Kumi v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION: The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Judge Liles C Burke on 3/27/2024. (AHI)

FILED
2024 Mar-27 PM 01:20
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
FREDERICK KUMI,
Plaintiff,
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
COMMISSIONER,
Defendant.

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Case No. 5:22-cv-01430-LCB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Frederick Kumi seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
of an adverse, final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner”), regarding his claim for disability and disability
insurance benefits. The Court carefully considered the record, and for the reasons
expressed herein, AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
To qualify for benefits, the claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social
Security Act and the Regulations promulgated under it. The Regulations define
“disabled” as the “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement
to disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or mental
impairment” which “results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
In determining whether a claimant suffers a disability, the Commissioner,
through an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), works through a five-step evaluation
process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The burden rests on the claimant at the
first four steps of this five-step process; the burden then shifts to the Commissioner
at step five, if the evaluation proceeds that far. Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
906 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018).
In the first step, the claimant cannot be currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant must prove the
impairment is “severe” in that it “significantly limits [the] physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities . . . .” Id. at § 404.1520(c).
At step three, the evaluator must conclude the claimant is disabled if the
impairments meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, App. 1, §§ 1.00-114.02. Id. at § 404.1520(d). If a claimant’s
impairment meets the applicable criteria at this step, that claimant’s impairment
would prevent any person from performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§
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404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1525. That is, a claimant who satisfies steps one and two
qualifies automatically for disability benefits if the claimant suffers a listed
impairment. See Williams v. Astrue, 416 F. App’x 861, 862 (11th Cir. 2011) (“If, at
the third step, [the claimant] proves that [an] impairment or combination of
impairments meets or equals a listed impairment, [the claimant] is automatically
found disabled regardless of age, education, or work experience.” (citing 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920; Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997))).
If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step,
where the claimant demonstrates an incapacity to meet the physical and mental
demands of past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). At this step, the evaluator
must determine whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to perform the requirements of past relevant work. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If
the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent
performance of past relevant work, the evaluator will determine the claimant is not
disabled. See id.
If the claimant succeeds at the preceding step, the fifth step shifts the burden
to the Commissioner to provide evidence, considering the claimant’s RFC, age,
education and past work experience, that the claimant is capable of performing other
work. Id. §§ 404.1512(b)(3), 404.1520(g). If the claimant can perform other work,
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the evaluator will not find the claimant disabled. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); see
also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the claimant cannot perform other work, the
evaluator will find the claimant disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

404.1520(g).
The Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal
standards. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Court reviews the ALJ’s “‘decision with deference to the factual findings and
close scrutiny of the legal conclusions.’” Parks ex rel. D.P. v. Comm’r, Social Sec.
Admin., 783 F.3d 847, 850 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d
1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991)). Indeed, “an ALJ’s factual findings . . . ‘shall be
conclusive’ if supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.
1148, 1153 (2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Although the Court must “scrutinize
the record as a whole . . . to determine if the decision reached is reasonable . . . and
supported by substantial evidence,” the Court “may not decide the facts anew,
reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment” for that of the ALJ. Bloodsworth
v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). “[W]hatever
the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary
sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence . . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ . .
. [and] means – and means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
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accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (citations
omitted). Therefore, substantial evidence exists even if the evidence preponderates
against the Commissioner’s decision. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th
Cir. 2005).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kumi filed an application for disability and disability insurance benefits on
June 24, 2021, alleging disability as of June 15, 2020. (Tr. 293-304). Kumi’s claim
was denied initially on December 17, 2021, and upon reconsideration on March 25,
2022. (Tr. 179-183, 192-201). Thereafter, Kumi filed a written request for a hearing
on March 31, 2022. (Tr. 208). An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a
telephone hearing on July 12, 2022. (Tr. 254).
The ALJ issued an opinion on August 12, 2022, denying Kumi’s claims. (Tr.
16-30). Applying the five-step sequential process, the ALJ found at step one that
Kumi did not engage in substantial gainful activity since June 15, 2021, the alleged
onset date. (Tr. 21). At step two, the ALJ found Kumi manifested the severe
impairments of cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, posttraumatic stress
disorder, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. (Id.). At step
three, the ALJ found Kumi’s impairments, or combination of impairments, did not
meet or medically equal any impairment for presumptive disability listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 23).
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At step four, the ALJ found Kumi exhibited the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work with the following exceptions:
he requires the option to sit for 30 minutes after every 30 minutes of
standing; he can never climb ladders or scaffolds; he can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, balance as that term is defined by the Selected
Characteristics of Occupations in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(DOT), stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; he can never work around
hazards such as unprotected moving mechanical parts and unprotected
heights; he can only perform simple tasks; he can only respond to
occasional changes in a routine work setting; and he is limited to
occasional interaction with the public and coworkers in work situations.
(Tr. 23).
In addition, the ALJ determined Kumi could not perform past relevant work.
(Tr. 28). At step five, the ALJ determined Kumi could perform a significant number
of jobs in the national economy considering his age, education, work experience,
and RFC. (Tr. 29). Accordingly, the ALJ determined Kumi has not suffered a
disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, since June 15, 2021. (Tr. 30).
Kumi requested review of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 278). On September 9,
2022, the Appeals Council denied review, which deems the ALJ’s decision as the
Commissioner’s final decision. (Tr. 1-6); see Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Hum.
Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (“When the Appeals Council denies
review, the decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the Secretary.” (citing
20 C.F.R. § 404.955)). On November 9, 2022, Kumi filed his complaint with the
Court seeking review of the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 1).
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ANALYSIS
In this appeal, Kumi argues the ALJ failed to properly apply the pain standard
and that his decision is not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 11 at 5). For
the reasons discussed below, the Court disagrees.
As previously discussed, at step four of the sequential analysis the ALJ
formulates a claimant’s RFC by assessing his or her “ability to meet the physical,
mental, sensory, and other requirements of work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(4). The
claimant’s RFC represents “the most [he or she] can still do despite [their]
limitations.” Id. at § 404.1545(a)(1). Assessing a claimant’s RFC lies within the
exclusive province of the ALJ.

See id. at § 404.1527(d)(2) (“[T]he final

responsibility for deciding [a claimant’s RFC] is reserved to the Commissioner.”);
id. at § 404.1546(c) (“[T]he administrative law judge . . . is responsible for assessing
[a claimant’s] residual functional capacity.”); Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r,
987 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c)) (“The
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration has, at the hearing level,
delegated to an administrative law judge the responsibility of determining a
claimant’s residual functional capacity and whether the claimant is disabled.”);
Oates v. Berryhill, No. 17-0130-MU, 2018 WL 1579475, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 30,
2018) (“The responsibility for making the residual functional capacity determination
rests with the ALJ.”).
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Here, Kumi argues his self-described limitations contradict the ALJ’s finding
that he retained the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light
work:
Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even
though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when
it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves
sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg
controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range
of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these
activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he or she
can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors
such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
(Doc. 11 at 5); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
Specifically, during the hearing, Kumi claimed he stopped working in June
2021 because he was having back and knee pain, and suffered from anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 42). His symptoms also included lack of concentration
and irritability. (Tr. 45). As for his abilities, Kumi stated that he can sit and stand for
about 15 minutes, and walk about half a block. (Tr. 48). In terms of treatment, he
proclaimed his prescription medication does not help with his pain. (Id.). In essence,
Kumi argues that his testimony and subjective complaints of pain render him
disabled.
A three-part “pain standard” applies when a claimant attempts to
establish disability through her own testimony of pain or other
subjective symptoms. [Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th
Cir. 2002)]. The pain standard requires evidence of an underlying
medical condition and either objective medical evidence that confirms
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the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or a showing
that the objectively determined medical condition is of such severity
that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Id.
Porto v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 851 F. App’x 142, 148 (11th Cir. 2021).
A claimant’s testimony coupled with evidence that meets this standard suffice “to
support a finding of disability.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.
1991) (citation omitted); see also Hollingsworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 846 F.
App’x 749, 752 (11th Cir. 2021).
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p eliminates the use of the term
“credibility” as it relates to assessing the claimant’s complaints of pain and clarifies
that the ALJ “will consider any personal observations of the individual in terms of
how consistent those observations are with the individual’s statements about his or
her symptoms as well as with all of the evidence in the file.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL
5180304, *7 (Oct. 25, 2017). An ALJ rendering findings regarding a claimant’s
subjective symptoms may consider a variety of factors, including: the claimant’s
daily activities; symptom location, duration, frequency, and intensity; precipitating
and aggravating factors; type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication
taken to alleviate the symptoms; and other factors concerning functional limitations
and restrictions due to symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), (4).
SSR 16-3p further explains that the ALJ’s decision “must contain specific
reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and
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supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any
subsequent review can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s
symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, *10; see also Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225
(If an ALJ discredits a claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ “must articulate
explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.”).
Applying the pain standard, the ALJ concluded Kumi’s “medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms,” but he nonetheless found Kumi’s “statements concerning the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with
the medical evidence and other evidence in the record . . . .” (Tr. 25-26). The ALJ
considered Kumi’s objective imaging and testing, physical and mental examinations,
course of treatments, and prior administrative findings. (Tr. 24-28).
In response, Kumi argues that the ALJ’s findings are based upon a
mischaracterization and incomplete review of the medical record. (Doc. 11 at 8).
However, the record does not support that assertion. Looking at Kumi’s first
argument, he states the “ALJ’s determination that the objective testing does not
support [his] allegations of debilitating pain and limitation is not supported by
substantial evidence,” because while the “ALJ acknowledged the various x-rays and
MRI’s of [his] lumbar and cervical spine,” the ALJ “did not properly consider the
significant findings of those diagnostic tests.” (Id.).
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The ALJ discussed various x-rays and MRIs that showed Kumi suffered from
“mild degenerative disc disease and facet arthrosis,” “disc protrusion,” “disc
osteophyte with mild to moderate compromise,” “mild . . . right paramedian
posterior disc protrusion,” “mild multilevel degenerative disc disease,” and “small
osteophytes.” (Tr. 26). However, Kumi’s electromyography and nerve conduction
studies contained “basically normal” results and showed “no significant narrowing,
sclerosis, or erosions.” In the aggregate, the ALJ found the objective imaging and
testing record to be “mostly mild.” (Id.).
Kumi essentially disagrees with how the ALJ weighed the objective imaging
and testing record, restates and emphasis the evidence that the ALJ already
discussed, and asks the Court to inappropriately reweigh the evidence. Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (“This limited review precludes
deciding the facts anew, making credibility determinations, or re-weighing the
evidence.”). Moreover, the issue before the Court is not whether the evidence might
support Hightower’s allegations but whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
RFC finding. See Sims v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 706 F. App’x 595, 604 (11th Cir.
2017) (“Under a substantial evidence standard of review, [the claimant] must do
more than point to evidence in the record that supports her position; she must show
the absence of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the record substantially supports the ALJ’s RFC
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finding.
Next, Kumi contends the ALJ erred in analyzing his physical and mental
examinations by overlooking, mischaracterizing, and isolating the record. (Doc. 11
at 9, 15). Specifically, Kumi states the “ALJ’s description and analysis of [his]
various physical examinations illustrate [the ALJ’s] selective treatment of the
evidence in this case.” (Id. at 9). In addition, Kumi avers that the ALJ relied upon
isolated mental examination treatment notes to support his rationale. (Id. at 15).
Indeed, Eleventh Circuit precedent does not tolerate “cherry picking” evidence. See
McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986) (“It is not enough to
discover a piece of evidence which supports [a] decision, but to disregard other
contrary evidence,” and a decision is not supported where it was reached “by
focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring other parts of the record”);
Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An ALJ has the obligation to
consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherry-pick facts that
support a finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability
finding.”). However, the ALJ noted that Kumi’s physical examinations did contain
abnormalities but found that the abnormalities did not support a finding for disability
because the abnormalities “fluctuated or were longstanding and present when the
claimant was working at a very heavy exertional level.” (Tr. 26). Similarly, the ALJ
also discussed how Kumi’s psychologist observed how he had an anxious mood,
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congruent affect, and passive suicidal ideation at specific times, but that Kumi
otherwise had mostly normal mental status examination findings. (Tr. 27-28).
Ultimately, the ALJ discussed how Kumi’s objective mental and physical
examinations revealed some limitations but did not support the degree of limitations
he alleged. For this Court to find otherwise, it would have to provide greater weight
to Kumi’s evidence. The Court, however, accords deference to the ALJ’s factual
findings, and “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute
[its] judgment” for that of the ALJ. Winschel v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 631 F.3d
1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).
In an effort to save his argument, Kumi points out evidence that the ALJ did
not mention in his finding. (Doc. 10-11). Yet, “[s]o long as the ALJ’s decision
demonstrates to the reviewing court that it considered the claimant’s medical
condition as a whole, the ALJ is not required to cite every piece of evidence in the
record.” Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1326 (11th Cir.
2021) (citing Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)).
Nothing in the ALJ’s decision supports that he did not consider the whole record.
(Tr. 20 (“After careful consideration of all the evidence, the undersigned concludes
the claimant has not been under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security
Act from June 15, 2021, through the date of this decision.” (emphasis added))).
Furthermore, the evidence that Kumi points out does not render a different
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conclusion because the record as a whole provides substantial evidentiary support
for the ALJ’s RFC finding. (Tr. 26-28).
Similarly, Kumi makes the same argument as to his course of treatment. (Doc.
11 at 11). That is, the “ALJ’s description of his treatment as conservative and
effective is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.). But like the flaws of his
earlier arguments, the ALJ points to substantial evidence in the record to support his
decision. (Tr. 27). And although some evidence could support a different finding,
the relevant inquiry is not whether some evidence might support greater limitations,
but whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. See Sims, 706 F.
App’x at 604.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
The court will enter a separate final judgment.
DONE and ORDERED this March 27, 2024.

_________________________________
LILES C. BURKE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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