Daniel et al v. Cullman County Court Referral LLC et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER re 7 MOTION to Stay or Dismiss the Underlying Suit, or in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement. For the reasons stated herein, the court abstains from exercising jurisdiction and DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 6/8/15. (YMB)
2015 Jun-08 AM 09:41
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
CRETA MAY DANIEL, et al.,
CULLMAN COUNTY COURT
REFERRAL, LLC., et al.,
Civil Action Number
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The court has for consideration Cullman County Court Referral, LLC
(“CCCR”), Cynthia Keller, and Lisa Sharpton’s (“Defendants”) motion to stay or
dismiss the underlying suit, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement, doc.
7, which is fully briefed and ripe for review, docs. 13, 14, 15. Defendants contend,
inter alia, that, pursuant to the abstention doctrine laid out in Colorado River
Water Conservation District, et al., v. United States, et al., considerations of
“[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources
and comprehensive disposition of litigation” suggest that abstention is appropriate
here. 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). The court agrees with Defendants and, in light of
the parallel state case pending in the Circuit Court of Cullman County, Jane Doe v.
Cynthia Keller, et al., CV-2014-900448 (Al. Cir. Ct. 2014) (hereinafter Jane Doe),
dismisses this case without prejudice.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs’ allegations are relatively straightforward. In a nutshell, Defendant
Winfred Eugene Vance, a CCCR employee, subjected Plaintiffs, who are all
criminal defendants undergoing mandatory drug and alcohol rehabilitation at
CCCR, to sexual abuse, extortion, coercion, and other forms of misconduct. Docs.
1 at ¶¶ 23, 40-41; 7-1 at ¶¶ 27-31. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants Lisa
Sharpton and Cynthia Keller, owners of CCCR, knew about Vance’s misconduct
but failed to take preventative measures. Docs. 1 at ¶¶ 42-43, 48; 7-1 at ¶¶ 31-37.
As a result, Plaintiffs filed a 19 count lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cullman
County on December 18, 2014, claiming that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §
1983, and committed state law torts, including negligence, assault, conspiracy,
false imprisonment / malicious prosecution, negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and corporate liability doctrine / non-delegable duty. See doc.
7-1. Approximately one month later, Plaintiffs filed a 19 count lawsuit in this
court, in which they also claim Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and,
generally, committed the same torts identified in the complaint filed in state court.
See doc. 1.
Defendants contend that the court should dismiss this lawsuit because the
circumstances surrounding these parallel lawsuits favor Colorado River abstention.
See 424 U.S. at 817-27. “Generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is
that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning
the same matter in the federal courts [because] federal courts have a ‘virtually
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’” Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 817. Consequently, “federal courts can abstain to avoid
duplicative litigation with state courts only in ‘exceptional’ circumstances.”
Ambrosia Coal and Const. Co. v. Pages Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir.
2004) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817) (hereinafter “Ambrosia Coal”).
Although there is no “bright-line test,” the Eleventh Circuit has distilled six factors
from Colorado River that courts should weigh to determine whether circumstances
favor abstention: (1) whether one of the courts has assumed jurisdiction over
property, (2) the relative inconvenience of the federal forum, (3) the potential for
piecemeal litigation, (4) the order in which the fora obtained jurisdiction, (5)
whether state or federal law will be applied, and (6) the adequacy of the state court
to protect the parties’ rights. Ambrosia, 368 F.3d at 1331. “No one factor is
necessarily determinative . . . [and] [t]he weight to be given any one factor may
vary greatly from case to case. . . .” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1983).
However, before addressing these factors, the court must make a threshold
determination of whether these two proceedings are parallel. Specifically, the court
must first ascertain whether the proceedings “involve substantially the same parties
and substantially the same issues.” Ambrosia, 368 F.3d at 1330. As to the first
query, the court notes that the parties to the two lawsuits are slightly different. 1
Still, this discrepancy is not fatal to Defendants’ motion because, if it were,
“parties could avoid the doctrine of Colorado River by the simple expedient of
naming additional parties.” Interstate Material Corp. v. City of Chicago, 847 F.2d
1285, 1288 (7th Cir. 1988), cited with approval in Ambrosia, 368 F.3d at 1330.
Next, with respect to the second query, the alleged facts underlying each lawsuit
are virtually identical. Compare doc. 1 at 15-31 with doc. 7-1 at 4-8. Indeed,
Plaintiffs raise § 1983 claims and state law tort claims in both lawsuits that are
similar in scope and form, and the majority of their claims encompass the same or
similar legal elements. Compare doc. 1 at 32-76 with doc. 7-1 at 8-30. Put simply,
The federal lawsuit includes Whitney Bates and Jordan Wilson as additional
Plaintiffs, and the state lawsuit includes “[a]ll other county drug courts within the
boundaries of the state of Alabama” as additional defendants. Compare doc. doc. 1
at 1 with doc. 7-1 at 1. Otherwise, the two lawsuits share the same Plaintiffs and
Plaintiffs have filed the same lawsuit in state and federal court. For this reason, the
two lawsuits are parallel for purposes of the Colorado River analysis.
The court turns now to the relevant Colorado River factors, 2 and, for the
reasons listed below, finds that the circumstances surrounding this lawsuit favor
1. The Circuit Court of Cullman County is the More Convenient Forum
The convenience factor “focus[es] primarily on the physical proximity of the
federal forum to the evidence and witnesses . . .” Ambrosia, 368 F.3d at 1332
(citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. First State Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 882, 885 (11th
Cir. 1990)). Defendants contend that the Circuit Court of Cullman County is a
more convenient forum because it is geographically closer to witnesses and
evidence, and that the number of parties to this lawsuit would result in significant
expenses for the parties to litigate the matter in this court. 3 See doc. 7 at 9 (stating
that “nearly all of the defendants and plaintiffs are domiciled in Cullman County
[and] any third party witnesses are expected to reside in Cullman County.”).
Indeed, the relevant events occurred exclusively in Cullman, Alabama, which is
Only five factors are relevant here. The first factor, i.e. whether one of the two
courts has already assumed jurisdiction over property, see Ambrosia, 368 F.3d at
1320, is inapplicable because there are no property interests at stake in this
litigation. See, e.g. Maharaj v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 432 F.3d 1292,
1306 (11th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiffs do not dispute this contention. See doc. 13.
approximately fifty miles from this court’s seat in Birmingham, Alabama. See doc.
1 at 15-31; doc. 7-1 at 4-8. Although Cullman and Birmingham are linked by
Interstate 65, there is a general lack of public transportation between the two cities
that will adversely impact individuals who do not own an automobile. This fact,
when paired with the financial costs and the time that litigants and witnesses would
have to spend travelling to Birmingham, increases the relative inconvenience of
litigating this matter here. Considering these circumstances holistically, the court
finds that the Circuit Court of Cullman County, with its close proximity to the
evidence, witnesses, and litigants, is clearly a more convenient forum.
2. Parallel Proceedings Will Result in Piecemeal Litigation
The piecemeal litigation factor “does not favor abstention unless the
circumstances enveloping th[ese] cases will likely lead to piecemeal litigation that
is abnormally excessive or deleterious.” Ambrosia, 368 F.3d at 1333. In other
words, parallel litigation that is “inevitably piecemeal[,]” – i.e. where parties
operate under distinctive legal frameworks and must offer differing evidence and
testimony – militate against abstention. Jackson-Platts v. General Elec. Capital
Corp., 727 F.3d 1127, 1142 (11th Cir. 2013). Conversely, parallel litigation with
identical factual allegations in which plaintiffs assert virtually identical legal
claims encompassing the same elements and burdens of proof favors abstention
because the litigants and the court are exposed to unnecessary inconvenience,
expense, and the danger of needless duplication of effort. See, e.g. Amason and
Assocs. v. Columbus Land Development, LLC, No. 7:12-cv-02459-JHE, 2014 WL
467509 *12 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 4, 2014); see also Sides v. Simmons, No. 7-cv-80347,
2007 WL 3344405 at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2007); Bosdorf v. Beach, 79 F.Supp.
1337, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Benetton Servs. Corp. v. Benedot, Inc. 758 F. Supp.
685 (N.D. Ala. 1991). This is precisely the case here where the federal and state
complaints share fourteen counts, compare doc. 1 at 32-76 with doc. 7-1 at 8-30,
and parallel litigation would result in the danger of conflicting obligations that the
Colorado River doctrine seeks to avoid. While there are five federal claims that are
not included in the state lawsuit, they either share the same elements and standards
of proof or can otherwise be fully adjudicated in state court. 4 See generally
Jefferson County v. Acker, 210 F.3d 1317, 1318 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2000); Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. and Assoc., 743 F.2d 1519, 1524-25 (11th
Cir. 1984). Moreover, prosecution of the parallel lawsuits would not be “inevitably
piecemeal” in light of the absence of federal claims that would require different
The federal claims that are not included in the state lawsuit are § 1983 claims for
refusing or neglect to prevent, obstruction of justice and intimidating a party or
witness, and conspiracy, § 1985 deprivation of rights or privileges, and a § 1988
claim for attorneys and expert fees. Compare doc. 1 at 32-76 with doc. 7-1 at 8-30.
However, the issues that these causes of action raise can be fully adjudicated by the
Cullman County Circuit Court because Plaintiffs raise claims in that lawsuit for
negligence and gross negligence, negligent hiring, training, supervision and
retention of employees, extortion, abuse of process, and conspiracy. See doc. 7-1 at
types of “law, evidence, and testimony” than the claims in the state court
proceeding. See Jackson-Platts, 727 F.3d at 1142. Consequently, because the two
lawsuits are essentially identical, it is almost certain that any resolution of the state
lawsuit will be dispositive of the federal lawsuit, leading to “wasteful, duplicative
adjudication the abstention doctrine was created to prevent.” Allied Machinery
Service, Inc., v. Caterpillar Inc., 841 F. Supp. 406, 408 (S. D. Fla. 1993). In short,
the burdens of litigating both cases simultaneously outweigh any possible benefit.
For that reason, the court finds that the potential for piecemeal litigation weighs in
favor of abstention.
3. The Order of Filing and the Progress of the Respective Cases Tilts in
Favor of Abstention
Although the temporal factor considers “the order in which jurisdiction was
obtained by the concurrent forums[,]” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 1247, it “should
not be measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms
of how much progress has been made in the two actions[,]” Moses H. Cone, 460
U.S. at 21; see also Ambrosia Coal, 338 F.3d at 1333. Here, the Cullman County
Circuit Court case, which Plaintiffs filed a month before this case, see docs. 1 at 1;
7-1 at 1, has progressed further than this case. Among other things, the parties in
the state litigation have made pre-discovery filings, Plaintiffs have filed two
amended complaints, and there are pending motions for a protective order, a stay
of the proceedings, and to dismiss. Jane Doe at docs. 9, 33, 41-43, 52, 72, 73, 75,
81, 84 In contrast, this case has not made any significant progress and is currently
stayed pending the outcome of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In fact, the parties
cannot proceed to their Rule 26 meeting or commence discovery until after the
court rules on this pending motion. As is evident, the state litigation is more
developed than the federal litigation. Therefore, the temporal factor weighs in
favor of abstention.
4. Both Federal and State Law Govern
The court next considers whether federal or state law applies. Although
Defendants contend that “the federal court action involves at least nine claims that
are controlled by Alabama state law,” doc. 7 at 13, the court notes that the state
claims do not involve “complex questions of state law that a state court might be
best suited to resolve.” See Ambrosia, 368 F.3d at 1334. Moreover, Plaintiffs also
assert twelve federal claims that this court, like the state law claims, is equally well
suited to adjudicate. Therefore, because the court extends a heavy bias in favor of
exercising jurisdiction when weighing the Colorado River factors, see id. at 1332,
the court finds that this factor weighs in favor of exercising jurisdiction.
5. Federal and State Courts can Adequately Protect the Parties’ Rights
The final Colorado River factor “only weigh[s] in favor or against abstention
when one of the fora is inadequate to protect a party’s rights.” Id.at 1333. As
Defendants concede, both the state and federal courts can adequately protect the
parties’ rights. Consequently, this factor is neutral.
Although three of the five relevant Colorado River factors weigh in favor of
abstention, the court is particularly persuaded by the fact that the events underlying
the parallel lawsuits occurred in Cullman County, and the litigants and witnesses
all purportedly reside there. Conversely, Plaintiffs have failed to indicate why the
adjudication of an essentially identical lawsuit in a court that is fifty miles away
from the evidence, witnesses, and litigants is necessary in light of the fact that the
Circuit Court of Cullman County is fully competent to adjudicate this matter in its
totality. For these reasons, the court abstains from exercising jurisdiction and
DISMISSES this case WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
DONE the 8th day of June, 2015.
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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