Langford v. Gordy et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION adopting Report and Recommendations re 12 Report and Recommendation. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on December 30, 2017. (Haikala, Madeline)
FILED
2017 Dec-30 PM 02:44
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
RICKEY GLENN LANGFORD,
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
vs.
)
)
WARDEN CHRISTOPHER GORDY, )
and the ATTORNEY GENERAL OF )
THE STATE OF ALABAMA,
)
)
Respondents.
)
Case No. 5:17-cv-342-MHH-TMP
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On November 20, 2017, the magistrate judge filed a report in which he
recommended that the Court dismiss without prejudice as time barred petitioner
Rickey Glenn Langford’s 28 U.S.C. § 2244 petition for writ of habeas corpus.
(Doc. 12). Mr. Langford filed objections to the report and recommendation. (Doc.
13).
A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
When a party objects to a report and recommendation, the district court must “make
a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. The Court reviews
for plain error proposed factual findings to which no objection is made, and the
Court reviews propositions of law de novo. Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779
n.9 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir.
1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1050 (1984) (“The failure to object to the
magistrate’s findings of fact prohibits an attack on appeal of the factual findings
adopted by the district court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.”)
(internal citation omitted); Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed. Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir.
2006).
In his objections, Mr. Langford contends that the statutory time bar contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) does not apply to convictions where the underlying court of
conviction lacked jurisdiction.
Mr. Langford contends that an illegal search
warrant was obtained to search his residence, causing the evidence against him to be
illegal. Therefore, he argues, the trial court lost or never had jurisdiction to
adjudicate the drug-trafficking charges on which he was convicted. The Court is
not persuaded by Mr. Langford’s argument.
The state trial court was not without jurisdiction simply because a Fourth
Amendment search issue existed with respect to evidence offered in the case. Such
Fourth Amendment issues are usually left to the state court for resolution. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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Because there is no genuine issue
concerning the jurisdiction of the court of conviction, Mr. Langford’s objection is
without merit.
Mr. Langford asserted in his habeas petition that he is actually innocent of the
charges on which he was convicted, and this allegation may itself be a basis for
avoiding the time bar. (Doc. 1, p. 12) (citing McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383
(2013)). As the Supreme Court explained in McQuiggin:
We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through
which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural
bar, as it was in Schlup and House, or, as in this case, expiration of the
statute of limitations. We caution, however, that tenable
actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: “[A] petitioner does not meet
the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in
light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have
voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.
S., at 329; see House, 547 U. S., at 538 (emphasizing that the Schlup
standard is “demanding” and seldom met). And in making an
assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, “the timing of the [petition]”
is a factor bearing on the “reliability of th[e] evidence” purporting to
show actual innocence. Schlup, 513 U. S., at 332.
McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386-87 (citing and quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298
(1995)). Thus, with a convincing showing of new evidence proving the petitioner
to be actually innocent, he may avoid the time bar.
Mr. Langford has not offered convincing “new evidence” of actual innocence.
At best, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to show that
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he is guilty. This is not an adequate showing of new evidence of innocence.
[A]s the Schlup decision explains, the gateway actual-innocence
standard is “by no means equivalent to the standard of Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979),” which
governs claims of insufficient evidence. Id., at 330, 99 S. Ct. 2781.
When confronted with a challenge based on trial evidence, courts
presume the jury resolved evidentiary disputes reasonably so long as
sufficient evidence supports the verdict. Because a Schlup claim
involves evidence the trial jury did not have before it, the inquiry
requires the federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react to
the overall, newly supplemented record. See ibid.
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006).
Because courts trust jurors to resolve evidentiary disputes, a Schlup gateway
claim requires more than simply re-weighing the evidence at trial; it requires new,
credible, and reliable evidence proving the innocence of the petitioner such that it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict the petitioner. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
To meet the proper standard, “the petitioner must show that it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in
the light of the new evidence.” [Schlup], 130 L. Ed. 2d at 867
(emphasis added). This showing is more than that showing required to
establish prejudice. Id. The Supreme Court in Schlup said this about
the needed evidence: “[t]o be credible, such a claim requires petitioner
to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable
evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not
presented at trial.” Id. at 865.
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Kuenzel v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr., 690 F.3d 1311, 1314–15 (11th Cir.
2012) (italics in original).
Mr. Langford has not offered credible new and reliable evidence of his
innocence. Rather, he re-argues the evidence from the trial, contending that it does
not establish that he constructively possessed the controlled substances in question.
He argues that there is evidence that the mobile home searched by police was not his
residence, but this is an issue he litigated at trial, and the jury found him guilty. The
prosecution offered testimony to establish that Mr. Langford’s driver’s license listed
the address of the search as his residence.
Mr. Langford has not proven that he is actually innocent of the drug
trafficking offenses. Accordingly, he cannot avoid application of the one-year time
bar of § 2244(d) under McQuiggin, and the Court overrules any objection to the
magistrate judge’s conclusion that this habeas petition is time-barred.
Having reviewed and considered de novo Mr. Langford’s habeas petition, the
report and recommendation, and Mr. Langford’s objections, the Court adopts the
magistrate judge’s report and accepts his recommendation. The Court will enter a
separate final order consistent with this memorandum opinion.
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DONE this December 30, 2017.
_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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