Stone v. Stone et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER DISMISSING CASE that this complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice as more fully set out in order. Signed by Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr on 7/10/2018. (AHI)
2018 Jul-10 PM 01:54
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
VINCENT WILLIAM STONE, JR.,
VINCENT WILLIAM STONE, SR.; )
Civil Action No. 5:18-cv-867-CLS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Vincent William Stone, Jr., who variously represents himself as a resident of
Indialantic, Florida, and, Huntsville, Alabama,1 filed a complaint in this court on June
5, 2018. His pleading asserts claims against: Vincent William Stone, Sr.;2 three
branches of the Wells Fargo Bank located in Florida, Alabama, and Illinois;3 the San
Mateo, California Branch of the Chase Bank;4 the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation;5 the Blackstone Group LP; Kristine Marie Stone; Warren Buffet; and
Compare doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ I.A. (stating that plaintiff’s residence is 1345 North
Highway A1a, Apt. # 604, Indialantic, Brevard County, Fla. 32903) with id., ¶ V. (stating that
plaintiff’s mailing address is P.O. Box 193, Huntsville, Ala. 35804) and doc. no. 3 (In Forma
Pauperis Affidavit), ¶ 1 (stating plaintiff’s mailing address as P.O. Box 193, Huntsville, Ala. 35804).
The address alleged for Vincent William Stone, Sr., is is identical to that of the plaintiff,
except for the Apartment number: i.e., 1345 North Highway A1a, Apt. # 401, Indialantic, Brevard
County, Florida 32903. See doc. no. 1 (Complaint), ¶ I.B., at 2 (“Defendant No. 1”).
Id. (Defendants No. 2, 3, and 4).
Id. (Defendant No. 5).
Id., Ex. A (Defendant No. 6).
Over the course of six pages of rambling assertions, plaintiff alleges vague
claims pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of
1970 (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.7
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which
was granted by U.S. Magistrate Judge Herman N. Johnson.8 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915
states that a district court may authorize a person to commence a civil action without
prepayment of fees, provided the plaintiff “submits an affidavit that includes a
statement of all assets such [person] possesses [and avers] that the person is unable
to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (alterations
supplied). Even so, the statute goes on to provide that
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that:
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
Id. (Defendants No. 7 – 10).
Id., Exhibits B, D [sic, “C” is skipped], and E.
See doc. nos. 3 (In Forma Pauperis Affidavit) and 4 (Order).
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim can be described as “frivolous” when a
reviewing court determines that it lacks “arguable merit either in law or fact.”
Thomas v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union, 393 F. App’x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010).
Binding precedent also provides that a district court retains discretion to dismiss a
complaint “when it appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success,’” meaning
that review of the complaint reveals “the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or
. . . the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392,
393 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), subsequently recodified as 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) (i.e., a claim that “is frivolous or malicious”)).
Of course, courts hold complaints authored by pro se litigants to a less
stringent standard, and construe them more liberally than pleadings drafted by
attorneys. See, e.g., Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006).
Nevertheless, a pro se litigant’s complaint still “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). All litigants,
regardless of whether they are proceeding with the aid of counsel or pro se, must
assert “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not” suffice. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007). Furthermore, even though a district court must interpret the pleadings
of pro se litigants more liberally than those drafted by counsel, it “may not serve as
de facto counsel for a party . . . or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to
sustain an action.” Ausar-El ex. rel. Small, Jr. v. BAC (Bank of America) Home
Loans Servicing LP, 448 F. App’x 1, 2 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and
After reviewing the complaint filed by Vincent William Stone, Jr., in
accordance with the foregoing principles, this court concludes, for the reasons set out
below, that his complaint is frivolous, and, that it fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).
Plaintiff’s complaint consists of a number of rambling, fantastical allegations.
For example, he alleges that he is not the biological son of the man whose name he
bears (i.e., Vincent William Stone, Senior), but that he is, instead, “the biological son
of the assassinated 35th Present of the United States of America, John Fitzgerald
Kennedy.” Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), Appendix D, 5th paragraph. Plaintiff also asserts
that he is a victim of multiple shootings and kidnappings, but he received cash and
diamonds as compensation for his injuries. Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the
current Chief Executive Officer of Chase Bank was one of the shooters who injured
him when he was six years old. Plaintiff details how his putative father willfully
participated in his kidnappings as a child, how the individual defendants are allegedly
conspiring to steal and control his assets, and how the bank defendants are willfully
assisting the individual defendants in stealing his assets.
Plaintiff has advanced no facts in support of the allegations of his complaint,
other than conclusory, disjointed statements and documents that fail to bolster his
claims. At best, plaintiff’s claims are fantastical and frivolous, and 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e)(2)(B)(i) precludes him from proceeding with this action.
Even if the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint were not frivolous, the pleading
still fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A liberal reading of the
complaint fails to reveal any facts that suggest, let alone demonstrate, that any of the
named defendants deprived plaintiff of a federal right, or engaged in a conspiracy
actionable under the RICO Act. The complaint lacks any facts that would allow the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants are liable to plaintiff.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, this court also finds that the plaintiff has also
failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. §
In accordance with the foregoing discussion, it is ORDERED that the
complaint in this case be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED without prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of July, 2018.
United States District Judge
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