastly different than daily interaction with co-workers and
supervisors. Further, Yates explained that she watches television and looks at
Facebook, but the mere ability to watch television and scroll through social media
does not necessarily equate with the requisite mental ability to withstand an eighthour workday, especially considering Yates’ numerous mental diagnoses. As for
attending to her dogs, Yates explained that she lets them outside to use the
bathroom and feeds them. (R. 271-72).

The ability to care for her pets’ basic

needs does not equate with an ability to work an eight hour workday. See Parker
v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (substantial evidence did not
support the ALJ’s finding that the claimant’s ability to do simple household chores
negated her claims that she had to lie down every two hours because of her
impairments); see also Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971-72 (3d Cir. 1981)
(“[S]tatutory disability does not mean that a claimant must be a quadriplegic or an
amputee. . . . Disability does not mean that a claimant must vegetate in a dark
room excluded from all forms of human and social activity. . . . It is well settled
that sporadic or transitory activity does not disprove disability.”) (citations and
quotations omitted.).
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Additionally, the consulting physician opinions are generally consistent with
the treatment records. The medical records from mid-2013 through 2015 note
episodes of hallucinations, thoughts of hurting others, severe anxiety and
depression, and poor attention and concentration, among other things. (R. 556,
557-60, 614-17, 622-23, 843, 845-47, 858). By the end of 2014 and middle of
2015, the treatment notes indicate increased anger and anxiety, depression at least
three out of every five days, and continued hallucinations, including a report of
seeing a leprechaun in her laundry room. (R. 840-843, 845, 847, 850-53, 858).
For these reasons, the court finds that substantial evidence does not support the
reasoning stated by the ALJ for assigning minimal weight to the opinions of Dr.
Randolph and Dr. Nichols.
V. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the decision of the Commissioner is due to
be REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner to conduct further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.7

7

The court notes the lack of citation to the record throughout the ALJ opinion. This deficiency
severely hampers the court’s ability to adequately review and understand the exact reasoning of
the ALJ and whether the record supports his conclusions.
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DATED this 1st day of March, 2019.

_________________________________
JOHN E. OTT
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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