Rogers v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 7/23/2014. (KAM, )

FILED
2014 Jul-23 AM 10:20
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
AMY BRANNON ROGERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No.
5:13-CV-01448--LSC

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Amy Brannon Rogers, appeals from the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her
applications for a period of disability, Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Rogers timely pursued and exhausted her
administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Rogers was 41 years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ’s”) decision, and she has completed the twelfth grade. (Tr. at 32, 140.) Her

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past work experiences include employment as a home health aide and a sewing
machine operator. (Tr. at 32, 51, 53.) Ms. Rogers claims that she became disabled on
February 16, 2010 due to back and arm problems, Bells palsy and high blood pressure.
(Tr. at 21, 112, 114, 43-44, 139.)
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The
first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the
claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the
Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments
combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments
must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be
found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.
See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments
are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether
the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20

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C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within this category, he or she
will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a
determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made
and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past
relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant
cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five
requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age,
education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other
work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other
work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Rogers does
not meet the nondisability requirements for a period of disability. (Tr. at 23, Finding
1.) The ALJ further determined that Ms. Rogers has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the alleged onset of her disability, February 16, 2010. (Id., Finding 2.)

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The ALJ found at step two that Plaintiff had severe impairments of degenerative disk
disease and status post anterior and posterior lumbar fusion. (Id., Finding 3.)
However, he found that these impairments neither meet nor medically equal any of
the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr. at 28,
Finding 4 .) The ALJ did not find Ms. Rogers’s allegations to be totally credible, and
he determined that she has the following residual functional capacity: light work as
defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b); she would need the option to sit
and stand during the workday for 1 to 2 minutes every hour or so, and she can sit for
no more than 1 hour at one time before needing to get up, stand for 45 minutes at one
time before needing to sit down or walk around, and she can sit, stand, and walk for
at least 6 hours total in 8-hour working day with normal breaks in the morning, lunch,
and afternoon; she can frequently balance and perform fine fingering and gross
handling with her upper right extremity, and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl,
and climb ramps and stairs; she is limited to performing occupations that do not
require climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; and she can never be around unprotected
heights. (Tr. at 28, Finding 5.)
According to the ALJ, Ms. Rogers is unable to perform any of her past relevant
work, she is a “younger individual,” and “at least a high school education” as those

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terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 32, Findings 6, 7 and 8.) He determined
that the transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that
the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job
skills.” (See Social Security Ruling 82-41 and 20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).”
(Tr. at 32, Finding 9.) Considering Ms. Rogers’ age, education, work experience and
residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that she can perform, such as cashier, ticket seller,
and storage rental clerk, (Tr. at 33, Finding 10.) The ALJ concluded his findings by
stating that Plaintiff “was not under a ‘disability,’ as defined in the Social Security
Act, from February 16, 2010, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.120(g)
and 416.920(g).” (Tr. at 33-34, Finding 11.)
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,

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1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the Commissioner
with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See Miles v. Chater,
84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence,
or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The substantial evidence
standard permits administrative decision makers to act with considerable latitude, and
‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed,
even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s
decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential
standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court scrutinize the record in
its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v. Bowen,
815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal
standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir.
1984).

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III.

Discussion
Ms. Rogers filed the instant action for judicial review in this Court on August 6,

2013. (Doc. 1.) See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). She claims the ALJ’s adverse decision is “not
based upon substantial evidence and that improper legal standards were applied.”
(Doc. 1, p. 2.) Ms. Rogers, however, failed to submit any brief, argument, list of
authorities, or statement in support of her claims. The Commissioner submitted a brief
(Doc. 9), and Ms. Rogers did not submit a reply. Deadlines for submissions have
passed, and the issues in this case are now ripe for decision. Ms. Rogers has failed to
point to any errors in the ALJ’s opinion despite the fact that she has had three
opportunities to do so: (1) her complaint, (2) an initial brief in support of her claim, and
(3) a reply to the Commissioner’s brief.
Nonetheless, this Court has thoroughly reviewed both the ALJ’s opinion and the
entire evidentiary record. Based upon that evaluation, the Court concludes that the
ALJ’s decision applies the proper legal standards and is supported by substantial
evidence. The ALJ did not err when he concluded that Ms. Rogers is not disabled.
IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Rogers’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial

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evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.
Done this 23rd day of July 2014.

L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
[160704]

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