Lane v. Department of Defense Missile Defense Agency

Filing 102

MEMORANDUM OPINION: Ms. Pedersen (formerly Ms. Lane) requested reinstatement in her third amended complaint but abandoned the request during discovery. Absent reinstatement, Ms. Pedersen lacks standing to seek prospective relief under the Rehabilitation Act. The Court dismisses Ms. Pedersen's claim for injunctive or declaratory relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 02/28/2020. (ZTC)

FILED
2020 Feb-28 PM 06:48
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
LINDA S. LANE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY,
Ashton Carter, Secretary of
Defense,

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Case No.: 5:14-cv-02304-MHH

Defendant.

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this employment action against the Department of Defense Missile Defense
Agency, plaintiff Linda Pedersen (formerly Linda Lane) alleges that the agency
discriminated against her on the basis of a disability and retaliated against her for
reporting acts of discrimination. The Court previously entered judgment for the
Secretary of Defense with respect to Ms. Pedersen’s Title VII retaliation claim
because Ms. Pedersen’s evidence does not indicate a causal relation between her
protected activity and the adverse employment action she experienced. (Doc. 84).
The Court also entered judgment for the Secretary with respect to Ms. Pedersen’s
claim for compensatory and punitive damages under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
because under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lane v. Pena, money
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damages are not available in a suit against a federal executive agency. 518 U.S. 187
(1996). (Doc. 84). That left Ms. Pedersen with a claim for declaratory or injunctive
relief under the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
The Court reserved ruling on the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment
on Ms. Pedersen’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief and, by separate
order, asked the parties to brief the following issues:
Whether discriminatory intent is an element of the Rehabilitation Act
claim that Ms. Lane must prove, given that she cannot recover
compensatory damages, and whether Ms. Lane, if she does not wish to
be reinstated, has standing to request declaratory or injunctive relief,
and if not, whether this case may proceed on any other grounds.
(Doc. 86). The question regarding standing concerns this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a plaintiff lacks standing
to pursue her claim, a district court may not exercise jurisdiction over the claim.
A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC v. Geico General Ins. Co., 925 F.3d 1205, 1210
(11th Cir. 2019).
“The fundamental prerequisite for standing is that the claimant have ‘a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy [such] as to warrant his invocation
of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on
his behalf.’” In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 780 F.3d 1031, 1038

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(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975)). To have
standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact,” that injury must be “fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” and it must be likely that “a
favorable decision” will redress the plaintiff’s injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
A prospective remedy like an injunction “will provide no relief for an injury
that is, and likely will remain, entirely in the past.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30
F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994). “[W]hen a plaintiff cannot show that an injury is
likely to occur immediately, the plaintiff does not have standing to seek prospective
relief even if he has suffered a past injury.” 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d
1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003).
In her third amended complaint, Ms. Pedersen requested reinstatement to her
former position, but Ms. Pedersen abandoned the request during discovery. In her
deposition, Ms. Pedersen stated repeatedly that she is not seeking reinstatement with
MDA:
Ms. Everitt: And if you turn to page 14 [of the complaint], the
next page, one of your requests for relief is to be reinstated.
Are you seeking reinstatement still?
Ms. Pedersen: Not with MDA.
Ms. Everitt: You do not wish to be reinstated with MDA;
correct?
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Ms. Pedersen: No way.
Ms. Everitt: But are you seeking some form of federal
employment or just no reinstatement?
Ms. Pedersen: I think that would be open for negotiation.
Ms. Everitt: But you do not seek reinstatement with MDA?
Ms. Pedersen: Correct.
(Doc. 68-1, p. 15, tp. 55) (emphasis added). Ms. Pedersen reiterated this position in
her briefs. She stated: “I do not wish to be reinstated for employment at the Missile
Defense Agency. I have felt their condemnation of me while protecting MDA upper
management. My mental health and physical safety are more important to me.”
(Doc. 97, p. 9).
Absent reinstatement, the Secretary will not be in a position to violate Ms.
Pedersen’s rights under the Rehabilitation Act in the future. As a result, Ms.
Pedersen lacks standing to pursue injunctive or declaratory relief under the
Rehabilitation Act. Ms. Pedersen argues that she has standing because of the harm
she endured as an MDA employee. She states she has “suffered past, present and
future earnings [sic] due to their termination of my employment due [sic] and the
loss of my ability to successfully pass a background and clearance check.” (Doc.
97, p. 9). But these are the lingering effects of a past injury—Ms. Pedersen’s
termination—not a concrete future injury. “To pursue an injunction or a declaratory
judgment, [a plaintiff] must allege a likelihood of future violations of [her] rights by

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[the defendant], not simply future effects from past violations.” Wood v. Dixon, No.
13-0278-KD-N, 2013 WL 6183143, at *4 n.6 (S.D. Ala. November 26, 2013)
(quoting Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 563 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Even if Ms. Pedersen’s alleged “loss of her ability to successfully pass a
background and clearance check” were to constitute an injury that is not entirely in
the past, the record contradicts Ms. Pedersen’s allegation.

Ms. Pedersen

acknowledges that Integrated Federal Solutions, a government contractor, hired her
to work at the IRS. (Doc. 98, p. 1). That admission demonstrates that MDA has not,
and is not likely in the future to have, the ability to hamper Ms. Pedersen’s ability to
pass a background check. Because Ms. Pedersen has not asserted an injury that this
Court’s grant of declaratory or injunctive relief is likely to redress, Ms. Pedersen
does not have standing to seek injunctive relief.
“[O]nce a federal court determines that [the plaintiff has no standing], the
court is powerless to continue.” A&M Gerber Chiropractic LLC, 925 F.3d at 1230
(quoting Univ. of S. Ala. v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir.
1999)). Ms. Pedersen has described troubling behavior at the Missile Defense
Agency, but the Court has no means to address or correct that conduct, were Ms.
Pedersen to prove it, because Ms. Pedersen no longer works at MDA, and she does
not wish to return.

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Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Ms. Pedersen’s Rehabilitation Act claim
for injunctive or declaratory relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To the
extent that Ms. Pedersen asks the Court to consider new claims against MDA (see,
e.g., Doc. 98), the Court will not entertain new claims asserted for the first time at
the summary judgment stage. See Manley v. Dekalb County, 587 Fed. Appx. 507,
511 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A] plaintiff may not add new claims to her complaint through
an argument in a brief opposing a motion for summary judgment.”). The Court asks
the Clerk to please send a copy of this opinion to Ms. Pedersen at her address of
record. Because the Court has resolved all of Ms. Pedersen’s claims, by separate
order, the Court will close the file.
DONE and ORDERED this February 28, 2020.

_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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