Deloney v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge T Michael Putnam on 7/16/18. (MRR, )

FILED
2018 Jul-16 PM 04:32
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

GLORY JEAN DELONEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Deputy Commissioner for
Operations of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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Case No. 5:17-cv-00697-TMP

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Glory Jean Deloney, appeals from the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying
her application for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”).
Deloney timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies and the
decision of the Commissioner is ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction
by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 12).
Deloney was 54 years old on the date of the ALJ’s opinion. (Tr. at 27, 59).
Her past work experiences include employment as a dye automation operator and
1

crew leader. (Tr. at 39-40). Deloney claims that she became disabled on October
29, 2013, due to reflex sympathetic dystrophy1 of the lower right limb and GERD.
(Tr. at 22). However, Deloney amended her alleged onset date to April 1, 2015.
(Tr. at 20, 164).
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.
2001). The first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing
substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If
she is, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If she is not, the
Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental
impairments combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These
impairments must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a
claimant will be found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical
evidence in the record. See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If
the claimant’s impairments are not severe, the analysis stops.

20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Otherwise, the analysis continues to step
1

Reflex sympathetic dystrophy is one type of Complex Regional Pain Syndrome. “Complex
regional pain syndrome (CRPS) is a form of chronic pain that usually affects an arm or a leg.
CRPS typically develops after an injury, a surgery, a stroke or a heart attack. The pain is out of
proportion to the severity of the initial injury.”
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/complex-regional-pain-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20371151
(last
viewed
July 16, 2018).
2

three, which is a determination of whether the claimant’s impairments meet or
equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s
impairments fall within this category, she will be found disabled without further
consideration. Id. If they do not, a determination of the claimant’s residual
functional capacity will be made and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). Residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is an
assessment, based on all relevant evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability to do
work despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.945(a)(1).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent her from returning to past relevant work.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

20 C.F.R.

If the claimant can still do her past

relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the
claimant cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step.
Id. Step five requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the
claimant’s age, education, and past work experience, in order to determine if she
can do other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the
claimant can do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The burden is on the
Commissioner to demonstrate that other jobs exist which the claimant can perform;
and, once that burden is met, the claimant must prove her inability to perform those
3

jobs in order to be found disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir.
1999).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Deloney
meets the insurability and duration requirements for a period of disability and DIB
and was insured through December 31, 2019. (Tr. at 22). She further determined
that Deloney has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the amended
alleged onset of her disability of April 1, 2015. Id. According to the ALJ, the
plaintiff has the following impairments that are considered “severe” based on the
requirements set forth in the regulations: reflex sympathetic dystrophy of the lower
right limb.

Id.

However, she found that this impairment neither meets nor

medically equals any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Tr. at 23). The ALJ did not find Deloney’s allegations of pain to be
entirely credible, and she determined that Deloney has the following residual
functional capacity:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except no climbing ladders,
ropes or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps/stairs, balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch and crawl; avoid concentrated exposure to temperature
extremes; avoid all exposure to unprotected heights and moving
machinery.

4

(Tr. at 23). According to the ALJ, Deloney “is capable of performing past relevant
work as a dye automation operator.”2 (Tr. at 26). The ALJ concluded her findings
by stating that Deloney “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from April 1, 2015, through the date of this decision.” (Tr. at 27).
II.

Standard of Review
This court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether
there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284
F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The court approaches the factual findings of the
Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions.
See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). “Substantial evidence is
more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Mitchell v. Commissioner, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). The court may not decide facts,
weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Miles, 84
2

According to the plaintiff’s testimony, her job as a dye automation operator required her to
watch a set of four monitors related to the introduction of dyes in the paper-making process. She
indicated that she sat most of the time, only occasionally being required to go out to the
machinery to restart or reset it, which took about five to six minutes. Otherwise, her job required
her to remain seated at a panel of monitors. (Tr. at 39). A vocational expert testified that the
Department of Labor categorized a dye automation operator as light work, although plaintiff’s
description of her job made it sedentary work. (Tr. at 40).
5

F.3d at 1400. “The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision
makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’”

Parker v.

Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting
Consolo v. Federal Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this
court finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision,
the court must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles,
84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for “despite this deferential
standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the court scrutinize the record
in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v.
Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to apply the correct
legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635
(11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision that she can perform past

relevant work is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the plaintiff
contends that that ALJ erroneously concluded that the plaintiff’s subjective
complaints of pain were not entirely credible in contravention of the pain standard.

6

The Eleventh Circuit established a pain standard to direct ALJs in evaluating
claimant’s subjective allegations of disabling pain. Subjective testimony of pain
and other symptoms may establish the presence of a disabling impairment if it is
supported by medical evidence. See Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir.
1995). To establish disability based upon pain and other subjective symptoms,
“[t]he pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and
either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain
arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical condition
is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged
pain.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Holt v.
Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Landry v. Heckler, 782
F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
The ALJ is permitted to discredit the claimant’s subjective testimony of pain
and other symptoms if she articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). Under Social Security
Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 3

In evaluating an individual’s symptoms, it is not sufficient for our
adjudicators to make a single, conclusory statement that “the
individual's statements about his or her symptoms have been
considered” or that “the statements about the individual's symptoms
3

SSR 16-6 became effective on March 16, 2016, before the hearing with the ALJ on April 25,
2015, and her decision dated May 23, 2016.
7

are (or are not) supported or consistent.” It is also not enough for our
adjudicators simply to recite the factors described in the regulations
for evaluating symptoms. The determination or decision must contain
specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's symptoms, be
consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly
articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess
how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms.
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10 (2017). 4 Although the Eleventh Circuit
does not require explicit findings as to credibility, “‘the implication must be
obvious to the reviewing court.’” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Foote, 67 F.3d
at 1562). “[P]articular phrases or formulations” do not have to be cited in an
ALJ’s credibility determination, but it cannot be a “broad rejection” which is “not
enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ]
considered her medical condition as a whole.” Id.
The ALJ determined that the plaintiff met the first step of the pain standard;
that is, the plaintiff provided evidence of an underlying medical condition. See
Dyer, 395 at 1210. The ALJ found that “the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms.
4

“SSR 16-3p eliminates the term ‘credibility’ from social security policy but does not
change the factors that an ALJ should consider when examining subjective pain testimony . . . .
SSR 16-3p provides clarification of the subjective pain standard; it does not substantively change
the standard.” Harris v. Berryhill, No. 5:16-cv-01050-MHH, 2017 WL 4222611, at *3 n.2 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 22, 2017); see also Griffin v. Berryhill, No. 4:15-cv-0974-JEO, 2017 WL 1164889, at
*6 n.10 (N.D. Ala. March 29, 2017) (“The Eleventh Circuit’s pain standard is consistent with the
parameters that SSR 16-3p set forth.”). The 2017 version of SSR 16-3p supersedes the
March 16, 2016, version only to address the applicable date of the ruling and its retroactivity.
2017 WL 5180304, at *13 n.27. The versions are materially the same in all other respects.
Compare 2017 WL 5180304, with SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029.
8

. . .” (Tr. at 24). However, the ALJ determined that the plaintiff did not meet the
second or third step of the pain standard. See Dyer, 395 at 1210. The ALJ held
that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and
the other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Tr. at
24). The ALJ elaborated:

The claimant testified she stopped working after 22 years at
International Paper. She went on medical leave at first and then
received severance pay when the plant closed. She testified she
cannot stand for long periods of time due to numbness in her leg. She
also has to elevate her leg frequently. She has severe pain in her leg at
6-7/10, 10-12 days per month. She takes stronger pain medication
during this time, which causes her to feel sleepy. During this time,
she takes 2-3 hour naps. She can sit 5-6 minutes before needing to get
up and stretch. She testified she can walk a few blocks before needing
to rest. She testified she tries not to bend over due to pain. She also
testified she needs help getting in/out of the shower. She is able to
wash dishes, go to the grocery store and she drives 4-5 times per
week. She takes classes online and goes to the school one day every
other week to take tests.
...
In terms of the claimant's medical evidence, Exhibit 5F contains pain
clinic records. In 2000, the claimant suffered a crush injury at work to
her right foot. She underwent surgery in 2002 and 2005. In February
2015 records show she had a steady gait and was ambulating
independently. Notably, she stated at this time she was looking for
another job because the plant closed in 2013. She also reported good
relief from pain by using ibuprofen with no adverse side effects. She
was diagnosed and treated for sympathetic dystrophy of the right leg.
She was given a prescription for Neurontin at this visit and was
encouraged to swim, stretch daily and exercise for weight loss. In
9

March 2015, the claimant underwent a lumbar spinal block. Most of
the claimant’s records show reported pain on a good day at 3/10 and
on a bad day at 9/10. At the time of the amended onset date, the
claimant reported she was starting back to school because the
government would pay 100% since the plant closed that she was
working for. Notably, the claimant testified she has to lie down
frequently to elevate her leg; however, her treating physician, Dr.
Morgan did not give such orders in the treatment records. She also
did not mention to Dr. Morgan that she was lying down frequently
and elevating her leg. In May 2015, she underwent another lumbar
block. A few weeks later, she presented to the clinic requesting pain
medication to help her sleep. She stated she had good response from
the lumbar block until she started school. She had some distal
weakness in the right leg but no edema was noted. She had another
lumbar block in August 2015. In September 2015, she reported low
back pain radiating to the right hip at 6/10 on the pain scale. At this
time, she reported the medication allows her to go to school and take
care of her kids. She had another block in October 2015. In
December 2015 there is a note stating she is no longer prescribed
narcotic pain medication because her past two urine drug screens were
negative for narcotics. She had another block in January 2016.
...
Exhibit 11F contains additional records from Dr. Roberts at the pain
clinic. At the last visit of record in February 2016, the claimant
reported 90% relief of pain after the last block with good relief using
the medication and no side effects. She reported her worst pain was in
her right foot and thigh at 4/10. She requested a support letter from
Dr. Roberts for her disability. Examination findings showed normal
gait, no clubbing, no obvious edema in the right lower extremity,
normal left lower extremity and distal weakness in the right lower
extremity. In April 2016, the claimant underwent another lumbar
block and Dr. Roberts noted, “I told her she would have to have a
functional capacity evaluation with respect to her overall functional
status.” This was in response to the claimant’s request for Dr. Roberts
to complete a disability opinion.
...
10

The claimant’s nurse practitioner, Alan M. Heidt, CRNP, submitted
an opinion at Exhibit 10F. Mr. Heidt stated the claimant’s pain is
aggravated by movement. She is unable to stand more than 10
minutes at a time and unable to sit without breaks more than one hour
at a time. She [sic] advised to keep her leg elevated as much as she
can to alleviate pain (Exhibit 10F). Little weight is afforded to this
opinion as this opinion is from a non-acceptable medical source
pursuant to the Regulations.
Furthermore, claimant was not
prescribed pain medication from May 2015 through January 2016 (30
day supply); therefore, she essentially used non-narcotic medication to
treat her pain during most of the period under consideration. There
are also notes in the file stating the claimant was not given any
additional pain medication by the pain clinic due to having two drug
screens that did not show narcotic pain medication in her system
despite a prescription for such. This opinion is not supported by the
totality of the evidence. The claimant’s gait is normal and her
extremities have normal strength with some distal weakness in the
right leg. Pain clinic notes show she responded well to lumbar blocks
and pain medication with no reports of side effects. At the hearing,
she testified to side effects of medication and difficulty walking and
bending; these symptoms are simply not noted in the treatment files to
the extent alleged by the claimant at the hearing. There are no treating
or examining opinions of record relevant to the period under
consideration.
Exhibit 7F contains various statements that were provided to the
claimant’s short term disability insurance company. There is a note
from Dr. Roberts (signature is illegible) dated February 19, 2014
stating the claimant was disabled from October 29, 2013 through
April 29, 2014. This note also states the claimant was unable to stand
more than 15 minutes without needing to change positions; the spinal
cord stimulator was awaiting approval but Dr. Roberts (presumably)
stated hopefully with the stimulator the claimant’s pain would return
to the baseline and she could return to work. In August 2014 it was
noted by presumably Dr. Roberts that the claimant could return to
regular work duty at the light level with no walking or standing for
more than 30 minutes at one time. No weight is afforded to these
opinions as they are well before the amended alleged onset date. One
statement states the claimant could return to work in August 2014;
however, the plant had closed at this time and there was nothing to
11

return to. Furthermore, these are statements provided for temporary
disability and are not statements meant to be considered permanent in
nature. The claimant received a severance package from her
employer when the plant closed in August 2014. She testified she
looked for work but no one would hire her due to liability. Thus, it
does not appear the claimant stopped working due to health reasons as
the plant closed.
While the allegations regarding the nature of these symptoms are
found to be supported within the medical and other evidence of
record, the contentions regarding the severity of, and the related
functional restrictions, are not supported. The undersigned has
carefully read and considered all the evidence of record, regardless of
whether it is specifically cited in the decision and finds that the
residual functional capacity set forth above is more consistent with the
appropriate medical findings and the overall evidence of record than
the allegations made by the claimant.

(Tr. at 24-26).
The plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
findings regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain
because she “was intensively treated for her low back pain and reflex sympathetic
dystrophy of the lower limb . . . [Tr. at 501-609, 636-808, 872-883].” (Doc. 17, p.
7).

She asserts that the records are consistent with her testimony, specifically

alleging that the medical records reflect that she “more often than not reported pain
levels . . . 7-10 out of 10 on the pain scale” and that her pain levels were
aggravated by activity such as bending, standing, and walking. (Id.). Furthermore,
the plaintiff contends that the ALJ mischaracterized the relief that she received

12

from approximately 15 lumbar spinal blocks, explaining that the relief typically
lasted only three to four weeks. (Doc. 17, pp. 7-8).
Despite the evidence supporting the plaintiff’s arguments, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that the plaintiff failed either to show
objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the pain or that the
medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give
rise to the alleged pain. See Dyer, 395 at 1210. The ALJ explained that the
plaintiff’s subjective testimony of pain was inconsistent with the medical record.
As set out above, the ALJ cites both the medical records as well as the plaintiff’s
own testimony to support her determination that the plaintiff’s subjective pain
testimony is not credible.
Specifically, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision as it relates to
the plaintiff’s credibility regarding the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of
her pain. Despite reporting pains levels at seven or greater during her clinic visits,
the ALJ noted that Dr. Roberts, a physician employed by Tennessee Valley Pain
Consultants, discontinued the plaintiff’s prescription for narcotic pain medications
in either April or May 2014 because the plaintiff’s two previous urine drug screens
were negative for the controlled medications prescribed by Dr. Roberts, indicating
that the plaintiff no longer needed narcotic pain medication to manage her pain.
(Tr. at 538-39, 548-49). From May 2014 to the present, the plaintiff has managed
13

her pain with a combination of Neurontin,5 ibuprofen, aspirin, and a compounded
cream, in addition to regularly prescribed lumbar spinal blocks every two to three
months.

(See tr. at 539) (“Discussed tx option with pt – Options include

medications/injections/physical therapy/surgical consideration”); (see also tr. at
538, 548, 531, 505, 648, 664, 673, 688, 697, 713, 722, 737, 746, 762, 772, 788,
798, 877). Dr. Roberts has since refused to prescribe for the plaintiff any narcotic
pain medications on a regular basis (tr. at 505, 532, 539, 664, 688, 714, 737, 762,
789, 878), except for three- to four-day dosages, which typically follow a lumbar
spinal block (tr. at 229-231, 698, 723, 799). Following a lumbar spinal block, the
plaintiff typically reported relief of seventy percent or greater for approximately
three to six weeks. (Tr. at 505, 532, 664, 688, 713, 737, 762, 788-89, 877-78).
The plaintiff explained that her pain was better with the combination of lumbar
spinal blocks and her medications, reporting good relief and no side effects. (See
tr. at 505, 532, 539, 548, 664, 688, 713, 737, 762, 789); (see also tr. at 878)
(“Currently Rx’d Neurontin 300mg 4/d, Ibuprofen 800mg 2/d and Comp cream –
working well to manage pain, denies SE – states her meds work more effectively
while getting relief from her procedure . . . No changes in regimen, as pt is
stable.”).

In September 2015, the nurse noted that the plaintiff reported that

5

Neurontin is the brand name for gabapentin, an anticonvulsant and antiepileptic
medication also used to treat nerve pain.
https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-98458217/neurontin-oral/gabapentin-oral/details (last viewed July 16, 2018).
14

Neurontin worked well and did not report any side effects with her current
medications. (Tr. at 762). In a recent procedure note, Dr. Roberts dictated that the
plaintiff “always gets very good relief with these procedure about 2 months at a
time.”

(Tr. at 882).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s reasonable

conclusions that the pain was not as intense, persistent, or limiting as the plaintiff
claimed given that she was not consistently prescribed narcotic pain medications
after April 2014. Objective evidence further supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
the plaintiff’s pain management plan was reasonable; regularly scheduled lumbar
spinal blocks, in combination with non-narcotic pain medications, effectively
managed the plaintiff’s pain.
Additionally, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision as it relates to
the claimant’s activity levels, which undercuts the plaintiff’s credibility regarding
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her pain.

Despite complaints

about the ability to sit, stand, or walk, Dr. Roberts repeatedly noted that the
plaintiff ambulated independently and that she had a steady gait. (Tr. at 502-03,
515-16, 525, 529-30, 536-37, 546, 561, 568-69, 579, 586, 602, 647-48, 661, 672,
685, 696, 710, 721, 735, 745-46, 759-60, 771-772, 785-86, 797-98, 812-13, 82324, 874-75). Admittedly, Dr. Roberts makes varying notations that the plaintiff
reported that activity, such as standing and walking, aggravated her level of pain.
(Tr. at 502, 515, 524, 529, 536, 546, 561, 568, 579, 586, 661, 685, 710, 759, 785,
15

812, 823, 874; see also id.). However, Dr. Roberts still noted that she ambulated
independently and that her gait was steady despite repeatedly reporting these
alleged aggravations and pain levels of seven or greater during clinic visits. (Id.).
He also advised her to stretch and swim regularly as part of her treatment.
Furthermore, her function report indicated that she prepared food or meals two to
three times a week, in addition to completing light cleaning and laundry for eight
to ten hours each day and going shopping for about fifteen minutes to one hour
twice a week. (Tr. 186-87). Moreover, the plaintiff reported that she was looking
for a job in 2014 and attending school in 2015. (Tr. at 505, 664, 688, 713-14, 737,
762). Her current medications, which included Neurontin, ibuprofen, aspirin, and
a compounded cream, permitted her to attend school and take care of her children.
(Tr. at 762).
The determination of credibility is left to the ALJ, and the ALJ is entitled to
discredit the plaintiff’s assertion of the severity of her pain so long as she
articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Here, the ALJ has done so.
IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Deloney’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. A separate order will be entered.

16

DONE this 16th day of July, 2018.

_______________________________
T. MICHAEL PUTNAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17