Crane v. Brennan

Filing 82

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Corey L. Maze on 1/17/2023. (SRD)

FILED
2023 Jan-17 AM 08:56
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
SYLVIA E. CRANE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 4:20-cv-572-CLM

LOUIS DEJOY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sylvia Crane sued the United States Postal Service under the
Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate and retaliation. A jury
found for the USPS on both counts. (Doc. 63). Crane now moves this court
to alter or amend the judgment or grant a new trial under Rule 59. (Doc.
69). For the reasons stated below, the court DENIES her motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, the court may grant a
new trial or alter or amend the judgment. But “new trials trials should
not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict
is against the great, not merely the greater weight of the evidence.” Hewitt
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984). Thus, “[i]f the
jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence, then it is immaterial that . . .
the district judge would have arrived at the same verdict because it is not
[the court’s] place to substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury.” AutoOwners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 571 F.3d 1143, 1145
(11th Cir. 2009). At bottom, “[w]hen there is some support for a jury's
verdict, it is irrelevant what. . . the district judge would have concluded.”
Redd v. City of Phenix City, Ala., 934 F.2d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991).

DISCUSSION
Count 1: Failure to Accommodate
On Count 1, the jury found that Crane failed to prove that she had
a disability. (Doc. 63, p.1). Crane argues that she presented sufficient
evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she had a
disability, and that the jury’s contrary finding was against the great
weight of that evidence. (Doc. 69). Crane points to medical testimony
about her condition, and statements from doctors and medical records
that show her impairment substantially limited major life activities. She
also points out that the defendant did not contest her having a disability
at summary judgment or in closing arguments.
The USPS disagrees. It argues that significant evidence allowed the
jury to find that Crane did not have a disability. (Doc. 77). The USPS
points out that witnesses testified that Crane was a “liar” and a
“dishonest, manipulative victim.” (Doc. 77 at 5). The USPS also argues
that the jurors could have determined that Dr. Lachman’s testimony
(Crane’s psychiatrist) was not credible because she based her medical
opinion on limited information. Even more, Crane’s co-workers and
supervisors’ testimony could have led the jury to reasonably conclude that
Crane did not have a disability.
The court agrees with the USPS that the jury’s finding was not
against the great weight of the evidence. Based on the evidence presented
at trial by both parties, the jury could have reasonably concluded that
Crane failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she had
a disability. So the court DENIES Crane’s Rule 59 motion on Count 1.
Count 2: Retaliation
On Count 2, the jury found that Crane failed to prove that she had
engaged in a protected activity. (Doc. 63, p.2). Crane argues that finding
was against the great weight of that evidence. (Doc. 69).

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In support, Crane points out that she filed multiple EEO complaints
about the USPS’s failure to accommodate her. She argues that the
evidence showed that she based those complaints on a good-faith belief
that the USPS was engaged in unlawful employment practices. She also
argues that at summary judgment and closing arguments, the USPS did
not argue that she did not engage in a protected activity or that she lacked
a good-faith basis for the EEO complaints.
The USPS counters that there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to determine Crane did not have a good faith, reasonable belief as a basis
for her EEO complaints.1 (Doc. 77). The USPS argues that the jury could
have based its decision on her credibility as a plaintiff, her alleging all
types of discrimination in her EEO complaints, and testimony that she
often lied. The USPS also notes that, contrary to Crane’s assertion, it did
argue in closing that the jury should find that Crane failed to prove that
she engaged in a protected activity because Crane lacked a good-faith
belief that the USPS acted because of her alleged disability. See (Doc. 76,
pp. 675-76) (USPS counsel arguing that Crane’s retaliation claim “dies”
on the first element of protected activity).
The court finds that the jury’s verdict was not against the great
weight of the evidence. Considering both parties’ evidence, a reasonable
juror could have determined that Crane failed to prove a good faith,
reasonable basis for her EEO complaints, and thus failed to prove that
she engaged in protected activity. This finding would fit with the jury’s
verdict on Count 1—i.e., the jury found that Crane was not disabled
(Count 1) and Crane lacked a good-faith belief for her EEO complaints
because she knew she was not disabled (Count 2).
So the court DENIES Crane’s Rule 59 motion on Count 2.

1

Following the Eleventh Circuit’s pattern instruction, the court instructed the jury that “action is ‘protected
activity’ if it was based on Crane’s good-faith reasonable belief that USPS discriminated against her because
of her disability. Crane had a ‘good faith’ belief if she honestly believed that USPS discriminated against her
because of her disability.” (Doc. 62, pp. 11-12).

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the court DENIES Crane’s motion to alter
or amend the judgment or for a new trial. (Doc. 69). The court will enter a
separate order that carries out this opinion.
DONE and ORDERED on January 17, 2023.

_________________________________
COREY L. MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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