Keith v. Naglich et al
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER granting 7 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint filed by Nakeetsha Dryer, Robert Hunter; granting 17 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Christopher Gordy, Ruth Naglich; As stated within the co urt sua sponte STRIKES Mrs. Keith's response brief, 19 , and untimely; Further stated within the Defendants' twin motions to dismiss, 17 and 17 are GRANTED; Accordingly, all of Ms. Keith's claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Abdul K Kallon on 1/23/2018. (KBB)
FILED
2018 Jan-23 AM 10:54
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
ROSEMARY KEITH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Dwight Hammonds,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RUTH NAGLICH, ET AL.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil Action Number
5:17-cv-01437-AKK
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rosemary Keith brings this lawsuit via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of her
deceased son, Dwight Hammonds, alleging that the Defendants, individuals
employed by the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) and by MHM
Correctional Services, Inc. (MHM), a private contractor used by the ADOC to
provide mental health care to prisoners, violated her son’s rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment. Ms. Keith also brings a parasitic state law claim
under Alabama’s wrongful death statute, ALA. CODE § 6-5-410. The Defendants
have now filed two motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, docs. 7 and 17, primarily arguing that the complaint fails
to plausibly allege the existence of a constitutional violation.
1
After carefully
reviewing the parties’ briefs, docs. 7; 9; and 17,1 and the complaint, doc. 1, the
court finds that the Defendants’ motions are due to be granted.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere “‘labels and conclusions’
or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’” are insufficient. Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Id.
(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a
complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) or does not otherwise state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6),
1
The court notes that Ms. Keith filed a response to the ADOC Defendants’ motion, doc. 17, on
January 16, 2017. This filing comes over a month late, see doc. 18, and Ms. Keith did not seek
leave of court to file an out-of-time brief. This court sets deadlines, in part, to ensure that it is
able to “maintain control over its docket . . . [a] power [that] is necessary for the court to
administer effective justice and prevent congestion.” Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859,
864 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that courts have “both the authority to establish deadlines and the discretion to
enforce them”). Accordingly, the court sua sponte STRIKES Mrs. Keith’s response brief, doc.
19, as untimely.
2
the court accepts “the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d
1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016).
However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must . . . ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint states a facially
plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Id.
While the plausibility standard does not impose a
“probability requirement,” the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint must establish
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (emphasizing that the “[f]actual allegations [included in
the complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level”). Ultimately, the line between possibility and plausibility is a thin one, and
making this determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679.
II.
FACTS
Dwight Hammonds was a troubled young man with an extensive history of
mental health problems including: (1) “a history of outpatient mental health
treatment;” (2) at least one period of inpatient treatment following a suicide
3
attempt; and (3) several experiences involving repetitive suicidal ideation. Doc. 1
at 5. In 2001, Mr. Hammonds was sentenced to forty years in prison and, as part of
the ADOC prisoner intake process, underwent a psychiatric evaluation which
showed he was suffering from “a serious mental illness.”
Id. at 5–6.
The
examining psychiatrist recommended that the ADOC provide Mr. Hammonds with
medication and refer him to a counselor for further treatment. Id. at 6. While in
prison, Mr. Hammonds was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and, at
least as of May 2005, his medical records indicate that he still suffered from a
serious mental illness. Id.
In 2006, however, the ADOC adopted a new coding system for monitoring
the mental health of prisoners. Id. In April 2008, pursuant to the new mental
health criteria, Mr. Hammonds received a classification of MH-0 indicating that he
had “no need for mental-health care.” Id. While the ADOC did briefly assign a
mental health code of MH-1 to Mr. Hammonds, a classification showing a mild
psychological impairment, he was soon returned to his prior MH-0 classification.
Id. at 6–7. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Hammonds experienced any
other mental health issues until 2015 when he was placed on suicide watch for an
unspecified period of time. Id. at 7, 13. Shortly after Mr. Hammonds’ release
from suicide watch, prison officials assigned him to administrative segregation
after an incident involving a confrontation with guards in his dormitory. Id. at 7.
4
Mr. Hammonds did not receive mental health treatment or counseling before being
placed in isolation, id., and roughly a day later he committed suicide in his
segregation cell. Id. at 8. His death occurred approximately ten days after the
ADOC released him from suicide watch. Id. at 13.
III.
ARGUMENT
The four individual Defendants in this case have filed two separate motions
to dismiss. Docs. 7 and 17. The two Defendants employed by MHM, Dr. Robert
Hunter and Nakeetsha Dryer (collectively the MHM Defendants), argue that Ms.
Keith’s complaint is a “shotgun pleading” subject to summary dismissal, and that,
in any event, the complaint fails to plausibly allege that they violated Mr.
Hammonds’ constitutional rights. The other two Defendants, Christopher Gordy
and Ruth Naglich (collectively the ADOC Defendants), are employed by the
ADOC and raise a largely duplicative argument claiming qualified immunity on
the basis that Ms. Keith has failed to plausibly allege a violation of her son’s
constitutional rights. The court will address each motion separately.
A.
The MHM Defendants Motion to Dismiss
1. Ms. Keith’s Complaint is not a Shotgun Pleading
The MHM Defendants’ primary argument for dismissal is that Ms. Keith’s
complaint is a quintessential “shotgun pleading.” A shotgun pleading is typically
defined as “a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
5
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that
came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.”
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015).
These types of pleadings are generally flawed because they fail “to give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which
each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. However, dismissal based on this failing requires a
complaint so deficient that “‘it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of
fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.’” Id. at 1326 (quoting
Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir.
1996)).
While Ms. Keith’s complaint is not as clear as it might be, it does include
specific factual allegations supporting each of her claims and providing enough
substance to enable the MHM Defendants to “‘discern what [Ms. Keith] is
claiming and [to] frame a responsive pleading.’” Id. (quoting T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby
Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1544 n.14 (11th Cir. 1985) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)).
Indeed, the MHM Defendants’ motion to dismiss accurately identifies the basis for
the various claims Ms. Keith asserts against them. See Doc. 7 at 3. Moreover, the
complaint specifically identifies each of the claims it asserts along with
particularized supporting facts. This is simply not a situation where the complaint
“‘presents scores of allegations regardless of their relevance and incorporates them
6
in their entirety into several counts asserting discrete claims for relief.’” Kyle K. v.
Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000) (GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia,
132 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998)). Nor does the fact that a single claim is
asserted against multiple defendants “render the complaint [fatally] deficient.” Id.
Where, as here, a complaint consists of identifiable claims brought against specific
defendants and supported by particularized facts, the court declines to classify it as
a shotgun pleading subject to summary dismissal.
2. The Complaint Fails to Plausibly Allege that the MHM Defendants
Violated Mr. Hammonds’ Constitutional Rights
The MHM Defendants also aver that Ms. Keith failed to adequately allege
that they violated the constitution. This is a prisoner suicide case brought via §
1983 alleging the violation of Mr. Hammonds’ constitutional rights secured via the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It is by now well established that the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment also proscribes
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See, e.g., Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).2 In this circuit, an inmate at risk of committing
suicide is considered to have a serious medical need and accordingly suicide cases
are analyzed analogously to cases involving a jailer’s failure to provide needed
2
The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344–45 (1981), and this is presumably why Ms. Keith has
also asserted an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7
medical care. See Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir.
1990).
An Eighth Amendment claim asserted against an individual requires proof of
both “subjective and objective elements.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35
(1993). “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citation omitted). In a case like this
one, where the Eighth Amendment violation turns on a failure to prevent harm,
“the inmate must show that [she] is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. With respect to the subjective requirement,
the “prison official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’” i.e. the
prison official must be deliberately indifferent “to inmate health or safety.” Id.
(citation omitted).
In other words, to prevail on her Eighth Amendment claim
“‘[Ms. Keith] must show that the jail official displayed deliberate indifference to
[Mr. Hammonds’] taking of his own life.’” Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1353
(11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274–75 (11th Cir.
1989)). Deliberate indifference requires “‘(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of
serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere
negligence.’” Id. (quoting McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.
1999)).
8
In the context of prison suicide, this standard requires the defendant to
“deliberately disregard ‘a strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility that the
self-infliction of harm will occur.’” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of
Monroe Cty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cagle v. Sutherland,
334 F.3d 980, 986 (11th Cir. 2003)). Critically, such a finding “requires that
officials have notice of the suicidal tendency of the individual whose rights are at
issue.” Tittle v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994). The
key question then is not whether the defendant was indifferent “to suicidal inmates
or suicide indicators generally, but rather it ‘is a question of whether a defendant
was deliberately indifferent to an individual’s mental condition and the likely
consequences of that condition.’” Cook, 402 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Tittle, 10 F.3d
at 1539). “Proof of deliberate indifference requires a great deal more than does
proof of negligence . . . ‘the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.’” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., 400 F.3d
1313, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2005)). Thus, a deliberate indifference claim, in the
context of prison suicide, depends specifically on “the level of knowledge
possessed by the officials involved, or that which should have been known as to an
inmate’s suicidal tendencies.” Popham, 908 F.2d at 1564.
9
In this regard, the complaint articulates two primary theories of liability
against the MHM Defendants: (1) that they took Mr. Hammonds off of the
ADOC’s mental health caseload despite his serious mental illness depriving him of
necessary treatment; and (2) that they improperly discharged Mr. Hammonds from
suicide watch and failed to adequately follow-up with him even after he was placed
in administrative segregation. Doc. 1 at 3–5, 14–16. The court can easily dispose
of Ms. Keith’s first theory because, as mentioned, a finding of deliberate
indifference requires a prison official to disregard “a strong likelihood rather than a
mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will occur.” Cook, 402 F.3d at
1115 (quotation omitted). Here, the MHM Defendants allegedly removed Mr.
Hammonds from the mental health caseload sometime around 2008, roughly six
years after he initially began receiving treatment from the ADOC. Doc. 1 at 5–6.
During this six year period, there are no allegations that Mr. Hammonds ever
threatened or attempted suicide. Nor does the complaint assert that the ADOC
considered Mr. Hammonds a suicide risk prior to August 2015, almost eight years
after he had stopped receiving mental health care.
The Eleventh Circuit has
explained “[n]o matter how defendants’ actions might be viewed, the law in this
circuit makes clear that they cannot be liable under § 1983 for the suicide of a
prisoner who never had threatened or attempted suicide and who had never been
considered a suicide risk.” Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1540 (quotations omitted).
10
While the complaint does allege that Mr. Hammonds disclosed his earlier
suicide attempts to ADOC officials, doc. 1 at 5, 13, these prior suicide attempts are
simply too attenuated to indicate that Mr. Hammonds’ removal from the mental
health caseload over six years later created the “strong likelihood” of self-harm
necessary to show deliberate indifference. And, the complaint is entirely bereft of
specific allegations related to the decision to remove Mr. Hammonds from the
mental health case load or, more broadly, to the inadequacy of the psychiatric
treatment Mr. Hammonds received.
Instead, the complaint contains myriad
allegations bearing on systemic issues with the ADOC’s procedures for classifying
and treating mental ill inmates. Id. at 8–10. These allegations, as deeply troubling
as they are, fail to demonstrate that Mr. Hammonds was personally exposed to a
“strong likelihood” of self-harm based on his removal from the ADOC’s mental
health caseload. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that the proper
inquiry under these circumstances is whether a prison official was “deliberately
indifferent to an individual’s mental condition and the likely consequences of that
condition.” Cook, 402 F.3d at 1117 (quotation omitted). As such, none of the
generalized factual allegations attacking the overall level of mental health care
provided by the ADOC have any bearing on the adequacy of the medical decisions
related to the removal of Mr. Hammonds from the mental health caseload in 2008.
11
Ms. Keith’s second theory of liability predicated on the decision to release
Mr. Hammonds from suicide watch and the failure to provide follow-up care
afterwards presents a much thornier question. While it is clear that, by this time,
Mr. Hammonds presented a strong likelihood of self-harm, the complaint lacks the
necessary allegations to establish the MHM Defendants’ subjective knowledge of
that risk. See Jackson, 787 F.3d at 1353. The complaint does generally allege that
the MHM Defendants had responsibility for providing care to Mr. Hammonds,
doc. 1 at 3–4, but it fails to indicate that they were either personally involved in the
provision of that care or had any knowledge of Mr. Hammonds’ medical condition
at all. Unfortunately for Ms. Keith, the case law in this area is clear: “the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332 (quotation omitted). The complaint simply does not
provide the requisite facts to allow this court to infer that the MHM Defendants
were aware that Mr. Hammonds was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm
when he was released from suicide watch or when he failed to receive any followup care before being placed in segregation.
Again, the complaint seeks to avoid the import of the lack of specific
information linking the MHM Defendants to Mr. Hammonds’ treatment by
alleging that the MHM Defendants were aware of the purported systemic failures
12
of the ADOC to provide constitutionally adequate mental health care to prisoners.
Doc. 1 at 8–10, 11–16. But these allegations do nothing to establish the subjective
awareness of a risk of serious harm to Mr. Hammonds that is legally required to
state a deliberate indifference claim against an individual. In short, the complaint
provides no basis for the court to conclude that the MHM Defendants had actual
“notice of the suicidal tendency of the individual whose rights are at issue [i.e. Mr.
Hammond].” Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1539. Absent such notice, or at this stage, wellpleaded factual allegations allowing the court to draw the plausible inference of the
existence of such notice on the part of the MHM Defendants, the court cannot say
that Ms. Keith has adequately alleged the existence of a constitutional violation.3
Therefore, because the complaint does not contain a single factual allegation
bearing on the MHM Defendants’ subjective knowledge of Mr. Hammonds’
suicidal tendencies or of any other factor bearing on the treatment Mr. Hammonds
received at Limestone, Ms. Keith’s constitutional claims against the MHM
Defendants are due to be dismissed.4
3
The complaint does contain allegations regarding the MHM Defendants’ subjective awareness
of the risks Mr. Hammonds was allegedly exposed to during his incarceration. See Doc. 1 at 13.
However, the repeated allegations that the MHM Defendants “were deliberately indifferent,” id.,
or that they “subjectively knew of, and disregarded, the risk,” id., are mere legal conclusions and
not entitled to an assumption of truth. See Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 738 F.3d 1246,
1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that these types of statements are “conclusory legal
allegations” that “carry no weight”).
4
Ms. Keith also filed claims against fictitious MHM employees. However, consistent with the
general rule that fictitious party practice is not allowed in federal court, see Richardson v.
13
3. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Ms.
Keith’s State Law Claims
The complaint also alleges a state law claim for wrongful death under ALA.
CODE § 6-5-410 against the MHM Defendants. There is no question that when a
constitutional violation “actually causes the injured party’s death, a § 1983 claim
can be asserted through the Alabama wrongful death statute.” Estate of Gilliam ex
rel. Waldroup v. City of Prattville, 639 F.3d 1041, 1047 (11th Cir. 2011).
However, as discussed above, Ms. Keith’s complaint has failed to adequately
allege a constitutional violation. Accordingly, her attempt to bring that claim via
the Alabama wrongful death statute fails for the same reasons outlined previously.
In the alternative, Ms. Keith asserts a state law negligence claim for
wrongful death against the MHM Defendants. However, in light of this court’s
decision to dismiss Ms. Keith’s § 1983 claims against both sets of Defendants in
this case, only her state law negligence claims remain in the action. As a general
matter, “[i]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,
[they also] have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims . . . [forming] part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.”
28 U.S.C. §1367(a).
However, after “the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it may decline to
Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010), the claims against these unnamed defendants are
also dismissed without prejudice.
14
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining claims.
28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Therefore, because the resolution of Ms. Keith’s remaining claims
depends exclusively on questions of state law, and the Eleventh Circuit has
instructed that “[s]tate courts, not federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state
law,” Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir.
1997), the court dismisses Ms. Keith’s negligence claim brought pursuant to ALA.
CODE § 6-5-410 without prejudice. See Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352
(11th Cir. 1999) (explaining if state-law claims are dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds “they should be dismissed without prejudice so that the claims may be
refiled in the appropriate state court”).
B. THE ADOC DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS5
1. The ADOC Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
The ADOC Defendants primarily rely on the doctrine of qualified immunity
in support of their motion. Qualified immunity reflects both “the need to hold
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need
to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform
their duties reasonably.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Accordingly, “government officials performing discretionary functions are
5
The primary thrust of the ADOC Defendants’ qualified immunity argument is that Ms. Keith
has failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation against them in their individual capacities.
Because this argument essentially duplicates the ADOC Defendants’ argument that the
complaint fails to state a plausible claim, the qualified immunity analysis described here applies
equally to that argument.
15
immune not just from liability, but from suit, unless the conduct which is the basis
for [the] suit violates clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Sanders v. Howze, 177 F.3d 1245,
1249 (11th Cir. 1999).
“‘[A]ll but the plainly incompetent or one who is
knowingly violating the federal law’” are entitled to the protection of qualified
immunity.
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Qualified
immunity, however, “does not extend to one who knew or reasonably should have
known that his or her actions would violate the plaintiff’s federal rights.” Gaines
v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2017).
As a threshold matter, a public official must have acted within the scope of
her discretionary authority to invoke qualified immunity. Jones v. Fransen, 857
F.3d 843, 851 (11th Cir. 2017). Here, Ms. Keith does not contest that the ADOC
Defendants were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority when they
set and implemented the policies governing administrative segregation and mental
health classification and treatment at Limestone prison. Accordingly, the court
finds that the ADOC Defendants have satisfied the required threshold showing for
their qualified immunity request, and that Ms. Keith bears the burden of showing
“‘that qualified immunity is not appropriate.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,
1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194).
16
To make this showing, “[Ms. Keith] must demonstrate . . . the following two
things: (1) that the defendant violated her constitutional rights, and (2) that, at the
time of the violation, those rights were ‘clearly established . . . in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Gaines, 871 F.3d
at 1208 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled, in part, on
other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). The court “may
decide these issues in either order, but, to survive a qualified-immunity defense,
[the plaintiff] must satisfy both showings.” Jones, 857 F.3d at 851. Because the
court finds that Ms. Keith’s complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation
under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, it does not address whether Mr.
Hammonds’ constitutional rights were clearly established.6
6
Although the primary thrust of the ADOC Defendants’ argument focuses on whether Ms.
Keith’s complaint plausibly alleges a constitutional violation, they argue very briefly that the law
with respect to their alleged actions in this case is not clearly established. The court disagrees.
“Federal and state governments . . . have a constitutional obligation to provide minimally
adequate medical care to those whom they are punishing by incarceration.” Harris v. Thigpen,
941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991). This obligation extends to the provision of psychiatric
care to incarcerated individuals. See Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that “providing an inmate with inadequate psychiatric care could violate the inmate’s
eighth amendment right”). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has “repeatedly found that ‘an
official acts with deliberate indifference when he or she knows that an inmate is in serious need
of medical care, but he fails or refuses to obtain medical treatment for the inmate.’” McElligott,
182 F.3d at 1256 (citation omitted). Indeed, in the context of prisoner suicide cases a showing
that a “jail official displayed ‘deliberate indifference’ to the prisoner’s taking of his own life’”
violates the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Cook, 402 F.3d at 1115 (citation
omitted).
17
a. The complaint fails to plausibly allege that the ADOC Defendants
violated the constitution
Before discussing liability in a § 1983 suit “it is necessary to isolate the
precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged.” Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S 137, 140 (1979). This is a prisoner suicide case alleging the
violation of Mr. Hammonds’ constitutional rights secured via the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments and accordingly “‘[Ms. Keith] must show that the jail
official displayed deliberate indifference to [Mr. Hammonds’] taking of his own
life.’” Jackson, 787 F.3d at 1353 (citation omitted).
Moreover, where, as here, the plaintiff uses § 1983 to assert constitutional
tort claims against supervisory officials, it is well settled that principles of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability do not apply. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d
1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Instead, supervisory liability arises only when “the
supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when
there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the
alleged constitutional deprivation.”
Id.
Among other methods, a causal
connection may be “established by facts which support an inference that the
supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the
subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.”
Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003). The requisite causal
connection may also be established when “‘a history of widespread abuse puts the
18
responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and
[she] fails to do so.’” Keith v. DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360). The widespread abuse necessary to “notify
the supervising official [of the need for corrective action] must be obvious,
flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.”
Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990). In this circuit “‘[t]he
standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual capacity for the
actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.’” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234
(quoting Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir.
1998)).
Here, the ADOC Defendants primarily argue that Ms. Keith has failed to
allege, as she must, a causal connection between their actions and Mr. Hammonds’
suicide.
A review of the complaint shows that it alleges that the ADOC
Defendants were indifferent toward a broad class of inmates, those with mentalhealth issues, and that, as part of that class, Mr. Hammonds individually suffered
constitutional harm. See Doc. 1 at 8–10. However, in the Eleventh Circuit,
indifference to a class of suicidal inmates does not subject an official to
supervisory liability for the suicide of a particular class member. See Cook, 402
F.3d at 1117 (holding that even a finding that an official was deliberately
indifferent “toward suicidal inmates in general” is insufficient to impose § 1983
19
liability for the failure to prevent a particular suicide).
Instead, the named
defendants must have had “‘subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm’ . . .
‘[to] the individual whose rights are at issue in order to be held liable for the
suicide of that individual.’” Cook, 402 F.3d at 1116–17 (citations omitted). The
court will address Ms. Keith’s claims for supervisory liability against each named
ADOC Defendant in turn.
i. ADOC Defendant Gordy is entitled to qualified immunity
With respect to the claims against Gordy, the Warden of Limestone prison,
the complaint alleges that Gordy knew that Limestone’s segregation cells were not
suicide proof, and, more broadly, that he was aware of the rising suicide rate
among inmates in ADOC custody. Doc. 1 at 18–19. However, with regard to
Gordy’s alleged failure to provide safe segregation cells for mentally ill inmates,
“the mere opportunity for suicide, without more, is clearly insufficient to impose
liability on those charged with the care of prisoners.” Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1540.
Similarly, Gordy’s awareness of the systemic inadequacy of the ADOC’s mental
health policies does not translate into actual knowledge of the specific risk of harm
Mr. Hammonds was exposed to at Limestone. Instead, the “defendant [must have
been] deliberately indifferent to an individual’s mental condition and the likely
consequences of that condition.” Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1539. For that reason, the
Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly found that “[a]bsent knowledge of a detainee’s
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suicidal tendencies, the cases have consistently held that failure to prevent suicide .
. . [does not] constitute deliberate indifference.”
Popham, 908 F.2d at 1564.
“Deliberate indifference requires more than constructive knowledge.” Franklin v.
Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2013).
The complaint simply does not allege that Gordy had any direct
involvement with Mr. Hammonds or was otherwise aware that Mr. Hammonds was
a suicide risk. Indeed, the court lacks a basis to conclude that Gordy even knew
that Mr. Hammond was incarcerated at Limestone let alone that Gordy had
sufficient knowledge of Mr. Hammonds’ mental health issues to infer that Mr.
Hammonds’ placement in administrative segregation created “‘a strong likelihood,
rather than a mere possibility’” of suicide.
omitted).
Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1540 (citation
In the absence of any allegations establishing Gordy’s subjective
awareness of the suicide risk posed by placing Mr. Hammonds in administrative
segregation, the court concludes that Gordy’s conduct did not violate the
constitution and that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
ii. ADOC Defendant Naglich is entitled to qualified immunity
Ms. Keith’s supervisory liability claim against Ruth Naglich, the Associate
Commissioner of Health Services for the ADOC, presents a more difficult
question.
Naglich was responsible for, among other things, “supervising the
provision of adequate mental health care for prisoners in ADOC custody.” Doc. 1
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at 20.
As part of these responsibilities, Naglich supervised the MHM staff
members providing psychiatric care to inmates, including those inmates classified
as suicide risks. Id. at 20–21. The complaint also alleges the existence of serious
deficiencies in the ADOC’s treatment of mentally ill prisoners including the failure
to: (1) identify and properly treat inmates with serious mental illnesses; (2)
properly evaluate inmates being released from suicide watch; (3) provide necessary
follow-up care to inmates after they are released from suicide watch; and (4)
provide mentally ill inmates placed in segregation with appropriate treatment or
with safe cell conditions. Id. at 8–10, 21–24. The complaint further avers that
Naglich was aware of these systemic issues, but failed to take any corrective action
to alleviate the risk of serious harm her policies imposed on suicidal inmates. Id.at
19–24.
As damning as these allegations are, they are inadequate, under Eleventh
Circuit precedent, to establish that Naglich was deliberately indifferent toward Mr.
Hammonds. As discussed above, “[d]eliberate indifference, in the jail suicide
context, is not a question of the defendant’s indifference to suicidal inmates or
suicide indicators generally, but rather it ‘is a question of whether a defendant was
deliberately indifferent to an individual’s mental condition and the likely
consequences of that condition.’” Cook, 402 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Tittle, 10 F.3d
at 1539). In other words, “the defendant must have had ‘notice of the suicidal
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tendency of the individual whose rights are at issue in order to be held liable for
the suicide of that individual.’” Id. (quoting Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1539). As the
Eleventh Circuit explained in Cook, indifference toward a class of suicidal inmates
is not enough to demonstrate the foreseeability of a particular individual’s suicide,
and it is the latter question that is dispositive in the context of a suit against an
individual for money damages under § 1983. Id. at 1116 (explaining that because
there is no respondeat superior under § 1983 the defendant herself must have had
“subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm”).
Ms. Keith has not alleged that Naglich had subjective knowledge of Mr.
Hammonds’ mental condition such that she subjectively knew he was ever exposed
to a risk of serious harm. To establish that an official was deliberately indifferent
to a risk of harm, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists . . . he must
also draw the inference.” Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332 (quotation omitted). Just as
with Gordy, the complaint fails to plausibly establish that Naglich was subjectively
aware of the suicide risk posed by Mr. Hammonds.
Accordingly the court
concludes that Naglich’s conduct, as reprehensible as it purportedly was, did not
violate the Constitution, at least with regard to Mr. Hammonds’ suicide, and that
she is also entitled to qualified immunity.
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2. The Court Declines Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Ms. Keith’s State
Law Claims Against the ADOC Defendants
The ADOC Defendants also argue that Ms. Keith’s wrongful death claims
brought against them pursuant to ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 are due to be dismissed
based on State Agent Immunity.
The court need not address this argument
because, for the same reasons discussed above, see supra pp. 14–15, the court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Keith’s state law
negligence claims asserted against the ADOC Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Accordingly, these claims are also dismissed without prejudice.
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons outlined above, the Defendants’ twin motions to dismiss,
docs. 7 and 17, are GRANTED. Accordingly, all of Ms. Keith’s claims are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
DONE the 23rd day of January, 2018.
_________________________________
ABDUL K. KALLON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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