Eubanks v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 11/9/17. (SAC )

FILED
2017 Nov-09 PM 03:38
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
KAREN EUBANKS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) Case No.: 5:16-CV-1487-VEH
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING )
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
)
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
)
)
Defendant.
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Karen Eubanks (“Eubanks”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). Eubanks seeks a review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), who denied her application for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”).
Eubanks filed her application on December 13, 2013. After that, Eubanks pursued

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Nancy A. Berryhill was named the Acting Commissioner on January 23, 2017. See
https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), “[a]ny action
instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the
person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”
Accordingly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court has substituted Nancy A. Berryhill for Carolyn W. Colvin in the case
caption above and HEREBY DIRECTS the clerk to do the same party substitution on CM/ECF.

and exhausted the administrative remedies available before the Commissioner.
Eubanks filed her Complaint in the Northern District of Alabama on September 9,
2016. (Doc. 1). Eubanks filed her brief in support of her position on March 10, 2017.
(Doc. 10). The Commissioner responded on March 29, 2017. (Doc. 11). This case is
now ripe for judicial review under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Court carefully reviewed the record in this case and AFFIRMS the ALJ’s
decision.
II.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The amended alleged onset date is March 27, 2013. (Tr. 42). Eubanks suffers

from “migraine headaches, carpal tunnel syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), anxiety, and depression.” (Tr. 29). On December 13, 2013, Eubanks filed an
application for Social Security benefits. (Tr. 112, 196-206). The Social Security
Administration denied that application. On November 7, 2014, Administrative Law
Judge Randall C. Stout held a hearing. (Tr. 40-62). The ALJ issued his decision on
February 9, 2015, which was unfavorable to Eubanks. (Tr. 26-35). In that opinion, the
ALJ founds that Eubanks “does not have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments.” (Tr. 29) (emphasis omitted). Eubanks requested the Appeals Council
review her claim. (Tr. 1-3). They refused. (Tr. 1-3).
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III.

STANDARDS
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.

The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner
is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,
1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). This court will
determine that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence if it finds “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Id. Factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence must
be upheld by the court.
The ALJ’s legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo, because no
presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal
standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the
court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide
the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has
been conducted, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.
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2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
IV.

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a

period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act
and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.2 The Regulations define “disabled” as
“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to
disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence about a “physical or mental
impairment” that “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant
is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently employed;

2

The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R.
Parts 400 to 499.
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(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

(3)

whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment
listed by the [Commissioner];

(4)

whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5)

whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the
national economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable
C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 56263 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will
automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment.
If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her
work, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant
can perform some other job.
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy
in significant numbers. Id.
V.

FINDING OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
After considering the record, the ALJ made the following findings:
1.

The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through September 30, 2013.

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2.

The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since March 27, 2013, the amended alleged onset date (20
CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3.

The claimant has the following medically determinable
impairments: migraine headaches, carpal tunnel syndrome,
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and
depression (20 CFR 404.1521 eq seq. and 416.921 et seq.).

4.

The claimant does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that has signficantly limited (or is expected
to significantly limit) the ability to perform basic workrelated activities for 12 consecutive months; therefore, the
claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination
of impairments (20 CFR 404.1521 et seq. and 416.921 et
seq.).

5.

The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in
the Social Security Act, from March 27, 2013, through the
date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

(Tr. 28-35).
VI.

ANALYSIS
A.

Whether Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Decision To Discount
the Plaintiff’s Testimony and Find That She Is Not Disabled

Eubanks argues that “[t]he ALJ improperly discounted Eubank’s testimony of
disabling physical limitations and failed to fully and fairly develop the record.” (Doc.
10 at 11). Further, Eubanks states that “[t]he ALJ’s articulated reasons for rejecting
[Eubanks]’s testimony are not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at 11).
Eubanks argues that “[t]he ALJ’s determination that [Eubanks] does not suffer from
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any severe impairment demonstrates his disregard for the medical evidence and is
simply not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id. at 5). Specifically, Eubanks takes
issue with the ALJ’s use of her daily activities. (See id. at 5-7). Also, Eubanks argues
that the ALJ mistreated the evidence regarding her work on the chicken farm. (See id.
at 10-11). Finally, Eubanks argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to properly consider
[Eubanks’s] longitudinal medical record which supports [Eubanks’s] testimony.” (Id.
at 7). In particular, Eubanks points to her treatment with Dr. Beeler and to Dr.
Haney’s opinion. (See id. at 7-10).
In response, the Commissioner reminds the Court that Eubanks has “the burden
of proving an impairment is severe.” (Doc. 11 at 4). She defends the ALJ’s decision
by arguing that Eubanks was doing fairly normal daily activities while also claiming
she was severely impaired. (See id. at 5-8). Further, the Commissioner notes a
seeming lack of treatment for depression. (See id. at 8-11). Finally, the Commissioner
defended the ALJ’s use of Eubanks’s chicken farm work as undercutting her
allegations. (See id. at 11-12).
i.

Eubanks’s Level of Daily Activity

Much of this appeal revolves around the ALJ’s consideration of Eubanks’s

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level of daily activity. (Doc. 10 at 6);3 (Doc. 11 at 7-9).4 Daily activity “does not mean
the plaintiff is not disabled.” Horton v. Barnhart, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1046 (N.D.
Ala. 2006). Further, the court in Horton noted that:
“[S]tatutory disability does not mean that a claimant must be a
quadriplegic or an amputee. Similarly, shopping for the necessities of
life is not a negation of disability and even two sporadic occurrences
such as hunting might indicate merely that the claimant was partially
functional on two days. Disability does not mean that a claimant must
vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and social
activity .... It is well established that sporadic or transitory activity does
not disprove disability.”
Id. (quoting Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 971-72 (3rd Cir. 1981)) (emphasis and
changes added by the Horton court, emphasis changed to underlining by this Court).
“It is the ability to engage in gainful employment that is the key, not whether a
plaintiff can perform minor household chores or drive short distances.” Id. However,
while “a claimant’s admission that she participates in daily activities for short
durations does not necessarily disqualify the claimant from disability. . . that does not
mean it is improper for the ALJ to consider a claimant’s daily activities at all.” See

3

Eubanks argued: “The ALJ ignored the limitations testified to by the Plaintiff and did
not properly explain how the Plaintiff’s activities contradicted her testimony concerning her
disabling symptoms and limitations.” (Doc. 10 at 6). Eubanks claims that “[t]he ALJ . . . ignored
her explanation that she is able to engage in those activities when she ‘is able’ or is migraine
free.” (Doc. 10 at 6).
4

The Commissioner argued: “[T]he ALJ merely noted that the [sic] level of Plaintiff’s
allegations and contrasted them with her activity level. This was a proper consideration.” (Doc.
11 at 7).
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Hoffman v. Astrue, 259 F. App’x 213, 219 (11th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ adequately took into account Eubanks’s qualifiers. (Tr. 32) (“While
the claimant has reported limitations in her level of functioning, she continues to
perform a wide range of activities.”) (emphasis added); (Id. at 31) (“She can cook and
clean if she does not have a migraine.”) (emphasis added); (Id. at 30) (noting the selfreported limitations on the Function Report-Adult in January 2014); (Id. at 30-31)
(“She reported no problems getting along with authority figures and could handle
changes in routine, but indicated she had limitations in her ability to deal with
stress.”) (emphasis added); (Id. at 30) (“She also reports poor concentration,
indicating she cannot read or watch television.”). Eubanks is correct to note that ALJs
should not give a “selective description of the plaintiff’s activities.” (Doc. 10 at 6)
(quoting Horton, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1047). However, ALJs are permitted “to consider
a claimant’s daily activity.” Hoffman , 259 F. App’x at 219. On the whole, it appears
that the ALJ used the reports of Eubanks’s daily activities as a part of his overall
credibility analysis. (See Tr. 31-32).5 Importantly, the ALJ noted that “medical
5

The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

In assessing the claimant's credibility about her symptoms and their effects, the
ALJ will consider in addition to the objective medical evidence: the individual's
daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the individual's
symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness,
and side effects of medication taken to relieve the symptoms; treatment, other than
medication, for the symptoms; any other measure used to relieve the symptoms;
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evidence has not supported the severity of limitations alleged.” (Id. at 31). For these
reasons, the ALJ’s determinations on these matters are supported by substantial
evidence.
ii.

Eubanks’s Chicken Farm Work

Regarding the chicken farm work, the ALJ noted the seeming inconsistency
between Eubanks’s claimed level of disability and her activity. (See Tr. 34) (“She also
testified that she had migraines twice a week that lasted for two to three days and
based on that alone, the claimant would be incapable of performing any work activity,
even the work activity she reported and the undersigned finds the claimant is not fully
credible in her allegations.”). The ALJ concluded that “there would be a significant
amount of work to perform.” (Id. at 34). The Vocational Expert called during the
hearing confirmed that a chicken farm laborer and chicken farmer both have medium
exertional levels. (Id. at 59). Further, a chicken farmer is a highly skilled position.
(Id.). This Court might not have weighed the chicken farm evidence in the same way
that the ALJ did but, on appeal, this Court does not “reweigh the evidence.”
Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239. For these reasons, the ALJ’s determination is

and any other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to the
symptoms. Id. § 404.1529(c)(3).
Horowitz v. Commissioner of Social Security, 688 F. App’x 855, 863 (11th Cir. 2017).
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supported by substantial evidence.
iii.

Longitudinal Medical Record

Regarding the longitudinal medical record, the Court finds that the ALJ’s
determinations are supported by substantial evidence. The Court reviewed the
Disability Determination from Dr. Haney, Ph.D. (Tr. 88-89). Eubanks urges the Court
to understand this report as “support[ing] the presence of [Eubanks’s] severe mental
impairments.” (See doc. 10 at 8-9). The Commissioner argues that the ALJ was right
to discount “Dr. Haney’s opinion” because it was “inconsistent with Dr. Beeler’s
treatment during the relevant period, including the finding in November 2013 that
Plaintiff was doing well with her medications.” (See doc. 11 at 10).
The Court finds that there is at least substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
position. The alleged date of onset of disability is March 27, 2013. (Tr. 42). The
medical reports from Dr. Beeler do not seem to indicate the level of severity that
Eubanks claims. (Id. at 416-17). They do not conclusively point to either the idea that
Eubanks is disabled, or that she was a completely healthy female. (Id.). On August
22, 2013, the medical report from Dr. Beeler states that “she was tearful, crying. She
said that she has been off her antidepressant medication for some time now because
she was not able to afford it.” (Id. at 417). However, on November, 21, 2013, the
medical report from Dr. Beeler states that “she is doing well with her pain medication
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and anxiety meds.” (Id.). On February 13, 2014, the medical report from Dr. Beeler
does not seem to mention anything about depression at all. (Id. at 416).
The Court is not saying that Eubanks has not suffered numerous medical issues
throughout her life. She has. (Id. at 413-14). However, Eubanks was never seen in
specialized mental health treatment, which undercuts her claims. See O’Neal v.
Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-1772-AKK, 2014 WL 3970167 at *4-5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13,
2014) (noting that the claimant “failed to seek out mental health treatment, in contrast
to her extensive efforts to seek treatment for other health problems” and that the
primary care doctor never referred the claimant to mental health treatment); see also
Horowitz, 688 F. App’x at 861-62 (noting that a “conservative and routine nature of
. . . treatment . . suggests that [claimant’s] impairments – while significant – were not
so severe that [claimant] could not perform any job duties”).
Further, the ALJ was not wrong to discount Dr. Haney’s consultive examining
opinion. (Tr. 32). The ALJ contrasted Dr. Haney’s non-treating, examining opinion
with the history of treatment by Dr. Beeler and with Eubanks’s own level of activity.
(Id.). The Code of Federal Regulations states the following:
(2) Treatment relationship. Generally, we give more weight to medical
opinions from your treating sources, since these sources are likely to be
the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal
picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique
perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the
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objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief
hospitalizations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
Eubanks points out all of the other times that Dr. Beeler treated her for
migraines, anxiety, muscle spasms, and depression. (See doc. 10 at 7-8). However,
it appears that the ALJ considered Eubanks’s long treatment history. (Tr. 31) (noting
the record from Dr. Beeler going back to 1996); (Id. at 32) (“[Dr. Haney’s] findings
are also inconsistent with the treatment provided by Dr. Beeler over an extended
period, with records in November 2013 showing the claimant was doing well with her
anxiety medication.”); (Id.) (noting Dr. Beeler’s comments regarding Eubanks’s
mental health and her positive response to medication); (Id. at 33) (noting Dr.
Beeler’s “extended period” of treatment and using that treatment to discount
Eubanks’s claims); (Id.) (“Review of the medical evidence shows the claimant has
been treated for a variety of physical impairments with a long history of treatment for
headaches.”); (Id. at 34) (stating that the ALJ reviewed the whole record). In her
brief, Eubanks states that “[t]here is no indication that the Plaintiff’s treating
physician did not believe her migraines, anxiety and depression were severe.” (Doc.
10 at 7). However, “the claimant bears the burden of proving that [she] is disabled,”
not the Commissioner. See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
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Ultimately, this Court is constrained by the standard of review of an ALJ’s
factual findings. While the Court might not have come to the same conclusions as the
ALJ, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of November, 2017.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge

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