Eads v. Decatur Utilities

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE that the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and all of plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice, costs are taxed to plaintiff as more fully set out in order. Signed by Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr on 6/4/2013. (AHI)

FILED
2013 Jun-04 AM 10:27
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
MARLENE EADS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DECATUR UTILITIES,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. CV-11-S-3766-NE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Marlene Eads, alleges that defendant, Decatur Utilities, terminated
her employment on the basis of her age and disability in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”), and
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. (“ADA”).1 The
action is before the court on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.2 Upon
consideration, the court will grant the motion.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 indicates that summary judgment “should
be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

1

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint) ¶ 1.

2

See doc. no. 14 (Motion for Summary Judgment).

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he
plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate
time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (alteration supplied).
In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and
make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment.
[However,] [t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not
defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an
issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of
substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine
issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable [factfinder] to return a
verdict in its favor.
Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal
citations omitted) (alterations and emphasis suppled).
II. SUMMARY OF FACTS
Defendant, Decatur Utilities, is an entity that is governed by the Municipal
Utilities Board of Decatur, Morgan County, Alabama.3

3

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 1.

2

The entity provides

electricity, natural gas, water, and wastewater services to the Decatur community.4
Plaintiff, Marlene Eads, was employed by defendant as a Work Order Coordinator in
the Electric Construction Group for ten years, between her hiring in February of 2000
and her termination on August 13, 2010.5 On the date of her termination, plaintiff
was 60 years of age.6 She also had undergone surgery to remove her thyroid gland,
and suffered from congestive heart failure, fibromyalgia, and arthritis.7
In her capacity as a Work Order Coordinator, plaintiff took direction from her
immediate supervisor, Electric Field Superintendent Steven Williams.8 Williams
reported to Electric Manager Glenn Boyles, who, in turn, reported to General
Manager Ray Hardin.9 Despite the fact that plaintiff and Hardin were a mere three
steps removed on the chain of command, plaintiff did not work directly with the
General Manager, and, in fact, “never had any communication with Mr. Hardin.”10
The series of events that culminated in plaintiff’s termination began with her act of
4

Id.

5

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 7-8; id., Defendant’s Exhibit 2 (Job
Description), at D00015; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Exhibit 3 (E-Mail Regarding
Plaintiff’s Termination Decision).
6

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 22-23. Plaintiff was born on December 4,
1949. Id.
7

Id. at 29-30.

8

Id. at 10, 15; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 38.

9

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 38.

10

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 44; see also doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of
Ray Hardin) ¶ 6; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 38.

3

accessing the General Manager’s electronic calendar without his knowledge.
A.

Plaintiff’s Job Description
Plaintiff argues that she accessed the General Manager’s calendar to fulfill the

duties of her position as a Work Order Coordinator.11 The written job description for
plaintiff’s position contains the following “essential duties and responsibilities”:
• Coordinates distribution of work order documents.
• Contacts One Call center for locates.
• Enters field work order data, estimated and actual man-hours, start and
complete dates.
• Assists warehouse supervisor [to] reconcile work order materials.
• Responds to customer inquiries about work progress, scheduling
status, service interruptions, etc.
• Works with engineers and warehouse personnel on work units and
materials.
• Coordinates switching requests with General Construction Supervisor
and submits request forms to Dispatch Center.
• Maintains database for Apprentice/Crewman work and training hours.
• Maintains database for Electric Maintenance and Inspections.
• Coordinates vehicle maintenance schedules, schedules truck repairs
and enters vehicle inspection data.

11

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 38-39.

4

• Prepares various reports as requested by Superintendent.
• Helps maintain and assemble system maps by verifying field
corrections and relaying data to CAD.12
The written job description for the position of Work Order Coordinator also contains
the caveat that “[o]ther duties may be assigned to [e]nsure excellence in customer
service.”13
Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of the job description on the grounds that she
also performed a variety of other duties.14 Before offering plaintiff the position of
Work Order Coordinator in February of 2000, plaintiff’s former supervisor, Stan
Keenum, allegedly inquired whether plaintiff was willing to “do what[ever she] was
asked to do, from mopping a floor to doing [her] job.”15 Plaintiff testified that she
entered work order data, called in “locates” to identify safe areas to dig, and assisted
in balancing the inventory of work materials following the completion of jobs.16 If
work left a road impassable, plaintiff informed the Decatur city authorities of the need
to patch it, ordered gravel to fill in dig sites, and occasionally delivered materials to

12

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), Defendant’s Exhibit 2 (Job Description), at
D00015 (alteration supplied). “CAD” is presumably an acronym for “Computer-Aided Drafting.”
13

Id. (alterations supplied).

14

Id. at 20.

15

Id. (alteration supplied).

16

Id. at 8-12.

5

those sites.17 She also performed a number of menial tasks, including buzzing visitors
through a security gate on defendant’s premises, delivering mail to the post office,
assisting with retirement parties, making coffee, and cleaning.18
B.

Plaintiff’s Act of Accessing the Electronic Calendars of Various
Supervisors
At the time when plaintiff accessed General Manager Ray Hardin’s electronic

calendar without his knowledge, a Decatur Utilities employee could attempt to access
a coworker’s electronic calendar by logging onto defendant’s computer network,
opening the Microsoft Outlook program, and selecting the coworker’s name from a
list.19 If the employee had clearance to access that person’s electronic calendar, she
could open the calendar by clicking on the name without entering a password.20 The
employee did not need to “hack” into the calendar or override security measures.21
During the course of her employment with defendant, plaintiff accessed the
electronic calendars of various coworkers, both within and outside the Electric
Construction Group.22 Those coworkers included General Manager Ray Hardin,

17

Id. at 13-20.

18

Id. at 8, 19-21, 40.

19

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 10.

20

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 38; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray
Hardin), at 10, 12-13, 21.
21

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 10.

22

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 39, 40, 42.

6

Human Resources Administrator Shannon Kirby, Electric Manager Glenn Boyles,
Electric Field Superintendent Steven Williams, Lead Lineman Joel Herring, Meter
Shop Supervisor Ken Lindsey, Warehouse Supervisor Randy Dunn, and Purchasing
Agent Mickey Jones.23
Plaintiff became aware of her ability to access General Manager Ray Hardin’s
electronic calendar in February of 2010.24 Once she made that discovery, plaintiff
began checking the calendar on a daily basis.25 When asked her reasons for accessing
that calendar, plaintiff asserted that her supervisor, Electric Field Superintendent
Steven Williams, instructed her to look for meetings that conflicted with the activities
of the Electric Construction Group.26 Plaintiff also testified that she told Williams
that she was accessing the electronic calender of various coworkers.27
specifically, plaintiff stated:
I was looking at the managers[’ calendars] to see if there was meetings
or anything scheduled that would interfere with our [presumably, the
Electric Construction Group’s] work schedule. I did a report every
morning that would state where the [field] crews were for the day. I put
the weather report on it and if there was any meetings or anything that
was — might interfere. And we also had a calendar like a dry erase
board in the lead linemen’s offices that had big squares for the day, and
23

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 39, 40, 42.

24

Id. at 38; see also doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 10.

25

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 39.

26

Id. at 41.

27

Id.

7

More

I put meetings on that if there was any.28
Even so, plaintiff admitted that the employees on the field crews did not attend
meetings with General Manager Ray Hardin.29 She maintained, nevertheless, that her
supervisors attended meetings with Hardin, and that those meetings did not
“necessarily” appear on her supervisors’ calendars.30 The implication of plaintiff’s
testimony is that, although Hardin was not a part of the Electric Construction Group,
she needed to access Hardin’s calendar in order to determine whether the meetings
attended by her supervisors and Hardin conflicted with the Group’s work.
It is undisputed that General Manager Ray Hardin did not tell plaintiff that she
could access his electronic calendar for any reason.31 Hardin alleged that he
“assumed that [his] calendar was secure and not accessible to other employees.”32
Even so, plaintiff testified that Lead Lineman David Evans and Warehouse Clerk
Linda Sanders each told plaintiff that they also had accessed Hardin’s electronic
calendar.33 Plaintiff was not aware of either employee’s reasons for doing so.34
The record is not clear on whether plaintiff was told that she could access the
28

Id. at 38 (alterations supplied).

29

Id. at 39.

30

Id.

31

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 6.

32

Id. (alteration supplied); see also doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 11, 20.

33

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 41-42.

34

Id.

8

electronic calendars of other coworkers, including Human Resources Administrator
Shannon Kirby, Electric Manager Glenn Boyles, Electric Field Superintendent Steven
Williams, Lead Lineman Joel Herring, Meter Shop Supervisor Ken Lindsey,
Warehouse Supervisor Randy Dunn, and Purchasing Agent Mickey Jones. Plaintiff
alleged only that she received access to Kirby’s calendar from Kirby’s predecessor,
Beth Wirey, and that “when Beth had [the calendar,] she put meetings on there for us
to know when there was meetings.”35 Plaintiff did not state how she received access
to the electronic calendars of Boyles, Williams, Herring, Lindsey, Dunn, and Jones.
C.

The Calendar Entry Regarding the Decision Not to Promote Jonathan
Aldridge
By August of 2010, plaintiff was working in defendant’s electric warehouse

with Jonathan Aldridge, a male coworker in his late 20s who had submitted an
application for the position of Measurement Technician.36 During her review of
General Manager Ray Hardin’s calendar on August 11, 2010, plaintiff noticed a
meeting request from Human Resources Manager Christy Lamb.37
Lamb had proposed a meeting with Hardin and Manager Jimmy Evans in order

35

Id. at 42-43 (alteration supplied).

36

Id. at 14, 44; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 45.

37

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 44; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray
Hardin), at 11-12, 15-16, 45; id., Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum in Plaintiff’s Personnel File).

9

to discuss a hiring recommendation for the position of Measurement Technician.38
The request contained the names of the top candidates, their current pay, and their
interviewers’ recommendations.39 It revealed that Jonathan Aldridge had not been
selected for the position.40 Plaintiff was not involved in the hiring decision.41
After reading the request, plaintiff informed Jonathan Aldridge that she had
seen an entry on General Manager Ray Hardin’s electronic calendar regarding the
Measurement Technician position.42 Plaintiff then told Aldridge how to access the
calendar from his computer, stood behind Aldridge’s desk on the warehouse dock,
and watched as Aldridge followed her oral instructions.43
Jonathan Aldridge immediately sent a text message to Thomas Russell, an
employee of one of defendant’s service centers who also had applied for the
Measurement Technician position.44 The text message stated: “[W]ith you having
that card already and [J]ames putting in for it I knew I was screwed unless they have
changed their minds b/c what I saw was a recommendation to [General Manager R]ay
38

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum in
Plaintiff’s Personnel File).
39

Id.

40

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 47, 49.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 45-47.

43

Id. at 45-47.

44

Id. at 48; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum
in Plaintiff’s Personnel File).

10

[Hardin] with just our 3 names on it[,] mine being 3.”45
D.

The Investigation of Jonathan Aldridge’s Knowledge of Defendant’s
Hiring Decision
At 7:30 a.m. on August 11, 2010 (the day that plaintiff shared the calendar

entry with Jonathan Aldridge), two employees named Glenn Hill and Lonnie Dunn
informed Human Resources Manager Christy Lamb of the text message sent by
Jonathan Aldridge to Thomas Russell.46 Lamb then met with Manager Jimmy Evans
to discuss the fact that an employee had accessed and distributed confidential
information about an upcoming hiring decision.47 Evans called General Manager Ray
Hardin, who was out of town, to inform him about the matter.48
Lamb contacted Aldridge at 10:45 a.m. and asked him to come to her office for
a meeting with her and Evans.49 When questioned on the source of his knowledge,
Aldridge stated that plaintiff came to his office early that morning and “said she had

45

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum in
Plaintiff’s Personnel File) (alterations supplied).
46

Id. The job title of Glenn Hill is not clear from the record. Lonnie Dunn may be a
nickname for, or a relative of, Warehouse Supervisor Randy Dunn. See doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition
of Marlene Eads), at 17 (discussing Randy Dunn); doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 25
(same).
47

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum in
Plaintiff’s Personnel File).
48

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 13-14; id., Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2
(Memorandum in Plaintiff’s Personnel File).
49

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum in
Plaintiff’s Personnel File).

11

some information that he might want to see.”50 Plaintiff then “told him that he could
access Ray Hardin’s personal [O]utlook calendar[,] and showed him how to access
it on his computer.”51 Aldridge was sent home at 12:00 p.m. pending further
investigation and discussion with Hardin and Electric Manager Glenn Boyles.52
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff’s supervisor, Electric Field Superintendent
Steven Williams, asked plaintiff to come to the Human Resources office for a meeting
with Human Resources Manager Christy Lamb and Manager Jimmy Evans.53
Plaintiff alleges that Lamb refused to permit plaintiff to invite Williams to attend the
meeting.54 In any event, plaintiff admitted that she had accessed General Manager
Ray Hardin’s electronic calendar.55 According to the memorandum prepared by
Lamb for inclusion in plaintiff’s personnel file,
[Plaintiff] stated that she accessed Ray Hardin’s calendar
frequently and started approximately six month ago when she
discovered it was a “shared calendar” to her. She said that she looked
at it daily to see what was going on in the company. She stated that she
did not see anything wrong with her looking at it. She admitted that
when she read the measurement tech meeting information, she called
Jonathon [Aldridge] and then went over to his office to show him how
to access the calendar. She also stated that she went down through the
50

Id.

51

Id. (alterations supplied).

52

Id.

53

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 49.

54

Id.

55

Id.

12

names of other DU [i.e., Decatur Utilities] employees/managers to see
if she could view others, mentioned Jimmy Evans. She said she did this
routinely as part of her job as a Work Order Coordinator, although no
one had asked her to do this. Based on the information that [plaintiff]
admitted on sharing confidential information to another employees, she
was sent home at approximately 1:00 pm for the remainder of the
week.56
Later that afternoon, Human Resources Manager Christy Lamb described the
matter to Electric Manager Glenn Boyles, and Manager Jimmy Evans discussed the
matter with General Manager Ray Hardin.57 An unidentified employee reviewed
plaintiff’s Outlook calendar settings and discovered that, in addition to accessing
Hardin’s calendar, she also had opened the calendar of Human Resources
Administrator Shannon Kirby.58 Hardin sought “input” from plaintiff’s supervisor,
Electric Field Superintendent Steven Williams, and asked whether Williams was
aware that plaintiff was accessing Hardin’s calendar.59 Hardin could not recall
Williams’s response to that question during his deposition.60
Upon General Manager Ray Hardin’s return to the area, he and Human
Resources Manager Christy Lamb scheduled a meeting with plaintiff for 1:00 p.m.
56

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum in
Plaintiff’s Personnel File) (alterations supplied).
57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 36; id., Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum
in Plaintiff’s Personnel File).
60

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 36.

13

on August 13, 2010.61 Prior to attending the meeting, plaintiff called her supervisor,
Electric Field Superintendent Steven Williams, and asked whether she could collect
her belongings because she “thought she was going to be terminated on Monday.”62
Plaintiff was denied access to the building pending a decision regarding her continued
employment.63 She attended the meeting with Hardin and Lamb in the company of
an attorney, Allen Stoner.64

(Mr. Stoner is not representing plaintiff in this

litigation.65)
During the meeting, plaintiff confirmed that she had been accessing General
Manager Ray Hardin’s electronic calendar for the six previous months, that she had
read an entry about a promotion to the Measurement Technician position, and that she
had instructed Jonathan Aldridge, a candidate for the position, on how to access
Hardin’s calendar in order to review the information contained therein.66 When
Hardin asked plaintiff why she had accessed his calendar, plaintiff claimed that she
had done so as part of her job.67 However, she could not explain how the General
61

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum in
Plaintiff’s Personnel File).
62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

See docket sheet. Plaintiff was represented by Gregg L. Smith until October 5, 2012, and
she presently is represented by Brian M. White of White & Oakes LLC.
66

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 4.

67

Id.

14

Manager’s calendar related to her duties as Work Order Coordinator in the Electric
Construction Group.68
General Manager Ray Hardin explained to plaintiff that accessing his calendar
without permission was equivalent to rifling through his desk drawers.69 Plaintiff did
not apologize or show remorse for her actions, and, in fact, displayed “no recognition
that what we [presumably, Hardin and Lamb] had determined was wrong was
inappropriate at all.”70 Even so, Hardin would not testify that if plaintiff had
apologized or shown remorse for her actions, she would have kept her job.71
General Manager Ray Hardin also interviewed Jonathan Aldridge about the
incident.72 During the meeting, Aldridge confirmed that plaintiff had shown him how
to access Hardin’s calendar.73 Aldridge also admitted that he had accessed Hardin’s
calendar on that occasion only.74 Aldridge, unlike plaintiff, acknowledged that his
actions were inappropriate, and promised to refrain from accessing Hardin’s calendar

68

Id. ¶¶ 4, 7; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 20, 50.

69

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 6; doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads),

at 51.
70

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 46 (alteration supplied); see also doc. no. 161 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 4; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2
(Memorandum in Plaintiff’s Personnel File).
71

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 46.

72

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 5.

73

Id.

74

Id.

15

without permission.75
General Manager Ray Hardin’s investigation left several questions
unanswered, including: whether plaintiff had permission to access the electronic
calendars belonging to Human Resources Administrator Shannon Kirby and certain
other coworkers;76 whether plaintiff had previously been told that reviewing
coworkers’ electronic calendars was part of her job;77 whether plaintiff had previously
been told that reviewing coworkers’ electronic calendars was not part of her job;78
whether other employees accessed Hardin’s calendar without his knowledge;79 and
whether other employees accessed the calendars of coworkers outside their work
groups.80
E.

The Discipline of Plaintiff and Jonathan Aldridge
Upon concluding his investigation, General Manager Ray Hardin “[could not]

conceive of any reason [why plaintiff] would need to access [his] calendar as part of
her job.”81 Hardin reasoned that he “[did] not work directly with [plaintiff] and, prior
to this incident, had only met her in passing. [Hardin and plaintiff did] not even work
75

Id.

76

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 24-25.

77

Id. at 47-48.

78

Id. at 20-21.

79

Id. at 28.

80

Id.

81

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 7 (alterations supplied).

16

in the same building.”82
General Manager Ray Hardin made the decision to terminate plaintiff’s
employment on August 13, 2010.83 He announced the decision to Human Resources
Manager Christy Lamb in an e-mail sent at 3:49 p.m., less than four hours after his
meeting with plaintiff.84 Hardin testified that the “calendar incident” was the only
reason for plaintiff’s termination.85 He considered termination warranted because:
[plaintiff] had repeatedly accessed [his] and other managers’ Outlook
calendars, though [he] had never given her permission to do so and
though it was not necessary for her to do so to perform her job; she
shared information about a pending personnel decision with an affected
employee; and she would not even acknowledge that her conduct was
inappropriate.86
General Manager Ray Hardin also concluded that Jonathan Aldridge had
accessed his electronic calendar and shared the information therein with another
employee.87 Hardin did not, however, terminate Aldridge’s employment, allegedly
because Aldridge only accessed the calendar on one occasion, acknowledged that his

82

Id. (alterations supplied); see also doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 11-18.

83

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 21-22; id., Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 (Termination

E-Mail).
84

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 21-22; id., Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3 (Termination

E-Mail).
85

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 7.

86

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 8 (alterations supplied); see also doc. no. 16-3
(Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 21-22, 31, 34-35.
87

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 9.

17

conduct was inappropriate, and promised to refrain from accessing the calendar
without permission.88 Hardin instead subjected Jonathan Aldridge to less severe
forms of discipline, which included a suspension without pay, a written warning
regarding the incident, ineligibility for a raise during the next review cycle, and
ineligibility for transfer or promotion for a period of one year.89
F.

The Implementation of Security Measures to Protect Calendars from
Unauthorized Access
At the time of plaintiff’s termination, General Manager Ray Hardin had no

reason to suspect that certain employees could access the electronic calendars of their
coworkers without permission.90 Accordingly, Hardin directed Human Resources
Manager Christy Lamb to dispatch Information Technology Coordinator John
Kuhlman to investigate the extent to which “there had been breaches of other
calendars around the company.”91
Kuhlman informed Hardin of the results of his review of plaintiff’s e-mail
account and electronic calendar access in an e-mail dated August 16, 2010, three days
after Hardin made the decision to terminate plaintiff’s employment.92 To explain his
88

Id.; see also doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 44-46.

89

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 9; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin),

at 44-45.
90

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 11.

91

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 33.

92

Id. at 32, 34; id., Plaintiff’s Exhibit 4 (Kuhlman E-Mail).

18

failure to await the results of Kuhlman’s investigation, Hardin testified that “there
was enough information known about the situation to make th[e termination] decision
. . . . [W]e really just wanted to find out how extensive the situation had become.”93
Information Technology Coordinator John Kuhlman discovered that plaintiff
was able to access the calendars of General Manager Ray Hardin and various other
coworkers because the calendars had mistakenly been designated as “open” and
could, therefore, be viewed by any employee.94 Since the incident, defendant has
implemented security measures to protect calendars from unauthorized access.95
G.

The Role of Plaintiff’s Age and Disability
At the time of plaintiff’s termination, General Manager Ray Hardin was not

aware of plaintiff’s medical conditions, and had not commented on any such
conditions.96 In fact, none of defendant’s employees had remarked negatively on
plaintiff’s conditions.97 Hardin had also not commented negatively on plaintiff’s
age.98
After General Manager Ray Hardin terminated plaintiff’s employment, five
93

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 34 (alterations supplied).

94

Id. at 27.

95

Id. at 27, 29.

96

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 10; doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene
Eads), at 71.
97

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 62, 72.

98

Id. at 70-71.

19

persons applied to fill her position.99 Defendant first offered the job to Glenda Ratliff,
age 58 (two years younger than plaintiff), who declined the position.100 Defendant
then offered the job to Sandra Stephenson, age 49 (eleven years younger than
plaintiff), who accepted the position.101
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff “does not oppose summary judgment on the ADA claim.”102
Accordingly, this court will grant summary judgment on that claim.
Defendant also requests summary judgment on plaintiff’s ADEA claim.103 The
ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The ADEA protects individuals who “are
at least 40 years of age but less than 70 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(a).
Plaintiff presents no direct evidence of age discrimination. She must therefore
satisfy the burden-shifting framework for claims provable through circumstantial
evidence that was promulgated by the Supreme Court in a trilogy of decisions,
99

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 13.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Doc. no. 17 (Response to Motion for Summary Judgment), at 2.

103

Doc. no. 14 (Motion for Summary Judgment), at 9.

20

beginning with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), then
elaborated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981), and finally elucidated in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).104
The analytical framework developed by that trilogy has three steps, the goal of
which is that of “progressively . . . sharpen[ing] the inquiry into the elusive factual
question of intentional discrimination.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 (quoting Burdine, 450
U.S. at 255 n.8). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of intent to discriminate.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

The

establishment of a prima facie case “creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
The effect of the presumption of discrimination is to shift to the employer the
burden of producing, but not proving, some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the contested employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To
satisfy the burden of production, “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant’s
evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the
104

Although those cases involved Title VII discrimination claims, a variant of the analysis
also applies to ADEA discrimination claims. See Mitchell v. Worldwide Underwriters Insurance
Co., 967 F.2d 565, 566 (11th Cir. 1992); Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1500 (11th
Cir. 1991).

21

plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (citation and footnote omitted).
“If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by
the prima facie case is rebutted,” id. at 255, and “drops from the case.” Id. at 255
n.10. At the third level of analysis, “the plaintiff has the opportunity to come forward
with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima
facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons
given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment action.”
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997).
[T]his circuit’s post-Hicks decisions uniformly hold that once a plaintiff
has established a prima facie case and has put on sufficient evidence to
allow a factfinder to disbelieve an employer’s proffered explanation for
its actions, that alone is enough to preclude entry of judgment as a
matter of law.
Id. at 1532 (alteration supplied).
A.

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case
To make out a prima facie case of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA,

the plaintiff must prove: (1) that she was a member of the class of persons protected
by the Act, that is, individuals between the ages of 40 and 70; (2) that she was
qualified to perform the duties of her position; (3) that she was discharged; and (4)
that she was replaced by a substantially younger person.105 See, e.g., Reeves v.
105

The plaintiff is not required to establish that she was replaced by someone less than 40
years of age, but only by someone “substantially younger.” O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin

22

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Bogle v. Orange
County Board of County Commissioners, 162 F.3d 653, 656-57 (11th Cir. 1998);
Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998); Benson
v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 (11th Cir. 1997).
Alternatively, the plaintiff “may still satisfy the last prong of the prima facie
case requirement by identifying similarly situated comparators outside of his
protected class who were treated more favorably.” Horn v. UPS, 433 F. App’x 788,
792 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d
1181, 1185-86 (11th Cir. 1984)). Plaintiff attempts to make out a prima facie case
of age discrimination using the Nix/Horn method: i.e., “by showing that she was a
qualified member of a protected class and was subjected to an adverse employment
action in contrast with similarly situated employees outside the protected class.”106

Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996). This Circuit has interpreted the requirement that the
plaintiff’s replacement be “substantially younger” as follows:
Unlike race and sex discrimination cases, the plaintiff in an age
discrimination case need not necessarily prove that his replacement was outside the
protected class, that is, under forty years of age. The plaintiff in an age
discrimination case may establish a prima facie case merely by establishing that his
replacement was younger than he, provided that the discrepancy between the ages,
along with any other relevant evidence, is sufficient that a fact finder could
reasonably infer age discrimination.
Corbin v. Southerland International Trucks, 25 F.3d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1994).
106

See doc. no. 17 (Response to Motion for Summary Judgment), at 20-21.

23

The only “similarly situated employee” identified by plaintiff is Jonathan Aldridge.107
Defendant does not dispute (1) that plaintiff was 60 years old at the time of her
termination, (2) that she was qualified to perform the duties of her position, and (3)
that she was discharged. Defendant does dispute that plaintiff and Aldridge were
“similarly situated.”108 Defendant notes that plaintiff accessed the electronic calendar
of General Manager Ray Hardin on a daily basis over a period of six months,109 but
that Aldridge only did so on one occasion, and only at the urging and instruction of
plaintiff.110 Further, defendant observes that plaintiff did not apologize or show
remorse for her actions,111 but that Aldridge acknowledged that his actions were
inappropriate, and promised to refrain from accessing Hardin’s calendar without
permission.112
This Circuit has explained the “similarly situated” requirement as follows:
“In determining whether employees are similarly situated for
purposes of establishing a prima facie case, it is necessary to consider
whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar
conduct and are disciplined in different ways.” Jones v. Bessemer
107

Id. at 21.

108

Doc. no. 15 (Motion for Summary Judgment), at 10.

109

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 39.

110

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 5

111

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 46 (alteration supplied); see also doc. no.
16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 4; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit
2 (Memorandum in Plaintiff’s Personnel File).
112

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 5.

24

Carraway Medical Center, 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir.), opinion
modified by 151 F.3d 1321 (1998) (quoting Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d
1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997)). “The most important factors in the
disciplinary context are the nature of the offenses committed and the
nature of the punishments imposed.” Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted). We require that the quantity and quality of the
comparator’s misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from
second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples
with oranges. See Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d
13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Exact correlation is neither likely nor necessary,
but the cases must be fair congeners. In other words, apples should be
compared to apples.”).
Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis supplied).
Other circuits have recognized “the soundness of treating employees who admit
error and indicate a motivation to avoid it in [the] future differently than those who
do not.” Medlock v. UPS, Inc., 608 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (alteration
supplied) (citing Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1177 (10th Cir. 2004);
Kendrick v. Penske Transportation Services, Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1233 (10th Cir.
2000)). The Eleventh Circuit has likewise recognized that employees’ reactions to
concerns regarding their performance may affect whether those employees are
“similarly situated.” See Riley v. Emory University, 136 F. App’x 264, 267 (11th Cir.
2005) (holding that a plaintiff who “refused to coordinate a newsletter, but then
agreed to write an article after repeated requests” was not similarly situated to a
coworker who “apologized for her refusal and ensured that an article was written”).

25

This Circuit has also recognized that principle in the context of educational
discrimination suits. See Carr v. Board of Regents of the University System, 249 F.
App’x 146, 150 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that a plaintiff who “did not write an
apology or return the money she received” was not similarly situated to another
student who “wrote an apology, and returned the money”).
The facts that Jonathan Aldridge only accessed the electronic calendar of
General Manager Ray Hardin on one occasion, that he acknowledged that his actions
were inappropriate, and that he promised to change his behavior are compelling
evidence that plaintiff and Aldridge were not “similarly situated.” Thus, this action
could be resolved in favor of defendant on that basis alone. Even so, this court has
assumed for the sake of the following discussion that plaintiff and Aldridge were
“similarly situated,” and that plaintiff has established her prima facie case. If that
were to be assumed, defendant then would bear the burden of producing, but not
proving, some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the contested employment
action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
B.

Defendant’s Allegedly Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reasons
Defendant has identified three allegedly legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for terminating plaintiff’s employment: i.e., the fact that plaintiff
repeatedly accessed [General Manager Ray Hardin’s] and other
26

managers’ Outlook calendars, though [Hardin] had never given her
permission to do so and though it was not necessary for her to do so to
perform her job; she shared information about a pending personnel
decision with an affected employee; and she would not even
acknowledge that her conduct was inappropriate.113
Therefore, defendant has carried its burden of production. See McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802.
C.

Pretext
In addressing an argument that an employer’s allegedly legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action was pretextual, the Eleventh
Circuit admonished that:
A plaintiff is not allowed to recast an employer’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute his business judgment for that
of the employer. Provided that the proffered reason is one that might
motivate a reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason
head on and rebut it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply
quarreling with the wisdom of that reason. See Alexander v. Fulton
County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1341 (11th Cir.2000) (Title VII case) (“It
is not the court’s role to second-guess the wisdom of an employer’s
decisions as long as the decisions are not racially motivated.”); Combs,
106 F.3d at 1541-43. We have recognized previously and we reiterate
today that:
federal courts “do not sit as a super-personnel department
that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. No matter
how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how
high-handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken
the firm’s managers, the ADEA does not interfere. Rather
113

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 8 (alterations supplied); see also doc. no. 163 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 21-22, 31, 34-35.

27

our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an
honest explanation of its behavior.”
Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.1991)
(quoting Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th
Cir.1988) (citations omitted)); see also Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall
Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.1984) (An “employer
may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on
erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a
discriminatory reason.”); Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339 n. 5
(11th Cir.2000). We “do not … second-guess the business judgment of
employers.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1543; accord Alexander, 207 F.3d at
1339, 1341; Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d
1354, 1361 (11th Cir.1999) (“We have repeatedly and emphatically held
that a defendant may terminate an employee for a good or bad reason
without violating federal law. We are not in the business of adjudging
whether employment decisions are prudent or fair.” (internal citation
omitted)).
Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted).
Defendant’s first allegedly legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff’s
employment is the fact that she “repeatedly accessed [General Manager Ray Hardin’s]
and other managers’ Outlook calendars, though [Hardin] had never given her
permission to do so and though it was not necessary for her to do so to perform her
job.”114 It is undisputed that General Manager Ray Hardin did not tell plaintiff that
she could access his electronic calendar for any reason.115 Even so, plaintiff asserts

114

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 8 (alterations supplied); see also doc. no. 163 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 21-22, 31, 34-35.
115

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 6.

28

that her supervisor, Electric Field Superintendent Steven Williams, instructed her to
look for meetings that conflicted with the activities of the Electric Construction
Group.116 Plaintiff also testified that she told Williams that she was accessing the
electronic calender of various coworkers.117 All of those calendars were designated
as “open” and could, therefore, be viewed by any employee.118
Defendant’s second allegedly legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff’s
employment is the fact that she “shared information about a pending personnel
decision with an affected employee,” Jonathan Aldridge.119

That information

revealed not only the fact that Aldridge was not recommended for the position, but
also the names and salaries of his competitors for the position.120 Plaintiff has
admitted the truth of those allegations.121
Defendant’s third allegedly legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff’s
employment is the fact that she refused to “acknowledge that her conduct was

116

Id. at 41.

117

Id.

118

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 27.

119

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 8 (alterations supplied); see also doc. no. 163 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 21-22, 31, 34-35.
120

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 47, 49; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray
Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 (Memorandum in Plaintiff’s Personnel File).
121

See, e.g., doc. no. 17 (Response to Motion for Summary Judgment), at 3-4 (plaintiff’s
response to defendant’s statement of undisputed facts).

29

inappropriate.”122 Plaintiff remained adamant in her refusal to apologize even after
General Manager Ray Hardin explained his belief that accessing his calendar without
permission was equivalent to rifling through his desk drawers.123 Plaintiff has
admitted the truth of those allegations.124
This court holds that plaintiff has not proven that defendant’s allegedly
legitimate reasons for terminating her employment are pretextual, because those
reasons are ones “that might motivate a reasonable employer” to take the challenged
employment action. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s act
of sharing information about an upcoming hiring decision with applicant Jonathan
Aldridge showed poor judgment, because the information revealed not only the fact
that Aldridge was not recommended for the position, but also the names and salaries
of his competitors for the position. Defendant understandably wished to withhold
that information from Aldridge in order to protect the privacy of coworkers who also
had applied for the position.
Even accepting plaintiff’s argument that she accessed General Manager Ray
Hardin’s electronic calendar at the direction of her supervisor in order to look for
122

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 8 (alterations supplied); see also doc. no. 163 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 21-22, 31, 34-35.
123

Doc. no. 16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 6; doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene
Eads), at 51.
124

See, e.g., doc. no. 17 (Response to Motion for Summary Judgment), at 4 (plaintiff’s
response to defendant’s statement of undisputed facts).

30

meetings that conflicted with her work group’s activities, defendant was under no
obligation to credit that argument as a reasonable explanation for plaintiff’s decision
to share the entry regarding the hiring decision with Jonathan Aldridge. See
Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A plaintiff is not allowed to . . .
substitute his business judgment for that of the employer.”). Indeed, there is no
indication that plaintiff shared the calendar’s contents with Aldridge to resolve a
scheduling conflict. Rather, plaintiff explained that she did so because she “saw
something that applied to the job that [Aldridge] had applied for.”125
Defendant was likewise not obligated to decide that “the issue of [plaintiff] not
being satisfactorily contrite is not important” merely because plaintiff believed that
she acted in accordance with the duties of her position.126 See Chapman, 229 F.3d at
1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (observing that an “employee cannot succeed by simply
quarreling with the wisdom” of an allegedly legitimate reason for an adverse
employment action). Indeed, the refusal of an employee to apologize for her actions
and express a willingness to change her behavior is regularly considered in
disciplinary decisions. See, e.g., Arnold v. Tuskegee University, 212 F. App’x 803,
806 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment on the Title VII claims of an

125

Doc. no. 16-2 (Deposition of Marlene Eads), at 45 (alteration supplied).

126

Doc. no. 17 (Response to Motion for Summary Judgment), at 25 (alteration supplied).

31

employee who refused to apologize); Robinson v. AFA Service Corp., 870 F. Supp.
1077 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (granting summary judgment on the ADEA claims of an
employee who stated that “she was not willing to change”). A district court from
Georgia relied on Robinson to grant summary judgment on an age discrimination
claim, and reasoned as follows:
Defendant suggests that Robinson v. AFA Service Corp., 870 F.
Supp. 1077 (N.D. Ga. 1994) is instructive. See Robinson, 870 F. Supp.
at 1084 (granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s age discrimination
claim and retaliation claim in favor of employer based on finding that
employer’s reason for terminating plaintiff was not pretexutal). In
Robinson, the plaintiff filed an age discrimination case to which the
defendant responded that plaintiff was not terminated because of her
age, but because of her uncooperative behavior. Her supervisor stated
that he “became frustrated because she did not try to correct the problem
or even admit that she needed to make changes.” Robinson, 870 F.
Supp. at 1081. When the plaintiff’s supervisor tried to address certain
problems with her, the plaintiff “was antagonistic and would not accept
responsibility for her actions.” Id. The plaintiff’s response, instead, was
to point out the incompetence of her supervisor and others, attacking
them personally. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff was confronting other
employees about the reprimands she was receiving and upsetting them.
Id. Even after the plaintiff was placed on probation, she did not indicate
a willingness to improve — in fact, she stated that “she was not willing
to change” — and was terminated as a result. Id.
Tidwell-Williams, like the plaintiff in Robinson, was terminated
in part because of what her employers believed was a failure on her part
to indicate a willingness to improve. After Chastain, her supervisor,
confronted Tidwell-Williams with a list of errors she had made, the
record shows that Tidwell-Williams responded by making numerous
allegations of misconduct against her co-workers and by ‘writing up’ an
error made by Chastain. (Pl. Exhibits [53], Ex. S; Def. Exhibits [41],
32

Ex. U; Ex. V.) Even after she was placed on probation, defendants
perceived that plaintiff refused to acknowledge her mistakes or to make
an effort to improve.
If Chastain and the other managers involved in the decision to
force Tidwell-William’s resignation misinterpreted plaintiff’s
indifference to the errors she made, or if the errors were wrongly
attributed to Tidwell-Williams, or even if the management placed
greater significance on those errors than another hospital would have
placed on them, these things do not lead to a conclusion that the reasons
offered for her dismissal were merely a pretext for discrimination. The
issue is whether the defendants genuinely believed that plaintiff
committed a substantial number of errors and showed no interest in
improving; the issue is not, as plaintiff argues, whether plaintiff actually
committed the errors or actually exhibited an attitude that would be
objectionable to others. See Nix, 738 F.2d at 1186 (summary judgment
granted in favor of employer, even though employer may have been
mistaken about violation of work rule by plaintiff).
Tidwell-Williams v. Northwest Georgia Health System, No. 1:97-CV-1726A-JEC,
1998 WL 1674745, *56-59 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 1998) (emphasis supplied). As in the
Tidwell-Williams case, plaintiff has not rebutted the evidence that General Manager
Ray Hardin “genuinely believed” that plaintiff showed poor judgment by sharing his
electronic calendar with Jonathan Aldridge, and that she did not apologize or show
remorse for her actions.127
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, defendant’s motion for summary judgment
127

Doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), at 46 (alteration supplied); see also doc. no.
16-1 (Declaration of Ray Hardin) ¶ 4; doc. no. 16-3 (Deposition of Ray Hardin), Plaintiff’s Exhibit
2 (Memorandum in Plaintiff’s Personnel File).

33

is GRANTED, and all of plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice. Costs are
taxed to plaintiff. The Clerk is directed to close this file.
DONE this 4th day of June, 2013.

______________________________
United States District Judge

34