Chandler v. Stakeholder Payroll Services LLC et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION: The court will GRANT Defendant's motion 5 and ORDERS Chandler to file an amended complaint that complaint with the civil rules and this opinion by September 20, 2024. Defendants shall respond to Chandler's amended complaint on or before October 11, 2024. Signed by Judge Corey L Maze on 9/3/2024. (LCB)

FILED
2024 Sep-03 PM 03:42
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
ANITA CHANDLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 5:23-cv-1101-CLM

STAKEHOLDER PAYROLL
SERVICES LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Anita Chandler alleges that she was fired from her job as a facility
administrator at a nursing facility for seeking medical leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). So she sues her employer
Stakeholder Payroll Services LLC (“Stakeholder”) and the nursing facility
LP Huntsville LLC d/b/a Signature Healthcare of Whitesburg Gardens
(“Whitesburg Gardens”) for violation of the ADA, ADEA, and FMLA. (Doc.
1). Stakeholder and Whitesburg Gardens (“Defendants”) have moved to
dismiss Chandler’s complaint as a shotgun pleading. For the reasons
stated below, the court GRANTS Defendants’ motion (doc. 5) and
ORDERS Chandler to file an amended complaint that complies with the
civil rules and this opinion by September 20, 2024.
BACKGROUND
Anita Chandler has been working as an administrator in retirement
and rehabilitation facilities for over 30 years. Chandler was 61 years old
when she began working for Defendants in 2014 as facility
administrator. 1 In August 2021, Chandler says a co-worker physically
assaulted her at work. Because of this assault, Chandler developed post-

Chandler was initially employed by Signature Payroll Services, LLC. Defendant Stakeholder
has since replaced Signature Payroll Services, LLC and Stakeholder was Chandler’s employer
during the events of this case. (Doc. 1, p. 3, ¶¶ 10-11).

1

concussive syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Doc.
1, p. 4).
Chandler says her supervisor, Scott Goins, knew about the assault,
her injuries, and her subsequent medical care. Chandler tried to return to
work, but her injuries caused her to seek medical leave in September
2021. Chandler informed Goins she was approved for leave and says he
became angry that he would have to replace Chandler while she was gone.
(Id., p. 5). Chandler says this was similar to a previous situation with
Goins: earlier that year, Goins told Chandler that he wanted to fire a
facility administrator at another facility because he had to replace her
when she went on leave. But Goins said he would wait a few months after
that employee’s return to work so it would not look like retaliation. (Id.).
Goins then fired that employee a few months after her return from leave.
Chandler was afraid she would suffer the same fate, so she contacted
Human Resources (“HR”) with concerns about her job safety. But HR
assured her she couldn’t be retaliated against for taking leave.
In November 2021, Chandler returned to work after taking leave
but still suffered with her post-concussive syndrome and PTSD. She says
that Goins was “never the same” with her once she returned—that he
expressed displeasure with her for taking time off work and for the
repercussions of her injuries. And Goins asked Chandler more than once
when she planned to retire, but Chandler had no plans to retire. (Id., p.
6).
A few months later, Goins placed Chandler on a performance
improvement plan (“PIP”). Chandler says the reason for this was
unfounded and common to all administrators under Goins, who were
much younger than her and were not placed on a PIP. Goins would not
discuss the PIP with Chandler, so she filed a written response that she
believed Goins placed her on a PIP because of her age and disabling
conditions. (Id., p. 7). A week later, Goins fired Chandler, claiming that
she gave a written counseling to an employee without adequate grounds
and the employee filed an internal complaint—but Chandler says Goins

instructed her to do so. Chandler was then replaced by a woman in her
forties. (Id.).
So Chandler sued Defendants for violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
621 et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §
2601 et seq. Defendants move to dismiss Chandler’s complaint for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and as an impermissible shotgun
pleading under Rules 8(a)(2), 8(d)(1), and 10(b).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is plausible on
its face when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. When considering the motion, the court accepts
all factual allegations as true, and construes them “in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). This tenet, of course, is “inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Id. at 679. Courts should limit their “consideration to the
well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the
Complaint, and matters judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec.,
Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
Although Defendants move to dismiss Chandler’s complaint for
failure to state a claim and as a shotgun pleading, they focus their motion
on their shotgun pleading allegations. The Eleventh Circuit has identified
four categories of shotgun pleadings:

(1) “a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts
the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive
count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint”;
(2) “a complaint that … [is] replete with conclusory, vague,
and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular
cause of action”;
(3) a complaint that fails to “separate[e] into a different count each
cause of action or claim for relief”; and
(4) a complaint “asserting multiple claims against multiple
defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants
the claim is brought against.”
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-23 (11th
Cir. 2015). “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is
that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give
the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. A dismissal under
Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) is appropriate where “it is virtually impossible to
know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for
relief.” Id. at 1325 (citing Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla.
Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added)).
Defendants say that Chandler’s complaint falls into two categories
of shotgun pleadings (highlighted above): they allege (1) it includes
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts in every count, and (2) it
impermissibly groups together multiple claims into single causes of
action. (Doc. 5, p. 2).
A. Conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts
First, Defendants say that Chandler’s complaint includes
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts in every count because each count
in the complaint “incorporate[s] every factual allegation contained in the

Complaint,” essentially “includ[ing] the statutory basis for every count
inside each individual count. (Doc. 6, pp. 5-6).
The easiest way to understand this argument is to look at the
complaint. Paragraph 1 begins with a section on jurisdiction, listing each
of the statutes under which Chandler brings her claims:

(Doc. 1, p. 1). Paragraph 2 states that Chandler timely filed an EEOC
charge before filing her complaint. Paragraphs 3 through 6 list each of the
parties’ citizenships. Then paragraphs 7 through 51 list the statement of
facts giving rise to Chandler’s claims.
Defendants’ qualm is with the fact that Chandler incorporated all
paragraphs—1 through 51—into each count. For example:

(Doc. 1, pp. 7, 10, 11). Defendants say that by doing this, Chandler
includes completely immaterial facts in each count: they say Chandler
references citations to the ADA in claims she brings under the ADEA and
FMLA; that she includes mention of exhausting her EEOC charge in her
ADA and ADEA claims although not required for those claims; and that
she refers to her disability under her ADEA claim and references to her
age under her ADA and FMLA claims. (Doc. 6, pp. 5-9).
Chandler says that her complaint “set forth clearly-stated and
detailed factual allegations that support each of her causes of action and
gave Defendants more than adequate notice of the claims against them
and sufficient information for them to respond.” (Doc. 8, p. 2) (citing
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (“The unifying characteristic of all types of
shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one
way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims
against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”)). Chandler
says in addition to not confusing the Defendants about what her
complaint alleged, that she properly alleges “intersectional”
discrimination because her termination resulted from all three statutes
and that “all of the facts are supportive of each claim.” (Doc. 8, p. 8).
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Weiland (cited by Defendants) is
instructive here. In Weiland, an arrestee sued a sheriff’s office and
deputies for excessive force, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and malicious prosecution. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1317. Paragraphs 1
through 49 of his third amended complaint included an introductory
statement, jurisdiction section, parties section, and facts section—divided
into three fact subsections. Id. at 1318. He then listed seven counts, each
of which began with “Plaintiff realleges and reavers the allegations of

paragraphs 1–49 inclusive, and alleges further....” Id. The district court
dismissed Weiland’s complaint. Id. at 1319. The Eleventh Circuit found
that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Weiland’s
complaint on two claims for failure to comply with Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b)
because the two counts were “informative enough to permit a court to
readily determine if they state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Id. at 1326.
In rejecting a shotgun pleading finding, the Circuit Court said this
was “not a situation where a failure to more precisely parcel out and
identify the facts relevant to each claim materially increased the burden
of understanding the factual allegations underlying each count.” Id. at
1324. The court noted that the defendants did not state any difficulty
knowing what they were alleged to have done and why they were liable
for doing it, and the court itself did not struggle to understand the claims.
Id. The court said the “task of figuring out which of the 49 paragraphs
that are incorporated into count one is relevant [to each claim] . . . is
hardly a task at all.” Id. at 1324-25. And even though some sections were
over-inclusive for certain claims, other paragraphs “clearly and concisely
describe the events” that occurred. Id. at 1325. Because the complaint
gave Defendants “adequate notice of the claims against them and the
factual allegations that support those claims,” the dismissal of those
claims was in error. Id.
Following Weiland’s guidance, the court finds adequate notice.
Chandler’s complaint is 14 pages long, alleging three counts: violations of
the ADA, ADEA, and FMLA. Paragraphs 1 through 51 of Chandler’s
complaint include a jurisdiction section, parties section, and facts section.
(Doc. 1, pp. 1-7). She then lists three counts, each of which begins with
“Paragraphs 1-51 [and 53] above are incorporated by reference.” (Doc. 1,
pp. 7, 10, 11). To determine which facts are relevant to each of Chandler’s
claims “is hardly a task at all.” For example, under the ADEA, it is
unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual” who is at least 40 years old “because of such individual’s age.”
Thomas v. Atlanta Pub. Sch., No. 23-11101, 2024 WL 2992938, at *6 (11th

Cir. June 14, 2024) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a)). So those facts
in the complaint relevant to Chandler’s ADEA claim are those related to
her age: such as paragraphs 17 and 39-51. Those facts in the complaint
relevant to Chandler’s ADA claim are those related to her alleged
disability of suffering from post-concussive syndrome and PTSD
symptoms. And those facts in the complaint relevant to Chandler’s FMLA
claim are those related to the actions surrounding Chandler taking leave.
To dismiss Chandler’s case as a shotgun pleading, it must be “virtually
impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which
claim(s) for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325. “No such virtual
impossibility exists in this case.” See id. So Chandler’s complaint does not
fall into the second category of shotgun pleadings.
B. Multiple claims grouped into single causes of action
Defendants next say that Chandler impermissibly groups multiple
claims into single causes of action rather than separate each cause of
action into a different count. (Doc. 6, p. 5) For example, under “Count II,
ADEA,” Chandler alleges:

(Doc. 1, p. 10, ¶ 64). Defendants say that in doing so, Chandler “appears
to assert both a claim for wrongful termination and unlawful retaliatory
discharge under the ADEA in the same count.” (Doc. 6, p. 9). Chandler
says that even if she did so, Defendants do not claim that they are
confused by her alternative theories of liability or that they cannot
respond to the claim. (Doc. 8, p. 9).
While alternative pleading is allowed, the court agrees with
Defendants. Each count should plead a single claim that is plainly
identified. For example, Count II could be ADEA: Age Discrimination
and Count III could be ADEA: Retaliation. This clarification would

alleviate the allegation that Chandler’s complaint “fail[s] to one degree or
another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice
of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
“[I]n striking a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds and
affording the plaintiff with another opportunity to file a complaint that
passes muster, the District Court should point out the defects in the
complaint.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1359 (11th Cir.
2018) (citing Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.
2018)). Chandler should replead her complaint to state the specific claim
she brings in each count, and if she brings multiple claims or theories
under the same statute (ADEA, for example), then she should “separate[e]
into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1321-23.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated within, the court GRANTS Defendants’
motion to dismiss (doc. 5) and ORDERS Chandler to file an amended
complaint by September 20, 2024. Defendants Stakeholder and
Whitesburg Gardens shall respond to Chandler’s amended complaint on
or before October 11, 2024.
DONE and ORDERED on September 3, 2024.

_________________________________
COREY L. MAZE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE