Steelman v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 9/30/2014. (PSM)

FILED
2014 Sep-30 PM 04:23
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

REBECCA ANN STEELMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL ACTION NO.
5:13-cv-01259-AKK

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Rebecca Ann Steelman (“Steelman”) brings this action pursuant to
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking
review of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) decision, which has become the decision of the Commissioner, is
supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, for the reasons elaborated herein,
the court will AFFIRM the decision denying benefits.
I. Procedural History
Steelman, whose past relevant experience includes work as a retail sales
clerk, hotel cleaner, lab technician, and a customer service representative, filed an

application for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on July 6, 2010, alleging
a disability onset date of November 1, 2008, due to a hysterectomy, multiple
surgeries, knee problems, muscle and nerve damage, memory problems, problems
with sitting and standing, hypertension, and high blood pressure. (R. 24, 150).
After the SSA denied Steelman’s claim, she requested a hearing before an ALJ.
(R. 79). The ALJ subsequently denied Steelman’s claim, (R. 24-31), which
became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council refused
to grant review. (R. 1). Steelman then filed this action for judicial review
pursuant to § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 1.
II. Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial
evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v.
Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards. See Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988);
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
mandates that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if supported by
‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the evidence, or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must review the
2

final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable and
supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703
F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). Substantial evidence falls somewhere between
a scintilla and a preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849
F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If
supported by substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s
factual findings even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the
Commissioner’s findings. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court
acknowledges that judicial review of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it
notes that the review “does not yield automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at
701.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairments which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(I). A physical or mental
impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
3

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g). Specifically, the Commissioner must
determine in sequence:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3)

whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4)

whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5)

whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national
economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative
answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps
three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other
than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to
prior work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can
do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
IV. The ALJ’s Decision

4

In performing the five step analysis, the ALJ found that Steelman had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 6, 2010, and, therefore, met Step
One. (R. 26). Next, the ALJ found that Steelman satisfied Step Two because she
suffered from the severe impairments of “essential hypertension” and an “affective
mood disorder.” Id. The ALJ then proceeded to the next step and found that
Steelman failed to satisfy Step Three because she “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments.” Id. Although the ALJ answered Step Three in the
negative, consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, the ALJ
proceeded to Step Four where he determined that Steelman has the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to perform
a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
non-exertional limitations. The claimant can understand, remember
and learn simple work routines and work with simple instructions, but
should not perform work activity that requires detailed instructions.
She can carry out simple instructions with sustained attention for an
8-hour workday. She can tolerate ordinary work pressures, but should
not be required to perform work activity with excessive workloads or
work activity that requires quick decision making, rapid changes, or
multiple demands. She can adapt to infrequent changes and would be
able to perform short-term planning, but would need help with long
term planning or goal setting. She would need work activity that
requires only occasional contact with the general public and may miss
a day of work, every other month.

5

(R. 27). In light of her RFC, the ALJ held that Steelman “is capable of performing
past relevant work as a hotel cleaner.” (R. 31). Therefore, the ALJ found that
Steelman “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
since July 6, 2010, the date the application was filed” (R. 31).
V. Analysis
The court now turns to Steelman’s contentions that the ALJ failed to (1)
consider her impairments in combination in his RFC assessment and (2) obtain a
medical source opinion or vocational expert testimony to properly develop the
record in making his RFC determination. The court will examine each contention
in turn.
A.

ALJ Properly Considered the Medical Evidence in Making RFC
Decision

Steelman first contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider her
impairments in combination in making his RFC findings. Doc. 11 at 5-8.
Steelman specifically argues that “[t]he ALJ was somewhat dismissive of [her]
substantial history of treatment associated with bladder impairments as prior to the
date of the SSI application,” claiming that “the ALJ did not even include history of
surgical repairs totaling seven to the bladder as well as vaginal and rectal walls.”
Doc. 11 at 5. She also contends that her ability to “maintain standing, walking,

6

and sitting tolerances at all or any exertion levels would be reasonably affected by
[her] obesity,” and that the ALJ marginalized her obesity “by considering it to be a
non-severe impairment.” Doc 11 at 7. As a result, Steelman argues that, when
these conditions are properly considered in combination with her other established
physical and mental conditions, her conditions “preclude sustained competitive
work or at the very least would result in an RFC more restrictive than determined
by the ALJ.” Doc. 11 at 8.
Steelman’s contentions are unavailing because the ALJ properly considered
the medical evidence in making his RFC assessment. In fact, because “residual
function capacity is an assessment, based on all of the relevant evidence of a
claimant’s remaining ability to do work despite his impairments,” Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997), the ALJ recognized his duty that
he “must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that
are not severe.” (R. 25). Moreover, the ALJ specifically stated that he considered
“all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted
as consistent with the medical evidence” in making his RFC findings. (R. 27).
This finding alone was sufficient to show that the ALJ considered all of
Steelman’s impairments, including her impairments that were non-severe, in
assessing her RFC. Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529,
7

1533 (11th Cir.1991) (ALJ’s consideration of the claimant’s combined
impairments at later steps in the sequential evaluation process is sufficient to show
the impairments were considered in combination).
More significantly, the ALJ thoroughly discussed Steelman’s treatment
history for bladder problems and obesity. Contrary to Steelman’s contentions, the
ALJ noted that Steelman “has a significant history of treatment for female
problems and urological problems, with several procedures prior to the date of her
application.” (R. 28). The ALJ noted that Steelman reported improvement after a
procedure in June 2009 and had additional procedures in March 2010 and June
2010. (R. 29). However, the ALJ emphasized that “on July 20, 2010, only a few
days after she filed for disability benefits, [Steelman] was cleared to return to
normal activities.” (R. 29). The ALJ also found Steelman’s medical records “did
not show [that she] was experiencing significant limitations,” (R. 29), and that
“while the records show the claimant has a significant history of treatment, with
numerous surgeries for her medical problems, records relevant to her application
date are not supportive of the limitations she alleges,” (R. 30). In support of this
finding, the ALJ emphasized Steelman’s self-reported improvement and noted that
Steelman continued to perform work activity as recently as February 2010. (R.
28). In fact, Steelman indicated that she considered starting and operating a
8

business in October 2011, (R. 646), and reported that her job at Kohl’s Department
Store was “going okay” in February 2010, (R. 652).
Similarly, the ALJ also properly considered Steelman’s obesity in making
his RFC determination, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC
assessment. Contrary to Steelman’s contention that “[t]he ALJ marginalized her
obesity by considering it to be non-severe,” doc. 11 at 7, the ALJ committed no
error because “[n]othing requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the
impairments that should be considered severe,” so long as the ALJ considered the
claimant’s impairments, whether severe or not, in combination at the later steps.
Heatly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2010). The
record here shows clearly that the ALJ properly considered Steelman’s obesity in
making his RFC findings and found that “even considering the combined effects
of [her] impairments, [Steelman] retains the [RFC] to perform work activity at all
levels of exertion.” (R. 31). Significantly, the ALJ specifically addressed
Steelman’s obesity and noted that “[she] did not allege functional limitations due
to her weight” at the hearing. (R. 26). The ALJ further found that “the record is
inconsistent with any physician stating the claimant’s weight significantly limits
her or has resulted in impaired functioning,” and that “the record is inconsistent
with showing this impairment has impacted on her muscuoloskelatal system or
9

general health as to cause her treating physicians to diagnose her with impairments
secondary to or in combination with obesity.” (R. 26).
Put simply, contrary to Steelman’s contentions, the ALJ’s RFC assessment
was based on all of the relevant evidence, which include both severe and nonsevere impairments. As a result, the court finds that the ALJ applied the correct
legal standards in making his RFC determination, and that the record contains
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.
B.

The ALJ Properly Developed the Record

Citing, 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b), Steelman argues that the ALJ’s RFC
findings were not based on substantial evidence because the ALJ did not ask for
the opinion of a medical expert. Doc. 11 at 8. According to Steelman, the case is
due to be remanded for “further development and proceedings to include
reevaluation of the record with assistance of a [medical expert] and with
vocational expert (VE) testimony as warranted.” Id. at 8-9. Steelman overlooks,
however, that the regulations and law of this circuit do no impose such a
requirement. Rather, the pertinent regulation provides that opinions on issues
reserved to the Commissioner, such as a claimant’s RFC, are not medical opinions:
Opinions on some issues, such as the examples that follow, are not
medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to
the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are
10

dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or
decision of disability.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). One of the specifically reserved examples
is a claimant’s RFC: “Although we consider opinions from medical sources on
issues such as . . . your residual functional capacity . . . the final responsibility for
deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized
that “the task of determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity and ability
to work is within the province of the ALJ, not of doctors.” Robinson v. Astrue,
365 F. App’x 993, 999 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). Moreover, an ALJ’s RFC
finding can be supported by substantial evidence even without a medical source
statement in the record. See Green v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F. App’x 915, 922-23
(11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (rejected the claimant’s argument “that without
[the physician’s] opinion, there [was] nothing in the record” to support the ALJ’s
RFC assessment).
Here, the ALJ properly relied on Steelman’s treatment records and other
evidence to assess her RFC. For example, the ALJ noted “[Steelman] alleged an
inability to work due to her impairments, but continued to report a significant level
of activities” and found that she “has shown a level of functioning, inconsistent

11

with her allegations and inconsistent with significant limitations.” (R. 28). The
ALJ found also that Steelman “showed no limitations in performing her personal
care,” noting that
she cared for her daughter and her dog. She prepared meals daily,
performed small chores, watered the flowers, and did the laundry and
the dishes. She also indicated she went out of the house daily, drove a
car, and shopped in stores. She was able to pay bills, count change
handle a savings account, and use a checkbook or money orders.
Hobbies and interests included watching television and reading to her
daughter. She also indicated she spent time with others and went to
the rehab clinic daily
Id.
Finally, the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not support the level of
functioning Steelman alleged. Id. To support this finding, the ALJ discussed
Steelman’s extensive “history of treatment for female problems and urological
problems” and noted that “she was cleared to return to normal activities” on July
20, 2010, only a few days after she filed for disability. (R. 29). The ALJ also
considered Steelman’s treatment records at Huntsville Recovery that indicated that
she “was considering going into business and . . . that [she] had actually performed
work activity while in treatment at that facility.” (R. 29). The ALJ further
concluded that the “[r]ecords from other sources in 2010 and 2011 also failed to
show that [Steelman] was experiencing limitations that would prevent all work
activity.” (R. 29). “Accepting the findings of Dr. [Sharma] Bhvana, which
12

showed no significant physical limitations,” the ALJ concluded that Steelman’s
medical records relevant to he application date were not supportive of her alleged
limitations. (R. 30). Because sufficient medical evidence existed to allow the ALJ
to assess Steelman’s RFC and determine whether she was disabled, the record was
complete. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(e). Consequently, no additional development
was required, and the ALJ committed no reversible error by failing to utilize a
medical expert.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination
that Steelman is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the
ALJ applied proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s final decision is affirmed. A separate order in accordance with the
memorandum of decision will be entered.
Done this 30th day of September, 2014.

________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13