Smith v. Wayne Farms, LLC.

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER DISMISSING CASE that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to all claims; costs are taxed to plaintiff; as more fully set out in order. Signed by Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr on 5/7/2012. (AHI)

FILED
2012 May-07 AM 10:39
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
MELVIN T. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WAYNE FARMS, L.L.C.,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. CV-11-S-3590-NE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Melvin T. Smith, commenced this action against his then-employer,
defendant Wayne Farms, L.L.C., on October 11, 2011.1 Plaintiff alleges claims of
racial discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,2 and seeks
money damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Defendant moved for
summary judgment on all claims on April 12, 2012.3 Upon consideration of the
motion, brief, and evidentiary submission, the court concludes the motion is due to be
granted.
1

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint).

2

Id. Section 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Unlike Title VII,
it addresses discrimination only on the basis of race, and does not require a plaintiff to pursue
administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. A plaintiff claiming race discrimination can rely on
Title VII, § 1981, or both.
3

Doc. no. 16.

I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment “should
be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).4 In other
words, summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “A
genuine issue of material fact ‘exists only if sufficient evidence is presented favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’” Farley v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Stewart v.
Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 1997)).
“In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Chapman
v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v.

4

Rule 56 was amended, effective December 1, 2010, in conjunction with a general overhaul
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Advisory Committee was careful to note, however, that
the changes “will not affect continuing development of the decisional law construing and applying
these phrases.” Adv. Comm. Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (2010 Amends.). Consequently, cases
interpreting the previous version of Rule 56 are equally applicable to the revised version.
2

City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)). “[A]n inference is not reasonable
if it is only a guess or a possibility, for such an inference is not based on the evidence,
but is pure conjecture and speculation.” Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692
F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1983). Moreover,
[t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary
judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the
outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the
materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not
exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for
a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (quoting Haves, 52 F.3d at 921); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986) (asking “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law”).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Melvin T. Smith, who is African-American, began working for
defendant, Wayne Farms, L.L.C., in March of 2009.5 He was employed as a
“maintenance supervisor.”6 Beginning in June of 2010, Smith worked under the direct
supervision of Jerry Ravan, who held the position of “maintenance manager.”7 Smith
alleges that Ravan, who is Caucasian, discriminated against him on the basis of race
5

Doc. no. 1 § III ¶ 4.

6

Id.

7

Id. § III ¶¶ 5-6.
3

and retaliated against him when he complained to management about the
discrimination.8

Smith voluntarily submitted a letter of resignation from his

employment with Wayne Farms on March 4, 2012.9 His last day of work at Wayne
Farms was March 15, 2012.10 He took a new job as a maintenance manager at
Goodyear Tire.11
Smith filed this lawsuit on October 11, 2011.12 He filed a bankruptcy petition
on November 30, 2011, i.e., seven weeks after filing this lawsuit.13 “Schedule B” of
the bankruptcy petition is a list of the debtor’s personal property.14 For the category
labeled “Other contingent and unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax
refunds, conterclaims of the debtor, and rights to setoff claims,” Smith marked
“NONE.”15
Another section of the bankruptcy petition form is entitled “Statement of
Financial Affairs.” In the first subsection, Smith indicated that he was employed by

8

Id. § III ¶¶ 7, 19.

9

Doc. no. 18-8 (Affidavit of Brian Marto) ¶ 2.

10

Id.

11

Id. ¶ 3.

12

See doc. no. 1.

13

See doc. no. 18-3 (Bankruptcy Petition), at ECF 50; doc. no. 18-7 (Bankruptcy Docket
Sheet), at ECF 2..
14

See Bankruptcy Petition, at ECF 11-14.

15

Id. at ECF 13.
4

Wayne Farms.16 The fourth subsection is titled “Suits and administrative proceedings,
executions, garnishments and attachments.”17 The petitioner is instructed to “[l]ist all
suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor is or was a party within one
year immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case.”18 Smith listed three
suits: an ejection suit, in which he was the defendant, brought in the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County in 2011; a collection suit, in which he was the defendant, brought
in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County in 2010; and an uncontested divorce
proceeding, in which he was the plaintiff, brought in the Domestic Relations Court of
Jefferson County in 2010.19 He did not list this lawsuit. Smith signed the petition
under penalty of perjury on November 30, 2011.20
The bankruptcy trustee determined “that there is no property available for
distribution from the estate over and above that exempted by law.”21 As a result,
Smith’s debts were discharged in their full amount of $165,285.89 on March 20,
2012.22 On April 12th, Wayne Farms moved for summary judgment in this case, and

16

Id. at ECF 27.

17

Id. at ECF 28.

18

Id. (bracketed alteration supplied, emphasis in original).

19

Bankruptcy Petition at ECF 28-29.

20

Id. at ECF 50.

21

Bankruptcy Docket Sheet, at ECF 4.

22

Id.; doc. no. 18-6 (Bankruptcy Discharge Order), at ECF 2. See also Bankruptcy Petition,
at ECF 8 (listing total liabilities of $165,285.89).
5

the court ordered Smith to respond on or before May 3, 2012.23 Despite the fact that
he is represented by counsel, Smith did not file any response to the motion for
summary judgment.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiff’s Claim for Damages
Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate under the doctrine of

judicial estoppel, which
protects the integrity of the judicial system by barring litigants from
deliberately taking inconsistent positions based on the “exigencies of the
moment.” See [Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1281, 1285
(11th Cir. 2002)] (citation omitted). We have, on several occasions,
applied judicial estoppel to claims by plaintiffs who failed to disclose
their claims in a prior bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Robinson v. Tyson
Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2010); Barger v. City of
Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003); Burnes, 291 F.3d at
1287–88. This circuit applies a two part test for judicial estoppel. We
ask: (1) has the party previously adopted an inconsistent position under
oath in a judicial proceeding, and (2) did the party intend to “make a
mockery of the judicial system.” Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285 (quotation
omitted). These two factors “are not inflexible or exhaustive; rather,
courts must always give due consideration to all of the circumstances of
a particular case when considering the applicability of this doctrine.” Id.
at 1286.
Jones v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-00771-JOF, 2012 WL 833320, at *2 (11th Cir.
Mar. 14, 2012) (per curiam) (bracketed alteration supplied). Courts apply the doctrine
of judicial estoppel when parties do not disclose their lawsuits on their Statements of
23

Doc. no. 16; Text Order of April 12, 2012.
6

Financial Affairs because, in the bankruptcy context, “the importance of full and
honest disclosure cannot be overstated.” Id. (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1286).
Here, the first judicial estoppel factor, taking an inconsistent position under
oath, is satisfied. Plaintiff did not include this lawsuit in his bankruptcy petition,
despite the fact that it had been filed less than two months earlier, that he listed other,
older lawsuits to which he had been a party, and that he listed defendant as his
employer.24 Thus, the applicability of judicial estoppel depends on whether he
intended to “make a mockery of the judicial system.”
“For purposes of judicial estoppel, intent is a purposeful contradiction — not
simple error or inadvertence. ‘[D]eliberate or intentional manipulation can be inferred
from the record,’ where the debtor has knowledge of the undisclosed claims and has
motive for concealment.” Barger, 348 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at
1287). In Barger, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had the requisite intent
when she failed to list a discrimination claim she had filed six weeks prior to signing
her Statement of Financial Affairs. Id. at 1291, 1294-95. In Burnes, the court ruled
that intent could be inferred when the plaintiff had failed to amend his pending
bankruptcy petition upon filing an employment discrimination case. Burnes, 291 F.3d
at 1287-88. The Eleventh Circuit has held that preventing assets from becoming part

24

See Bankruptcy Petition, at ECF 27-29.
7

of a bankruptcy estate, and thus facilitating a discharge, is sufficient to satisfy the
“motive for concealment” requirement. See, e.g., Jones, 2012 WL 833320, at *4,
Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1275-76; Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1284.
Based on the record before it, this court can appropriately infer that plaintiff had
the requisite intent to “make a mockery of the judicial system.” Just as in Barger, he
filed an employment discrimination claim less than two months before filing his
bankruptcy petition. There can be no doubt that plaintiff had knowledge of this suit,
especially given his inclusion of older lawsuits in his petition, and his then-continuing
employment by defendant. He also had a motive to conceal the suit. His bankruptcy
was discharged quickly, and his debts were discharged in their entire amount of
$165,285.89. The disclosure of this suit would have jeopardized that outcome.
There are no special circumstances that suggest that judicial estoppel is
inappropriate for this case. Plaintiff is represented by counsel in this case, and was
represented by counsel in his bankruptcy case. Thus, plaintiff’s claim for damages is
due to be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
B.

Smith’s Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Defendant argues that plaintiff lacks standing to maintain a claim for

declaratory or injunctive relief. It is axiomatic that a “plaintiff has standing to seek
declaratory or injunctive relief only when he ‘allege[s] facts from which it appears
8

there is a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.’” Bowen v.
First Family Financial Services, Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1340 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342, 1346-47 (11th Cir.
1999)) (bracketed alteration in Bowen). Accordingly, a plaintiff lacks standing to
maintain a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief against his former employer. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The
. . . plaintiffs are all former employees of Motel 6, and allege neither that they will be
discriminated against by Motel 6 in the future nor any facts that would support such
a conclusion. Thus, the . . . plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their “retaliation”
claim.”) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff concluded his employment with defendant
on March 15, 2012.25 Thus, he no longer has standing to pursue his claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief, and they are due to be dismissed.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons stated herein, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED as to all claims. Costs are taxed to plaintiff. The clerk is directed to close
this file.
DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of May, 2012.
______________________________
United States District Judge
25

Affidavit of Brian Marto ¶ 2.
9