Beegle v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING CASE that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and costs are taxed against claimant as more fully set out in order. Signed by Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr on 5/7/2018. (AHI)

FILED
2018 May-07 PM 12:36
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
ANITA BEEGLE,
Claimant,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Deputy
Commissioner for Operations,
performing the duties and
functions not reserved to the
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 5:17-cv-0223-CLS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant, Anita Beegle, commenced this action on February 10, 2017, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the
Commissioner, affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and
thereby denying her claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits.
The court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is
a narrow one. The scope of review is limited to determining whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Lamb v.
Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253
(11th Cir. 1983).

Claimant contends that the Commissioner’s decision is neither supported by
substantial evidence nor in accordance with applicable legal standards. Specifically,
claimant asserts that the ALJ improperly considered the opinion of her treating
physician. Upon review of the record, the court concludes that contention lacks
merit, and that the Commissioner’s ruling is due to be affirmed.
The opinion of a treating physician “must be given substantial or considerable
weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d
1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Good cause exists when
“(1) [the] treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) [the]
evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) [the] treating physician’s opinion was
conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Id. (alterations
supplied). Additionally, the ALJ is not required to accept a conclusory statement
from a medical source, even a treating source, that a claimant is unable to work,
because the decision whether a claimant is disabled is not a medical opinion, but is
a decision “reserved to the Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d).
Social Security regulations also provide that, in considering what weight to
give any medical opinion (regardless of whether it is from a treating or non-treating
physician), the Commissioner should evaluate: the extent of the examining or
treating relationship between the doctor and patient; whether the doctor’s opinion can

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be supported by medical signs and laboratory findings; whether the opinion is
consistent with the record as a whole; the doctor’s specialization; and other factors.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). See also Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075
(11th Cir. 1986) (“The weight afforded a physician’s conclusory statements depends
upon the extent to which they are supported by clinical or laboratory findings and are
consistent with other evidence as to claimant’s impairments.”).
Dr. David Greer, claimant’s treating neurologist, completed a form prepared
by claimant’s attorney on February 26, 2015. Dr. Grier, who saw claimant for routine
follow-up appointments every two to three months, stated his belief that claimant’s
complaints of moderately severe to severe seizure disorder were credible. He
indicated that claimant could not sustain a full-time job at any exertional level, and
that her medical problems would cause her to miss at least five (5) days of work per
month. Dr. Greer added a handwritten notation to the form, stating that claimant “is
considered completely and totally disabled due to her chronic medical condition.”1
Dr. Greer indicated that claimant’s seizures would affect her ability to concentrate
and focus on tasks, but he did not state the extent to which those functions would be
affected. The form requested Dr. Greer to state his opinion regarding how often
claimant could perform functions such as climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, crawling, lifting, sitting, standing, and walking, but he did not do so.
1

Tr. 576.
3

Instead, the form included a handwritten note stating that “Dr. Greer does not do
FCE’s.”2 On the third and final page of the form, Dr. Greer stated that he had
prescribed anti-seizure medication to claimant. He also provided the following
summary statement: “Patient has a documented medical history including complex
partial epilepsy . . . . Previous MRI results showed evidence she has a dilated
perivascular spaces/tiny lacunar infarcts [sic] in the basal ganglia. Due to Mrs.
Beegle’s chronic medical condition, she is considered totally and permanently
disabled.”3
The ALJ afforded Dr. Greer’s opinion no weight because it was not supported
by substantial evidence from claimant’s medical record, and because it was
“inconsistent with [Dr. Greer’s] own treatment notes that indicate the claimant’s
seizure disorder is controlled with medication.”4 Specifically, the ALJ stated:
Dr. Greer cited previous MRI findings as the basis for his
conclusion and noted MRI results showed evidence the claimant had
dilated perivascular spaces/tiny lacunar infarcts on the basal ganglia.
However, the claimant’s most recent MRI, dated March 2, 2015, was
normal and it was noted there was “no explanation for symptoms
identified” . . . . Dr. Greer was aware of the results of this MRI as the
record shows he referred the claimant for the MRI. His conclusion that
the claimant was disabled based on MRI findings was contradicted by
his own treatment records and the claimant’s most recent MRI.

2

Tr. 578.

3

Tr. 577 (ellipsis supplied).

4

Tr. 31 (alteration supplied).
4

Tr. 31 (citation to the medical record omitted). The ALJ also stated:
Dr. Greer’s opinions on this check form offer the opinion that the
claimant is not only disabled but also apparently incapacitated.
However, his treatment notes do not reflect that he ever talked to
claimant about her ability to work. Testing is consistently negative, and
the claimant’s physical examinations are essentially normal.
Interestingly, when the form asked Dr. Greer for the claimant’s medical
condition to perform work activity he wrote “Dr. David Greer does not
do FCE’s 3/9/2015.” . . . . He failed to provide medical findings that
supported his assessment. Dr. Greer responded to this check form at the
request of Claimant’s attorney rather than in the course of treatment, and
this form is not part of his medical records. Cumulatively, these reasons
explain why the undersigned gives little weight to Dr. Greer’s
“opinions.” These opinions offer little more than a conclusory and
speculative responses are unsupported by the medical evidence. [sic]
As to missing days from work, if the claimant to return to work is pure
speculation of a possible future limitation if the claimant returned to
work. [sic]
Tr. 32 (citation to the medical record omitted).
Claimant rightly points out that it is difficult to discern the import of the ALJ’s
statement that Dr. Greer considered claimant to be “not only disabled but also
apparently incapacitated,” and that completing a form at the request of a claimant’s
attorney does not automatically discredit the statements on that form. Even so, on the
whole, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discredit Dr. Greer’s
opinion. As an initial matter, it is important to note that Dr. Greer did not provide any
assessment of claimant’s limitations in specific functional areas. Absent such an
assessment, the opinion amounts to little more than Dr. Greer’s bald statement that

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claimant is unable to work, and that is a decision reserved to the Commissioner of
Social Security, not a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1); Jones v.
Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986).
Moreover, the ALJ’s observations about the inconsistencies between Dr.
Greer’s opinion and his medical records are well-supported. Dr. Greer stated that
claimant’s MRI results contained findings to support a seizure disorder, but the actual
MRI report from June 27, 2012 stated that there were “[n]o intracranial
abnormalities,”5 and the report from March 2, 2015 stated: “Normal study, no
explanation for symptoms identified.”6 Additionally, Dr. Greer’s neurological
findings were consistently normal.7 Indeed, the only objective medical evidence
consistent with a seizure disorder is a June 27, 2012 electroencephalogram report
stating that the findings were “suggestive of a focus of underlying injury or cerebral
malfunction in the right temporal lobe(s). There is no evidence on this one-time
surface EEG for an active seizure focus, yet even the focal slowing seen may
represent a nidus for seizures.”8 The EEG results were not mentioned as a basis for
5

Tr. 306 (alteration supplied).

6

Tr. 591.

7

Tr. 302, 508-16, 583-600. Claimant makes much of Dr. Grier’s notation that claimant had
suffered bruises and contusions to her face and shoulder, presumably as a result of a seizure-related
fall. Tr. 515. But those physical injuries are not neurological findings that would support the
existence of a seizure disorder, and, even more importantly, they say nothing about claimant’s ability
to perform the various functional demands of work. It should also be noted that when claimant
suffered the alleged seizure that led to her injuries, she was not taking her seizure medication. Id.
8

Tr. 598.
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Dr. Greer’s opinion, and they say nothing about claimant’s functional abilities. The
mere existence of a seizure disorder is not sufficient to establish claimant’s disability.
Instead, the relevant consideration is the effect of that disorder, considered in
combination with any of her other impairments, on her ability to perform substantial
gainful work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (defining a disability as “the
inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months”). See also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 (1987) (“The [Social
Security] Act ‘defines “disability” in terms of the effect a physical or mental
impairment has on a person’s ability to function in the workplace.’”) (quoting Heckler
v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 459-60 (1983)) (alteration supplied).
In summary, the ALJ adequately articulated his reasons for rejecting the
assessment of disabling limitations by claimant’s treating physician, and the ALJ’s
decision was based upon substantial evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED. Costs are taxed against claimant. The Clerk is
directed to close this file.

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DONE this 7th day of May, 2018.

______________________________
United States District Judge

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