Campos v. Coast Personel Services Inc et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: As further set out in order, 31 , Benchmark's Motion for Summary Judgment, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 29 , Coast Personnel's Motion for Summary Judgment, is GRANTED; Coast Personnel is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 39 , MOTION to Strike 35 Reply to Response to Motion, is DENIED AS MOOT. In sum, Campos may proceed to trial on her claim for retaliatory discharge against Benchmark. All other claims and defendants are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 06/06/12. (CVA)
FILED
2012 Jun-06 PM 12:19
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ILDA CAMPOS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COAST PERSONNEL
SERVICES INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action Number
5:10-cv-2497-AKK
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are Defendants Coast Personnel Services, Inc. (“Coast
Personnel”) and Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc.’s (“Benchmark”) motions
for summary judgment against Plaintiff Ilda P. Campos (“Campos”), docs. 29, 31,
and Benchmark’s motion to strike portions of Sandra Lanier’s affidavit testimony
submitted by Campos in opposition to summary judgment, doc. 39. For the
reasons stated more fully below, the court DENIES Benchmark’s motion as it
relates to the retaliatory discharge claim, but GRANTS the motion in all other
respects. The court GRANTS Coast Personnel’s summary judgment motion and
DISMISSES Coast Personnel with prejudice. The court also DENIES
Benchmark’s motion to strike as moot.
A Pretrial Conference will be held on August 20, 2012 at 8:00 A.M. at the
Federal Courthouse in Huntsville, Alabama. This case is set for jury trial on
Page 1 of 35
October 9, 2012 at 9:00 A.M. at the Federal Courthouse in Huntsville,
Alabama.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” To
support a summary judgment motion, the parties must cite to “particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Moreover, “Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish that
there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must construe the
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to
Page 2 of 35
the non-moving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970);
see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual
allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v.
England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald
Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Moreover,
“[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not
suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for
that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action arises from Campos’ former employment with Benchmark. See
doc. 1. Benchmark originally hired Campos, a Hispanic woman from Pedras N.
Coahuila, Mexico, doc. 33-5, at 36, through Coast Personnel, a temporary staffing
agency, in September 2006 for a temporary position at its Bradford facility, id. at
62-63. Campos worked in Benchmark’s “quality control” department and earned
$9.50 an hour, id. at 61, 75, but Benchmark eliminated her position in January
2007 due to a reduction in work, doc. 36-1, at 3. About two months later,
Benchmark, again through Coast Personnel, rehired Campos to work in the quality
control department for $9.00 an hour and assigned her to its HSI facility. Doc. 335, at 71-72, 76. Coast Personnel’s on-site supervisor at Benchmark’s HSI facility,
Willette Logan (“Logan”), originally contacted Campos about this position, id. at
Page 3 of 35
71, and Robert Rice, Benchmark’s Quality Control Manager, hired Campos, id. at
72. Campos claims that Philip Cagle (“Cagle”), a Coast Personnel employee, set
her $9.00 an hour wage even though Robert Rice promised to pay her the $9.50
rate she earned while working at Benchmark’s Bradford facility. Id. at 75-76.
Cagle denies ever setting Campos’ hourly wage, doc. 36-3, at 9, and Logan asserts
that Benchmark set the pay rates for Coast Personnel temporary employees, doc.
33-1, at 19.
Campos maintains that David Paden (“Paden”), Campos’ immediate
supervisor at Benchmark, transferred her to an out-of-box auditor (“OBA”)
position even though Benchmark hired Campos as an “In Process Inspector” for
the HSI facility. See doc. 35, at 5-6. However, Campos admits that she began
working as an OBA on the first day. Doc. 33-5, at 80-81. Nonetheless, Campos
submits affidavit testimony from co-employee Sandra Lanier (“Lanier”) that “the
Out of Box Auditor is less desirable than Quality Control Inspector position
because it is more physically intensive, requires less skill, and less prestigious . . .
[and that] being moved from Quality Control Inspector to Out of Box Auditor
would have been a demotion.” Doc. 36-4, at 2. Moreover, Campos asserts that
Benchmark assigned her to work as the sole OBA at the HSI facility even though
two people traditionally performed this job. Doc. 33-5, at 145.
Campos also contends that Paden made certain discriminatory remarks.
Specifically, Campos claims that in February 2008 Paden mentioned Taco Bell to
a co-employee and the two started laughing while looking at Campos—when
Page 4 of 35
Campos complained to Paden about this comment, Paden replied “Don’t complain,
just do your work.” Doc. 33-5, at 87-89. Also in February 2008, Paden stated
four times, “I won’t make my team to learn Spanish,” id. at 93-94, and made
comments about a “Chicano accent,” id. at 101-02. Campos again purportedly
confronted Paden regarding the offensive nature of these comments, and, after this
discussion on February 14, 2008, Paden stopped making similar remarks. Id. at
100. Campos also complained to Coast Personnel’s on-site supervisor Logan and
to Benchmark’s human resources supervisor (Jayne Anne Higginbotham
(“Higginbotham”)) and director (Faye Robinson (“Robinson”)). Id. at 100, 252.
Paden denies making any derogatory or discriminatory comments to Campos and
also denies that Campos complained to him. Doc. 33-4, at 91, 184-85, 188.
However, Lanier, a Benchmark employee at the HSI facility, attested to Paden
making the statement “‘I don’t want my employees to have to learn Spanish.’”
Doc. 36-4, at 2.
On April 16, 2008, Campos applied for a permanent position with
Benchmark as a Quality Control Technician I (“Quality Tech I”) in the HSI
facility. Doc. 33-5, at 113. Paden informed Campos that he needed to sign the
application and stated “[b]ring [the application] to me because you are not going
to go anywhere if I don’t sign it.” Id. Although Benchmark posted this position,
Higginbotham testified that Benchmark’s corporate office had not actually
approved the position. Doc. 33-3, at 16. More specifically, the “corporate office
in Texas is the one that approved our jobs . . . . [O]ur supervisors or managers
Page 5 of 35
would put in for the number of people they needed. It would go off to corporate
and they would make a decision on whether they approved it or not . . . . I didn’t
want to, but it would get posted yes. But I would always put up there
unapproved.” Id. In other words, “in order to get interest from the people that
were already working there through Coast or whatever, we would go ahead and
post these [unapproved positions] so that we would have resumes and applications
ready for when the job did come open.” Id. at 23. And indeed, Campos submits
the Benchmark facility’s “Job Posting” which states that the Quality Tech I
position was “unapproved,” doc. 36-5, and admits that she was unaware of the
approval process, doc. 33-5, at 115.
Nevertheless, Campos testified that after she gave her application to Paden,
he failed to submit it to human resources or to Larry Coleman (“Coleman”),
Benchmark’s then quality control director. Id. at 119-20. As a result, Campos
complained to Higginbotham, asserting that “I have been discriminated because he
[Paden] is hiding my application somewhere. He doesn’t want me to apply for the
quality control position, the permanent full-time position.” Id. at 194. When
Higginbotham called Paden to inquire about the application, Paden told her that
Coleman had the application. Doc. 33-3, at 38. Indeed, Paden testified that he
gave Campos’ application to Coleman. Doc. 33-4, at 94. Logan also testified that
“Larry Coleman, the Quality Manager, had her application, so if another position
is posted, he could submit her application.” Doc. 33-1, at 36. Interestingly,
Coleman testified that he had no recollection of receiving a paper application from
Page 6 of 35
Paden or Campos and that he is unaware of Benchmark posting unapproved job
positions or that any Benchmark quality auditor positions were available in April
or May 2008. Doc. 33-2, at 43-44. In any event, Campos also complained to
Logan that she thought Benchmark was not responding to this April 2008
application because of her national origin. Id. at 60. In response, Logan asked
Campos whether this was a “formal complaint,” and, according to Logan, Campos
responded in the negative and stated that she “just wanted to make sure her
application was turned in.” Id. at 60-61, 114.
Campos began some form of “article inspection” training with Benchmark
employee David Gordy in April 2008. Doc. 33-5, at 127. Campos claims,
however, that Paden interfered by assigning Campos work in the Materials Review
Board (“MRB”) facility or warehouse thereby decreasing her time for this new
training. Id. at 130. Campos also provides that Paden failed to provide the proper
computer software or equipment to adequately complete this training, and when
Campos asked Paden about the deficiency, Paden responded “Well, you will see
what is going to happen.” Id. at 135-37. Campos also purportedly complained to
Logan and Higginbotham about Paden assigning her to work in the MRB facility
or warehouse. Id. at 158. Paden disputes this allegation and testified that he
created a training packet for Campos regarding Incoming Quality Assurance
(“IQA”), see doc. 33-4, at 131, 198-99, but the employees training Campos told
Paden that “she was having a hard time grasping the concept of IQA,” id. at 131.
As such, Paden wanted Campos to “cross-train” in the MRB facility when she had
Page 7 of 35
time from her OBA work. Id. at 66-67, 132, 194-95. Similarly, Logan provided
that “at one point [Campos] wanted to become full-time. They did not have an
opening at that time to be full-time. But it was in the works of a Quality Tech job
coming available. And they were going to give her the material that she would
need to get training for that. So when that position came available, she could
apply.” Doc. 33-1, at 29. Campos denies receiving any written training materials
from Paden. Doc. 33-5, at 130.
Campos further contends that Benchmark treated Shelly Markum, a
Caucasian woman and regular Benchmark employee, more favorably by providing
Markum training and a promotion in the beginning of 2008. Doc. 33-5, at 164.
Similarly, Campos provides that Estella Davis, an African American woman and
Coast Personnel employee, received better “mechanical technician” training
allowing her to perform “more skilled” work. Id. at 217, 222, 248. Finally,
Campos claims that Benchmark treated Becky Moore, a Caucasian woman and
Coast Personnel employee, more favorably because she too received better
training. Id. at 220-22.
The parties disagree on the events that led to Campos’ discharge. Coleman
testified that Campos came to his office two weeks before her termination and
requested “to be trained for an inspector position that I told her I did not have
available, that there was a potential down the road that I could and was willing to
give her training when she was not doing her typical - - her day-to-day work.”
Doc. 33-2, at 12-13. Accordingly, Coleman asked Paden and Shelly Markum to
Page 8 of 35
train Campos for an inspector position. Id. at 16-17. Coleman provided that
subsequently, on May 13, 2008, Campos “demanded to be trained full time until
she was qualified and then for [Coleman] to give her an inspector job.” Id. at 17.
Coleman informed Campos that he could not accommodate this request, at which
point Campos “became irate and said that I was holding her back, that I was a
racist, that I was holding her nationality against her.” Id. at 18. Coleman testified
that he attempted to explain to Campos that he had no such position available, but
Campos “kept calling [Coleman] a racist even to the point where she was calling
[Coleman] a racist pig.” Id. at 18-19. Coleman purportedly called Logan to join
them in his office, and Logan also attempted to calm Campos down; however,
Coleman stated that Campos “continued to raise her voice and yell - - it was
mostly pointed at me about being a racist pig. And at that point I can’t have an
employee working for me that is screaming and yelling at me, so at that point I
terminated her.” Id. at 19.
Logan corroborated Coleman’s testimony that Coleman called her to his
office for a meeting with Campos, and that “they started talking about [Campos’]
training for her job, that she wanted to train eight hours a day for the job that they
had offered her the material on. But she couldn’t train eight hours a day because
she still had her other function of her job that she was doing.” Doc. 33-1, at 41.
Logan also provided that Campos “wanted written a guarantee that when this job
comes available, that she would get the job,” but Coleman informed Campos that
he could not provide this written guarantee. Id. at 42. Eventually, Logan asserted,
Page 9 of 35
Campos “escalate[d] her voice. I asked her to calm down, and she wouldn’t calm
down. And then it escalated to the point of that she called Mr. Coleman a racist
pig. And looked at me and called me a racist pig. And at that time, Mr. Coleman
told her that her services were no longer needed at Benchmark.” Id. at 44. Indeed,
Logan provided that Coleman discharged Campos for insubordination because she
called him a racist pig. Id.
Campos offers a different version of the events. Specifically, Campos
maintains that, on May 13, 2008, Logan called her into Coleman’s office, where
Coleman informed Campos that he planned to transfer her from her position as an
OBA to the MRB facility but still under the supervision of Paden. Doc. 33-5, at
168-69. Campos provided that she responded “David Paden? Why you going to
send me to David Paden? You know, why are you going to send me if he’s treated
me that way?” Coleman then purportedly stated “You know what, You are done
with Benchmark,” and Logan furthered “You are terminated.” Id. at 169
(emphasis added). Campos also testified that she never called Coleman or Logan
a “racist.” Id. at 172-73. Rather, Campos provided that she said “[y]ou are
discriminating [against] me because I’m Hispanic, and what you just did is
discriminating [against] me.” Id. at 173. After being escorted out of Benchmark’s
HSI facility, Campos went to Benchmark’s Bradford facility and complained to
Robinson, Benchmark’s human resources director, about her termination. Id. at
201. Furthermore, Lanier asserted that “[f]ollowing Ms. Campos’s termination I
recall Toni Gipson a white female taking over Plaintiff’s job duties.” Doc. 36-4.
Page 10 of 35
After her termination, Campos applied—through Coast Personnel—for a
quality control technician position at “SCI” and another quality position with
General Electric. Doc. 33-5, at 232. Campos interviewed for the SCI position but
neither company hired her. Id. at 234-36. See also doc. 33-1, at 51. However, as
it relates to the SCI position, the SCI interviewing supervisor requested a hold on
Coast Personnel hiring for this position. Doc. 33-7, at 2.
Campos filed separate but virtually identical Charges of Discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Benchmark
and Coast Personnel on July 28, 2008, alleging race, national origin, and
retaliation discrimination. Doc. 17, at 7, 9. On April 5, 2010, the EEOC issued a
Determination against Benchmark that “the evidence obtained during the
investigation establishes reasonable cause to believe Charging Party was
discharged and disqualified for permanent employment in retaliation for opposing
practices made unlawful under Title VII.” Id. at 12. Similarly, on the same date,
the EEOC issued a Determination against Coast Personnel that “the evidence
obtained during the investigation establishes reasonable cause to believe that
Charging Party was terminated from a contractual placement employer, and not
given other assignments because of her opposition to practices made unlawful
under Title VII.” Id. at 14. However, after conciliation failed, the EEOC issued
Notice of Right to Sue letters to Campos on June 17, 2010. Id. at 17, 19. Campos
filed suit against Benchmark and Coast Personnel on September 15, 2010, alleging
race and national origin discrimination and retaliation. See generally doc. 1. Both
Page 11 of 35
Defendants moved for summary judgment, docs. 29, 31, which are fully briefed,
docs. 35, 40, 41, and ripe for review.
III.
ANALYSIS
Campos alleges that Benchmark violated Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by
discriminating against her “because of her race (Hispanic) and her national origin
(Mexican) in wages, job assignments, terminating her, disqualifying her for a full
time permanent position[,] and refusing to hire her.” Doc. 1, at 8. Similarly,
Campos contends that Benchmark retaliated against her in violation of Title VII
and § 1981 “in job assignments, by terminating her, by disqualifying her for a full
time permanent position, and by refusing to hire her.” Id. at 9. As it relates to
Coast Personnel, Campos alleges discrimination “in wages, job assignments,
terminating her, and refusing to assign her jobs” and retaliation “in job
assignments, by terminating her, and by refusing to assign her jobs.” Id. at 8-9.
The court will address the claims against each defendant in turn.1
However, before discussing each claim, the court notes that Title VII and §
1981 discrimination and retaliations claims “have the same requirements of proof
and use the same analytical framework.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161
F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the court “shall explicitly address
1
Out of an “abundance of caution,” both Benchmark and Coast Personnel address a
potential hostile work environment claim. See doc. 30, at 7; doc. 32, at 26. However, Campos
never alleges a hostile work environment in her complaint, see generally doc. 1, and never
addresses such a claim in her opposition to the motions for summary judgment, see generally
doc. 35. As such, the court finds no need to consider a hostile work environment claim.
Page 12 of 35
the Title VII claim[s] with the understanding that the analysis applies to the §
1981 claim[s] as well.” Id. See also Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d
1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Eleventh Circuit “routinely and
systemically group[s] Title VII and § 1981 claims for analytic purposes”).
A.
Benchmark
i.
Job Assignments and Training Discrimination
Title VII “makes it unlawful for an employer to ‘discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race [color, religion, sex, or national
origin].’” Brown v. Ala. Dep’t Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Implicit in a claim for race or national origin
discrimination is the contention that some racial or national origin animus factored
in the adverse employment action at issue. “[A] plaintiff may use three different
kinds of evidence of discriminatory intent: direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence or statistical evidence. The analytical framework and burden of
production varies depending on the method of proof chosen.” Standard, 161 F.3d
at 1330.
Campos attempts to offer direct evidence of race and national origin
discrimination as it relates to her job assignments and training with Benchmark.
See doc. 35, at 21-25. The Eleventh Circuit provides that direct evidence of
discrimination is “evidence which reflects a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude
correlating to the discrimination or retaliation complained of by the employee.”
Page 13 of 35
Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1086 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[d]irect evidence is ‘evidence, that, if
believed, proves [the] existence of [a] fact without inference or presumption.’” Id.
(quoting Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th
Cir. 1997)). As such, “‘only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be
nothing other than to discriminate on the [protected classification]’ are direct
evidence of discrimination.” Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d
1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Damon v. Fleming Supermkts. of Fla., Inc.,
196 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Essentially, Campos’ direct evidence claim is based on (1) three purported
comments Paden made that arguably reveal some discriminatory animus2 and (2)
certain actions Paden took that allegedly had an adverse effect on Campos’
employment.3 However, proof that Paden discriminated against Campos in job
assignments and training requires some inferential or presumptive step—i.e., a
reference to Campos’ “Chicano accent” and a subsequent assignment to work in
the MRB warehouse fails to meet the threshold of direct evidence of racial
2
These comments include: a remark about Taco Bell, doc. 33-5, at 87-89, the statement
“I won’t make my team to learn Spanish,” id. at 93-94, and a comment about Campos’ “Chicano
accent,” id. at 101-02.
3
These “adverse employment actions” include: Benchmark hired Campos as an InProcess Inspector, but Paden changed her permanent job title to “Out-of-Box Auditor;” Paden
failed to properly submit Campos’ Quality Tech I application; Paden interfered with Campos’
First Article Inspection training by not providing the proper training materials, and Paden
assigned Campos work in the MRB warehouse. See doc. 35, at 21-24.
Page 14 of 35
discrimination. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Wilson v. B/E Aerospace
found no direct evidence of sex discrimination where defendant’s decisionmaker
told the female plaintiff, prior to her not receiving a promotion, “even though
women aren’t typically in that type of position we’ll see what happens when we
throw your name out there to corporate.” 376 F.3d at 1086. Similarly, in Burrell
the Eleventh Circuit found no direct evidence of sex discrimination when, about a
year before her termination, plaintiff asked for an executive vice president position
and defendant “responded that he wanted to hire a man for the position because
too many women filled First Federal’s officer positions.” 125 F.3d at 1393.
Conversely, in Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 71 F.3d 837, 843 (11th Cir. 1996),
the court found direct evidence of racial discrimination where defendant stated
that he wanted an African American person to have the white plaintiff’s job. See
Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087 (discussing the direct evidence of discrimination in
Caban-Wheeler). Stated simply, an “example of direct evidence [of age
discrimination] would be a management memorandum saying, ‘Fire [plaintiff]-he
is too old.’” Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.
1990). Here, Campos’ evidence regarding Paden’s statements, “at most, suggests
discrimination, leaving the trier of fact to infer discrimination based on the
evidence; by definition then, the evidence is circumstantial.” Id. at 1081-82
(emphasis in original). Indeed, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to
Campos, Paden made some derogatory comments—but, these comments contain
little, if any, correlation to the adverse actions purportedly taken by Paden.
Page 15 of 35
However, regardless of Paden’s comments, Campos also fails to establish an
adverse employment action as it relates to her job assignments and training at
Benchmark. See Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.
2001) (plaintiff must establish an “adverse employment action” to succeed under
Title VII).4 “[T]o prove adverse employment action in a case under Title VII’s
anti-discrimination clause, an employee must show a serious and material change
in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Moreover, the employee’s
subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not
controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a
reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Campos first contends that she “was hired as an In-Process Inspector, but
Paden changed her permanent job title to ‘Out-of-Box Auditor’ . . . which was a
lower skilled job. Unlike the ‘In-Process Inspector’ position which had many
other responsibilities, including monitoring out-of-box activities, the [OBA] was
only required to manually check the label boxes of the unit, and not perform any
sort of other quality inspection.” Doc. 35, at 22. This assertion is simply
unsupported by any record evidence—namely, there is no evidence that Paden
changed Campos’ employment position immediately after Benchmark hired her.
4
As Campos fails to sufficiently demonstrate an adverse employment action for her
discriminatory job assignments claim, her retaliatory job assignments claim against Benchmark
also fails. See doc. 32, at 18-22. Accordingly, the court disagrees with Campos that Benchmark
neglected to address her retaliatory job assignments claim. See doc. 35, at 25 n.25. The court
also refuses to consider a retaliatory training claim against Benchmark because such claim is not
found in Campos’ complaint. See doc. 1, at 9.
Page 16 of 35
See Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (establishing that “mere conclusions and unsupported
factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion”).5 In fact, Campos testified that she held the same position from day one:
Q: “Did your position ever change? In other words, did you start
doing something other than out-of-the-box audit during your
assignment at HSI?”
A: “No. I was just out-of-the-box audit.”
Doc. 33-5, at 81. Moreover, Logan offered undisputed testimony that In-Process
Inspector is the same position as Out-of-Box Inspector. Doc. 33-1, at 122. Put
differently, Campos is challenging a purported switch in positions when, in fact,
the two positions are the same.
In support, Campos only offers the affidavit testimony of Sandra Lanier that
“I have performed the Out of Box Auditor and the Quality Control Inspector
positions and in my opinion the Out of Box Auditor position is less desirable than
Quality Control Inspector position because it is more physically intensive, requires
less skill, and less prestigious. In my opinion being moved from Quality Control
Inspector to Out of Box Auditor would have been a demotion.” Doc. 36-4, at 2.
While this may be true, Campos’ relevant comparison is with an “In-Process
5
The court disagrees with Campos’ assertion that Benchmark failed to address this
purported adverse employment action. See doc. 35, at 22. Benchmark sufficiently met its initial
burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See doc. 32, at 19-21.
Page 17 of 35
Inspector,” not a “Quality Control Inspector.”6 More importantly, the affidavit
misses the mark because it lends no support to the proposition that Paden changed
Campos’ position on the first day of her employment with Benchmark.7
Accordingly, a reasonable person could not find that Campos suffered some
materially adverse employment action when Benchmark assigned her to an OBA
on her first day.
Next, Campos argues that Paden’s failure to submit her Quality Tech I
application to the proper entities constitutes an adverse employment action. See
doc. 35, at 22-23. The court again disagrees because the Quality Tech I position
was not yet approved by Benchmark’s corporate office. See doc. 32, at 24; doc.
40, at 8-9. Higginbotham, a human resources supervisor, revealed that Benchmark
posted positions at its facilities prior to actual approval, doc. 33-3, at 16, 23, and,
significantly, Campos submitted a copy of the actual posting demonstrating that
Benchmark’s corporate office had yet to approve the Quality Tech I position, doc.
36-5, at 1. Moreover, Coleman testified that, while unaware of the policy for
posting jobs, no “quality tech one” positions were available in April or May 2008.
Doc. 33-2, at 44. Accordingly, even if Paden failed to properly submit Campos’
6
Campos claims that when Lanier “refers to the quality control inspector position she is
speaking about the ‘In-Process Inspector’ position.” Doc. 42, at 3. However, Campos fails to
offer any evidence supporting this assertion clarifying the Lanier Affidavit.
7
Benchmark moved to strike this paragraph of Lanier’s affidavit for various reasons. See
generally doc. 39. As the court considered this paragraph, but ultimately found no adverse
employment action, the court DENIES this aspect of Benchmark’s motion as moot.
Page 18 of 35
application to Coleman or human resources, Campos suffered no “serious and
material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis,
245 F.3d at 1239. Put differently, Campos claims a speculative, as opposed to
tangible, adverse employment action because the job application at issue sought a
non-existent position. See id. (“[T]he asserted impact cannot be speculative and
must at least have a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff’s employment.”).
Finally, as it relates to training and job assignments, Campos maintains that
Paden interfered with her “article inspection” training by not providing proper
training materials and by assigning her duties with the MRB. See doc. 35, at 23.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Campos, Paden refused to allow
Campos to train for certain techniques used in “First Article Inspection.”
However, this denial fails to establish an adverse change to Campos’ employment
with Benchmark. Campos’ allegations focus on a failure to train for a different
position, rather than failure to properly train for her existing position. Thus, as
this training relates to a separate employment position with Benchmark—a
position not even available at the time—Campos fails to demonstrate a tangible
adverse employment action. See Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d
398, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1999) (“There is no reasonable basis on which to conclude
that a denial of such training, so peripheral to [plaintiff’s] main duties as a tax
processor, would ‘tend to’ result in a change of employment status, benefits or
responsibilities.”) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the court refuses to find that Campos’ assignments in the MRB
Page 19 of 35
warehouse constitute an adverse employment action. The Eleventh Circuit
instructs that “[w]ork assignment claims strike at the very heart of an employer’s
business judgment and expertise because they challenge an employer’s ability to
allocate its assets in response to shifting and competing market priorities.” Davis,
245 F.3d at 1245. A change in work assignment “may be so substantial and
material that it does indeed alter the ‘terms, condition, or privilege’ of
employment;” however, “where, as here, the work assignment at issue is only by
definition temporary and does not affect the employee’s permanent job title or
classification,” there is no tangible adverse employment action. Id. Indeed,
Campos admits that, even though Paden assigned her temporary work with the
MRB, she suffered no wage decrease or permanent job reclassification. Doc. 335, at 142-44.8
Alternatively, even if the court assumes that Campos suffered some adverse
employment action with her job assignments and training at Benchmark, there is
insufficient circumstantial evidence of race or national origin discrimination.
When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to show discriminatory intent,
the court applies the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
8
Campos argues that “[i]n determining whether the requisite level of adversity is reached,
it is necessary to examine the alleged adverse actions in the aggregate.” Doc. 35, at 16. While
this may be true, even considering Paden and Benchmark’s conduct in the aggregate, the court
still finds insufficient adverse employment action to allow this claim against Benchmark to
survive summary judgment.
Page 20 of 35
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).9 Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the plaintiff must first create an inference of discrimination by
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty.,
Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). If the plaintiff
satisfies his initial burden, “then the defendant must show a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its employment action.” Id. (citation omitted). “If it
does so, then the plaintiff must prove that the reason provided by the defendant is
a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “[t]he
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Springer
v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]o establish a prima facie case for disparate
treatment in a race [or national origin] discrimination case, the plaintiff must show
that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse
employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside
of her protected class more favorably than she was treated; and (4) she was
qualified to do the job.” Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323; see also Coutu v.
Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir 1995)
(establishing the same prima facie elements for a national origin discrimination
9
While Campos mentions the circumstantial evidence standard, see doc. 35, at 15, she
never actually attempts to satisfy this standard as it relates to job assignments, training, or even
wages. See id. at 21-25.
Page 21 of 35
claim).
Here, in addition to offering no adverse employment action, Campos fails to
provide a satisfactory comparator—or similarly situated employee—as it relates to
job assignments and training. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091 (“The plaintiff and the
employee she identifies as a comparator must be similarly situated ‘in all relevant
respects’”) (quoting Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir.
1994)). At deposition, Campos made blanket assertions that Benchmark treated
her less favorably than Shelly Markum, Estella Davis, and Becky Moore as it
relates to job training. See doc. 33-5, at 164, 217, 221-22, 248. However, Campos
never addresses Benchmark’s argument that she is not similarly situated to these
three employees. See doc. 32, at 25-26; see generally doc. 35. Moreover, Campos
offers no other comparator evidence—therefore, the court cannot reasonably infer
circumstantial evidence of discrimination when Campos fails to satisfy two of the
four prima facie elements.
In sum, there is insufficient evidence to raise the reasonable inference that
Campos suffered a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of her employment as it relates to job assignments and training.
Additionally, Campos fails to produce sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence
of discriminatory animus in job assignments and training. Thus, the court
GRANTS Benchmark’s motion for summary judgment on these claims.
ii.
Wage Discrimination
To support her claim for wage discrimination, Campos states that Coast
Page 22 of 35
Personnel assigned her to work for Benchmark “from September 2006 through
May 2008, only interrupted by a two (2) month layoff. As a Benchmark ‘Quality
Control Auditor’ Campos was paid $9.50/hr, but as a Benchmark ‘In-Process
Inspector’ her hourly rate was reduced to $9.00/hr. Campos alleges this reduction
in pay is an adverse employment action.” Doc. 35, at 21. Campos produces no
direct evidence of wage discrimination; as such, she must rely on circumstantial
evidence. See Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. “In order to establish a prima
facie case of intentional compensation discrimination based on race, the plaintiff
must establish that: (1) [s]he belongs to a racial minority; (2) [s]he received low
wages; (3) similarly situated comparators outside the protected class received
higher compensation; and (4) [s]he was qualified to receive the higher wage.” Hill
v. Emory Univ., 346 F. App’x 390, 395 (11th Cir. 2009). However, again, Campos
neglects to offer any similarly situated Benchmark employee that received a higher
wage. Indeed, Campos fails to offer any evidence at all as it relates to wage
discrimination. See generally doc. 35. Therefore, the court GRANTS
Benchmark’s summary judgment motion for the wage discrimination claim.
iii.
Discriminatory Discharge
In addition to job assignment, training, and wage discrimination, Campos
also brings a discriminatory discharge claim against Benchmark that is premised
on circumstantial evidence. “To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
discharge, the plaintiff must show that she (1) was a member of a protected class,
(2) was qualified for the job, (3) suffered an adverse employment action, and (4)
Page 23 of 35
was replaced by someone outside the protected class.” Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of
Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004). The only issue in contention for
Campos’ prima facie case is whether Benchmark replaced her with someone
outside the protected class. To support this element, Campos again offers the
affidavit of Sandra Lanier which provides that, “[f]ollowing Ms. Campos’s
termination I recall Toni Gibson a white female taking over Plaintiff’s job duties.”
Doc. 36-4, at 2. For purposes of summary judgment, and taking the evidence in
the light most favorable to Campos, this affidavit satisfies the prima facie case.10
Therefore, the burden shifts to Benchmark to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
Coleman testified that he discharged Campos for insubordination. See doc.
33-2, at 19, 40. Put simply, Coleman provided, “I can’t have an employee
working for me that is screaming and yelling at me, so at the point I terminated
her.” Id. at 19. Insubordination constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
justification for discharge, see Godoy v. Habersham Cnty., 211 F. App’x 850, 855
(11th Cir. 2006) (“Defendants proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
[plaintiff’s] termination—insubordination”); accordingly, the burden shifts back to
Campos “to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was merely a
10
Benchmark moved to strike this affidavit testimony arguing that Campos failed to
disclose Toni Gibson in her initial disclosures and in response to certain interrogatories. See doc.
39, at 2-4. Even though the court accepts this affidavit testimony, the court ultimately concludes
that Benchmark is due summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claim. Accordingly,
the court DENIES the motion to strike as moot.
Page 24 of 35
pretext to mask discriminatory actions.” Brown, 597 F.3d at 1182 (citations
omitted).
Campos, however, fails to offer any evidence of pretext as it relates to her
purported discriminatory discharge. See doc. 35, at 25. To support this claim,
Campos merely provides that “Coleman had no intent of firing Campos until she
called him racist and said he was holding her back because of her nationality and
because she was Hispanic.” Id. While this may demonstrate an inference of
retaliation, see infra, it lends no support to the discriminatory discharge claim.
See also Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 963 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The
plaintiff employee . . . always retains the ultimate burden of proving that he was
the victim of intentional discrimination.”). That Coleman discharged Campos for
calling him a racist does not necessarily mean that he discharged Campos because
of her race or national origin. Ultimately, to prevail, Campos must present
evidence of some employee(s) outside of her protected class who engaged in
insubordination and whom Benchmark retained. Unfortunately, Campos fails to
offer any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that her race or national origin
actually motivated Coleman to discharge her. Therefore, the court GRANTS
Benchmark’s summary judgment motion for the discriminatory discharge claim.
iv.
Retaliation
Finally, while Coleman essentially admits to discharging Campos in
Page 25 of 35
retaliation for calling him a “racist pig,” see doc. 33-2, at 19,11 the court also finds
circumstantial evidence of retaliatory discharge. See also doc. 35, at 29. The
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework also applies for Title VII
retaliation claims, Brown, 597 F.3d at 1181, and “[a] prima facie case of
retaliation under Title VII requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) she engaged in an
activity protected under Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir.
11
Coleman provided at deposition that he discharged Campos immediately after she
became irate and began calling him a “racist pig,” doc. 33-2, at 19-21; however, Campos testified
that she has never called anyone a racist, doc. 33-5, at 172-73. The court must take all inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and here, Coleman’s admission that he
discharged Campos after she called him a racist, combined with the admission that he had no
previous intention to discharge her, could constitute direct evidence of retaliation sufficient to
survive summary judgment. However, in taking the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly instructs:
When the nonmovant has testified to events, we do not (as urged by Plaintiffs’
counsel) pick and choose bits from other witnesses’ essentially incompatible
accounts (in effect, declining to credit some of the nonmovant’s own testimony)
and then string together those portions of the record to form the story that we
deem most helpful to the nonmovant. Instead, when conflicts arise between the
facts evidenced by the parties, we credit the nonmoving party’s version. Our duty
to read the record in the nonmovant’s favor stops short of not crediting the
nonmovant’s testimony in whole or part: the courts owe a nonmovant no duty to
disbelieve his sworn testimony which he chooses to submit for use in the case to
be decided.
Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Accordingly, under Evans,
this court may not discredit Campos’ testimony and find direct evidence of retaliation based
solely on Coleman’s different version of the facts. However, the holding in Evans never
proscribes the use of testimony—inconsistent with that of the nonmovant—to reveal
circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory or discriminatory intent.
Page 26 of 35
2008). Accordingly:
These three elements create a presumption that the adverse action was
the product of an intent to retaliate. Once a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to rebut the presumption by articulating a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the
defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised
by the prima facie case is rebutted and drops from the case. After the
defendant makes this showing, the plaintiff has a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was
merely a pretext to mask discriminatory actions.
Brown, 597 F.3d at 1181-82 (quoting Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1307-08
(11th Cir. 2009)).
First, as it relates to the prima facie elements, Campos suffered an adverse
employment action when Benchmark discharged her. See Doe v. Dekalb Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998) (listing involuntary termination
as an adverse employment action). Second, Campos complained to Coleman
about Paden’s purported discriminatory conduct immediately before her
discharge—a statutorily protected activity. Campos testified that, on May 13,
2008, upon her purported reassignment to MRB by Coleman, she stated “‘Under
what supervisor am I going to be working?’ And [Coleman] said, ‘Under David
Paden.’ And I said, ‘David Paden? Why you going to send me to David Paden?
You know, why are you going to send me if he’s treating me that way?’ Because
by that time - - sometime in May I already talked to Larry Coleman, as I say to
you, about the issues with David Paden.” Doc. 33-5, at 169 (emphasis added).
Page 27 of 35
See also doc. 35, at 17, 23. Coleman then allegedly discharged Campos. Id. See
also Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir.
2010) (“Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against an employee ‘because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . .’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a)). At the summary judgment phase, Campos presents sufficient
evidence to satisfy her initial burden that she complained to Coleman about
Paden’s alleged racial and national origin discrimination before her discharge.12
While Campos’ complaints were not formal charges of discrimination, they
implicitly establish an opposition to purported illegal discrimination in the
workplace. See Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, Fla., 267 F.3d 1197, 1201
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[s]tatutorily protected expression includes internal
complaints”); Murphy v. City of Aventura, 383 F. App’x 915, 918 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“A complaint about an employment practice constitutes protected opposition only
if the individual explicitly or implicitly communicates a belief that the practice
12
The Eleventh Circuit provides that “[e]ven if an employment practice is not as a matter
of fact unlawful, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation ‘if he shows
that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful
employment practices . . . . A plaintiff must not only show that he subjectively (that is, in good
faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his
belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.’” Dixon v. The
Hallmark Companies, Inc., 627 F.3d 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Little v. United Techs.,
Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis and alterations in
original)). Thus, while the court ultimately found insufficient evidence that Paden discriminated
against Campos based on her race and national origin, this is not detrimental to Campos’
retaliation claim because Campos’ complaints against Paden were not unreasonable given the
evidence presented.
Page 28 of 35
constitutes unlawful employment discrimination.”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Finally, Campos sufficiently establishes a causal connection between her
complaints to Coleman and her discharge because these events occurred within
minutes of each other. See doc. 33-5, at 178. See also Thomas v. Cooper
Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The burden of causation
can be met by showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected
activity and the adverse employment action . . . . But mere temporal proximity,
without more, must be ‘very close.’”) (citations omitted). Benchmark, on the other
hand, argues that “[i]n her own deposition testimony, Campos indicates that her
alleged complaint to Logan and Coleman regarding racial discrimination in their
meeting on May 13, 2008, did not occur until after Coleman made the decision to
end her assignment.” Doc. 32, at 30. The court disagrees because this
interpretation of Campos’ testimony fails to take the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party or construe the “causal link requirement
broadly.” E.E.O.C. v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1571 (11th Cir.
1993). Campos specifically provides that she complained about Paden’s
discriminatory treatment to Coleman before Coleman discharged her, see doc. 335, at 169, 178; as such, the “protected activity and the negative employment action
are not completely unrelated.” Reichhold Chemicals, 988 F.2d at 1571-72.
Therefore, the burden shifts to Benchmark to provide a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. In that regard,
Page 29 of 35
Coleman testified that he discharged Campos for insubordination. See supra; see
also doc. 33-2, at 19, 40. Accordingly, similar to the discriminatory discharge
claim, the burden shifts back to Campos “to demonstrate that the defendant’s
proffered reason was merely a pretext to mask [retaliatory] actions.” Brown, 597
F.3d at 1182 (citations omitted).
However, unlike the discriminatory discharge claim, the court finds
evidence of pretext to support Campos’ retaliatory discharge claim. Specifically,
Coleman’s testimony that he discharged Campos immediately after she called him
a “racist” and “racist pig,” see doc. 33-2, at 19, 21-22, 39-40, raises a reasonable
inference of a retaliatory animus. See doc. 35, at 29. In other words, even without
accepting Coleman’s version of the facts to the discredit of Campos’ version, see
Evans, 407 F.3d at 1278, Coleman’s testimony—as the Benchmark employee that
discharged Campos—offers sufficient evidence of a retaliatory intent. Indeed, in
the memorandum Coleman provided to Benchmark regarding Campos’
termination, he stated “[Campos] kept demanding that I make her a full time
employee until I could no longer accept her insubordination. I then offered her a
position entering data with no opportunity for a full time position. She then began
calling me a racist. I then explained to her that Benchmark no longer needed her
services.” Doc. 36-6, at 1.
Taken in the light most favorable to Campos, Coleman’s admission of
discharging Campos for the “racist” accusation “cast[s] sufficient doubt on the
defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder
Page 30 of 35
to conclude that the employer’s proffered ‘legitimate reasons were not what
actually motivated its conduct.’” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519,
1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 605
(11th Cir. 1994)). See also McClain, 131 F.3d at 964-65 (“[A] plaintiff can
survive a motion for summary judgment . . . simply by presenting evidence
sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the truth or falsity
of the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.”). Moreover, in
weighing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Campos
contends that Coleman discharged her when she complained about Coleman’s
decision to reassign her to Paden’s supervision—an individual she complained
about previously. The decision to discharge Campos shortly after this protected
activity creates a quintessential issue of fact for a jury to resolve. Therefore, as a
jury is best suited to determine whether Benchmark discharged Campos in
retaliation for her race and national origin discrimination complaints, the court
DENIES Benchmark’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.
B.
Coast Personnel
Coast Personnel’s separate motion for summary judgment incorporates the
arguments made by Benchmark and also asserts additional justifications for
summary judgment. See doc. 30, at 5-10. First, as it relates to the discriminatory
wage claim, Coast Personnel contends that it “was not involved in the decision
regarding Campos’ pay rate at [Benchmark]. [Benchmark] management
determined the rates of pay for Coast employees assigned to work for
Page 31 of 35
[Benchmark].” Doc. 30, at 6-7. Campos fails to refute this assertion in her
opposition to summary judgment, see generally doc. 35; and indeed,
Logan—Coast Personnel’s onsite supervisor— testified that Benchmark set the
pay rates. Doc. 33-1, at 19.13 Without the authority to set Campos’ wage rate,
Coast Personnel could not have taken any discriminatory action. Therefore, based
on this undisputed evidence, and the court’s aforementioned reasons in the section
addressing Campos’ wage discrimination claim against Benchmark, see supra, the
court GRANTS Coast Personnel’s summary judgment motion on the wage
discrimination claim.14
Second, Campos asserts a discriminatory discharge and a retaliatory
discharge claim against Coast Personnel. Similarly, however, Coast Personnel
provides that “[i]t is undisputed that Coast was not involved in the decision to end
Campos’ assignment with [Benchmark]; instead, [Coleman], the director of quality
at [Benchmark], made the decision to end Campos’ assignment based on her
13
Campos asserts at deposition that Cagle, a Coast Personnel employee, set her pay rate
with Benchmark, doc. 33-5, at 76-77; however, Campos never raises this testimony in opposing
summary judgment; fails to provide any additional support for this assertion; and, even if true,
there is no direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination relating to wages. See supra.
14
Moreover, Campos asserts discrimination and retaliation claims against Coast
Personnel for “job assignments” and “refusal to assign jobs.” To the extent that Campos bases
these claims on her work assignments with Benchmark—it is unclear from the complaint and
opposition to summary judgment—the court GRANTS Coast Personnel’s summary judgment
motion. In short, Campos submits no evidence that Coast Personnel was involved in her work
assignments with Benchmark. See doc. 41, at 6-7. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence of
discrimination or retaliation in Benchmark’s conduct as it relates to work assignments. See
supra.
Page 32 of 35
insubordination.” Doc. 30, at 6. Again, Campos neglects to address this argument
in her opposition to summary judgment, see generally doc. 35, and the court is
unable to find any evidence that Coast Personnel contributed to the decision to
discharge Campos. See doc. 33-2, at 19 (Coleman testifying that he made the
decision to terminated Campos); doc. 33-1, at 44-45 (Logan testifying that
Coleman discharged Campos from Benchmark). Thus, the discrimination and
retaliation claims against Coast Personnel regarding Campos’ discharge from
Benchmark fail as a matter of law, and the court GRANTS Coast Personnel’s
summary judgment motion for these claims.
Finally, Campos alleges that Coast Personnel discriminated and retaliated
against her by failing to find her other temporary employment after the discharge
from Benchmark. See doc. 35, at 20. Specifically, Campos testified that,
following her discharge from Benchmark, she submitted two applications for
temporary positions through Coast Personnel and interviewed for a quality control
position at SCI. Doc. 33-5, at 232. At the interview, SCI supervisor Bob Moon
purportedly provided, “‘I really want to hire you because you have knowledge in
quality control, and I like your resume and your experience,’ but by the end, he
told me that Phillip Cagle [Coast Personnel employee] is the one who is going to
have the last word.” Id. Thus, Campos’ apparent theory of liability against Coast
Personnel, although not expressly stated, is—following the May 13, 2008
accusations of discrimination to Coast Personnel onsite supervisor Logan and
Benchmark supervisor Coleman, Coast Personnel retaliated and/or discriminated
Page 33 of 35
against Campos because it prevented Campos from receiving the SCI position.
See doc. 1, at 7.
Assuming that Campos satisfies the prima facie elements for these claims,
which the court is hesitant to assume given that Campos never explicitly discusses
her prima facie case, Coast Personnel provides an undisputed legitimate business
reason for Campos not receiving the SCI position. See doc. 30, at 9; see also
Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. Campos’ interview form for the SCI position
reveals that the SCI supervisor requested a “hold” on hiring for the position. See
doc. 33-7, at 2; doc. 36-3, at 17. Accordingly, the court finds no reasonable
inference of discrimination or retaliation where SCI, rather than Coast Personnel,
decided not to hire an employee in the position for which Campos applied. See
doc. 30, at 9. And indeed, Campos also fails to address this non-discriminatory
business decision provided by Coast Personnel. See generally doc. 35. Therefore,
absent any other specific allegations of retaliation or discrimination, the court
GRANTS Coast Personnel’s motion for summary judgment on these claims.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Campos may proceed to trial on her claim for retaliatory discharge against
Benchmark. All other claims and defendants are hereby DISMISSED with
prejudice.
Page 34 of 35
Done the 6th day of June, 2012.
________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 35 of 35
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?