Lewis v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 9/17/2014. (KAM, )

FILED
2014 Sep-17 PM 04:25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
DIANE MARIE LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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5:13-cv-00560-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Diane M. Lewis, appeals from the decision of the Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her application for
a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Lewis timely
pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the
Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Lewis was 58 years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ’s”) decision, and she has a college education. (Tr. at 32.) Her past work
experience is as a financial analyst. (Tr. at 183.) Ms. Lewis claims that her bipolar
disorder, which she has had since at least 1975, intensified and caused her to be
disabled once she was hospitalized with manic symptoms on February 6, 2008. (Tr.

at 210, 135.)
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The
first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the
claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the
Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments
combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments
must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be
found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.
See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments
are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the
analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s
impairments fall within this category, he or she will be found disabled without further
consideration. Id. If they do not, a determination of the claimant’s residual functional

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capacity (“RFC”) will be made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(e).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past relevant work, the
claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant cannot do past
relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five requires the
court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age, education, and
past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other work. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled.
Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Ms. Lewis meets the
nondisability requirements for a period of disability and DIB and was insured through
the date of his decision. (Tr. at 22.) He further determined Ms. Lewis has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability. (Id.) According
to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s combination of bipolar and anxiety disorders are considered
“severe” based on the requirements set forth in the regulations. (Id.) However, he
found these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of the listed

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impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. at 26.) The ALJ did
not find Ms. Lewis’s allegations to be totally credible, and determined she has the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform less than the full range of medium
work as defined by 20 C.F.R. Part 404.1567(c). (Tr. at 28.) The ALJ found she can lift
30 pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently, she can sit for 2 hours of an 8 hour
workday, and she can stand or work for 6 hours of an 8 hour workday. The ALJ
further found she can push, pull, stoop, climb ramps and stairs, and operate foot
controls for 4 hours of an 8 hour workday; she can frequently balance and occasionally
kneel and crawl, but must avoid any exposure to hazards such as moving machinery
or exposure to unprotected heights, or even moderate exposure to excessive noise.
Furthermore, the ALJ found Ms. Lewis can perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks
with normal breaks, no fast-paced production requirements, simple work-related
decisions, few, if any, and gradual changes in work setting, occasional judgment, and
minimal interaction with the public. Finally, the ALJ found Ms. Lewis can be around
co-workers throughout the day with occasional interaction with such coworkers. (Id.)
According to the ALJ, Ms. Lewis is unable to perform her past relevant work,
she is an “individual of advanced age,” and she has “at least a high school education
and is able to communicate in English” as those terms are defined by the regulations.

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(Tr. at 32.) The ALJ determined that transferability of job skills is not material to the
issue in this case, because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework
supports a finding that Ms. Lewis was “not disabled” whether or not she has
transferable job skills. (Id.) Based on the finding that Ms. Lewis has the RFC to
perform less than the full range of medium work, the ALJ used Medical-Vocational
Rule 201.25 as a guideline for finding there are a significant number of jobs in the
national economy she is capable of performing, such as hand packager, assembler, and
childcare worker. (Tr. at 32-33.) The ALJ concluded his findings by stating Ms. Lewis
had “not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January
8, 2008, through the date of th[e] decision.” (Tr. at 33.)
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the
Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See

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Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts,
weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The
substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with
considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.
1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against
the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for
“despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court
scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision
reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to
apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d
629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion
Ms. Lewis alleges the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded for two

reasons. First, she believes the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical opinion

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evidence of the physicians in the case. (Doc. 9 at 12.) Second, Ms. Lewis argues the
ALJ failed to properly evaluate her credibility when determining whether she was
disabled. (Id. at 19.)
Before addressing Plaintiff’s claims, an overview of Plaintiff’s medical history
and her reported daily activities is warranted. Plaintiff has had bipolar disorder since
she was 25 years old and has experienced several manic episodes. (Tr. at 48.) Despite
her disorder, Plaintiff had a long career at Boeing, earning up to $90,000 per year as
a financial analyst. (Tr. at 52.) In February 2008, Plaintiff had a manic episode due
to stress at work. (Tr. at 50.) The episode occurred while she was cleaning out a
storage unit with her husband which she says made her frustrated. (Id.) She was
hospitalized for five days—from February 10, 2008 to February 15, 2008—because
she was in a manic state, and presented symptoms including lack of sleep,
disorganization, racing thoughts, and hypertalkativeness. (Tr. at 324.) After a brief
period back at home, Plaintiff was readmitted to the hospital on February 23, 2008 and
discharged March 3, 2008. (Id.) Since those hospitalizations, Plaintiff has not been
back to the hospital, and she has consistently been stable on medication in the three
years since her hospitalizations. (Tr. at 50.) Plaintiff testified that she routinely
prepares lengthy meals, shops for “several hours” multiple times a week, reads novels

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for “several hours” in one sitting, walks one to two miles multiple times per week,
cleans, cares for two dogs, and has no problems getting along with others. (Tr. at 5060.) Plaintiff and her husband also discussed other activities that they do such as
boating, camping, going out to eat, going to concerts, traveling, and gardening. (Tr.
at 29, 175-80, 213-28.) Plaintiff testified that she feels she cannot work because she
does not know when she is going to have another manic episode, or what might trigger
it. (Tr. at 52.) She says that while she is at home, she can choose whatever she wishes
to do, such as garden or cook, but if she were to have a job, no matter whether skilled
or unskilled, there would be things that were expected of her that she is not in control
of, and she is worried that will trigger an episode. (Tr. at 55.)
A.

The Weight Given by the ALJ to the Medical Opinion Evidence

Ms. Lewis argues the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions of the four
physicians in this case, including her treating psychiatrist. The ALJ discussed
extensively the weight he was giving to each of the physicians in this case: 1) Dr.
Devabhaktuni, Ms. Lewis’s treating psychiatrist, 2) Dr. Bilbrey, a psychologist who
examined Plaintiff on March 5, 2011, at her attorney’s request; 3) Dr. Smith, a
consultative psychologist who examined Plaintiff on July 19, 2010 at the request of the
Social Security Administration; and 4) Dr. Jackson, a state agency psychologist who

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did not examine the plaintiff but reviewed her records. The ALJ gave the greatest
weight to the opinion of Dr. Jackson, while he gave little weight to the three other
physicians’ opinions.
1.

Standard

As a general matter, the weight afforded to a medical opinion regarding the
nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments depends, among other things, upon
the examining and treating relationship the medical source had with the claimant, the
evidence the medical source presents to support the opinion, how consistent the
opinion is with the record as a whole, and the specialty of the medical source. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Within the classification of acceptable medical
sources are the following different types of sources which are entitled to different
weights of opinion: 1) a treating source, which is defined in the regulations as “your
physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides you, or has
provided you, with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an
ongoing treatment relationship with you;” 2) a non-treating source, which is defined
as “a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who has examined
you but does not have, or did not have, an ongoing treatment relationship with you;”
and 3) a non-examining source, which is a “a physician, psychologist, or other

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acceptable medical source who has not examined you but provides a medical or other
opinion in your case . . . includ[ing] State agency medical and psychological
consultants . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. The regulations and case law set forth a
general preference for treating sources’ opinions over those of non-treating sources,
and non-treating sources over non-examining sources.

See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(d)(2); Ryan v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 939, 942 (11th Cir. 1985). However, an ALJ
“may reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary
conclusion.” McCloud v. Barnhart, 166 F. App’x 410, 418–19 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 1983)).
A treating physician’s testimony is entitled to “substantial or considerable
weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Crawford v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125
F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted).”Good cause” exists
for an ALJ to discount the weight of a treating physician’s opinion when the: “(1)
treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence
supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or
inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d
1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440); see also Edwards v.

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Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding “good cause” existed where
the opinion was contradicted by other notations in the physician’s record).
The Court must also be aware that opinions on topics such as whether a
claimant is disabled, the claimant’s residual functional capacity, and the application
of vocational factors, “are not medical opinions . . . . but are, instead, opinions on
issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are
dispositive of a case; i.e. that would direct the determination or decision of disability.”
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). The Court is concerned with the doctors’
evaluations of Ms. Lewis’s “condition and the medical consequences thereof, not
their opinions of the legal consequences of his [or her] condition.” Lewis, 125 F.3d at
1440. Such statements by a physician are relevant to the ALJ’s findings, but they are
not determinative, as it is the ALJ who bears the responsibility for assessing Ms.
Lewis’s RFC. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546©.
2.

Treating Source

Ms. Lewis first contends the ALJ erred in giving little weight to Dr.
Devabhaktuni’s opinions. (Doc. 9 at 13-14.) Dr. Devabhaktuni began treating Ms.
Lewis for bipolar disorder in May 2007 and noted treatment through 2010. (Doc. 9 at
2.) The ALJ discussed January, March, and June 2008 questionnaires that Dr.

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Devabhaktuni filled out for Plaintiff’s insurance, a May 2009 letter the doctor wrote
to Plaintiff’s attorneys, and a February 2011 questionnaire and letter he wrote to
Plaintiff’s attorneys. In January 2008, Dr. Devabhaktuni stated that Ms. Lewis was
unable to work due to stress and her inability to focus. (Tr. at 424-25.) After Plaintiff
was hospitalized in February 2008, Dr. Devabhaktuni increased her medication. (Id.)
In March 2008 and April 2008, Dr. Devabhaktuni reported in assessment updates that
Ms. Lewis remained unable to return to work. (Tr. at 427-28, 431.) In the May 2009
letter, Dr. Devabhaktuni stated Ms. Lewis “continue[d] to be unable to work,” and
that she was “very likely” to experience another manic episode if she “continued to
work or was placed in any similar environment.” (Tr. at 492.) He noted that since
Plaintiff had been released from the hospital in February 2008, she “has improved to
where she is no longer showing signs of mania, however, there is no indication there
would not be a recurrence of a manic episode if she were to return to work.” (Tr. at
492.) He noted that she should not return to work due to the “risk” of another manic
episode. (Tr. at 493.) His February 2011 letter to Plaintiff’s lawyers is almost
identical to his May 2009 letter. (Tr. at 570-71.)
The ALJ exhibited good cause to give little weight to Dr. Devabhaktuni’s
opinions. As an initial matter, the ALJ was not required to accept Dr. Davabhaktuni’s

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opinion that Plaintiff could not work, because those types of opinions from doctors are
not entitled to any particular deference, as that is an issue reserved to the
Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Even if the opinion that Plaintiff could
not work was entitled to deference, Dr. Devabhaktuni was opining that Plaintiff could
not return to her former job as a financial analyst, but he does not address whether
Plaintiff could perform other work, such as the unskilled medium-level work outlined
in the ALJ’s RFC assessment. Aside from that, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in
giving little weight to Dr. Devabhaktuni’s opinions because the fact that she remains
stable while unemployed does not indicate that she would be able to function in a
competitive job. The ALJ specifically addressed this concern, stating that:
The essence of this case, and what I do not accept, is claimant’s
allegation, supported by Dr. Devabhaktuni’s report, that claimant cannot
work because she would decompensate and experience mania under the
stress of work. Though this did happen in early 2008 ostensibly due to
stress from claimant’s work activity, claimant was working 54 hour work
weeks as a financial analyst in the aerospace industry. (Exhibit 5E). This
is highly stressful work activity which claimant was able to perform for
nearly 25 years despite a long history of bipolar disorder and
decompensation under these circumstances does not prove that claimant
would experience similar decompensation with the low-stress work
parameters outlined in my residual functional capacity finding.
(Tr. at 29.) Further, the ALJ noted that Dr. Devabhaktuni’s assessments contradicted
his own treatment notes about Ms. Lewis’s improved condition after her

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hospitalization, in which he noted that she was generally stable and “doing well” in
many instances, and Ms. Lewis’s ability to perform substantial daily activities in both
low-stress and more stressful environments. (Tr. at 495-500, 55-58.) Additionally, the
ALJ noted that Dr. Devabhaktuni’s opinions that Plaintiff would have problems
carrying out simple instructions and substantial difficulty with interaction was
contradicted by the statements of Ms. Lewis and her husband that “she could carry
out simple instructions and was generally able to interact well with others.” (Tr. at
31.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been generally stable since early 2008 while
performing substantial daily activities in an albiet low-stress home environment, but
also in more stressful situations such as attending concerts and sporting events. (Tr.
at 31.) In sum, because Dr. Devabhaktuni’s opinions were in some instances
contradicted by his own treatment notes and generally only addressed Ms. Lewis’s
mental state immediately after decompensating under high stress work conditions and
did not address whether she could function in a lower-stress work environment, the
ALJ had good cause to give little weight to Dr. Devabhaktuni’s opinions.
3.

Examining Sources

Ms. Lewis also argues the ALJ erred in giving little weight to Dr. Bilbrey’s
March 2011 assessment, which he submitted after examining Plaintiff at her attorneys’

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request. During Dr. Bilbrey’s mental status examination the only deficient finding
was noted to be some difficulty concentrating. (Tr. at 573.) Dr. Bilbrey noted that
Ms. Lewis had slow psychomotor skills but would be capable of reading to others,
interacting and communicating effectively, and would have adequate judgment and
reasoning abilities in non-stressful situations. (Tr. at 574.) He recommended she
avoid stressful situations. (Tr. at 576.) Despite these mild findings, he then
completed an assessment finding markedly limited impairments in Ms. Lewis’s ability
to function, such as concentrating for extended periods, sustaining an ordinary
routine, or interacting appropriately with others without distracting them. (Tr. at 58082.)
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Bilbrey’s
assessment little weight. The ALJ noted that despite the fact that Dr. Bilbrey
examined Ms. Lewis once in 2011, he reported that Ms. Lewis’s limitations had
existed since 1975, which is inconsistent with the fact that she was able to perform
demanding, high-stress work in her 33-year career lasting until 2008. (Tr. at 31, 584.)
Further, the ALJ found that Dr. Bilbrey’s observations of Ms. Lewis’s cognitive speed
were inconsistent with Dr. Smith’s observations of the same, discussed infra. (Tr. at
31, 517, 573-74.) As the ALJ noted, despite Dr. Bilbrey’s assessment that Ms. Lewis

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was markedly limited, Ms. Lewis’s own statements indicated that, after her
hospitalization in 2008, she has been able to maintain concentration on tasks for
extended periods of time, sustain an ordinary routine, and interact well with others.
(Tr. at 31, 167-74.) She described daily activities such as shopping for hours, reading
novels, and lengthy meal preparation. (Tr. at 31.) Ms. Lewis relies on Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d at 1441, to argue that her ability to perform “everyday activities of
short duration, such as housework” does not contradict Dr. Bilbrey’s assessment.
(Doc. 9 at 17.) However, Lewis v. Callahan concerned an individual with heart
difficulties who required frequent rest throughout the day, and not an individual with
an alleged mental disability. Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1438. While “participation in everyday
activities of short duration, such as housework or fishing,” may not automatically
disqualify a claimant from disability or be inconsistent with a finding of heart-related
limitations, id. at 1441, Ms. Lewis’s ability to sustain an ordinary routine, interact
appropriately with others, and maintain concentration for hours at a time while
reading novels directly contradicts Dr. Bilbrey’s one-time assessment of her mental
health. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Bilbrey’s onetime assessment was entitled to little weight.
Ms. Lewis also contends the ALJ did not give sufficient weight to the opinions

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of the consultative examining psychologist, Dr. Smith, who provided an assessment
on July 19, 2010 at the request of the Social Security Administration. (Doc. 9 at 18.)
Dr. Smith noted that Plaintiff was polite and cooperative, at ease during the interview,
and had appropriate behavior. (Tr. at 517.) Plaintiff was able to initiate and maintain
eye contact, had a euthymic mood, and appropriate affect. (Tr. at 517.) Her speech
was normal in rate and tone and there were no significant difficulties with articulation
or prosody. (Id.) She was alert and oriented to time, place, person, and situation, with
thought content and processes within normal limits, and no indication of auditory or
visual hallucinations, bizarre mentation or abnormal fears or obsessions. (Id.) Despite
these mild clinical findings, Dr. Smith’s conclusion was that Plaintiff’s overall level
of social and adaptive functioning was severely impaired and her ability to maintain
gainful full-time employment is severely impaired by her chronic psychiatric
conditions. (Tr. at 18.)
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to the
opinion of Dr. Smith. While Ms. Lewis again argues that her ability to engage in daily
living activities does not demonstrate ability to engage in work-related activities, her
ability to independently perform substantial activities of daily living directly contradict
Dr. Smith’s opinion that her “overall level of social and adaptive functioning appears

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to be significantly impaired.” (Tr. at 30, 518.) Further, the ALJ noted that Dr.
Smith’s assessment was too severe and was inconsistent with Dr. Smith’s own
“generally unremarkable objective examination findings,” such as that Ms. Lewis was
“polite and cooperative” during the evaluation, that her behavior, dress, and eye
contact were “appropriate,” that she “reported that she sleeps well with her
medication,” and her “[t]hought content and processes were within normal limits,”
and “[h]er insight and judgment [were] good.” (Tr. at 30, 517.) It should be noted
that the ALJ did find that Plaintiff had a restricted ability to interact and persist given
her apparent sensitivity to stress and decreased cognitive speed and concentration as
reported by Dr. Smith. (Tr. at 30.) Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision
to give little weight to Dr. Smith’s opinions.
4.

Non-Examining Source

The ALJ gave the greatest weight to the opinions of Dr. Jackson, a state agency
psychologist who reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and provided an opinion on
behalf of the Social Security Administration. The ALJ found Dr. Jackson’s July 2010
assessment to be “well-supported and most consistent with the record.” (Tr. at 30,
521-38.) Ms. Lewis in her brief did not address the weight the ALJ gave to Dr.
Jackson’s opinion, except to say that it was not entitled to greater weight than the

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opinions of the other physicians. (Doc. 9 at 13.) Dr. Jackson noted that Plaintiff would
have moderate difficulty with complex instructions, but could remember and
understand short instructions. (Tr. at 537.) She also noted that she had moderate
difficulty with sustaining attention for two hours at a time on complex tasks but could
maintain attention for two hours at a time on simple tasks. (Tr. at 537.) Dr. Jackson
assessed Plaintiff as only being able to appropriately handle casual and infrequent
contact with the general public and co-workers. (Tr. at 537.) Dr. Jackson noted that,
given Plaintiff’s difficulties, she could be taxed by others and proximity to others
should not be intensive or prolonged, and any feedback should be positive. (Tr. at
537.) Dr. Jackson also stated that Plaintiff would have problems with unpredictable
or constant changes in a work setting and should have changes presented gradually
and infrequently. (Tr. at 537.)
Dr. Jackson’s opinions are consistent with what Plaintiff and her husband
reported as her own capabilities. Plaintiff reported she could follow short, simple
instructions, could not handle changes in routine well, and could concentrate for
several hours on a novel or movie. (Tr. at 172-74, 213-20.) Her husband reported she
could follow written or spoken instructions if she understands them, that she could
not handle sudden changes but gradual changes were okay, and that her attention span

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varied depending on the task. (Tr. at 180-82, 221-28.) Nothing in the regulations
prevents an ALJ from affording great weight to an opinion from a state agency nonexaminining source, when that opinion is consistent with the record as a whole.
Indeed, state agency psychologists are highly qualified experts in Social Security
disability evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2); SSR 96-6p.
Because the ALJ clearly articulated valid and proper grounds for the weight
given to each physician’s opinion, the Court finds the ALJ properly evaluated the
medical opinion evidence.
B.

The ALJ’s Evaluation of Ms. Lewis’s Credibility

Ms. Lewis contends the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her credibility in
regards to her subjective complaints of symptoms and limitations. (Doc. 9 at 20.)
Subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms may establish the presence of a
disabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish disability based upon pain and other
subjective symptoms, “[t]he pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying
medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity
of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined
medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise

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to the alleged pain.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Landry v. Heckler, 782
F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
The ALJ is permitted to discredit the claimant’s subjective testimony of pain
and other symptoms if he articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Wilson
v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996
WL 374186 (1996) (“[T]he adjudicator must carefully consider the individual’s
statements about symptoms with the rest of the relevant evidence in the case record
in reaching a conclusion about the credibility of the individual’s statements.”).
Although the Eleventh Circuit does not require explicit findings as to credibility,
“‘the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court.’” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210
(quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562). “[P]articular phrases or formulations” do not have
to be cited in an ALJ’s credibility determination, but it cannot be a broad rejection
which is “not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the
ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.” Id.
The ALJ in this case found Ms. Lewis had an underlying impairment that could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, and also that Ms. Lewis and
her husband’s “allegations regarding [her] symptoms and limitations are largely

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consistent with medical evidence and one another, and are thus generally credible.”
(Tr. at 28-29.) Ms. Lewis disagrees, however, with the ALJ’s rejection of her
allegation that she could not work without experiencing mania from job-related stress.
(Doc. 9 at 20.)
Ms. Lewis first claims the ALJ’s use of “template” language is insufficient to
support the finding. (Doc. 9 at 20-21.) She cites to Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640,
645-46 (7th Cir. 2012), arguing that the “language used by the ALJ in this case [is]
insufficient.” (Doc. 9 at 20.) While the Seventh Circuit criticized in dicta the use of
“boilerplate” language in the introduction of an ALJ’s findings, it reversed the case
because the ALJ did not provide a proper credibility analysis with valid reasons for
rejecting the plaintiff’s credibility. Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 646-49. Here, the ALJ did
provide such analysis and the use of “boilerplate” language to introduce that section
of the findings does not discredit the ALJ’s reasoning. (Tr. at 28-29.)
The ALJ in this case found Ms. Lewis’s allegation that she was unable to work
without decompensating under stress is unsupported by the medical evidence and
contrary to Ms. Lewis and her husband’s own statements about her ability to perform
substantial activities of daily living, get along with others and with authority figures,
follow short instructions, and handle changes that were gradually introduced. (Tr. at

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167-74, 181.) Ms. Lewis claims these activities are insufficient to show she can
“mentally withstand any stress or pressure[] in a competitive work environment.”
(Doc. 9 at 21.) The ALJ, however, specifically addressed this argument by noting that,
although Ms. Lewis may be unable to perform highly stressful work activity as she did
in early 2008, there is no indication she would decompensate in a low-stress work
environment or “normal work atmosphere.” (Tr. at 30.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff
had a significant history of bipolar disorder including hospitalizations, that this was
precipitated by work stress, that Plaintiff was taking medication, and that her
treatment notes did not report significant complaints of medication side effects, but
noted mental slowing due to medication. (Tr. at 29.) Essentially, the ALJ found
Plaintiff to be generally credible regarding her symptoms and limitations, but found
that even with Plaintiff’s symptoms, she was still capable of performing low-stress
work within the parameters defined in the ALJ’s RFC determination. (Tr. at 29.)
Because the ALJ clearly articulated the reasons for partially discrediting Ms.
Lewis’s testimony based on the entire record in accordance with Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p,
1996 WL 374186 (1996), the Court finds the ALJ properly evaluated Ms. Lewis’s
credibility.
IV.

Conclusion

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Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Lewis’s
arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.
Done this 17th day of September 2014.

L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
[160704]

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