Junkins v. Dejong et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM OPINION - The Court dismisses all of the claims in this action other than Mr. Junkins's § 1983 claim for false arrest against Officer Dejong in his individual capacity. Within 14 days, Mr. Junkins and Officer Dejong shall propose discovery deadlines for this case. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 3/6/2020. (KEK)

FILED
2020 Mar-06 AM 10:13
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHWESTERN DIVISION
RICHARD G. JUNKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DANIEL DEJONG, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 5:17-cv-00350-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This § 1983 action is before the Court on Officer Daniel Dejong’s motion to
dismiss. (Doc. 35). Officer Dejong shot and killed plaintiff Richard Junkins’s dog,
Mr. Bear, and then arrested Mr. Junkins for obstructing traffic. Mr. Junkins sued
Officer Dejong and four other defendants, asserting eight claims under state and
federal law. (Doc. 31). Mr. Junkins now concedes that his claims against every
defendant other than Officer Dejong, his claims against Officer Dejong in his official
capacity, and his claim for malicious prosecution should be dismissed. (Doc. 48,
p. 2).

This opinion addresses Mr. Junkins’s remaining claims against Officer

Dejong. For purposes of this opinion, the Court accepts the well-pleaded facts in
Mr. Junkins’s amended complaint as true and draws all inferences in favor of Mr.
Junkins. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709–10 (11th Cir. 2010).

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I.

Background
March 6, 2015 was a tragic day for Mr. Junkins and his wife. That morning,

the family’s mobile home caught fire and burned completely. (Doc. 31, ¶¶ 6–7).
Mr. Junkins and his wife lost everything except their dog, Mr. Bear. (Doc. 31, ¶ 7).
Mr. Junkins and his wife went to the Red Cross, where they received blankets and
funds to buy food. (Doc. 31, ¶¶ 9–10). When they returned to their burned home,
they discovered that water the fire department used to douse the home had flooded
the yard, making it muddy. (Doc. 31, ¶ 11). Mr. Junkins’s truck became stuck in
the mud. He tried to free his truck from the mud and became distraught when he
could not. (Doc. 31, ¶ 11).
Around 10 or 11 p.m., Mr. Junkins and Mr. Bear noticed a car’s headlights
coming down the road, which was “unusual at that hour of the night.” (Doc. 31,
¶ 12). Mr. Bear took off after the car, and Mr. Junkins chased after the dog, “waving
his arms to get the attention of the driver to prevent Mr. Bear from getting struck by
the vehicle.” (Doc. 31, ¶ 12). The car drove off, and Mr. Junkins, out of breath, sat
down on the curb by the mailbox. (Doc. 31, ¶ 14). He “looked at his home still
smoldering and his truck that was stuck and just became overwhelmed again.”
(Doc. 31, ¶ 13). Mr. Junkins then saw the vehicle turn around and head back towards

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him, so he “stood up and began walking back to his house and told the driver to, ‘go
on.’” (Doc. 31, ¶ 15).
Officer Dejong arrived and walked up the driveway, shining his flashlight on
Mr. Junkins. (Doc. 31, ¶ 16). Mr. Junkins came towards Officer Dejong, and was
approximately twelve to fifteen feet from him, when Officer Dejong turned the
flashlight on Mr. Bear. Mr. Bear was lying beside the burned home. (Doc. 31, ¶ 17).
Mr. Bear barked twice but did not move towards Officer Dejong. (Doc. 31, ¶ 18).
Officer Dejong, “who already had his gun pulled and in front of him,” fired two
shots and killed Mr. Bear. (Doc. 31, ¶ 18). Mr. Junkins “became so overcome with
emotion that he passed out.” (Doc. 31, ¶ 19).
Officer Dejong arrested Mr. Junkins and charged him with obstructing
vehicular or pedestrian traffic under Alabama Code § 13A-11-7(5). (Doc. 31, ¶ 20).
In his incident report, Officer Dejong reported that Mr. Junkins was extremely
intoxicated. (Doc. 31, ¶ 23). During Mr. Junkins’s criminal trial, Officer Dejong
acknowledged that he did not have a conversation with Mr. Junkins, did not observe
Mr. Junkins with any type of alcoholic beverage, and did not see alcoholic containers
lying around. (Doc. 31, ¶ 24). Mr. Junkins denies that he was intoxicated. (Doc. 31,
¶ 23). A jury acquitted Mr. Junkins of the criminal charge. (Doc. 31, ¶ 20).
II.

Analysis

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Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Junkins asserts claims against Officer
Dejong for false arrest and excessive force. Officer Dejong’s defense rests on the
doctrine of qualified immunity, an affirmative defense that “protects police officers
from suit in their individual capacities for discretionary actions performed in the
course of their duties.” Carter v. Butts County, 821 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir.
2016). The availability of the affirmative defense is a “question of law for the court
to determine.” Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1165 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Qualified immunity allows police officers “‘to carry out their discretionary
duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from
suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating the federal
law.’” Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 733 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). “Qualified immunity ‘does
not offer protection if an official knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].’” Carter, 821 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Holmes
v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir. 2003), in turn quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982)) (alteration provided by Holmes).

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An officer asserting entitlement to qualified immunity “must first prove that
he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194
(quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). If the officer establishes that his actions were within the
scope of his discretionary authority, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish
that the officer violated a constitutional right and that the right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Carter, 821 F.3d at 1319; Lee, 284
F.3d at 1194. A right is clearly established if its contours are so clear that a
reasonable officer would know that what he is doing violates that right. Hope v.
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity for discretionary conduct
that violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights if the right at issue was clearly
established when the constitutional violation occurred. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 790 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012).
It is undisputed that Officer Dejong was performing a discretionary function
when he encountered Mr. Junkins; in his role as a law enforcement officer, Officer
Dejong was investigating a potential disturbance. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d
1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). Mr. Junkins’s § 1983 claims for false arrest and

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excessive force concern the Fourth Amendment. 1

The Fourth Amendment

guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. An arrest is a “seizure of the person” and
must be reasonable, or else it violates the Fourth Amendment. See Skop v. City of
Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007).
A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment
and may serve as the basis for a § 1983 claim. Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290,
1297 (11th Cir. 2018). “But where probable cause supports an arrest,” probable
cause “acts ‘as an absolute bar to a section 1983 action for false arrest.’” Carter,
821 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th
Cir. 2004). Probable cause exists where the totality of the circumstances of which
the arresting officer was aware at the time of arrest “would cause a prudent person
to believe that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense.” Carter, 821 F.3d at 1319 (quoting Kingsland 382 F.3d at 1226) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because “‘it is inevitable that law enforcement officials
will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is

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Mr. Junkins argues that because the arrest was “unnecessary and baseless, it follows that the force
used to effect the arrest was also unreasonable and excessive.” (Doc. 48, pp. 7–8). Because Mr.
Junkins’s excessive force claim is derived from the false arrest claim, and Mr. Junkins offers no
evidence to support an independent excessive force claim, his excessive force claim is subsumed
in the false arrest claim. See Bashit v. Rockdale Cty., 445 F.3d 1323, 1331 (11th Cir. 2006). For
the purposes of a qualified immunity analysis, the Court evaluates Mr. Junkins’s Fourth
Amendment theories under the false arrest rubric.
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present,’” an officer will receive the protection of qualified immunity if he can
demonstrate that he had arguable probable cause to make an arrest. Carter, 821 F.3d
at 1319–20 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).
Arguable probable cause exists when reasonable officers in the same
circumstances, having the same knowledge as the arresting officer, would believe
that probable cause existed. Brown, 608 F.3d at 734-35.
To determine whether an officer had arguable probable cause, we ask
“‘whether the officer’s actions are objectively reasonable ... regardless
of the officer’s underlying intent or motivation.’” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195
(quoting Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027, 1036 (11th Cir. 2001)). This
standard does not shield officers who unreasonably conclude that
probable cause exists. Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137.
Carter, 821 F.3d at 1320. “Where an officer arrests without even arguable probable
cause, he violates the arrestee’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizures.” Carter, 821 F.3d at 1320 (citing Case v. Eslinger,
555 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009)). A determination of arguable probable cause
“depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern.” Brown,
608 F.3d at 735.
Officer Dejong arrested Mr. Junkins for obstructing vehicular or pedestrian
traffic under Alabama Code § 13A-11-7(5). (Doc. 31, ¶ 20). Citing Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), and Lee, Officer Dejong argues that he “is entitled to
qualified immunity if he had probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest
Junkins for any offense.” (Doc. 35, p. 9). Officer Dejong is correct; so long as he
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had arguable cause to arrest for any offense, qualified immunity will apply. Brown,
608 F. 3d at 735.
Officer Dejong contends that he “had probable cause or at least arguable
probable cause to arrest Junkins for the offense of public intoxication” under
Alabama Code § 13A-11-10. (Doc. 35, p. 9). Under Alabama Code § 13A-11-10(2),
“[a] person commits the crime of public intoxication if he appears in a public place
under the influence of alcohol, narcotics or other drug to the degree that he endangers
himself or another person or property, or by boisterous and offensive conduct annoys
another person in his vicinity.” “[T]he offense of public intoxication requires
something more than ‘mere drunkenness.’” Martin v. Anderson, 107 F. Supp. 2d
1342, 1354 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (quoting Congo v. State, 409 So. 2d 275, 277 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1981)). The suspect must appear in a public place, and he must present
some danger to himself, others, or property. See Cagle v. State, 457 So. 2d 463, 465
(Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (“The Commentary to the corresponding model code
provision states that ‘[i]t is not the state of incapacitation per se that is condemned,
but only its public manifestations in ways that may endanger the actor or
inconvenience others.’”).
Officer Dejong argues that he had sufficient cause to arrest Mr. Junkins for
public intoxication because he (Officer Dejong) “was confronted with an erratically
and bizarrely acting Junkins who passed out in front of him for no apparent reason.”
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(Doc. 35, pp. 11–12); see also (Doc. 49, p. 10) (“The bizarre conduct on the part of
Junkins clearly qualified as reasonably objective evidence that Junkins was so
impaired that he possibly constituted a danger to himself.”). Mr. Junkins’s amended
complaint indicates that when Officer Dejong arrived at Mr. Junkins’s property some
time after 10:00 p.m., it was dark. It is reasonable to infer that it was dark because
of the hour and because Officer Dejong was using his flashlight to see as he walked
to the spot where Mr. Junkins stood in his driveway. (Doc. 31, ¶ 16). It is reasonable
to infer that there was no light coming from Mr. Junkins’s house because Mr.
Junkins’s house had burned to the ground earlier in the day, destroying the contents
of the house. (Doc. 31, ¶ 7). The dark surroundings would make it difficult for a
reasonable officer to see evidence of intoxication.
The only evidence of intoxication that Officer Dejong identifies is Mr.
Junkins’s loss of consciousness. The amended complaint indicates that Mr. Junkins
passed out after Officer Dejong fired his gun twice on Mr. Junkins’s property, killing
Mr. Junkins’s dog, Mr. Bear, as the dog “[laid] beside the area that used to be the
door of the home.” (Doc. 31, ¶¶ 17–18). No reasonable officer, knowing that he
had just entered a citizen’s property, stood 12 to 15 feet from the citizen, and shot
the citizen’s dog dead on the citizen’s property, would conclude that the citizen’s
loss of consciousness was the result of intoxication. (Doc. 31, ¶¶ 17–19). A
reasonable officer in the same circumstances with the same knowledge likely would
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conclude that Mr. Junkins passed out because he witnessed his dog being killed
beside (it would be reasonable to infer) his still-smoldering house. The Court rejects
Officer Dejong’s contention that a reasonable officer would conclude that Mr.
Junkins passed out for “no apparent reason.” Drawing reasonable inferences in favor
of Mr. Junkins, a reasonable officer could not conclude solely because a man
collapsed at night after a shooting on his property that the man must be intoxicated.
On an evidentiary record, the Court may reach a different conclusion, but at this
stage of the litigation, viewing the allegations in the amended complaint in the light
most favorable to Mr. Junkins, Mr. Junkins has demonstrated that Officer Dejong
lacked arguable probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication.2 Thus, Mr.
Junkins’s Fourth Amendment claim survives Officer Dejong’s motion to dismiss.
Though Mr. Junkins does not explicitly concede his state law claims against
Officer Dejong in his individual capacity, the Court will dismiss those claims.
Officer Dejong is a deputy of the Madison County Sheriff’s Department. (Doc. 31,
¶ 5). Under Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, sheriff’s deputies
share in the sovereign immunity that protects sheriffs from actions against them in
their individual capacity for acts performed in the course and scope of their
employment. Suttles v. Roy, 75 So.3d 90, 94 (Ala. 2010); see also Ex parte Shelley,

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The Court leaves for another day the question of whether Mr. Junkins, while standing in his
driveway, was in a public place and whether, when he passed out, he was a danger to himself or
others. See State v. Phillips, 517 So.2d 648, 651 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987).
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53 So.3d 887, 891 (Ala. 2009) (expanding immunity to deputy sheriffs). The Court
has previously dismissed the Madison County Sheriff’s Office as a defendant.
(Doc. 42).
III.

Conclusion

The Court dismisses all of the claims in this action other than Mr. Junkins’s
§ 1983 claim for false arrest against Officer Dejong in his individual capacity.
Within 14 days, Mr. Junkins and Officer Dejong shall propose discovery deadlines
for this case.
DONE and ORDERED this March 6, 202020.

_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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