Davis v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/17/2012. (AVC)

FILED
2012 Sep-17 PM 12:25
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
TIM WAYNE DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 6:11-CV-2542-RDP

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff Tim Wayne Davis brings this action pursuant to Sections 205(g) and
1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), seeking review of the decision by the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denying his claim for disability, disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”), and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). After reviewing the record
and the briefs submitted by the parties, the court finds that the decision of the ALJ is due
to be affirmed.
I.

Proceedings Below
Plaintiff filed an application for disability and DIB on December 18, 2008 (R.

113-18), and an application for SSI on December 9, 2008 (Tr. 110-12), in which he
alleged that disability began on November 27, 2002. (R. 142, 147). Plaintiff’s onset date
of disability was later amended to September 1, 2006. (R. 204; Supp. R. 23).
Plaintiff’s applications were denied by the Social Security Administration on
March 2, 2009. (R. 59-68). Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing on July 22, 2009.
(R. 74). Plaintiff’s request was granted on February 9, 2010, and a hearing was scheduled
for May 11, 2010. (R. 77). On June 29, 2010, the ALJ delivered his decision denying

Plaintiff disability benefits. (R. 13-26). In his decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
was not disabled under Sections 216(i), 223(d), or 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. (R. 26).
Plaintiff’s alleged disability is primarily based on his suffering from mental
problems that he states were caused by the death of his infant son in November 2002.
(Supp. R. 7; R. 209, 212, 227). The earliest medical records for Plaintiff are from August
2003 at Baptist Health Center Graysville, where Plaintiff expressed to Dr. W.A. Keith his
concerns about diabetes, lipomata on his arms and chest wall, mood swings, and
irritability. (R. 227). Plaintiff had regular appointments with Dr. Keith until January 16,
2004. At that appointment, Plaintiff inquired whether his “lazy eye” would “get him on
disability.” Dr. Keith advised Plaintiff that he “needed to stay busy” and “check with an
eye doctor about that.” (R. 224). It was two years later, on April 7, 2006, that Plaintiff
returned to see Dr. Keith with complaints of general malaise, fatigue, headaches, mood
swings, and poor sleep. (R. 223). On September 19, 2006, Dr. Keith’s office was
contacted by Plaintiff’s (then current) attorney informing them that Plaintiff had quit his
job because he was having thoughts of injuring a co-worker by “chopping their fingers
off with a clever.” (R. 222). On October 16, 2006, Plaintiff was instructed by Dr. Keith
to go to Western Mental Health for psychiatric help. (R. 221-22).
During a two-year hiatus from treatment at Baptist Health Center Graysville,
Plaintiff sought treatment from Northwest Alabama Mental Health Center (“NAMHC”)
for his depression and anger problems. (R. 208-19). Plaintiff’s first visit occurred on
March 10, 2004, which was followed by regular visits until October 27, 2004. (R. 209,
212-17). On January 24, 2005, NAMHC closed Plaintiff’s case due to Plaintiff’s failure
to follow his treatment program. (R. 211).
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Dr. Wolfram Glaser of Western Mental Health Center, Inc. (“WMHC”) saw
Plaintiff on March 6, 2007 and described Plaintiff as a “generally pleasant gentleman,
who seems a little impaired intellectually. He is a little dysphoric, but not severely
depressed.” (R. 261). Dr. Glaser prescribed Prozac to Plaintiff and saw him again on
April 3, 2007, noting that Plaintiff stated he no longer had suicidal thoughts and did not
seem to be excessively depressed at that time. (R. 259, 261). On May 9, 2007, Dr. Glaser
listed mood disorder and behavior/conduct disorder as Plaintiff’s problems, and assigned
Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 52.1 (R. 253-54). On
August 7, 2007, Dr. Glaser prescribed Zyprexa, and on January 30, 2008 added samples
of Abilify to Plaintiff’s list of prescriptions. (R. 245, 249). On May 2, 2008, Plaintiff was
assigned a GAF score of 50. (R. 239). On October 14, 2008, Plaintiff reported that he
was “doin[g] a lot better” and claimed that he had only had one outburst in the past
several months. (R. 236). Plaintiff’s next visit at WMHC was on January 12, 2009, after
which Dr. Glaser opined that there was “little clinical change since [their] last contact.”
(R. 235).
Dr. John Neville conducted a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff on February 6,
2009. (R. 267). In his report Dr. Neville opined:
[Plaintiff] is considered cognitively able to manage financial benefits. He
is not emotionally capable of functioning independently at present.
[Plaintiff] was able to understand instructions. Short-term memory was
good. His ability to carry out instructions appeared moderately impaired.

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A GAF score ranging between 51 and 60 indicates moderate symptoms &
impairments, including for example, occasional thoughts of suicide, occasionally verbally
aggressive, moderate difficulty in social or occupational functioning (e.g., few friends,
occasional conflicts with family, peers or co-workers, occasionally problems at work). (R.
254)
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[Plaintiff]’s ability to respond appropriately to coworker’s was considered
moderately to severely impaired. His ability to cope with ordinary work
pressures was considered moderately to severely impaired. [Plaintiff]
seemed willing to accept supervision, although his history suggested that
episodes of resistance to supervision would be likely.
(R. 269). Dr. Neville’s diagnostic impression was that Plaintiff suffered from Major
Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Moderate and Intermittent Explosive Disorder,
Provisional. (Id.).
On February 12, 2009, Dr. Simona Dunlap conducted a consultative examination
of Plaintiff. (R. 272). Her assessment of Plaintiff was that he had major depression, low
back pain, bilateral knee arthralgias, and left eye blindness. (R. 275). Dr. Dunlap also
noted that with regard to Plaintiff’s back, there was no spasm or deformity, and that his
range of motion in all four extremities was normal except that mobilization of the knee
was painful mostly on flexion above seventy-five (75) to eighty (80) degrees. (R. 274).
On February 13, 2009, Dr. Gloria Roque conducted a psychiatric review of
Plaintiff and asserted that Plaintiff suffered from mild restriction of daily living activities,
moderate difficulties in maintaining social function, and moderate difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. (R. 277, 287). In her assessment, Dr.
Roque concluded that Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity was not significantly
limited except that he was markedly limited in his ability to interact appropriately with
the general public, and moderately limited in the following areas:
the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions; the ability to
carry out all detailed instructions; the ability to maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods; the ability to work in coordination
with or proximity to others without being distracted by them; the ability to
complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace
without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; the ability to
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accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from
supervisors; the ability to get along with coworkers or peers without
distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; the ability to maintain
socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness
and cleanliness; and the ability to respond appropriately to changes in the
work setting.
(R. 291-92). Dr. Roque concluded her evaluation by assessing Plaintiff’s functional
capacity based on his limitations. (R. 293).
On February 27, 2009, Dr. Richard Whitney evaluated Plaintiff and opined that
Plaintiff’s statements about his physical symptoms and functional limitations are only
partially credible. (R. 297).
Plaintiff returned to WMHC on May 4, 2009 and was assigned a GAF score of 47
by Dr. Glaser. (R. 301-02). On May 11, 2009, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Glaser that his
increased dosages of prescription medication reduced his crying and improved his mood,
and Dr. Glaser noted that gradual symptom reduction was seen. (R. 307). Plaintiff’s last
recorded visit at WMHC occurred on October 5, 2009, and Dr. Glaser asserted that there
was little change in Plaintiff’s condition. (R. 306).
II.

ALJ Decision
For an individual to be determined disabled as defined under the Social Security

Act, the claimant must be unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of
impairments that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. The
Social Security Administration has established a five-step process to determine whether
an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). These steps are followed in order, and
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if it is determined that the claimant is or is not disabled at any step of the evaluation
process, the evaluation will not proceed to the next step.
The first step provides that if the claimant is working, and that work qualifies as
substantial gainful activity, then he cannot claim disability regardless of medical
condition, age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). “Substantial
gainful activity” is work activity that is usually done for pay or profit and involves doing
significant mental or physical activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.974.
At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(c). An impairment or combination of impairments is “severe” if it significantly
limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921. Third,
if the ALJ determines that the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment or
combination of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, then the
claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).
Before proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) based on all the relevant medical and other evidence
contained in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). An individual’s RFC is their ability to do
physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from
impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. At step four, the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant is capable of performing past relevant work based on the claimant’s RFC. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If the claimant’s RFC allows for him to do past relevant work, then
he is not disabled.

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At the fifth and final step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is
capable of making an adjustment to any other kind of work given his RFC, age,
education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 416.920(g). If the claimant is able to do other
work then he is not disabled.
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act
through December 31, 2009. (R. 15). At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 27, 2002.2 (Id.). The ALJ then
determined that Plaintiff’s low back pain, affective mood disorder, and conduct disorder
were all severe impairments that were supported by medically acceptable evidence and
that those impairments caused Plaintiff more than a minimal functional limitation on his
ability to perform basic work activities. (Id.). The ALJ declined to include diabetes
mellitus or left eye blindness (despite Plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary) because he
found that there was no objective medical evidence indicating that Plaintiff was ever
diagnosed with diabetes, and there was no evidence that his left eye blindness ever
caused him any limitations with respect to his activities of daily living or in his
employment. (R. 16).
At step three, the ALJ determined first that Plaintiff’s back pain does not meet
listing 1.04. (Id.). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments, considered singly
or in combination, did not meet or medically equal listing 12.04 criteria because they did
not result in at least two of the following: marked restriction of daily living; marked
difficulties in maintaining social functioning; marked difficulties in maintaining

2

This was the initial alleged onset date, before Plaintiff amended the onset date to
September 1, 2006.
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concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of decompensation, each of
extended duration. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff was not found to be disabled at step three of the
analysis.
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s RFC was as
follows:
[Plaintiff] has the [RFC] to perform simple, but not complex tasks; can
maintain attention and concentration for two hours at a time and complete
an eight hour day provided all customary breaks are given; contact with
coworkers should be casual, with a work setting that is well spaced, with
his own work area without close proximity to other employees; could
tolerate ordinary work pressures, but not excessive work loads, quick
decision making, rapid changes, or multiple demands upon him;
supervision should be non-confrontational and tactful; changes to the
workplace should be gradual, well-explained and infrequent; has mild to
moderate difficulties getting along with coworkers or supervisors; and
would miss not more than two days of work per month.
(R. 18). The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s medically determined impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms he alleged, but found that Plaintiff’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the alleged
symptoms were not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with his RFC
determination. (R. 19).
In making that credibility determination, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s ability to
take care of himself and others was inconsistent with his allegation of disability based on
mental and physical impairments. (R. 24). Additionally, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s
testimony during the hearing that he had never hurt anyone, and the record indicates that
Plaintiff was noncompliant with his medication regimen, which abates his symptoms
when he takes it. (Id.). Furthermore, the ALJ cited the inconsistencies within Plaintiff’s
reported duration of his mental health problems, as Plaintiff claimed that he has had
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mental problems all of his life, yet he also alleges that his problems were caused by his
infant son’s death in November 2002 (despite having continued to work for nearly four
years until September 2006). (Id.). Summing up his analysis, the ALJ concluded that
“[Plaintiff] simply alleges a greater degree of debilitation than what objective evidence
can support.” (Id.).
Next the ALJ addressed the weight accorded to the various doctors’ opinions
concerning Plaintiff. The ALJ explained that the opinions of Dr. Roque and Dr. Whitney
were afforded substantial weight (despite the fact that neither doctor examined Plaintiff),
because they provided specific reasons indicating their opinions were based on the
evidence of record, and their opinions were internally consistent, as well as consistent
with the evidence as a whole. (R. 24). The ALJ then stated that Dr. Dunlap’s findings
were afforded substantial weight because they were based on direct observation and
examination of Plaintiff, as she was Plaintiff’s examining doctor. (R. 25). Also, the ALJ
noted that Dr. Neville’s findings were only given some weight because, although they
were based upon direct observation and examination, the records from Plaintiff’s treating
mental health provider provided a better longitudinal picture of Plaintiff’s mental health.
(Id.).
At step four, the ALJ examined whether Plaintiff was capable of performing past
relevant work. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had worked as a floor cleaner within the last
15 years, and did so for a sufficient period of time to learn the duties of the job. (Id.).
During the hearing, a vocational expert, Julia Russell, testified that an individual with
Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC would be able to work as a floor
cleaner. (Id.). Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled and denied his
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applications.
III.

Plaintiff’s Argument for Reversal
Plaintiff alleges that there are three errors in the ALJ’s decision. First, Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ made an incorrect finding at step two, both because the ALJ failed
to note the correct impairments diagnosed by a DDS consultive examiner, and also
because he refused to find that Plaintiff’s blindness in the left eye was a severe
impairment. (Pl.’s Mem. 8). Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the most
significant errors in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental health treatment and mental
health diagnosis. (Pl.’s Mem. 9). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to accord
appropriate weight and consideration to the various medical opinions submitted for his
consideration, and that he failed to make clear what weight he accorded to each item of
evidence, or give a reason for making such a decision. (Pl.’s Mem. 10-11). Third,
Plaintiff submits that the ALJ erred by improperly citing occasions of noncompliance to
support his finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Pl.’s Mem. 11-12).
IV.

Standard of Review
The only issues before this court are whether the record reveals substantial

evidence to sustain the ALJ’s decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Walden v. Schweiker, 672
F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129,
131 (11th Cir. 1986). Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) mandates that the Commissioner’s
findings are conclusive if supported by “substantial evidence.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894
F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The district court may not reconsider the facts,
reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner; instead,
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it must review the final decision as a whole and determine if the decision is reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence. See Id. (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d
1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Substantial evidence falls somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance of
evidence; “[i]t is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at
1239) (other citations omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s
factual findings must be affirmed even if the evidence preponderates against the
Commissioner’s findings. See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. While the court acknowledges
that judicial review of the ALJ’s findings is limited in scope, the court also notes that
review “does not yield automatic affirmance.” Lamb, 847 F.2d at 701.
V.

Discussion
a.

The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Two of the Disability Evaluation.

Plaintiff argues that he suffers from other severe impairments that were not listed
at step two of the ALJ’s decision. (Pl.’s Mem. 8). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he
has been diagnosed with degenerative changes in lumbar spine, a variety of psychiatric
issues other than affective mood disorder or conduct disorder, and left eye blindness. As
Plaintiff correctly notes, “[a]n impairment can only be considered non-severe if it is a
slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the claimant that it would not be
expected to interfere with the claimant’s ability to work irrespective of age, education, or
prior work experience.” (Pl.’s Mem. 9; Stratton v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir.
1987)). However, this analysis would only be applicable if the ALJ had dismissed
Plaintiff’s claim at step two. The Eleventh Circuit has clearly indicated, “[n]othing
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requires that the ALJ must identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should be
considered severe,” so long as the ALJ considers a claimant’s impairments in
combination at step three in the analysis. Heatly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x
823, 825 (11th Cir. 2010). Additionally, “[e]ven if the ALJ erred in not indicating
whether [a condition] was a severe impairment, the error was harmless because the ALJ
concluded that [the claimant] had a severe impairment and that finding is all that step two
requires.” Id. at 824-25.
Here, the ALJ stated at step two that Plaintiff suffered from low back pain,
affective mood disorder, and conduct disorder, all of which are severe impairments.
Plaintiff’s argument – that the ALJ’s exclusion of his other symptoms from the list of
severe impairments constitutes reversible error – misses the mark. As long as the ALJ
considered Plaintiff’s impairments in combination at step three of the analysis, then it is
unnecessary to identify all of the impairments that may be individually considered
severe. The record indicates that at step three of the analysis the ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s lower back symptoms and mental impairments singly and in combination. (R.
16-18). Also, the ALJ’s decision not to classify Plaintiff’s left eye blindness as a severe
impairment is supported by the fact that Plaintiff has not offered any evidence that this
condition causes him any limitations. To the contrary, Plaintiff had a very good work
history up until 2006, and has gone his entire life without vision in his left eye. Thus, the
ALJ did not err in any way at step two of the disability evaluation, as he indicated that
Plaintiff did in fact suffer from some severe impairments.

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b.

The ALJ Did Not Err in His Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Mental Health
Treatment and Diagnosis.

Plaintiff next asserts that the most significant errors committed by the ALJ related
to his mental health treatment and mental health diagnosis. (Pl.’s Mem. 9). Specifically,
Plaintiff submits that the ALJ erred by failing to consider his GAF score assigned by his
treating psychiatrist, Dr. Glaser, and failing to properly consider the opinion of the DDS
consultative psychologist, Dr. Neville.
Plaintiff fails to cite any authority showing how a GAF score could establish
disability. In fact, courts in this Circuit have noted that a GAF score “is not an
assessment of a claimant’s ability to work, but a global reference scale to aid in the
treatment of an ongoing condition.” Anderson v. Astrue, No. 2:08CV917-CSC, 2010 WL
1052845, at *7 n.5 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 23, 2010) (emphasis added) (citing Jiles v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. Civ. A. 05-G-0861-S, 2006 WL 4402937, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 11,
2006)). The Eleventh Circuit has also spoken to this issue (albeit in an unpublished
decision), noting that “the Commissioner has declined to endorse the GAF scale for ‘use
in the Social Security and SSI disability programs,’ and has indicated that GAF scores
have ‘no direct correlation to the severity requirements of the mental disorders listings.’”
Wind v. Barnhart, No. 04-16371, 2005 WL 1317040, at *6 n.5 (11th Cir. June 2, 2005);
see also, 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-65 (Aug. 21, 2000). Given the lack of any authority
requiring an ALJ to consider a GAF score to make a disability determination, the court
finds that the ALJ was not required to discuss or assign any weight to Dr. Glaser’s GAF
assessment of Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to adhere to Eleventh Circuit law that
places a duty on an ALJ to make clear the weight accorded to various testimony and the
reasons for the decision. (Pl.’s Mem. 11); Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th
Cir. 1981). The particular part of the ALJ decision that Plaintiff takes issue with reads as
follows:
While Dr. Neville’s findings are based upon direct observation and
examination of [Plaintiff], the records from [Plaintiff]’s treating mental
health provider provides a better longitudinal picture of [Plaintiff]’s
mental health. Therefore, Dr. Neville’s findings have only been given
some weight. The findings of Simona Dunlap, the examining doctor . . .
are given substantial weight. These findings are based upon direct
observation and examination of [Plaintiff].
(R. 25). Plaintiff’s argument – that this is an insufficient showing of the weight accorded
to the doctors’ opinions’ rationale for doing so – is without merit. First, the ALJ clearly
annunciated what weight was given to the two doctors’ testimony: Dr. Neville’s opinion
was only given some weight; Dr. Dunlap’s opinion was given substantial weight. The
ALJ also provided a clear explanation of his rationale for the weight he attributed to both
opinions. Dr. Dunlap’s opinion was given substantial weight because it was based on
direct observation and examination of Plaintiff. Dr. Neville’s opinion was afforded only
some weight (despite the fact that it also was based on direct observation and
examination), because records from Plaintiff’s treating mental health provider provided a
better picture of Plaintiff’s mental health. Thus, the ALJ properly considered the findings
reported by Dr. Neville and Dr. Dunlap in accordance with the law of this circuit.
c.

The ALJ Did Not Improperly Rely on Plaintiff’s Noncompliance With
Treatment to Find Plaintiff Not Disabled.

Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred by relying upon his noncompliance in
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finding him to not be disabled is also without merit. Plaintiff cites authority from the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits which provide that a claimant’s failure to seek treatment for a
mental impairment may be caused by the impairment itself, and thus is not an appropriate
ground on which to reject a disability claim. (Pl’s Mem. 12). These authorities have little
relevance, however, as here Plaintiff repeatedly sought treatment, but failed to comply
with the treatment plans prescribed to him.
Plaintiff also argues that a claimant’s failure to follow a recommended treatment
might be a symptom of a mental impairment itself. Bennett v. Barnhart, 288 F. Supp. 2d
1246, 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2003). However, neither Plaintiff nor any of his physicians have
ever indicated that Plaintiff failed to comply with a recommended treatment because of
his impaired mental state. In fact, Plaintiff reported that he did not follow prescribed
treatment plans on some occasions due to a lack of finances (R. 212, 216); and on other
occasions, he explained his noncompliance with treatment was a result of being busy at
his house (R. 235, 243). The ALJ did not rely solely on Plaintiff’s noncompliance to deny
this claim. Rather, the ALJ merely noted Plaintiff’s noncompliance as further evidence
undermining the credibility of Plaintiff’s alleged disability, and this is a finding permitted
by administrative regulations, SSR 96-7p, and Eleventh Circuit case law. (R. 24); see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(v), 416.929(c); SSR 96-7p; Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206,
1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The ALJ did not significantly rely on Plaintiff’s noncompliance in
making his decision; therefore, this part of Plaintiff’s argument fails.
VI.

Conclusion
The ALJ properly denied Plaintiff’s claim for disability. The ALJ’s findings are

supported by substantial evidence and he applied the law correctly in denying Plaintiff’s
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claim. Thus, the judgment of the ALJ is due to be affirmed.
DONE and ORDERED this

17th

day of September, 2012.

___________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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