Carden v. Springfield Mortuary Service Inc et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION: For reasons stated within, the court DENIES Springfield's motion 21 and DEFERS RULING on transfer pending a status conference with the parties. The Court SETS a telephone status conference on Wednesday, September 11, 2024 at 2:00 p.m. and will enter a separate order that contains dial-in information for this conference. Signed by Judge Corey L Maze on 9/3/2024. (LCB)

FILED
2024 Sep-03 PM 03:51
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
DIANE CARDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 4:23-cv-1053-CLM

SPRINGFIELD MORTUARY
SERVICE INC., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Diane Carden’s son died in Missouri. Carden arranged to have her
son’s body returned in time for his funeral. But various errors resulted in
his body’s late arrival—in a state of decomposition. Carden sues multiple
defendants involved in the transport for outrage, negligence/wantonness,
and negligent/wanton hiring, training, and supervision.
Each defendant answered Carden’s complaint, except one:
Springfield Mortuary Service, Inc. 1 Springfield moves to dismiss the
claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.
For the reasons stated within, the court DENIES Springfield’s
motion. (Doc. 21). In the alternative, Springfield moves to transfer venue
to the Western District of Missouri. (Id.) The court DEFERS RULING
on transfer pending a status conference with the parties.

1 The court identified a motion to dismiss within Southwest’s answer (doc. 25) and set a briefing
schedule on that motion, ordering Southwest to file a separate motion that complies with this
court’s Rules. (Doc. 28). Southwest did not respond, so the court considers its motion forfeited.
The only motion to dismiss before the court now is Springfield’s.

BACKGROUND
A. The delayed transport
Michael Ryan Akins passed away on October 2, 2021, in Springfield,
Missouri. His mother, Diane Carden, lives in Alabama and wished her son
to be buried in Alabama a week later. So Carden arranged with a local
funeral service, Alabama Cremation and Funeral Services, LLC
(“Alabama Cremation”), to ensure that her son was returned in time for
an open-casket funeral one week later (October 9).
Alabama Creation contracted with the Defendants, Inman Shipping
Worldwide, LLC (“Inman Shipping”), Eagle’s Wings Air, LLC (“Eagle’s
Wings”), Southwest Airlines, Co. (“Southwest”), and Springfield Mortuary
Service, Inc. (“Springfield”), to ensure Akins’ body was properly preserved
and transported. On the morning of the funeral, Southwest was to fly
Akins’ body to Alabama, with the plane departing from Kansas City at
6:05 AM and landing in Birmingham at 10:50 AM. Springfield and Inman
Shipping were to deliver the body to the airport no more than 12 hours
before takeoff.
Unfortunately, someone delivered Akins’ body to the airport three
days before the flight. And Southwest or Eagle’s Wings accepted Akin’s
body nearly three days early even though they lacked proper storage.
Realizing that it possessed a corpse that it could not properly store,
Southwest called Springfield to retrieve Akin’s body. But Springfield
never answered. So Southwest ultimately loaded Akin’s improperly stored
body onto a plane on October 9th. But Akins’ body didn’t arrive in
Birmingham until October 11—two days after the scheduled funeral.
So Carden had to reschedule her son’s funeral multiple times. When
she finally received her son, his body had significantly decomposed. It had
turned color and was bulging, swollen, and blistering. It also produced a
strong, foul odor.

B. The lawsuit
Carden sued Springfield, Southwest, Inman Shipping, and Eagle’s
Wings for Negligence/Wantonness, Outrage, and Negligent/Wanton
Hiring, Training, and Supervision. Because none of these defendants
reside in Alabama, and Carden seeks more than $75,000 in damages, this
court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Springfield,
however, challenges (1) the court’s personal jurisdiction over it, and (2)
venue being proper in the Northern District of Alabama. (Doc. 21).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a Rule 12 motion, the court accepts the
allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and views them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267,
1275 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Moore v. Cecil, 488 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1155
(N.D. Ala. 2020). If the facts as pleaded could give rise to an entitlement
of relief, then the court must deny the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). If, however, the
court accepts the pleaded facts as true, and the plaintiff “still would not
be entitled to relief, the court must grant the motion.” Moore, 488 F. Supp.
3d at 1155.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant.” Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288
F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted). A prima facie case
of personal jurisdiction “is established if the plaintiff presents enough
evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict.” Id. (quoting Madara
v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). Similar to a 12(b)(2)
standard, to survive a 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing a prima facie showing of venue. Home Ins. v.
Thomas Indus., Inc., 896 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1990). When deciding
either motion, the court looks to the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s
complaint and takes the facts as true “to the extent they are
uncontroverted by defendants’ affidavits.” Id.

DISCUSSION
1. Personal Jurisdiction
Springfield is based in Missouri and does business in Missouri.
Springfield argues that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it
because Springfield did not conduct any actions, or make any omissions,
related to Carden’s case in Alabama. (Doc. 21 at 6).
A. Legal standard
“[A] federal court generally undertakes a two-step analysis to
determine whether there is personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged sufficient facts to subject the defendant to the forum state’s longarm statute. Second, if the court determines that the forum state’s longarm statute has been satisfied, it must then decide whether the exercise
of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.
2022) (citations omitted). Fortunately, these inquiries merge because
Alabama’s long-arm statue grants jurisdiction over nonresidents to the
fullest extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir.
2007); see also Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2. So the question is whether exercising
personal jurisdiction over Springfield would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
“At bottom, due process prohibits the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless its contacts with the
state are such that it has a fair warning that it may be subject to suit
there.” Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 360 (2021)). A nonresident
defendant’s contacts with a state can be evaluated one of two ways: “(1)
the plaintiff can show that the defendant has continual and systematic
contact with the State (i.e. ‘general jurisdiction’), or (2) the plaintiff can
establish a substantial connection between the conduct at issue and the

state where the lawsuit was filed (i.e. ‘specific jurisdiction’).” Moore, 488
F. Supp. 3d at 1156. The parties (and court) agree that general
jurisdiction is lacking because Springfield does not have continual and
systematic business in Alabama.
So Carden must show specific jurisdiction. When looking for specific
jurisdiction, courts examine “whether (1) the plaintiff’s claims ‘arise out
of or relate to’ one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state; (2) the
nonresident defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state; and (3) the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is in accordance with traditional notions of ‘fair play
and substantial justice.’” Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275. Carden must plead
enough facts to establish the first two elements. See id. If she does,
Springfield must then “make a compelling case that the exercise of
jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
B. Carden’s claims
Carden pleads three state-law claims against Springfield: Count I
alleges Negligence/Wantonness (doc. 16, ¶¶ 37-43); Count II alleges
Outrage (¶¶ 44-50); and, Count III alleges Negligent/Wanton Hiring,
Training, and Supervision. (¶¶ 51-55). The court starts with Count II
(outrage) so that it can then group the negligence-based claims.
o Count II: Outrage
In Alabama, the tort of outrage punishes conduct “so outrageous in
character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society.” Wilson v. Univ. of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C.,
266 So. 3d 674, 677 (Ala. 2017) (quoting Horne v. TGM Assocs., L.P., 56
So.3d 615, 631 (Ala. 2010)). The state supreme court has recognized that
wrongful conduct in the family-burial context may constitute tortious
outrage. See Whitt v. Hulsey, 519 So. 2d 901 (Ala. 1987).

In short, Carden alleges that Springfield agreed to preserve and
store her son’s body in Missouri, then ensure that it was transported to
Alabama, but failed so outrageously that a reasonable person would find
Springfield’s conduct to be atrocious and utterly intolerable. See Wilson,
266 So. 3d at 677.
Again, the court has specific personal jurisdiction over this claim if
(1) it arises out of or relates to Springfield’s contact with Alabama; (2)
Springfield purposefully conducted business in Alabama; and, (3) it would
not violate fair play and substantial to force Springfield to litigate in
Alabama. Del Valle, 56 F. 4th at 1275. Carden has the burden for the first
two elements; Springfield bears the third (if applicable).
a.

Relatedness

Under the first element, Carden’s outrage claim arises from and
relates to Springfield’s contact with Alabama. Carden alleges that
Springfield agreed to work with an Alabama-based funeral home
(Alabama Cremation and Funeral Services LLC) to ensure that Akin’s
body was returned to Alabama. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 15-18). If Carden had not
agreed with an Alabamian to preserve then ship Akin’s body to Alabama,
then the alleged outrageous conduct (i.e., the late return of a corpse
suffering from odor, swelling, and advanced decomposition) would not
have occurred. See Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1314
(11th Cir. 2018) (“a tort ‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to’ the defendant’s
activity in a state only if the activity is a ‘but-for’ cause of the tort”); see
also SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211, 1230 (11th Cir. 2023).
b.

Purposeful Availment

Under the second element, the same alleged facts establish that
Springfield purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in
Alabama. There are two ways to show that a defendant purposefully
availed itself within the forum state: the “effects” test and the minimum
contacts test. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984); see Louis Vuitton
Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1356 (11th Cir. 2013). Carden

need pass only one test to satisfy specific personal jurisdiction. SkyHop
Techs., Inc., 58 F.4th at 1230. She does under the Calder “effects” test.
The Calder “effects” test requires that three things be shown: the
tort “(1) [was] intentional; (2) [was] aimed at the forum state; and (3)
caused harm that the defendant should have anticipated would be
suffered in the forum state.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1356 (citing
Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1285-88 (11th Cir. 2008)). Carden
pleads facts that would show all three. First, Carden alleges that
Springfield intended to preserve then ship Akin’s body to Alabama.
Second, the shipping of Akin’s body to Alabama for a funeral in Alabama
shows that Springfield aimed its conduct at Alabama. And third,
Springfield should have expected that failing to properly and timely ship
Akin’s body to Alabama for a funeral in Alabama would cause outrage in
Alabama.
—
For these reasons, Carden has met her burden of establishing the
first two elements of specific personal jurisdiction. Del Valle, 56 F.4th at
1275. The burden now shifts to Springfield to make a “compelling case”
that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction would not violate traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.
c.

Fair Play and Substantial Justice

To determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the court considers
“(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum’s interest in adjudicating
the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief; and (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in resolving
the dispute.” Id. at 1277 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (quotation marks omitted)). Springfield makes
no argument under this test, so it has waived any argument that
defending the claims in the Northern District of Alabama would offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 1275; (Doc.

29, p. 10). Nor would the court be likely to agree with any such argument,
as Carden has a significant interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief in Alabama, where she resides.
—
For these reasons, the court finds that it has personal jurisdiction
over Springfield for Count II (state-law outrage).
o Counts I and III (negligence and wantonness)
Carden’s other claims against Springfield are based in negligence
and wantonness: Count I focuses on Springfield’s negligent and wanton
conduct related to the treatment of Akin’s body, and Count III focuses on
Springfield’s negligent and wanton training of persons who mishandled
Akin’s body.
Having personal jurisdiction over Springfield for Count II doesn’t
necessarily vest personal jurisdiction over Springfield for Counts I and III.
A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, governs the exercise of
supplemental subject matter jurisdiction but does not address
supplemental or pendent personal jurisdiction. Id. So the court must look
to Eleventh Circuit precedent to see if pendent personal jurisdiction
exists. See 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 1069.7 (4th ed.).
Eleventh Circuit law on the issue is sparse, but the rule appears to
be that “personal jurisdiction over one individual claim cannot be
expanded to cover other related claims unless the claims ‘arose from the
same jurisdiction generating event.’” RMS Titanic, Inc. v. Kingsmen
Creatives, Ltd., 579 Fed. Appx. 779, 788 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cronin
v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 663, 671 (11th Cir. 1993)). As explained,
Springfield’s agreement to preserve and ship Akin’s body to Alabama,
followed by the actual shipment of Akin’s body to Alabama, established
specific personal jurisdiction for Count II. Counts I and III arise from the
same events because both depend on proving that Springfield or its agents

negligently or wantonly preserved and shipped Akin’s body to Alabama.
So the court finds that it has pendent jurisdiction over Counts I and III.
—
To sum up, the court has personal jurisdiction over Springfield for
Counts I, II, and III. So the court will DENY Springfield’s motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
2. Dismissal because of Improper Venue
Springfield next argues that the court should dismiss Carden’s
complaint under Rule 12(b)(3) because the Northern District of Alabama
is an improper venue. (Doc. 21, pp. 8-10).
A. Applicable law
To begin, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that “[a] civil action may be
brought in—(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; [or]
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred….” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 55-56 (2013). Rule 12(b)(3) and 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) permit dismissal of a complaint only when venue is
“wrong” or “improper.” Id. at 55. As the Supreme Court put it:
Section 1406(a) provides that ‘[t]he district court of a district
in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or
district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could
have been brought.’ Rule 12(b)(3) states that a party may
move to dismiss a case for ‘improper venue.’ These provisions
therefore authorize dismissal only when venue is ‘wrong’ or
‘improper’ in the forum in which it was brought.”
Id.

So when venue is challenged, the court must first determine
whether the case falls into one of § 1391(b)’s categories. If it does, venue
is proper. If not, venue is improper, meaning the case must then be
dismissed or transferred under § 1406(a). Id. at 56. “A plaintiff has the
burden of showing that venue in the forum is proper.” In re Blue Cross
Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 225 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1289–90 (N.D. Ala.
2016).
B. The Northern District of Alabama is a Proper Venue.
1. Section 1391(b)(1): Under § 1391(b)(1), venue is proper in “a
judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located.” 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(1). Carden says venue is proper because (a) the court has personal
jurisdiction over Springfield and (b) the other defendants waived personal
jurisdiction which establishes residency for purposes of venue. (Doc. 29,
pp. 12, 13).
To determine residency of corporations for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(1), courts look to § 1391(c)(2), which states a corporation “shall be
deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which [it] is
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action
in question.” 28 U.S.C § 1391(c)(2). And a party waives the right to dispute
personal jurisdiction “if the party fails to assert that objection in its first
Rule 12 motion, other responsive pleading or general appearance.”
Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1218 n.21 (11th
Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)).
At present, it is unclear whether all parties have waived personal
jurisdiction (see Doc. 16, p. 4, ¶ 13; Doc. 22, p.3, ¶ 13; Doc. 23, p. 3, ¶ 13),
and the parties have not fully briefed this issue. Because § 1391(b) is
disjunctive, the court turns to § 1391(b)(2) to determine whether the
Northern District of Alabama is a proper venue, rather than speculate
about the applicability of § 1391(b)(1).

2. Section 1391(b)(2): Venue is proper under § 1391(b)(2) in “a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred….” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Under §
1391(b)(2), when evaluating where a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to a claim occurred, “the Eleventh Circuit has made
clear that ‘[o]nly the events that directly give rise to a claim are relevant’
and that ‘only those acts and omissions that have a close nexus to the
wrong’ are properly weighed in the ‘substantial part’ analysis.” Morgan v.
N. MS Med. Ctr., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1123 (S.D. Ala. 2005), aff'd
sub nom. Morgan v. N. Mississippi Med. Ctr., Inc., 225 F. App’x 828 (11th
Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). In fact, under § 1391, a plaintiff “does not
have to select the venue with the most substantial nexus to the dispute,
as long as she chooses a venue where a substantial part of the events
giving rise to the claim occurred.” Id. at 1122 (finding Alabama a proper
venue under § 1391(b)(2) because the plaintiff relied heavily on Alabama
events to prove his claim, even though part of the events occurred in
Mississippi). The burden of “showing that venue in the forum is proper”
remains with Carden. In re Blue Cross, 225 F. Supp. 3d at 1289–90.
Springfield argues that the Northern District of Alabama is an
improper venue under § 1391(b)(2) because it says a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Missouri, not
Alabama. According to Springfield, the decedent was injured and passed
away in Missouri, his remains were taken into possession, embalmed,
prepared for shipping, transported, and scheduled for a flight in Missouri,
and his body allegedly remained at the airport in Missouri for three days.
(Doc. 21, pp. 9-10). Of course, this is true; many of the relevant events—
perhaps even most of the events—happened in Missouri.
But Carden says venue is proper in Alabama because a substantial
part of the events that led to this case happened in Alabama. The court
agrees. To demonstrate, here are the elements the court would explain
when instructing jury on the tort of outrage:

(1) the defendant intended to cause plaintiff emotional
distress, or the defendant should have known that his its
conduct was likely to caused plaintiff emotional distress;
(2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, in
which it goes beyond all bounds of human decency, and it is
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
society;
(3) that the defendant’s intentional or reckless conduct
caused plaintiff emotional distress; and
(4) that plaintiff’s emotional distress was so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Ala. Pattern Jury Instruction Civil 29.03 (3d ed. 2021). The first two
elements require evidence of Springfield’s conduct in Missouri. But the
last two elements require evidence of events that happened in Alabama.
So what relevant events occurred in Alabama? Carden says from
October 6 to October 9, she had phone calls in Alabama with Springfield
concerning the preservation and transportation of the decedent’s remains
after her son’s remains were delivered to the airport three days early and
were “rapidly deteriorating.” (Doc. 16, p. 7, ¶¶ 31-32). She then waited on
the body in Alabama for two days, from October 9 when the body was
loaded onto the airplane until October 11, when her son’s remains finally
arrived. (Doc. 16, p.p. 7-8, ¶¶ 33-34). Then when they did arrive, Carden
discovered they were in a state of advanced decomposition: the body was
“bulging, swollen, turning colors, and beginning to blister.” (Doc. 16, p. 8,
¶ 35). And Springfield knew its conduct would directly impact an Alabama
resident; Springfield’s services were arranged and paid for in Alabama;
Springfield spoke directly with Carden in Alabama multiple times; and
Carden was injured by Springfield’s tortious conduct in Alabama. (Doc.
29, pp. 14-15) (citing Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, Inc. v. Gormezano, No.
12-60888-civ, 2012 WL 3244664, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012) (referencing

cases holding that “substantial events occurred within a venue when
harm or injury was suffered in that venue”)).
These Alabama-based events bear a “close nexus” to Springfield’s
conduct and directly give rise to her claims. See Morgan, 403 F. Supp. 2d
at 1123; (Doc. 29, p. 8). And thanks to Carden’s burden of proof, these
Alabama-based events will figure prominently at trial—i.e., the jury must
determine whether Springfield caused Carden’s emotional distress in
Alabama and whether the Alabama-based distress was so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it. See 2 Ala. Pattern Jury
Instructions Civil 29.03 (3d ed. 2021). So even if a substantial part of
events giving rise to Carden’s claims occurred in Missouri, a substantial
part of relevant events also happened in the Northern District of
Alabama, making venue proper here under § 1391(b)(2). See Morgan, 403
F. Supp. 2d at 1123. The court will therefore DENY Springfield’s motion
to dismiss because of improper venue.
3. Transfer Under § 1404(a)
Last, Springfield argues that, in lieu of dismissal, the court should
transfer this case to the Western District of Missouri under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a). (Doc. 21, pp. 10-14). The parties have briefly addressed
arguments for and against transfer, but the court requires more facts to
determine the most appropriate venue.
So the court SETS a telephone status conference 2 for Wednesday,
September 11, 2024, at 2:00 PM CDT, during which the parties should
be prepared to present arguments on these factors:
(1) the convenience of the witnesses;
(2) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease
of access to sources of proof;
(3) the convenience of the parties;
The parties jointly moved to amend the scheduling order on June 21, 2024. (Doc. 37). The
parties should also be prepared to discuss this motion with the court during the telephone
conference.

2

(4) the locus of operative facts;
(5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of
unwilling witnesses;
(6) the relative means of the parties;
(7) a forum’s familiarity with the governing law;
(8) the weight accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum; and
(9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice, based on the
totality of the circumstances.
Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated within, the court DENIES Springfield’s
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. (Doc. 21).
The court withholds ruling on Springfield’s alternative motion to transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The court will conduct a telephone status conference on
Wednesday, September 11, 2024, at 2:00 PM CDT to discuss whether
the court should transfer the action to the Western District of Missouri.
The court will enter a separate order that contains the dial-in information
for this conference.
Done on September 3, 2024.

_________________________________
COREY L. MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE