Bramlett v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 6/23/2015. (AVC)

FILED
2015 Jun-23 PM 04:27
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DEBRA LYNN BRAMLETT
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,

Defendant.

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Civil Action Number
5:14-cv-2019-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Debra Lynn Bramlett (“Bramlett”) brings this action pursuant to
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 205(g), seeking
review of the final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”). This court finds that the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) applied the correct legal standard and that her decision—which has
become the decision of the Commissioner—is supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, the court AFFIRMS the decision denying benefits.
I. Procedural History
Bramlett filed her application for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits and
Title XVI Supplemental Security Income on February 1, 2012, alleging a disability
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onset date of December 15, 2011 due to fibromyalgia, osteoarthiritis, depression,
Graves’ disease, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, hypertension, asthma, diabetes,
acid reflux, and hypothyroidism. (R. 106, 107, 184, 255). After the SSA denied her
application, Bramlett requested a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 75, 127). The ALJ
subsequently denied Bramlett’s claim, (R. 10), which became the final decision of
the Commissioner when the Appeals Council refused to grant review, (R. 9-11).
Bramlett then filed this action pursuant to § 205(g) on October 21, 2014. Doc. 1.
II. Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record contains substantial
evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v.
Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards, see Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988);
Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c) mandate that the Commissioner’s “factual findings are conclusive if
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529
(11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts, reevaluate the
evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead, it must
review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is “reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.” See id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a
preponderance of evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Martin, 849 F.2d at 1529
(quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by
substantial evidence, the court must affirm the Commissioner’s factual findings
even if the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner’s findings.
See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges that judicial review
of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, it notes that the review “does not yield
automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(I)(A). A physical or
mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological,
or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrated by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

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Determination of disability under the Act requires a five step analysis. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). Specifically, the Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently unemployed;

(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3)

whether the impairment meets or equals one listed by the Secretary;

(4)

whether the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work; and

(5)

whether the claimant is unable to perform any work in the national
economy.

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “An affirmative
answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps
three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other
than step three, leads to a determination of ‘not disabled.’” Id. at 1030 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f)). “Once a finding is made that a claimant cannot return to
prior work the burden shifts to the Secretary to show other work the claimant can
do.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Lastly, where, as here, a plaintiff alleges disability because of pain, she must
meet additional criteria. In this circuit, “a three part ‘pain standard’ [is applied]
when a claimant seeks to establish disability through his or her own testimony of
pain or other subjective symptoms.” Holt v. Barnhart, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th
Cir. 1991). Specifically,
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The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical
condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the
severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it
can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain.1
Id. However, medical evidence of pain itself, or of its intensity, is not required:
While both the regulations and the Hand standard require objective
medical evidence of a condition that could reasonably be expected to
cause the pain alleged, neither requires objective proof of the pain
itself. Thus under both the regulations and the first (objectively
identifiable condition) and third (reasonably expected to cause pain
alleged) parts of the Hand standard a claimant who can show that his
condition could reasonably be expected to give rise to the pain he
alleges has established a claim of disability and is not required to
produce additional, objective proof of the pain itself. See 20 CFR §§
404.1529 and 416.929; Hale [v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th
Cir. 1987)].
Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 1991) (parenthetical
information omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[a] claimant’s subjective
testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard is itself
sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223. Therefore, if
a claimant testifies to disabling pain and satisfies the three part pain standard, the
ALJ must find a disability unless the ALJ properly discredits the claimant’s
testimony.
Furthermore, when the ALJ fails to credit a claimant’s pain testimony, the
ALJ must articulate reasons for that decision:

1

This standard is referred to as the Hand standard, named after Hand v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.
1985).

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It is established in this circuit that if the [ALJ] fails to articulate reasons for
refusing to credit a claimant’s subjective pain testimony, then the [ALJ], as a
matter of law, has accepted that testimony as true. Implicit in this rule is the
requirement that such articulation of reasons by the [ALJ] be supported by
substantial evidence
Hale, 831 F.2d at 1012. Therefore, if the ALJ either fails to articulate reasons for
refusing to credit the plaintiff’s pain testimony, or if the ALJ’s reasons are not
supported by substantial evidence, the court must accept as true the pain testimony
of the plaintiff and render a finding of disability. Id.
IV. The ALJ’s Decision
In performing the five step analysis, the ALJ found that Bramlett had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 15, 2011, and therefore met
Step One. (R. 21). Next, the ALJ found that Bramlett satisfied Step Two because
she suffered from the severe impairments of obesity, Graves’ disease/thyroid
disorder, fibromyalgia, a history of asthma, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, and a
depressive disorder. Id. The ALJ then proceeded to the next step and found that
Bramlett did not satisfy Step Three since she “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments.” (R. 22). Although the ALJ answered Step Three in the
negative, consistent with the law, see McDaniel, 800 F.2d at 1030, she proceeded
to Step Four, where she determined that Bramlett has the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to:

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[P]erform light work . . . except she can occasionally lift and/or carry
up to 20 pounds and frequently lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds. She
can stand and/or walk in combination, with normal breaks, for at least
six hours during an eight-hour workday and sit, with normal breaks,
for up to eight hours during an eight-hour workday. She frequently
can climb ramps and stairs and should never climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds. She frequently can balance and occasionally stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl. She should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme
heat, extreme cold, wetness, and humidity and working in areas of
vibration. She should avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary
irritants including fumes, dusts, odors, gases, and areas of poor
ventilation. She should avoid all exposure to industrial hazards
including working at unprotected heights and working in close
proximity to moving dangerous machinery. She can perform simple
routine tasks requiring no more than short simple instructions and
simple work-related decision making with few work place changes.
(R. 24). In light of Bramlett’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Bramlett “is capable
of performing past relevant work as a cashier/checker, ticket maker, parts counter
packer, and plastics machine tender.” (R. 27). Therefore, the ALJ found that
Bramlett “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
from December 15, 2011, through the date of [the ALJ’s] decision.” Id.
V. Analysis
Bramlett maintains that the ALJ’s “decision cannot be based upon
substantial evidence” because the ALJ “fail[ed] to properly state the weight given”
to the opinion of consultative examining physician Dr. John H. Lary, Jr. Doc. 9 at
8. This contention is unavailing because the ALJ seemingly afforded great weight
to Dr. Lary’s opinions and relied on them in determining that Bramlett can perform
light work. (R. 25, 26). In fact, the ALJ explicitly stated that she “agrees with the
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findings of . . . Dr. Lary.” (R. 25). To the extent Bramlett is arguing that this
explicit indication of agreement is insufficient to “properly state the weight given”
to the opinion of an examining physician, Bramlett points to no legal authority
supporting that proposition, and the court independently finds no such legal
authority. Therefore, the court rejects the argument.
Alternatively, to the extent Bramlett is arguing that Dr. Lary’s opinion
justifies a different RFC determination, the court disagrees. Specifically, Dr.
Lary’s opinion that Bramlett’s “ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, bend, squat,
and kneel [are] impaired by morbid obesity and joint pain,” (R. 496), is not
inconsistent with the ALJ’s RFC determination because, as the ALJ pointed out,
Dr. Lary did not quantify the degree of Bramlett’s impairments. In other words, in
stating generally that Bramlett’s abilities are “impaired,” Dr. Lary did not explain
the number of pounds he believed Bramlett could lift, the length of time Bramlett
could spend sitting or standing, or whether she can push or pull. As such, the court
finds no contradiction between Dr. Lary’s opinion and the ALJ’s determination
that Bramlett can perform light work involving “lifting no more than 20 pounds at
a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds[,] . . . a
good deal of walking or standing, or . . . sitting most of the time with some pushing
and pulling of arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. Ultimately, Dr. Lary’s
opinion supports the ALJ’s RFC determination because Dr. Lary noted that
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Bramlett is able “to walk normally,” has “normal 5/5 muscle strength in all muscle
groups,” has normal range of motion in her extremities, normal grip strength, and
normal back musculature. (R. 496). For these reasons, the court rejects Bramlett’s
contentions as to Dr. Lary’s opinion.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the ALJ’s determination
that Bramlett is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ
applied proper legal standards in reaching this determination. Therefore, the
Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED. A separate order in accordance
with the memorandum of decision will be entered.
DONE the 23rd day of June, 2015.

_________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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