Crump v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 9/19/2018. (PSM)

FILED
2018 Sep-19 PM 03:11
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
PATRICIA GAIL CRUMP,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NANCY BERRYHILL,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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5:17-cv-1108-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Patricia Gail Crump (“Ms. Crump”), appeals from the

decision

of

the

Commissioner

of

the

Social

Security

Administration

(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). Ms. Crump timely pursued
and exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is
ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Crump was fifty-two years old at the time of the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision. She has a high school education and attended some
college. (Tr. at 341.) Her past work experiences include employment as a contract
administrator, administrative clerk, and fast food worker. (Tr. at 66-7, 297-99, 341.)
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Ms. Crump claims that she became disabled on August 25, 2012, due to bipolar
disorder, major depression, anxiety, paranoia, and borderline personalities. (Tr. at
254, 259.)
The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential
evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled and thus
eligible for DIB or SSI. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v.
Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The evaluator will follow the steps in
order until making a finding of either disabled or not disabled; if no finding is made,
the analysis will proceed to the next step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
416.920(a)(4). The first step requires the evaluator to determine whether the
plaintiff is engaged in substantial gainful activity (“SGA”).

See id. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the plaintiff is not engaged in SGA, the
evaluator moves on to the next step.
The second step requires the evaluator to consider the combined severity of
the plaintiff’s medically determinable physical and mental impairments. See id. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An individual impairment or combination of
impairments that is not classified as “severe” and does not satisfy the durational
requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509 and 416.909 will result in a finding
of not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The

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decision depends on the medical evidence contained in the record. See Hart v.
Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that “substantial medical
evidence in the record” adequately supported the finding that plaintiff was not
disabled).
Similarly, the third step requires the evaluator to consider whether the
plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or is medically equal
to the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the criteria of a listed
impairment and the durational requirements set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509
and 416.909 are satisfied, the evaluator will make a finding of disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluator must determine the plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) before proceeding to the fourth step. See id.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The fourth step requires the evaluator to determine
whether the plaintiff has the RFC to perform the requirements of her past relevant
work.

See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).

If the plaintiff’s

impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent her from performing
her past relevant work, the evaluator will make a finding of not disabled. See id.

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The fifth and final step requires the evaluator to consider the plaintiff’s
RFC, age, education, and work experience in order to determine whether the
plaintiff can make an adjustment to other work. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
416.920(a)(4)(v). If the plaintiff can perform other work, the evaluator will find her
not disabled. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If the plaintiff
cannot perform other work, the evaluator will find her disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Crump
meets the nondisability requirements for a period of disability and DIB and was
insured through June 30, 2015. (Tr. at 18.) She further determined that Ms. Crump
has not engaged in SGA since the alleged onset of her disability. (Id.) According to
the ALJ, Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder, history of alcohol abuse, and borderline
personality disorder are considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth
in the regulations. (Id.) However, she found that these impairments neither meet
nor medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ did not find Ms. Crump’s allegations to be totally
credible, and she determined that she has the following RFC:
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the
following nonexertional limitations: the claimant is limited to simple
one to three step job tasks or instructions. She can occasionally
cooperate and have interactions with coworkers or the general public.
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The claimant should have work that requires no more than brief
occasional supervision and she should not work fast paced production
line type work. The claimant is able to maintain concentration,
persistence, or pace sufficiently to complete work in two-hour
intervals for an eight-hour workday/forty-hour workweek. She is able
to understand, remember, and carry out simple job tasks or instruction
in two hour intervals for an eight hour workday.
(Tr. at 22.)
According to the ALJ, Ms. Crump is unable to perform any of her past
relevant work, and she is a “younger individual,” as those terms are defined by the
regulations. (Tr. at 26.) She determined that “transferability of skills is not material
to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a
framework supports a finding that the claimant is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not the
claimant has transferable job skills.” (Id.) Because Plaintiff cannot perform the full
range of work at all exertional levels, the ALJ enlisted a vocational expert (“VE”)
and used Medical-Vocation Rule 201.25 as a guideline for finding that there are a
significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff is capable of
performing, such as cleaner, laundry worker, floor cleaner, housekeeping, marker,
document preparer, and surveillance systems monitor. (Tr. at 27.) The ALJ
concluded her findings by stating that Plaintiff “has not been under a ‘disability,’
as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 25, 2012, through the date of
this decision.” (Id.)
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II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act

is a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there
is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Stone
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 544 F. App’x 839, 841 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004)). This Court gives
deference to the factual findings of the Commissioner, provided those findings are
supported by substantial evidence, but applies close scrutiny to the legal
conclusions. See Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996).
Nonetheless, this Court may not decide facts, weigh evidence, or substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210
(11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir.
2004)).

“The substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision

makers to act with considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen,
793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed.
Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the

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proof preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, it must affirm if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400 (citing Martin
v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
However, no decision is automatic, for “despite th[e] deferential standard
[for review of claims], it is imperative that th[is] Court scrutinize the record in its
entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision reached.” Bridges v.
Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881,
883 (11th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, failure to apply the correct legal standards is
grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion
Ms. Crump alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded

for three reasons. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have given more
weight to the opinion of Dr. John R. Goff, Ph.D., to whom her attorney referred her
for a one-time neurological consultative examination. Second, Plaintiff contends
that the ALJ’s determination that she was only partially credible was erroneous.
Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination was flawed.
A.

Weight Given to One-Time Consultative Examiner’s Opinion

The ALJ must articulate the weight given to different medical opinions in the
record and the reasons therefore. See Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176,

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1179 (11th Cir. 2011). The weight afforded to a medical opinion regarding the
nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments depends, among other things, upon
the examining and treating relationship the medical source had with the claimant,
the evidence the medical source presents to support the opinion, how consistent
the opinion is with the record as a whole, and the specialty of the medical source.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).
Within the classification of acceptable medical sources are the following
different types of sources that are entitled to different weights of opinion: 1) a
treating source, or a primary physician, which is defined in the regulations as “your
physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who provides you, or
has provided you, with medical treatment or evaluation and who has, or has had, an
ongoing treatment relationship with you;” 2) a non-treating source, or a consulting
physician, which is defined as “a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable
medical source who has examined you but does not have, or did not have, an
ongoing treatment relationship with you;” and 3) a non-examining source, which is
a “a physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical source who has not
examined you but provides a medical or other opinion in your case . . . includ[ing]
State agency medical and psychological consultants . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502.

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The regulations and case law set forth a general preference for treating
medical sources’ opinions over those of non-treating medical sources, and nontreating medical sources over non-examining medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2); Ryan v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 939, 942 (11th Cir. 1985). Thus, a
treating physician’s opinion is entitled to “substantial or considerable weight
unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1159 (quoting
Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotations
omitted). “Good cause” exists for an ALJ to not give a treating physician’s opinion
substantial weight when the: “(1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by
the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s
opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.”
Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440); see also
Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that “good
cause” existed where the opinion was contradicted by other notations in the
physician’s own record).
On the other hand, the opinions of a one-time examiner or of a nonexamining source are not entitled to the initial deference afforded to a physician
who has an ongoing treating relationship with a plaintiff. McSwain v. Bowen, 814
F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987). Still, though, medical consultants or medical experts

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are highly qualified medical specialists who are experts in the Social Security
disability programs, and their opinions may be entitled to great weight if the
evidence supports their opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(iii),
416.927(e)(2)(iii); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180.
Indeed, a medical expert’s opinion may be entitled to greater weight than the
opinions of treating or examining sources in appropriate circumstances, such as
when the medical expert has reviewed the complete case record. See SSR 96-6p,
1996 WL 374180. In short, an ALJ “may reject the opinion of any physician when
the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” McCloud v. Barnhart, 166 F. App’x
410, 418–19 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1240
(11th Cir. 1983)).
The Court must also be aware of the fact that opinions such as whether a
claimant is disabled, the claimant’s RFC, and the application of vocational factors
“are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the
Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a
case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(d). The Court is interested in the doctors’ evaluations of
the claimant’s “condition and the medical consequences thereof, not their opinions
of the legal consequences of his [or her] condition.” Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Such

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statements by a physician are relevant to the ALJ’s findings, but they are not
determinative, as it is the ALJ who bears the responsibility for assessing a
claimant’s RFC. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c).
At the request of her attorney, Dr. John R. Goff performed a one-time
neuropsychological examination of Ms. Crump on November 17, 2015. (Tr. at 580.)
Dr. Goff’s examination included conversations with Ms. Crump, as well as
administration of the Victoria Symptoms Validity Test (“VSVT”), Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (“WAIS-IV”), the Reitan-Indiana Aphasia Screening
Test, informal clock drawing tasks, the fourth edition of the Wide Range
Achievement Test (“WRAT-IV”), the Test of Premorbid Functioning
(“TOPF”), the abbreviated version of the third edition of the Wechsler Memory
Scale (“WMS-III”), and the Personality Assessment Inventory (“PAI”). (Tr. at
583.) Dr. Goff diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar I disorder, cognitive disorder (loss),
alcohol dependence in reported long term remission, and borderline personality
disorder. (Tr. at 586.) According to Dr. Goff’s Medical Source Statement, he
opined that Plaintiff was moderately impaired in understanding, remembering, and
carrying out simple instructions and that she had marked to extreme impairment
with complex instructions and the ability to make judgments on complex workrelated decisions. (Tr. at 587.) Dr. Goff further opined that Plaintiff had marked

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impairment in her ability to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, and
coworkers, as well as in her ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations
and to deviations in a routine work setting. (Tr. at 588.)
The ALJ gave limited weight to Dr. Goff’s opinion because it was based
primarily on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and was not consistent with
Plaintiff’s medical records from Mental Healthcare of Cullman. (Tr. at 25.)
Substantial evidence supports that decision. The Mental Healthcare of Cullman’s
evaluations of Plaintiff are a result of approximately five years of frequent meetings
with Ms. Crump, while Dr. Goff’s evaluation was based on one meeting. Dr. Goff’s
resulting opinion from this one-time examination, as well as Plaintiff’s subjective
statements on which Dr. Goff’s opinion is majorly based, are not fully supported by
the medical records provided by Mental Healthcare of Cullman. Throughout years
of treatment at Mental Healthcare of Cullman, Plaintiff was consistently noted to
possess good or fair judgment, psychomotor activity within normal limits, and
logical, concrete, and/or goal directed thought processes. (Tr. at 329-89, 398-579,
590-637.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s judgment, psychomotor activity, and thought
processes are relatively better during the latter years of her treatment at Mental
Healthcare of Cullman than when she first began treatment, according to the
medical notes. (Id.) Plaintiff even stated that she believed therapy was helping her.

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(Tr. at 79). According to Plaintiff’s October 27, 2014 intake assessment at Mental
Health Center of Cullman, she had a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)
rating of 56, which equated to having moderate symptoms or difficulty in
functioning. (Tr. at 343.) See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic & Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 32-34 (4th ed. Text Revision 2000) (DSM).
However, Ms. Crump’s more recent intake assessment on November 27, 2015,
determined that she possessed good insight and good judgment, suggesting
improvement in her conditions. (Tr. at 38.) Plaintiff’s GAF rating remained at 56,
indicating no decline. (Tr. at 44.) The latter intake assessment mentioned was
conducted ten days after Dr. Goff’s examination. These reports run counter to the
opinion drawn by Dr. Goff, specifically his skepticism in Plaintiff’s ability to make
judgments and his implications of Plaintiff’s cognitive decline. (Tr. at 585-86.) The
Mental Healthcare of Cullman records also lend no support for Dr. Goff’s opinion
which calls into question Plaintiff’s ability to respond appropriately to usual work
situations or to deviations in routine work setting, given that Ms. Crump’s
practitioner consistently determined that she possessed good or fair judgment and
concrete or goal directed thought processes. (Id.)

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As a one-time examiner, Dr. Goff’s opinion was not entitled to any
deference. See McSwain, 814 F.3d at 619. The ALJ did not err in her decision to
place limited weight on Dr. Goff’s opinion.
B.

ALJ’s Credibility Determination

When a claimant attempts to prove disability based on her subjective
complaints, she must provide evidence of an underlying medical condition and
either objective medical evidence confirming the severity of her alleged symptoms
or evidence establishing that her medical condition could be reasonably expected to
give rise to her alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a), (b); SSR 96-7p;1
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, at 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2002). If the objective
medical evidence does not confirm the severity of the claimant’s alleged symptoms
but the claimant establishes that she has an impairment that could reasonably be
expected to produce her alleged symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity
and persistence of the claimant’s alleged symptoms and their effect on her ability to
work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c), (d); SSR 96-7p; Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225-26.
This entails the ALJ determining a claimant’s credibility with regard to the
Effective March 28, 2016, the Commissioner replaced SSR 96-7p with SSR 16-3p. The
Commissioner explained that the new ruling “eliminat[ed] the use of the term ‘credibility’ from
[the Social Security Administration’s] sub-regulatory policy, as our regulations do not use this
term. In doing so, we clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an
individual’s character. Instead, we will more closely follow our regulatory language regarding
symptom evaluation.” SSR 16-3p at *1-2. Neither party has asserted that SSR 16-3p applies
retroactively to Plaintiff’s claim in this case, which was decided before March 28, 2016.
1

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allegations of pain and other symptoms. See id. The ALJ must “[explicitly
articulate] the reasons justifying a decision to discredit a claimant’s subjective pain
testimony.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005). When the
reasoning for discrediting is explicit and supported by substantial evidence, “the
record will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553,
1562 (11th Cir. 1995).
In this case, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. (Tr. at
23.) However, she found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of these alleged symptoms were only partially
credible. (Tr. at 24.) Substantial evidence supports this conclusion.
In her function report, Ms. Crump stated that she has trouble completing
tasks such as getting dressed, taking a shower, washing her hair, and brushing her
teeth. (Tr. at 284.) She also stated that she prepares simple meals and does some
housework, and she shops in stores for food. (Tr. at 285-86.) She stated that she is
able to drive a car alone. (Id.) However, she stated that she is unable to pay bills,
count change, handle a savings account, or use a checkbook. (Id.) She claimed to
socialize with others, reporting no problems getting along with family, friends, or
neighbors. (Tr. at 288.) She claimed to have the ability to walk one mile before

15

needing to stop and rest. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that her attention span is
approximately ten minutes and she is not able to complete tasks. (Id.) She denied
the ability to follow written or verbal instructions and handle stress or changes in
routine. (Tr. at 288-89.)
During visits to Mental Healthcare of Cullman, Ms. Crump reported that
she socializes with people in several different ways, including the basic living skills
program, alcoholics anonymous (“AA”), and a vacation with a friend. (Tr. at 545,
554, 557, 578, 617.) During Ms. Crump’s appointment on December 10, 2015, she
stated that she socializes with others daily. (Tr. at 45.)
Plaintiff stated during her hearing that she uses AA meetings as a social
outlet, where she sees her sponsor and her friends. (Tr. at 71-72.) Ms. Crump had
earlier reported to her physicians that she attends these meetings regularly,
sometimes three times per week. (Tr. at 545, 554.) Ms. Crump also stated at her
hearing that she has a fear of authority figures. (Tr. at 69.) Plaintiff’s stated
reasoning for quitting work was due to having bad panic attacks that would cause
her to yell and scream. (Tr. at 67.) Plaintiff’s statements include claims that prior
work at McDonald’s and Burger King was stressful. (Tr. at 77.) Plaintiff stated that
she was not fast enough and was unable to count change. (Id.) She stated that she is
unable to read long articles and has difficulty remembering and understanding the

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things she reads. (Tr. at 78.) Plaintiff denied the ability to concentrate, follow
directions, or do multiple things at the same time. (Tr. at 79-80.) She stated that
she has good days and bad days with her depression. (Id.) She also stated that there
are days that she is unable to get out of the bed. (Id.)
However, as noted by the ALJ, Ms. Crump has been treated for her mental
issues through outpatient treatment along with medication, and treatment has
improved her symptoms. During the treatment Ms. Crump received at Mental
Healthcare of Cullman ranging from 2010 to 2016, the majority of Plaintiff’s
“consumer statements of current status” are positive reports. (Tr. at 33-58, 33489, 398-410, 437-532, 538-59, 561-79, 590-637.) The majority of Ms. Crump’s visits
also resulted in reports of normal psychomotor activity and attention, good
concentration, and statements that she was alert and oriented. (Id.) Ms. Crump
stated many times that she was doing well and had improvement of her depression,
anxiety, and mood. (Id.) It was also consistently reported in Plaintiff’s medical
records that medication reduced or alleviated Ms. Crump’s symptoms. (Id.)
Plaintiff often reported good efficacy with her medication, rating the efficacy as an
“eight” and “ten” more than once on a one-to-ten scale. (Tr. at 603, 609, 612.)
Plaintiff stated to her practitioner on multiple occasions that she is no longer having
anxiety and no longer needed to take Risperdal. (Tr. at 350, 545.) Plaintiff

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eventually ceased taking Risperdal because it effectively eliminated her anxiety, as
she stated during her hearing with the ALJ. (Tr. at 73.) Plaintiff’s intake
assessment on October 27, 2014, resulted in an overall normal examination other
than having a depressed mood and inconsistent insight and judgment. (Tr. at 33743.) Plaintiff had good concentration, was alert and oriented, and her memory was
intact. (Id.) Ms. Crump’s intake assessment found her attention level,
interpersonal behavior, and psychomotor activity to be within normal limits. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s more recent intake assessment on November 27, 2015 indicated similar
findings; however, this assessment determined that Ms. Crump had good insight
and good judgment. (Tr. at 37-38.) Plaintiff was found to have psychomotor activity
within normal limits, intact memory, normal attention, normal comprehension,
normal fund of knowledge, goal oriented and logical thought processes, normal
interpersonal behaviors, and she was easily engaged and cooperative with the
examiner. (Id.)
Additionally, during Plaintiff’s October 25, 2012, appointment at Mental
Healthcare of Cullman, Ms. Crump stated that she had filed for disability and
wanted to make sure everything was “on track.” (Tr. at 617-18.) According to the
practitioner’s notes from this appointment, Plaintiff asked if they would be able
write a letter on behalf of her disability claims. (Id.) In a separate appointment at

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Mental Healthcare of Cullman, Plaintiff stated, “I just don’t like to work or have to
do anything . . . I will just wait to get my disability.” (Tr. at 600.) It is also reported
during this visit that Plaintiff “was unable to identify reasons why she is unable to
seek employment, attend social situations, or find hobbies.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s
practitioner noted during her June 29, 2012, appointment that Ms. Crump was still
unwilling to look for work, hoping to receive disability benefits instead. (Tr. at 631.)
Again, after being encouraged by her therapist to seek employment during her
April 17, 2013, appointment at Mental Healthcare of Cullman, Plaintiff responded
that she does not feel like working and is simply hoping to receive disability. (Tr. at
603.)
As demonstrated above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to
discredit Plaintiff’s testimony of disabling symptoms and limitations.
C.

ALJ’s RFC Assessment

The RFC is the ALJ’s assessment of the most a claimant can do despite her
impairments based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1545(a)(1), (3), 416.945(a)(1), (3). An RFC assessment must identify an
individual’s functional limitations and assess her work-related abilities on a
function-by-function basis prior to expressing the RFC in terms of general
exertional levels. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3. The RFC assessment

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must “include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g. laboratory findings) and nonmedical
evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” See id.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have found she had additional mental
limitations. Dr. Robert Estock, a non-examining physician, reviewed Plaintiff’s
records and found that she had moderate difficulties in three areas of social
functioning: interacting appropriately with the general public; accepting
instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and
getting along with coworkers or peers without distracting them on exhibiting
behavioral extremes. (Tr. at 128.) The ALJ ultimately gave limited weight to Dr.
Estock’s opinion because although it was generally consistent with the evidence,
including records from Mental Health Center of Cullman, his opinion that she
would miss one to two days of work per month is unsupported. (Tr. at 25-26.)
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC determination was
erroneous because it failed to mention Dr. Estock’s specific finding that she had
moderate limitations in her ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately
to criticisms from her supervisor. However, the ALJ’s RFC finding adequately
accounted for Dr. Estock’s opinion that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in her
ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticisms from her

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supervisor because it limited Plaintiff to no more than brief, occasional supervision.
(Tr. at 22). The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s RFC finding.
IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms.

Crump’s arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be
entered.
DONE and ORDERED on September 19, 2018.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
160704

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