Hill v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 12/20/12. (CVA)

FILED
2012 Dec-20 AM 10:54
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
SHELTON HILL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
COMMISSIONER,
Defendant.

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Civil Action Number
5:12-cv-00812-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shelton Hill, Jr. (“Hill”) brings this action pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review
of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision - which has become the decision of the Commissioner - is
supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, AFFIRMS the decision denying
benefits to Hill.
I. Procedural History
Hill filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on December 18,

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2009, alleging a disability onset date of November 28, 2009, which was later
amended to January 9, 2009, due to congestive heart failure, Crohn’s disease, and
high blood pressure. (R. 10, 25, 98). After the SSA denied Hill’s applications, he
requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 49, 52). The ALJ subsequently denied
Hill’s claims, (R. 7-21), which became the final decision of the Commissioner
when the Appeals Council refused to grant review, (R. 1-6). Hill then filed this
action for judicial review pursuant to § 205(g) and § 1631(c)(3) of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3). Doc. 1; see also doc. 9.
II. Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial
evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v.
Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988);
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the
evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must
review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable
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and supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a
preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529
(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by
substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings
even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings.
See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review
of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield
automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairments which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(I). A physical or mental
impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable
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clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3)

whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4)

whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5)

whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national
economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative
answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps
three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other
than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to
prior work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can
do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Lastly, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges disability because of pain, she must
meet additional criteria. In this circuit, “a three part ‘pain standard’ [is applied]

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when a claimant seeks to establish disability through his or her own testimony of
pain or other subjective symptoms.” Holt v. Barnhart, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th
Cir. 1991). Specifically,
The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the
severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it
can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.1
Id. However, medical evidence of pain itself, or of its intensity, is not required:
While both the regulations and the Hand standard require objective
medical evidence of a condition that could reasonably be expected to
cause the pain alleged, neither requires objective proof of the pain
itself. Thus under both the regulations and the first (objectively
identifiable condition) and third (reasonably expected to cause pain
alleged) parts of the Hand standard a claimant who can show that his
condition could reasonably be expected to give rise to the pain he
alleges has established a claim of disability and is not required to
produce additional, objective proof of the pain itself. See 20 CFR §§
404.1529 and 416.929; Hale [v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th
Cir. 1987)].
Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991) (parenthetical
information omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[a] claimant’s subjective
testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard is itself
sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. Therefore, if
a claimant testifies to disabling pain and satisfies the three part pain standard, the

1

This standard is referred to as the Hand standard, named after Hand v. Heckler, 761
F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1985).
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ALJ must find a disability unless the ALJ properly discredits the claimant’s
testimony.
Furthermore, when the ALJ fails to credit a claimant’s pain testimony, the
ALJ must articulate reasons for that decision:
It is established in this circuit that if the [ALJ] fails to articulate reasons
for refusing to credit a claimant’s subjective pain testimony, then the
[ALJ], as a matter of law, has accepted that testimony as true. Implicit
in this rule is the requirement that such articulation of reasons by the
[ALJ] be supported by substantial evidence.
Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012. Therefore, if the ALJ either fails to articulate reasons for
refusing to credit the plaintiff’s pain testimony, or if the ALJ’s reasons are not
supported by substantial evidence, the court must accept as true the pain testimony
of the plaintiff and render a finding of disability. Id.
IV. The ALJ’s Decision
In properly applying the five step analysis, the ALJ first determined that Hill
has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 9, 2009, and therefore
met Step One. (R. 12). The ALJ also acknowledged that Hill’s cardiovascular
system disorders were severe impairments that met Step Two. Id. The ALJ
proceeded to the next step and found that Hill failed to meet or equal one of the
listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix 1 and thus did not
satisfy Step Three. Id. at 14. Although he answered Step Three in the negative,
consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, the ALJ proceeded to
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Step Four where he determined that Hill
has the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of light
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). I find claimant can frequently
lift or carry 10 pounds, occasionally lift or carry 20 pounds, sit for 6
hours of an 8 hour workday, and stand or walk for 6 hours of an 8 hour
workday. I also find claimant can never climb ladders, ropes and
scaffolds, and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, balance, and
climb ramps and stairs. I further find claimant must avoid concentrated
exposure to hazards, extreme heat, and extreme cold.
Id. at 15. With respect to the pain standard, the ALJ found that Hill’s “medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms; however, [Hill’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are
inconsistent with the above [RFC] assessment.” Id. Accordingly, the ALJ found
that Hill is capable of performing past relevant work. Id. at 16. Because he
answered Step Four in the negative, the ALJ declined to address Step Five and
found that Hill is not disabled. Id. at 18; see also McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030.
V. Analysis
Hill contends that “the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the credibility of
[Hill]’s complaints of pain consistent with the Eleventh Circuit Pain Standard.”
Doc. 9 at 4. This standard requires “evidence of an underlying medical condition”
that is either (a) supported by “objective medical evidence that confirms the

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severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition,” or (b) “of such a severity
that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” Holt, 921 F.2d
1221 at 1223. Moreover, a claimant’s subjective testimony regarding pain, if
supported by the medical evidence, is sufficient to support a finding a disability.
Id. Accordingly, an ALJ must articulate the reasons for discrediting a claimant’s
pain testimony and substantial evidence must support the reasons. Hale, 831 F.2d
at 1012. In this instance, the ALJ articulated two primary reasons for discrediting
Hill’s subjective testimony regarding pain: (1) that it was inconsistent with the
objective medical evidence, and (2) that it was inconsistent with Hill’s reported
daily activities. (R. 15-16). Hill disagrees and asserts that the ALJ’s reasons are
not supported by the evidence. Doc. 9 at 5. As set forth more fully below, the
court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
A.

Hill’s Testimony Regarding Pain & Other Symptoms
Hill testified that his symptoms include “fatigue, shortness of breath, [and]

chest pain” and that his symptoms “haven’t resolved” but “have gotten a little
better with the medications.” (R. 27). According to Hill, he experiences fatigue
and shortness of breath “[i]f [he] get[s] up to do something in the house, like,
cooking or something” after about 10 or 15 minutes. Id. at 28. To alleviate these
symptoms, Hill stated he has to “rest for a bit” and then he is able to get back up
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and “do some things, but not [] heavy lifting or anything.” Id. at 29. Hill
estimates that in an 8 hour workday, he would need to spend 5-6 hours laying
down. Id. With respect to his ability to lift things, Hill testified that physical
exertion “caus[es] [his] chest to hurt” so he is able to lift “[n]o more than. . . 10, 12
pounds.” Id. at 30. Hill stated also that he can walk about 25 yards before getting
out of breath. Id. Although he testified that his “breathing [is] normal if [he is]
standing in one place[,]” Hill stated also that he could not take a job that required
him to stand because “after [he] stand[s] for a while, it starts hurting.” Id. at 31.
Upon reexamination by the ALJ, Hill clarified that his chest pain was “like a
clamping pressure right in the center of [his] chest[.]” Id.
B.

The Objective Medical Evidence
The extensive medical record failed to support Hill’s disability claim. For

example, Dr. Basil Hirschowitz and Dr. Wilhelm Tietke treated Hill for Crohn’s
disease for several years. See (R.174, 190). In early 2008, prior to Hill’s alleged
onset date, Dr. Tietke noted that “[i]n the past [Hill’s] Crohn’s disease was very
severe and required surgery, but over the past several years he has had almost no
symptoms[.]” Id. at 190. The medical record includes no evidence suggesting that
Hill’s Crohn’s disease was not well managed through his prescriptions. To the
extent that Hill is contending that his Crohn’s disease supports his disability claim,
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he failed to establish this contention.
The medical evidence shows also that on January 9, 2009, Hill was admitted
to Crestwood Medical Center (“Crestwood”) after coming in for chest pain and
acute dyspnea (shortness of breath). Id. at 194, 202. “After optimization of
medical management, [Hill] underwent a cardiac catheterization on January 12,
2009.” Id. Dr. Sadasiva Katta then diagnosed Hill with congestive heart failure
with ischemic cardiomyopathy but noted that “[h]e has been clinically doing well
and his congestive heart failure is well compensated, and he will be discharged
home with followup in two weeks.” Id. Consulting physician Dr. Charles G.
Newton noted “I believe the patient has single-vessel coronary artery disease with
severe global left ventricular dysfunction. I am not convinced this is an ischemic
cardiomyopathy, and I am also not convinced that the patient is facing a
significant risk for a coronary event. . . . I believe that he would benefit from
continued anticongestive therapy and time, off alcohol, to assess potential
improvement in his left ventricular function which would make coronary artery
bypass graft a more attractive option.” Id. at 205. Ultimately, Dr. Katta
recommended medical management and a cardiac surgery consult for evaluation
for possible bypass grafting. Id. at 208. Following this hospital stay, Hill
followed up regularly with Dr. Katta and consistently reported no subsequent
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significant anginal episodes, leading Dr. Katta to repeatedly note that Hill was
doing well. Id. at 239, 240, 241.
The record contains no medical history for the period between September
2009 and July 2010, but by October 2010 Dr. Katta again noted that Hill was
“clinically doing well with no recent symptoms of chest pain[.]” Id. at 254.
Additionally, in April 2011, Dr. Katta noted that Hill was “clinically doing well on
present medical management without any shortness of breath, chest pain, or
orthopnea” and had a “normal clinical examination without any congestive heart
failure.” Id. at 253.
On May 17, 2011, Hill presented at Crestwood for chest pain but the
radiology report from Dr. John Kaliszak listed the impression as “no acute
abnormality.” Id. at 262. On May 19, 2011, Hill returned to Dr. Katta because of
a patent stent in the mid right coronary artery with no evidence of restenosis and
totally occluded left anterior descending artery with right-to-left collaterals. Id. at
251. Dr. Katta noted “no significant disease” and recommended medical
management. Id. A week later, Hill was admitted to Crestwood for two days for
cardiac catheterization showing patent stent in the RCA. Id. at 265. Dr. Katta
noted that Hill “did well without any vascular complications” and that “[h]e will
be discharged home and will have a followup in 2 weeks.” Id. At Hill’s follow up
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the next month, Dr. Katta noted that the “EKG done revealed normal sinus rhythm
with inferolateral T-wave inversion,” started Hill on a new medicine, and set a
four month follow up appointment. Id. at 252. Hill provided no further follow up
information and the record does not indicate that Hill suffered any complication or
further coronary event. Critically, nothing in these medical records supports Hill’s
contention that he is disabled.
C.

Hill’s Reported Daily Activities
On Hill’s function report, he indicated that he makes coffee, goes to the

bathroom “about 3 or 4 times,” watches television, makes small meals like cereal
and sandwiches, cleans up the kitchen, mows the yard with a riding lawnmower,
loads and unloads the washing machine, and folds and puts away the clothes. (R.
130, 137). Hill added later that he dusts for about 30 minutes and vacuums the
carpet for about 20 minutes, that his symptoms do not affect his ability to care for
himself, that he drives and rides in a car, and that he is able to grocery shop for
about 45 minutes with his wife. Id. at 131-133. Hill also stated that he can walk
for 15 to 30 minutes before he needs a break for about one minute. Id. at 135.
Moreover, Hill indicated on his cardiovascular questionnaire that he exercises by
walking half a mile twice a week for about 10-15 minutes. Id. at 138. Notably,
Hill marked that he does not have shortness of breath or chest or other discomfort
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when exercising. Id. at 138-39.
D.

The ALJ’s Opinion
Based on the medical evidence, the court finds that the ALJ’s decision that

Hill’s testimony regarding his symptoms was not fully credible is supported by
substantial evidence. The objective medical evidence provided almost entirely
from Hill’s treating physician shows that although Hill suffered from two serious
congestive heart failure complications, the condition was well treated by
medication. Following Hill’s final hospital stay, the record fails to indicate any
further complications or coronary events. As for Hill’s Crohn’s disease, the only
notes regarding this condition indicate also that it was successfully treated and
caused no further problems. In other words, the objective evidence does not
support Hill’s contention that his conditions are disabling. In fact, the medical
evidence does not indicate that Hill is unable to work. Additionally, Hill’s daily
activities and cardiovascular questionnaire directly contradict his testimony before
the ALJ. For example, Hill testified that he suffers from shortness of breath and
fatigue after doing basic daily activities for 10-15 minutes, would need to spend 56 hours laying down in an 8 hour workday, can only walk 25 yards, and suffers
from chest pain after merely standing for a short period of time. However, Hill
indicated on his report and questionnaire that he can drive and ride in a car, stand
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and walk in a grocery store for 30-45 minutes, walk a half mile for exercise, mow
the lawn and vacuum, and, most notably, that he suffers from no shortness of
breath or chest discomfort when he exercises. Accordingly, Hill’s testimony is
inconsistent with the medical record and the reports Hill filled out. Based on this
record, Hill has failed to establish that the ALJ improperly applied the pain
standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination
that Hill is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ
applied proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED.
DONE the 20th day of December, 2012.

________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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