Helms v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION: the court AFFIRMS the Commissioners decision as more fully set out therein. Signed by Magistrate Judge Herman N Johnson, Jr on 11/26/18. (BJL)

FILED
2018 Nov-26 AM 09:26
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
SHANNON HELMS,
Plaintiff
vs.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant

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) Case No. 4:17-cv-01452-HNJ
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shannon Helms seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of
an adverse, final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner” or “Secretary”), regarding her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits
(DIB). For the reasons stated below, the court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s
decision.
LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
To qualify for disability benefits and establish entitlement for a period of
disability, the claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the
Regulations promulgated thereunder.

1

The Regulations 1 define “disabled” as the

The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. Parts
400 to 499. Although the Social Security Administration amended the regulations on January 17, 2017,
the amendment applies only to Social Security applications filed after the effective date, March 27,
2017. Watkins v. Berryhill, No. 7:16-CV-242-FL, 2017 WL 3574450, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2017),

“inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12)
months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to disability benefits, a
claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or mental impairment” which “must
result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be
shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1508.
In determining whether a claimant suffers a disability, the Commissioner,
through an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), works through a five-step sequential
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The burden rests upon the claimant on
the first four steps of this five-step process; the Commissioner sustains the burden at
step five, if the evaluation proceeds that far. Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d
1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018).
In the first step, the claimant cannot be currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must prove the impairment is
“severe” in that it “significantly limits [the] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities . . . .” Id. at § 404.1520(c).

report and recommendation adopted, No. 7:16-CV-242-FL, 2017 WL 3568406 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 17, 2017).
Accordingly, the undersigned relies upon the prior versions in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision.
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At step three, the evaluator must conclude the claimant is disabled if [the]
impairments meet or are medically equivalent to one of the impairments listed at 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, §§ 1.00–114.02. Id. at § 404.1520(d). If a
claimant’s impairment meets the applicable criteria at this step, that claimant’s
impairments would prevent any person from performing substantial gainful activity. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1525, 416.920(a)(4)(iii). That is, a claimant who
satisfies steps one and two qualifies automatically for disability benefits if they suffer
from a listed impairment. See Williams v. Astrue, 416 F. App’x 861, 862 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“If, at the third step, [the claimant] proves that [an] impairment or combination of
impairments meets or equals a listed impairment, [the claimant] is automatically found
disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920).
If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step where
the claimant demonstrates an incapacity to meet the physical and mental demands of
past relevant work.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).

At this step, the evaluator must

determine whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
the requirements of past relevant work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent
performance of past relevant work, the evaluator will determine the claimant is not
disabled. See id.
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If the claimant is successful at the preceding step, the fifth step shifts the burden
to the Commissioner to prove, considering claimant’s RFC, age, education and past
work experience, whether the claimant is capable of performing other work. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(f)(1). If the claimant can perform other work, the evaluator will not find
the claimant disabled. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the claimant cannot perform other work, the evaluator
will find the claimant disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g),

416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
The court reviews the ALJ’s “‛decision with deference to the factual findings and
close scrutiny of the legal conclusions.’” Parks ex rel. D.P. v. Comm’r, Social Sec. Admin.,
783 F.3d 847, 850 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th
Cir. 1991)). The court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal
standards. Winschel v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).
Although the court must “scrutinize the record as a whole . . . to determine if the
decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence,” Bloodsworth v.
Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted), the court “may not
decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment” for that of the
ALJ. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
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reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citations
omitted). Nonetheless, substantial evidence exists even if the evidence preponderates
against the Commissioner’s decision. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir.
2005).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Helms worked for more than 30 years at a hosiery mill, as a miller, a turn sew
operator, an inspector, a knitter, and a pairer and boarder. In April 2008, Helms
underwent right carpal tunnel release surgery. She continued to work until 2008, when
the hosiery mill laid her off. (Tr. 41). Thereafter, she stayed home to care for her
husband after he underwent two open heart surgeries. (Tr. 42, 64-67). In June 2016,
after her date last insured, Helms underwent knee surgery to address problems
occurring after she left the mill.
Ms. Helms initially applied for disability benefits on October 27, 2014, alleging
disability beginning June 1, 2009.

She alleged disability due to fibromyalgia,

hypertension, diabetes, and hip problems. (Tr. 79). The ALJ held a hearing on
August 23, 2016, at which time Helms was 53 years old. At the hearing, Helms alleged
disability due to knee problems and overall pain.
In his December 2, 2016, decision, the ALJ first determined that Ms. Helms met
the Social Security Act’s insured status requirements through June 30, 2013. The ALJ
further found that Helms had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1,
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2009, the alleged onset date, through the date last insured. At step two, the ALJ
identified the severe impairments of status post carpal tunnel release on the right side
and obesity. (Tr. 12).
The ALJ concluded at step three that, through the date last insured, Helms’s
combination of severe impairments did not meet or medically equal any impairment for
presumptive disability listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 13).
The ALJ determined Helms retained the ability to perform her past relevant work as a
knitter. (Tr. 16). The ALJ proceeded to step five, finding Helms’s RFC allows her to
perform light exertional work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with certain
limitations. 2 (Tr. 14). The ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony that Helms also could
perform jobs in the national and local economy such as routing clerk, marker, and
laundry worker. (Tr. 17).
On August 8, 2017, the Appeals Council denied review, which deems the ALJ’s
decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.

(Tr. 1-4).

Ms. Helms filed her

complaint with the court seeking review of the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 1).
2

The ALJ described the following limitations:

the claimant was able to frequently use right foot controls and frequently use right
dominant hand controls. She could have frequently climb[ed] ramps and stairs but
never climbed ladders or scaffolds. She could have frequently crouched, kneeled and
crawled. The claimant should have never been exposed to unprotected heights or
operated commercial motor vehicles. In addition to normal workday breaks, she
would have been off-task 5% of an 8-hour workday (non-consecutive minutes).
(Tr. 14).
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ANALYSIS
In this appeal, Ms. Helms contends that the ALJ’s opinion lacks support in
substantial evidence, inasmuch as he found Helms capable of performing her past
relevant work. (Doc. 13 at 10). In addition, Ms. Helms argues that substantial
evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC to the extent he found she could frequently
use right dominant hand controls or use her right hand frequently. (Doc. 13 at 10-11).
Finally, Helms argues the ALJ erred by failing to pose a hypothetical to the VE which
included all of her limitations, specifically limitations on use of her right hand. (Doc.
12 at 12). For the following reasons, Ms. Helms’s arguments fail.
I. The ALJ Properly Found Helms Capable of Performing Her Past
Relevant Work Through the Date Last Insured
A claimant eligible for DIB must establish the onset of a disability on or before
the last date for which they were insured. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). If a claimant becomes disabled after losing insured status,
the Commissioner will deny the claim despite a disability. See McLain v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 676 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Demandre v. Califano, 591 F.2d
1088, 1090 (5th Cir. 1979)); Hughes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 11, 13 (11th Cir.
2012) (“In order to quality for DIB, an individual must prove that her disability existed
prior to the end of her insured status period, and, after insured status is lost, a claim will

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be denied despite her disability.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.131. Helms was last insured
on June 30, 2013.
In rendering his decision, the ALJ considered all medical records. However, the
only medical records which predated her date last insured demonstrate substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Dr. William Hartzog treated Helms for wrist
pain in 2008, resulting from heavy lifting associated with her job. He performed right
carpal tunnel release surgery on April 23, 2008.

(Tr. 378-79).

At a follow up

appointment on May 28, 2008, Dr. Hartzog noted Helms’ complaints of moderate to
mild pain displayed as disproportionate to his examination findings. Despite noting
Helms’ slow progress in physical therapy, he found no surgical complications and
satisfactory relief of her neurological symptoms. (Tr. 373). By June 18, 2008, Dr.
Hartzog again found Helms’ complaints of pain disproportionate and opined Helms
was not exerting maximum effort. He determined Helms had no significant abnormal
findings and recommended she complete another week of physical therapy and return
to work without restrictions on June 23, 2008. (Tr. 372). The only other medical
record during the relevant time period, before June 30, 2013, pertains to a
non-displaced tibia fracture in March 2012. (Tr. 230-31).
In medical records postdating the date last insured, Helms does not mention any
problems with her wrist. In fact, neurological and musculoskeletal examinations

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reflected normal strength, lack of pain or swelling, and full range of motion in her
extremities. (Tr. 238-39, 255, 257, 262, 275, 282, 289, 303-04, 311, 363, 494, 499, 503).
The ALJ considered Helms’s carpal tunnel syndrome under Listing 1.08,
pertaining to soft tissue injuries. (Tr. 13). To meet this listing, the claimant’s injury
must be under continuing surgical management directed toward the salvage or
restoration of major function, and such major function was not restored or expected to
be restored within 12 months of onset. 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.08.
The ALJ concluded because Helms was not under surgical management and had not
lost major function of the upper extremities, she failed to satisfy all the criteria of Listing
1.08. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (“An impairment that manifests
only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”); Wilson v.
Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (“To ‘equal’ a Listing, the medical findings
must be ‘at least equal in severity and duration to the listed findings.’”) (citation
omitted).
The ALJ also considered Listing 11.01 (neurological disorders) and concluded
Helms failed to satisfy the criteria because she suffered no neurological deficits
described in the listing, including sustained disturbances of two or more extremities.
(Tr. 13). See 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1, § 11.00, et seq.
Helms suffered a fractured patella in 2015, which Dr. Glenn Wilson repaired on
June 1, 2015. (Tr. 463-64). When the hardware used to repair the fracture failed after
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Helms again fell, Dr. Wilson performed a second surgery on July 8, 2015. (Tr. 336-37,
354-56, 399-400). By December 10, 2015, Helms expressed happiness with the
outcome of the surgery, with mild but tolerable pain in the knee and improved range of
motion of 0 to 95 degrees. (Tr. 416).
Dr. Wilson supplied an opinion dated January 6, 2016, in which he declared
Helms unable to work because she would miss two to five days per month due to
medical problems. (Tr. 433-35). He also opined Helms could only occasionally
climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl, but could sit for six hours. Dr. Wilson
assigned limitations in Helms’ ability to concentrate due to pain from her knee. The
ALJ gave Dr. Wilson’s opinion little weight, on the basis that he primarily used evidence
after the date last insured in forming his opinion, overly relied on Helms’s subjective
complaints without consistent objective findings, and formed the opinion several years
after the date last insured. (Tr. 15).3
The ALJ also found Helms’ testimony less than credible. (Tr. 14, 15). If the
ALJ discredits a claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ “must articulate explicit and
adequate reasons for doing so.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002)
(per curiam). “While an adequate credibility finding need not cite particular phrases or
formulations[,] broad findings that a claimant lacked credibility. . . are not enough. . . .”
3

Notably, Helms does not challenge the weight accorded to Dr. Wilson’s opinion. Therefore, she
has abandoned any such challenge. See Robinson v. Astrue, 235 F. App’x 725, 726 (11th Cir. 2007); Pettus
v. Astrue, 226 F. App’x 946, 949 (11th Cir. 2007).
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Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186 at *2 (“The determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the
finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be
sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the
weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that
weight.”). Nonetheless, credibility determinations remain within the province of the
Commissioner, not the courts. Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 213 F. App’x 778, 779 (11th
Cir. 2006).
The ALJ adequately explained his reasons for finding Helms’ testimony not
entirely credible. (Tr. 14, 15). While Helms testified she cannot hold anything
because her right hand releases and causes her to drop the item (Tr. 57), she also
testified she cares for her husband, including assisting him with shaving and dressing,
makes simple meals, does light cleaning and laundry, and experiences no difficulty with
personal care. (Tr. 47, 63-64, 195, 196).

The ALJ offered adequate explanation for

discounting Helms’s testimony as to her hand weakness. Further, the ALJ cited
objective medical evidence refuting the severity of the alleged impairment. Thus, the

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ALJ did not err in assessing Helms’s credibility.4 As a result, his decision rests upon
substantial evidence.
II. The ALJ Properly Formulated Helms’s RFC
“Residual functional capacity” represents “an individual’s ability to do sustained
work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing
basis.” SSR 96-8p.

A “regular and continuing basis” corresponds to eight hours a

day, for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. Id. The regulations define
RFC as “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In formulating an RFC, the ALJ considers a claimant’s
“ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(4). The ALJ examines all relevant medical and other evidence,
including “any statements about what [the claimant] can still do that have been provided
by medical sources,” as well as “descriptions and observations [provided by the
claimant, family, neighbors, friends, or other persons] of [the claimant’s] limitations. . .,
including limitations that result from . . . symptoms such as pain.”
§ 404.1545(a)(3).

The claimant bears the burden of providing evidence the

Commissioner will use to establish an RFC.

4

20 C.F.R.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(c).

The

While Helms does not explicitly challenge the ALJ’s determination as to her credibility, that
determination bears relevance to the overall finding that Helms retained the capability to perform her
past relevant work, as well as the ultimate finding that she was not disabled as of her date last insured.
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responsibility for determining a claimant’s RFC resides with the ALJ. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(e), 404 .1546(c); SSR 96–5p.
A diagnosis alone does not indicate a disability or limitations on a claimant’s
ability to work. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 n. 6 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
mere existence of [ ] impairments does not reveal the extent to which they limit [a
claimant’s] ability to work. . . .”); Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 660, 662-63
(11th Cir. 1987) (diagnosis does not equate to existence of impairment); Mansfield v.
Astrue, 395 F. App’x 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2010) (diagnosis insufficient to establish
disability); Osborn v. Barnhart, 194 F. App’x 654, 667 (11th Cir. 2006) (while doctor’s letter
reflected diagnoses, “it does not indicate in any way the limitations these diagnoses
placed on Osborn’s ability to work, a requisite to a finding of disability.”).
The ALJ determined treatment records established Helms had recovered from
her carpal tunnel surgery and had improved symptomology after the surgery, with no
significant abnormal findings upon examination. (Tr. 15). Thus, the ALJ only limited
Helms to frequent, rather than continuous, use of right hand dominant hand controls to
accommodate Helms’s status post carpal tunnel syndrome release. To accommodate
her obesity and alleged issues with walking, the ALJ limited Helms to light work.
Given the medical evidence of Helms’s physical condition as of June 30, 2013, the ALJ
correctly formulated Helms’s RFC.

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III.

The ALJ’s Hypothetical Question to the VE Included All Reasonable
Limitations

At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner “to show the existence of
other jobs in the national economy which, given the claimant’s impairments, the
claimant can perform.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007,
1011 (11th Cir. 1987).

For a vocational expert’s (VE) testimony to constitute

substantial evidence, the ALJ must present a hypothetical question that “comprises all
of the claimant’s impairments.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002).
However, the hypothetical need not include all of the claimant’s symptoms. See Ingram
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007).
Helms argues the VE’s testimony does not constitute substantial evidence
because the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE did not include limitations on the use of her
right hand. However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
finding that Helms failed to manifest disabling impairment in her right hand before the
date last insured, as well as his determination that her testimony about the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms display inconsistency with the medical
and other evidence in the record. The ALJ was not required to include additional
limitations in the hypothetical question to the VE in the present circumstance. See
Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (“the ALJ was not
required to include findings in the hypothetical that the ALJ had properly rejected as
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unsupported”); Moreno v. Astrue, 366 F. App’x 23, 29 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The ALJ did not
err by failing to include [the claimant’s] subjective symptoms in his hypothetical to the
VE because the ALJ was not required to include limitations that it found to be
unsupported.”). In addition to finding Helms could perform her past relevant work,
the ALJ also relied on the VE’s testimony that there exist other jobs in the national and
local economy Helms could perform. Because the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE
included all impairments he properly found existed as of the date last insured, the VE’s
testimony rests on substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court AFFIRMS the ALJ’s finding that Ms.
Helms was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act before her date
last insured.
DONE this 26th day of November, 2018.

____________________________________
HERMAN N. JOHNSON, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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