Collings et al v. Marshall County, Alabama et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OPINION: For reasons stated within, the court will GRANT 11 and 13 and DISMISS Plaintiff's claims against them WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs have until September 20, 2024 to file an amended complaint a nd correct the pleading deficiencies discussed within. Failure to file an amended complaint by this date will result in the court dismissing with prejudice the claims against him. The Court will enter a separate order that carries or this ruling. Signed by Judge Corey L Maze on 9/3/2024. (LCB)

FILED
2024 Sep-03 PM 01:49
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
EUJENA R. COLLINGS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 4:23-cv-349-CLM

MARSHALL COUNTY,
ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiffs Eujena R. Collings and J. Monroe Johnson sue Marshall
County, Samuel Ebeyer, Sheriff Phil Sims, Judge Mitchell Scott Floyd, Major
Jason W. Windsor, and Assistant Chief Deputy Steve Guthrie under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1).
Judge Floyd, Marshall County, and Sheriff Sims move for the court to dismiss
the claims against them. (Docs. 11, 13). Ebeyer, Windsor, and Guthrie have not
answered or otherwise responded to the complaint.
For the reasons stated within, the court will GRANT Judge Floyd,
Marshall County, and Sheriff Sims’ motions to dismiss (docs. 11, 13), and
DISMISS Plaintiffs’ claims against them WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiffs have until September 20, 2024, to file an amended complaint that
corrects the pleading deficiencies discussed below. Failure to file an amended
complaint by this date will lead to the court dismissing with prejudice the
claims against Judge Floyd, Marshall County, and Sheriff Sims.
Plaintiffs are required to serve their amended complaint on Defendants
who have not responded to their original complaint, Marshall County, and
Sheriff Sims on or before October 11, 2024. As explained below, Plaintiffs’
service of these Defendants must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4. Failure to comply with Rule 4 will lead to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims
against these Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

STATEMENT OF THE ALLEGED FACTS
Collings and Johnson allege that several officials in Marshall County
have engaged in “an ongoing; unwarranted & illegal . . . hate, theft, sabotage,
revenge conspiracy” against them and their associate Roger Coit Chappell.
(Doc. 1, p. 11). According to Collings and Johnson, Marshall County has
violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights because Marshall County
officials, including Judge Floyd, Sheriff Sims, Windsor, and Guthrie, have
committed perjury, obstruction of justice, RICO, and Alabama election crimes
against them. (Id., pp. 9–10).
1. Sheriff Sims: Collings and Johnson levy many complaints against the
Sheriff. They allege that Sheriff Sims violated their Fourteenth Amendment
rights by failing to properly evict tenants for Collings and Johnson after an
eviction order was granted. (Id., p. 15). They allege that Sheriff Sims also failed
to serve eight witnesses who could easily be found at work and “is the current,
primary contributing factor for the complete judicial system failure against
Plaintiffs.” (Id.). After Sims was elected Sheriff, civil rights abuses against
Collings and Johnson skyrocketed. (Id.). Sims and Margaret Lacy of Bancorp
South Bank in Guntersville “conspired to steal Plaintiffs’ prime-commercialreal-property valued at approximately one-million dollars . . . after BankerLacey gave away approximately $40K of Plaintiffs’ cash-reserves in order to
attempt to force Plaintiffs into unjust forced bank foreclosure.” (Id.). Collings
and Johnson say that under Sims they have experienced “Alabama-PoliceState-Styled-Totalitarian-Rule.” (Id., p. 16). Collings and Johnson also say that
Sims is either directly or indirectly linked to them being “feverishly-robbed,
viciously-slandered, abusively-shunned, brutally-sabotaged [and] constantlythreatened with the unjust loss of [their] lives, properties, businesses,
reputations, human-rights, civil-rights, sanity, etcetera.” (Id.). Collings and
Johnson say that Sims’ take on their “prime commercial real property heist” is
“Get out of here, this is mine!” (Id.).
2. Judge Floyd: Collings and Johnson allege that Judge Floyd has
violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights because he is “blatantly and
outrageously” biased against them, and a local attorney cannot believe that
Judge Floyd is allowed to hear cases related to Plaintiffs because of the civil
rights violations they have filed against him. (Id., pp. 16–17). Collings and
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Johnson say that in a case Brother Chappell had in front of Judge Floyd, Judge
Floyd threatened Brother Chappell with an unjust arrest for harassment and
sanctioned him with a $4,000 judgment. (Id., p. 17). Brother Chappell then
died after Attorney General Steve Marshall allegedly lied to Plaintiffs by
telling them (a) Johnson would not be falsely arrested again, and (b) Collings
would receive justice in a $40,000 suspicious theft case. (Id.).
3. Major Windsor and Chief Deputy Guthrie: Collings and Johnson’s
claims against Windsor and Guthrie relate to their handling of Johnson and
Chappell’s report of $300,000 in property damage related to theft from their
company First Credit Auto. (Id., pp. 18–20, 105–06). Collings and Johnson say
that for nine months Windsor refused to properly take the report, so they were
only able to file a report “on the last possible day that a report could be filed,”
i.e., a year from the day of the first listed incident. (Id., p. 19). According to
Collings and Johnson, Windsor and Guthrie lied in writing in the report,
refused to contact Collings or Johnson, and wrongfully adjudicated their claims
by closing the case because the “victim refused to cooperate.” (Id., pp. 19–20).
4. Agent Ebeyer: Collings and Johnson say that Ebeyer, a federal agent,
failed to take seriously their claims that Marshall County officials were
engaged in a “hate, theft, sabotage, revenge conspiracy” against them, Brother
Chappell, and Lynn Martin. (Id.). The specific claim that Plaintiffs and their
associates brought to Ebeyer’s attention was that Marshall County law
enforcement “ordered Plaintiff Johnson sexually assaulted in order for Sheriff
Sims to steal Plaintiff Collings’ Marshall County, Alabama, U.S.A., prime
commercial real property; by way of unjust forced foreclosure” and “the state
then moved to provide unjust-protection for the criminal sex offender [and]
simultaneously escalated the state sanctioned violence” against Plaintiffs and
their associates. (Id., p. 14). Ebeyer allegedly “fumbled the case because a
conflict of interest exists between him [and] Marshall County.” (Id., p. 11).
Ebeyer also gaslighted Johnson and Collings, which they say led to Brother
Chappell’s death. (Id.). For example, Ebeyer misled Johnson and Collings into
believing that they needed to make prescheduled appointments with the FBI’s
Gadsden office, refused to make appointments, and canceled one appointment
at the last minute. (Id., p. 12). Ebeyer also made light of Brother Chappell’s
concerns and said that he had time to work on little else than preparing for the
World Games in Birmingham. (Id.).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a Rule 12 motion, this court accepts the allegations in
Plaintiffs’ complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir.
2012). The ultimate question is whether Plaintiffs’ allegations, when accepted
as true, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). If the facts as pleaded could entitle Plaintiffs to relief,
the court must deny Judge Floyd, Marshall County, and Sheriff Sims’ motions
to dismiss. If, however, the court accepts Plaintiffs’ pleaded facts as true, and
Plaintiffs still would not be entitled to relief, the court must grant the motions.
DISCUSSION
A.

Judge Floyd

Collings and Johnson allege that Judge Floyd violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by: (a) being biased against them, (b) threatening Brother
Chappell with an unjust arrest for harassment, and (c) sanctioning Brother
Chappell with a $4,000 judgment. Judge Floyd says that sovereign immunity
bars any official capacity claims Plaintiffs are asserting against him and that
judicial and qualified immunity bar any individual capacity claims that
Plaintiffs are asserting.
1. Sovereign immunity: Collings and Johnson’s complaint suggests that
they are suing Judge Floyd in his official capacity. (Doc. 1, p. 3). “Lawsuits
against a state official in his or her official capacity are suits against the state
when the state is the real, substantial party in interest.” Carr v. City of
Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotations and citations
omitted). This typically means that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars
official capacity claims for monetary damages brought against a state official.
See Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1234 (11th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other
grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Congress hasn’t
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for § 1983 claims, and Alabama
hasn’t waived its immunity. Id. at 1235. So Collings and Johnson cannot bring
official capacity claims for monetary damages against Floyd, a judge for the
State of Alabama.
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The Eleventh Amendment does not, however, bar Collings and Johnson’s
official capacity claims for prospective, injunctive relief. See Carr, 916 F.2d at
1524 n.2. As explained when discussing Judge Floyd’s assertion that he’s
entitled to qualified immunity, these claims are instead subject to dismissal
for failure to state a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
2. Judicial immunity: To the extent that Collings and Johnson sue Judge
Floyd in his individual capacity, “[j]udges are entitled to absolute immunity
from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial
capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Sibley v.
Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). “This
immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were
in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id.
Collings and Johnson’s claims that Judge Floyd was biased against them
and shouldn’t hear their cases, threatened Brother Chappell with unjust
arrest, and sanctioned Brother Chappell with an unjust $4,000 judgment all
relate to alleged acts that Judge Floyd took in his judicial capacity. And
Collings and Johnson haven’t alleged any facts that would suggest that Judge
Floyd’s actions were in clear absence of all jurisdiction. So the court finds that
Judge Floyd is entitled to judicial immunity on any individual capacity claims
brought against him.
3. Qualified immunity: Even if Judge Floyd isn’t entitled to judicial
immunity, he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects
government officials from being sued in their individual capacities so long as
“their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Vineyard v. Wilson,
311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). The Eleventh Circuit applies a two-part test to determine
whether a government official is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.
“First, the official must prove that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct
occurred while he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.
Second, if the official meets that burden, the plaintiff must prove that the
official’s conduct violated clearly established law.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James,
157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).

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Judge Floyd’s actions are reasonably related to his job as a district court
judge for Marshall County. So Judge Floyd was acting within his discretionary
authority, and the burden is on Collings and Johnson to show that Judge Floyd
violated their clearly established constitutional rights.
Collings and Johnson fail to adequately allege that Judge Floyd violated
the Fourteenth Amendment, much less that he committed a clearly established
violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. Though Collings and Johnson
generally allege that Judge Floyd has violated their Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the complaint does not identify which Fourteenth Amendment right he
violated. (See generally Doc. 1). As another judge on this court has explained
to Collings and Johnson, Rule 8 requires more than vague and conclusory
allegations that Judge Floyd violated some abstract Fourteenth Amendment
right. See Johnson v. Marshall Cty., 2022 WL 264547, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 27,
2022). Collings and Johnson instead needed to explain which specific provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment Judge Floyd allegedly violated. For example,
did Judge Floyd violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Procedural Due
Process Clause, or some other Fourteenth Amendment right? Because Collings
and Johnson don’t explain which right Judge Floyd violated, they have not
stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim against him.
Collings and Johnson’s response brief suggests that Judge Floyd violated
Collings’ equal protection rights as she is disabled with a custom-made back
brace because of her five-deteriorated lower back discs. (Doc. 12, p. 3). But
Collings and Johnson do not include these allegations in their complaint, and
they cannot amend their complaint by asserting new allegations in their
response in opposition to Judge Floyd’s motion to dismiss. See Huls v. Llabona,
437 F. App’x 830, 832 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011). Nor does Collings and Johnson’s
response brief allege any facts that plausibly suggest that Judge Floyd’s
actions were because of Collings’ disability.
The specific factual allegations in Collings and Johnson’s complaint don’t
state a § 1983 claim against Judge Floyd either. Most of Collings and Johnson’s
claims against Judge Floyd relate to rulings he made against Brother
Chappell, including threatening him with unjust arrest and sanctioning him
with a $4,000 judgment. (Doc. 1, p. 17). Collings and Johnson lack standing to
bring claims for injuries to Brother Chappell. And because Collings and
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Johnson are pro se, they cannot represent Brother Chappell or his estate in
federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Iriele v. Griffin, 65 F.4th 1280, 1284–85
(11th Cir. 2023). Collings and Johnson’s other claim against Judge Floyd is
that he has been “blatantly and outrageously” biased against them. (Doc. 1, p.
16). But Collings and Johnson provide no examples of Judge Floyd acting
biased towards them. They instead assert that Judge Floyd must be biased
against them because (a) an attorney stated that he had firsthand knowledge
that Judge Floyd was biased, and (b) Judge Floyd shouldn’t be allowed to hear
their state court cases because of the civil rights violations they have filed
against him. (Id., pp. 16–17). These vague and conclusory allegations fail to
show that Judge Floyd violated Collings and Johnson’s constitutional rights.
For all these reasons, the court will grant Judge Floyd’s motion to
dismiss Collings and Johnson’s claims against him.
B.

Marshall County + Sheriff Sims

Marshall County and Sheriff Sims move to dismiss Collings and
Johnson’s claims against them under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5)
and 12(b)(6).
1. Insufficient Service: Under Rule 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to
dismiss the claims against him for insufficient service of process. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(5). Rule 4(j)(2) requires plaintiffs to serve local governments, like
Marshall County, by (a) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to its
chief executive officer, or (b) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed
by state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). Under Alabama law, a county must be
served by “serving the chief executive officer or the clerk, or other person
designated by appointment or by statute to receive service of process, or upon
the attorney general of the state if such service is accompanied by an affidavit
of a party . . . that all such persons . . . are unknown or cannot be located.” Ala.
R. Civ. P. 4(c)(8).
Collings and Johnson say that they have properly served Marshall
County because their process server served the Marshall County Circuit Court
Clerk Angie Johnson with the summons and complaint. (See Doc. 6). The
reference to “the clerk” in Rule 4(c)(8) refers to the clerk of the local government
being sued. See Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Addison, 3 So. 3d 885, 886 n.1
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(Ala. Civ. App. 2008). And Ms. Johnson is not the clerk of the Marshall County
Commission. Nor is she an authorized agent of Marshall County. She instead
is the Circuit Clerk for the 27th Judicial Circuit of Alabama, a separate
governmental entity. The court thus agrees with Marshall County that
Collings and Johnson haven’t adequately served it and will dismiss the claims
against the county under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of
process.
Collings and Johnson also haven’t adequately served Sheriff Sims. A
plaintiff can serve an individual, like Sheriff Sims, by: (a) delivering a copy of
the summons and complaint to him personally; (b) leaving a copy of each at the
individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and
discretion who resides there; or (c) delivering a copy of each to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(e); Ala. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). Collings and Johnson do not claim to have
personally served Sheriff Sims. (See Doc. 8, p. 1). They instead seem to assert
that their process server properly served Sims by “serving a person of suitable
age and discretion then residing in” Sims’ “usual place of abode” when he left
a copy of the complaint with someone in the dispatch office of the Marshall
County Sheriff’s Department. (See id.).
Collings and Johnson haven’t shown that the Sheriff’s Department was
Sims’ usual place of abode, that the person who received the complaint resided
at the Sheriff’s Department, or that the person who received the complaint was
authorized to receive service of process for Sheriff Sims. So the court agrees
with Sheriff Sims that Collings and Johnson’s process server didn’t properly
serve the Sheriff. And though Collings and Johnson later attempted to serve
Sheriff Sims by certified mail, the post office returned the summons with a
COVID-19 notation. (See Doc. 21). As a result, the court will dismiss Collings
and Johnson’s claims against Sheriff Sims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for
insufficient service of process.
2. Failure to state a claim (County): The court will also dismiss Collings
and Johnson’s claims against Marshall County under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The complaint suggests that Collings and Johnson seek to hold Marshall
County liable for the actions of Sheriff Sims, his employees, or Judge Floyd. As
explained above, Johnson and Collings haven’t shown that Judge Floyd
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violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. And in Alabama, sheriffs are
executive officers of the state, so “a sheriff is not an employee of a county for
the purposes of imposing liability on the county.” See Turquitt v. Jefferson Cty.,
137 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 1998). In other words, a sheriff and his officers
“act on behalf of the State, rather than the county, when acting in their law
enforcement capacity.” See McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 789 (1997).
Thus, Collings and Johnson cannot bring claims against Marshall County for
the actions of Sims, Guthrie, or Windsor who all work for the sheriff’s
department.
Even if Collings and Johnson had identified a county employee who
violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights, “[c]ounties and other municipal
entities may be held liable under § 1983 only where action pursuant to official
municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Plowright v.
Miami Dade Cty., 102 F.4th 1358, 1370 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotations omitted).
“This standard requires a plaintiff to show that (1) his constitutional rights
were violated; (2) the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted
deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) the policy or custom
caused the violation.” Id. (quotations omitted). A plaintiff may show a
governmental policy or custom in three ways: (1) an express policy; (2) a
widespread practice so permanent and well-settled that it counts as a custom;
or (3) the act or decision of an official with final policy-making authority. See
Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 285 F.3d 962, 966–68 (11th Cir. 2002).
Collings and Johnson do not allege that Marshall County has an express
policy or custom that led to the violation of their Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Nor have they alleged facts that plausibly suggest that a widespread
and well-settled practice caused their alleged harm. Finally, Collings and
Johnson do not allege that the Marshall County officials who violated their
rights were officials with final policy-making authority. So the court will
dismiss the claims against Marshall County under Rule 12(b)(6).
3. Failure to state a claim (Sheriff Sims): Collings and Johnson also fail
to state a claim against Sheriff Sims. As with their claims against Judge Floyd,
Collings and Johnson do not identify which Fourteenth Amendment right
Sheriff Sims violated. And the only well pleaded factual allegations against
Sheriff Sims are that he: (1) failed to properly serve 8 witnesses; (2) failed to
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evict tenants for Johnson and Collings; and (3) conspired with Lacey to steal
Collings and Johnson’s “prime-commercial-real-property valued at
approximately one-million-dollars.” (Doc. 1, p. 15). Collings and Johnson
haven’t cited, and the court hasn’t found, any authority that would suggest
that failing to serve witnesses violates the Fourteenth Amendment. And this
court has already held that Sheriff Sims did not violate Collings and Johnson’s
constitutional rights by failing to evict past due tenants from their properties.
See Johnson, 2022 WL 264547, at *6. Plus, Collings and Johnson provide no
details about how Sheriff Sims conspired with Lacey to steal their property. As
a result, the court finds that Collings and Johnson haven’t stated a Fourteenth
Amendment claim against Sheriff Sims.
The Eleventh Amendment also bars Collings and Johnson from bringing
claims for monetary damages against Sheriff Sims in his official capacity. See
Melton, 841 F.3d at 1234. And Sheriff Sims has shown that his alleged actions
fall within his discretionary authority, but Collings and Johnson have failed to
meet their burden to show that Sheriff Sims violated a clearly established
constitutional right. So to the extent that Collings and Johnson bring
individual capacity claims for monetary relief against Sheriff Sims, the court
finds that Sheriff Sims is entitled to qualified immunity on those claims. See
Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d at 1282.
In sum, the court will dismiss Collings and Johnson’s claims for
injunctive and monetary relief against Sheriff Sims for failure to state a claim.
The court will also dismiss Collings and Johnson’s claims for monetary relief
against Sheriff Sims because (a) the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for
monetary relief against sheriff’s sued in their official capacities, and (b) Sims
is entitled to qualified immunity for the individual capacity claims for
monetary damages.
C.

Leave to Amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that the court must grant
leave to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
And when a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this court must give him “at least
one chance to amend the complaint before” dismissing his claims with
prejudice if “a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.” Woldeab
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v. Dekalb Cty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). “But a district
court need not grant leave to amend when either (1) the district court has a
clear indication that the plaintiff does not want to amend his complaint, or (2)
a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a claim.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
Collings and Johnson have not stated that they do not want to amend
their complaint. In fact, they have filed several notices with the court alleging
new factual allegations against Defendants. And the court cannot say that a
more carefully drafted complaint could not state a Fourteenth Amendment
claim against Judge Floyd, Sheriff Sims, or Marshall County. So the court will
dismiss Collings and Johnson’s claims against these Defendants without
prejudice and allow Collings and Johnson to re-plead their claims against
them.
If Collings and Johnson choose to amend their complaint, the amended
complaint must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8
and 10. That means that each count in the amended complaint should include
no more than one discrete claim for relief and identify which Defendants
Collings and Johnson are bringing that claim against. The counts in the
amended complaint must also set forth each claim in a short, plain statement
alleging the who, what, when, and where of the claim; referencing the statute,
law, or constitutional provision under which each separate claim is brought;
and specifying the relief sought under each separate claim. For example, a
claim alleging an equal protection violation should explain (a) who allegedly
committed the equal protection violation, (b) what protected characteristic (i.e.,
race, gender, disability) the equal protection claim is based on, (c) how Collings
and Johnson were treated differently than others who didn’t possess that
protected characteristic, and (d) why the protected characteristic is what
caused them to be treated differently.
The court will also require Collings and Johnson to serve their amended
complaint on Marshall County, Sheriff Sims, Ebeyer, Windsor, and Guthrie.
Collings and Johnson’s service of Marshall County must comply with the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(j)(2) and Alabama Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(c)(8) discussed above. Service of Sheriff Sims, Ebeyer,
Windsor, and Guthrie must comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 4(e) and Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(1), which the
court has discussed in explaining why Collings and Johnson have failed to
properly serve Sheriff Sims. Collings and Johnson may serve these Defendants
by any method allowed under Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) but must
make sure to comply with the rules for the method of service that they choose.
The court finally notes that Collings and Johnson have filed several
notices with the court that include factual allegations not made in their
original complaint. If Collings and Johnson choose to file an amended
complaint, the court will consider only the allegations and claims set forth in
the amended complaint when ruling on any motions to dismiss that are filed.
The court will not consider any allegations not included in the
amended complaint. So Collings and Johnson’s amended complaint must set
forth all the facts that support their claims and must not refer back to the
original complaint or any other court filing.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will GRANT Judge Floyd, Marshall County,
and Sheriff Sims’ motions to dismiss (docs. 11, 13), and DISMISS Plaintiffs’
claims against them WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiffs have until September 20, 2024, to file an amended complaint
that corrects the pleading deficiencies discussed below. Failure to file an
amended complaint by September 20, 2024, will lead to the court dismissing
with prejudice the claims against Judge Floyd, Marshall County, and Sheriff
Sims.
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Plaintiffs are required to serve their amended complaint on Defendants
who have not responded to their original complaint, Marshall County, and
Sheriff Sims on or before October 11, 2024. Plaintiffs’ service of Defendants
must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Failure to comply with
Rule 4 will lead to dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against these Defendants
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
The court will enter a separate order that carries out this ruling.
Done and Ordered on September 3, 2024.

_________________________________
COREY L. MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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