Melvin v. Simmons et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 6/2/2016. (AVC)

FILED
2016 Jun-02 AM 11:19
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
MISTY MELVIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMAL SIMMONS et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action Number
5:15-cv-01418-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Misty Melvin brings this case against Jamal Simmons, Javeisha Barnes,
Robin Berry, Sandra Williams, and Angie DeNoon, in their individual and
professional capacities, and the Alabama Department of Human Resources (“the
Alabama DHR”), alleging violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.
§§1983 through 1985 and her rights under state law. Doc. 16. Specifically, under
federal law, Melvin alleges violations of her “constitutional rights” (Count I),
family association rights (Count II), and due process rights (Count III), and also
pleads state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV),
negligence (Count V), fraud (Count VI), false imprisonment (Count VII),
malicious prosecution (Count VIII), invasion of privacy (Count IX), and
1

Melvin’s Motion to Amend Complaint, doc. 15, is GRANTED. In light of the
Amended Complaint, doc. 16, the motions to dismiss, docs. 5 and 8, are MOOT.

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conspiracy (Count X). 2 Id. at 13-19. Simmons, Barnes, Berry, and Williams, who
are employees of the Alabama DHR, and the Alabama DHR move to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and DeNoon,
who is a police investigator, moves to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Docs. 9, 20, and 24. For the reasons stated more fully below,
the motions are due to be granted as to Counts I-III, and the state law claims are
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere “labels and conclusions”
or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does

2

The Amended Complaint raises several other causes of action in the “Allegation of
Facts” that are not included in Melvin’s causes of action. For example, Melvin asserts claims for
Title VII discrimination, disability discrimination, sexual harassment, and a violation of her
freedom of religion. See doc. 16 at 2, 5, 6, and 12. Because these contentions are not listed as
actual “counts,” and in light of the fact that discrimination claims generally require an employeremployee relationship, the court assumes that Melvin did not intend to raise these claims in this
lawsuit.

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a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 557).
A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
may be based upon either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint.
McElmurray v. Consolidated Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cty., 501 F.3d 1244
(11th Cir. 2007). Where the challenge is facial, the court must merely “see if [the]
plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the
allegations in [the] complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.”
Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). On a facial challenge,
the district court has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on
“(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts
plus the courts resolution of disputed facts.” Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,
413 (5th Cir. 1981).3 By contrast, where the challenge is factual the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction is considered irrespective of the pleadings, “and matters
outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are considered.” Id. (citing
Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a

3

In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed
down prior to October 1, 1981.

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complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint states a facially
plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The complaint must establish “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Bell
Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.”). Ultimately, this inquiry is a “context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4

The series of events giving rise to this lawsuit are related to Melvin’s arrest
on charges of child abuse, and the subsequent revocation of her parental rights.
See docs. 16; 19-1. During the arrest, a law enforcement officer took one of
Melvin’s four minor children into a bedroom and talked to the child alone. Doc.
4

For the purposes of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the
plaintiff’s allegations are presumed true. See, e.g. Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d
1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). As such, the facts are taken from the Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, doc. 16. However, legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations are not
entitled to that assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662.

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16 at 9-10. According to Melvin, the officer did not allow the child to use the
bathroom or get food or water, and interviewed the child alone, even though two of
the child’s grandparents were present. Id. The complaint does not specify whether
Defendant DeNoon is the officer in question.
The state ultimately indicted Melvin on three counts of aggravated child
abuse and one count of physical abuse.

See docs. 16 at 9-10, 26-28; 19-1.

Allegedly, the children made up the accusations against Melvin “because [their]
grandmother told them to,” and DHR personnel purportedly told the children not to
disclose this fact to anyone else. Doc. 16 at 16-18. To prepare for the trial,
Melvin’s attorney met with the District Attorney’s Office, and learned that
Melvin’s “accusers were questioned by agents[,] servants[,] or employees of DHR”
and had given electronically taped statements.

Id.

at 3-4.

However, when

Melvin’s attorney requested the electronic statements, he was told that they could
not “be gotten for him.” Id. at 4. Allegedly, “very little evidence necessary for
[Melvin’s] defense was ever given to [her attorney] despite the requests to the
Assistant District Attorney or anyone from the District Attorney’s office or anyone
connected with law enforcement for the State of Alabama.” Id. Instead, Melvin’s
attorney only received copies of hearsay statements of what the witnesses and
accusers said.

Id.

As a result, Melvin’s attorney filed a motion “regarding

discovery and the lack of it and the prejudice it caused [Melvin].” Id.
5

In the underlying state custody decision, a judge held an ex parte hearing
regarding one of the children, during which he terminated Melvin’s parental rights
and awarded custody to Melvin’s ex-husband. Id. at 6-7. Although it is unclear
from the amended complaint if the same judge made the decision, Melvin also lost
custody of her other three children. See doc. 16 at 5. The ex parte hearing in
which she lost custody rights and the alleged failure to provide investigation
materials to use in her criminal case are the basis for the alleged violations of
federal law in this case.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Melvin’s Federal Claims — Counts I – III
In Counts I-III, Melvin raises federal claims under “42 U.S.C. §§1983
through 1985” for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. Doc. 16 at 3.
Allegedly the Defendants violated her rights, as guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alabama, by “not providing
the exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor” (Counts I-III), doc. 16 at 13-14, and
“by giving no notice to [Melvin] or her Attorney, before giving her children away”
(Count III),5 id. at 14. As an initial matter, the court notes that §1983 only
5

In light of the court’s decision to dismiss the federal claims for the reasons stated
herein, the court does not reach the Defendants’ contention that Count III is also due to be
dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally
recognizes that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to act as appellate courts and
precludes them from reviewing final state court decisions.” Ware v. Polk Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 394 Fed. App’x. 606, 608 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2010) (citation omitted); see generally

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provides relief for a violation of federal rights.

Oden v. Buckner, 2014 WL

1320236, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055
(11th Cir. 1987)). Accordingly, to the extent that Melvin has pleaded §1983
claims for violations of rights guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution, such
claims are due to be dismissed.
1. Federal Claims Against the Alabama DHR
The court begins its analysis with the Alabama DHR’s contention that this
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against it because of the
immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment.

Relevant here, immunity

depends on whether the Alabama DHR is an “arm of the state.” Mykins, 2011 WL
4549181, at *3 (citing Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)); see also Thomas v. Buckner, 2011 WL 4071948,
at *6 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 2011) (“[I]t is . . . well-settled that Eleventh Amendment
immunity bars suits brought in federal court when . . . an ‘arm of the state’ is
sued.”) (citations omitted). The Alabama DHR’s status as an arm of the state is a
settled issue. 6 In fact, Melvin essentially concedes this point by describing the

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine strictly limits federal district courts’ authority to review state court judgments and
related claims, and applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.”).
6

As a number of federal courts have found, the Alabama DHR is a state agency and is
protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See e.g., Thomas, 2011 WL 4071948, at *6; Ford v.

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Alabama DHR as “an Alabama corporation” and a “State agency.” Doc. 16 at 1-2.
Given that the Alabama DHR has neither consented to suit nor waived immunity in
this case, this court finds that the Alabama DHR is shielded by the Eleventh
Amendment, and that its motion to dismiss is due to be granted. See Ross v.
Jefferson County Dep’t of Health, 701 F.3d 655, 659 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The Eleventh Amendment
protects the immunity of not only the states, but of state agencies . . . .”)).
2. Federal Claims Against the Individual Alabama DHR employees
The court turns next to the claims against Alabama DHR employees
Simmons, Barnes, Berry, and Williams, whom Melvin is suing both in their
individual and official capacities. Regardless of the theory, the claims against
them fail because, first, the Eleventh Amendment bar also extends to suits against
state officers and employees sued for damages in their official capacities. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (Official-capacity lawsuits are, “in
all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.”); see also
Jackson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Under the
Eleventh Amendment, state officials sued for damages in their official capacity are

Child Support DHR, 2010 WL 2305305, at *1 (M.D. Ala. 2010); Ziegler v. Alabama Department
of Human Resources, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2010); Danzy v. State of Alabama,
2010 WL 1994902, at *1 (S.D. Ala. 20120); Johnson-Price v. Alabama Department of Human
Resources, 2010 WL 1268095, at *4 (M.D. Ala. 2010); Mack v. Alabama Department of Human
Resources, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1207 (M.D. Ala. 2002); Liedel v. Juvenile Court, 707 F. Supp.
486, 487, 492 (N.D. Ala. 1989).

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immune from suit in federal court.”). Therefore, as Alabama DHR employees,
Simmons, Barnes, Berry, and Williams are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity with regard to the claims for damages against them in their official
capacities.
Second, as to the individual capacity claims, these defendants contend that
Melvin has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted and that they are
entitled to qualified immunity. Indeed, as pleaded, the court cannot ascertain what
actions or omissions each defendant took or made, or which claims Melvin is
asserting against each defendant. Instead, the amended complaint vaguely and
generally contends that a generic “defendant” violated Melvin’s constitutional
rights and participated in unconstitutional conduct by “not providing the
exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor,” doc. 16 at 13-14, and by failing to give
“notice to [Melvin] or her Attorney, before giving [Melvin’s] children away, id. at
14. Missing from these contentions is any allegation that Simmons, Barnes, Berry,
or Williams played any role in the alleged unconstitutional conduct. See doc. 16;
see also Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Pamel
Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980) (“While we do not
require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state
with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal
wrong.”)). Melvin asks this court to overlook her pleading deficiencies because
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“the Defendants are in possession of all the records pertaining to the [DHR]
investigation,” and “they are participants as potential witnesses in the criminal case
against [Melvin] . . . .” Doc. 26 at 5-6. The court declines to do so because its
analysis is limited to the actual amended complaint, see Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010), and the pleading
standard announced in “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. In
short, because Melvin has not pleaded facts sufficient to allow the court to draw a
reasonable inference that Simmons, Barnes, Berry, or Williams are liable for the
alleged constitutional violations, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, the federal claims
against these defendants in their individual capacities are also due to be dismissed.
Alternatively, the claims fail because of qualified immunity, which offers
“complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities so
long as ‘their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Thomas ex rel. Thomas
v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1170 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Relevant here, Melvin does not challenge these

defendants’ contention that they have met their burden of “establish[ing] that the
allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred while [they were] acting within the
scope of [their] discretionary authority.” Muhammad v. Bethel-Muhammad, 2012
10

WL 1854676, at *9 (S.D. Ala. May 21, 2012) (quoting Harbert International, Inc.
v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998)); see generally doc. 26. Instead,
Melvin argues only that qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that requires
full discovery and litigation. Doc. 26 at 5. To the contrary, “once the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity is advanced . . . [u]nless the plaintiff’s allegations
state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified
immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.”
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Marsh v. Butler
County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). “For the law to be ‘clearly established,’ case law must ordinarily have
been earlier developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it
obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant’s place, that what he
is doing violates federal law.” Stewart v. Alabama Dep’t. of Human Resources,
2012 WL 4339499, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2012) (quoting Priester v. City of
Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000)). Where, as here, Melvin
failed to identify any case law that requires DHR employees, rather than the
judicial officials handling a case, to produce discovery in a criminal proceeding or
give notice of a custody hearing,7 the federal claims against Simmons, Barnes,

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Melvin pleads that “[t]he State of Alabama in a Supreme Court decision and in other
decisions has clearly stated the law requires an evidentiary hearing with both parties present in a
court of competent jurisdiction before a child can be taken away from one parent and have her

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Berry, and Williams in their individual capacities fail also because of qualified
immunity.
3. Federal Claims Against DeNoon
The court turns next to the claims against DeNoon. As stated previously,
DeNoon was the police investigator assigned to Melvin’s case. DeNoon contends
that Melvin has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against her. Doc. 24 at 5.
A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As it
relates to DeNoon, Melvin contends only that DeNoon “consulted with [Melvin]
and . . . was one of the first law enforcement officers at [Melvin’s] house the night
she was arrested and she never read [Melvin] her rights or tried to protect the rights
of [Melvin’s] children while in [Melvin’s] house . . . .” Doc. 16 at 8. These
contentions, however, do not help the court to draw a reasonable inference that
DeNoon participated in the alleged constitutional violations here, i.e., failed to
“provide exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor,” id. at 13-14, or “giv[e] . . . notice
[to Melvin and her attorney], before giving [Melvin’s] children away,” id. at 14, as

parental rights terminated, and the child be given to another parent.” Doc. 16 at 7. However, to
the extent that Melvin’s claims are based on the Defendants alleged failure to follow law “clearly
established” by the Alabama Supreme Court, such failure would not constitute a violation of
clearly established federal law. Furthermore, because Melvin does not cite to any specific cases
to support her claim, her assertion of “clearly established law” amounts to nothing more than an
unsupported factual allegation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662.

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pleaded in Counts I-III. Again, “[w]hile [courts] do not require technical niceties
in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal
particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.” Douglas, 535
F.3d at 1322 (citing Pamel Corp., 621 F.2d at 36). Although Melvin contends in
her response that DeNoon “works with the [DHR] and was involved in the
investigation of Misty Melvin [and] . . . should be in possession of all the records
pertaining to the [DHR] investigation,” doc. 25 at 5-6, these facts are noticeably
absent from the amended complaint. See Speaker, 623 F.3d at 1379 (citing St.
George, 285 F.3d at 1337) (The “scope of the review [of a motion to dismiss] must
be limited to the four corners of the complaint.”)). Moreover, these contentions
fail to link any act or omission by DeNoon to the alleged unconstitutional conduct.
Accordingly, the federal claims against DeNoon are due to be dismissed.
B. Melvin’s State Law Claims
In light of the decision to dismiss the federal claims, the court declines to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Melvin’s state law claims. See Rainey
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have
encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the
federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”).
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss are due to be granted solely as to
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the federal claims (Counts I-III).

The court will enter a separate order in

accordance with this memorandum opinion.
DONE the 2nd day of June, 2016.

_________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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