Dexter v. Amedisys Holding LLC et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 12/5/12. (KGE, )
FILED
2012 Dec-05 AM 10:45
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
BEVERLY LANE DEXTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMEDISYS HOLDING, LLC,
ET AL.,
Defendant.
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] 6:11-CV-04019-LSC
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MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.
Introduction
Before this Court is Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Complaint, pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 38). Amedisys Home Health of
Alabama, Inc. (“Defendant”) seeks to dismiss Beverley Lane Dexter’s (“Plaintiff”)
claim of hostile work environment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (“ADEA”) asserted in Count One of the Second Amended Complaint and her
ADEA retailitation claim in Count Two. In the alternative, Defendant asks for a more
definite statement from Plaintiff, pursuant to FRCP 12(e). Plaintiff opposes the motion
in part but agrees that her claim for punitive damages should be dismissed.
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II.
Analysis
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court “accepts
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” Speaker v. U.S. Dept of Health & Human Services Centers for
Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). However, to survive
a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations on its
face to make a claim for relief plausible. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Rules”) only require “a short plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the
plausibility standard “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Instead, the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right of relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Sinaltrainal v. Coco-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir.
2009) (quoting Twombly, 566 U.S. at 555) (internal citations and emphasis omitted in
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original).
Defendant first contends that the Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) Charge of Discrimination (the “Charge”) does not allege any
claims of hostile work environment or retaliation and therefore Counts I and II must
be dismissed. (Doc. 38 at 7.) Before a plaintiff can bring a claim under the ADEA, she
first must file an EEOC charge at least 60 days before filing suit, as required by 29
U.S.C. § 626(d). There is no dispute that Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge in a timely
manner. However, Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge is factually
insufficient to support the claims in Count I and II of her Second Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 38.)
In her EEOC charge, Plaintiff marked the box labeled “age” discrimination and
stated that she was “constructively discharged” and replaced by a “younger male.”
(Doc. 21-1 at 1.) She did not mark the box for “retaliation,” but she did allege that her
discharge was after she “spoke out about changes the employer was implementing.”
(Id.) While she does not explicitly state so in her charge, Plaintiff asserts that she
intended to argue that the changes she complained about were intentionally enacted
to have a disperate impact on older workers. (Doc. 32 ¶ 15.)
“[A] plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC
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investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Gregory v. Department of Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotes omitted). As long as facts are reasonably present in the
charge for the EEOC to conduct an investigation, this Court need not bar any claims
simply because the Plaintiff did not check all of the proper boxes on the EEOC charge.
See Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (discussing the purpose of an exhaustion of
administrative remedies requirement and determining that it was proper to allow a
plaintiff to proceed on with a similar EEOC charge).1 In her EEOC charge, Plaintiff
mentions a “younger” replacement, that she was often reprimanded following her
complaints, and that she was constructively discharged. (Doc. 1-1 at 1.) This is
sufficient information to prompt the EEOC to investigate her retaliation and hostile
work environment claims.
Defendant next contends that Plaintiff failed to plead adequate facts in her
complaint to support her hostile work environment claim. A plaintiff alleging a hostile
work environment must allege: (1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she
has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment must have been
1
This case discusses an EEOC charge in relation to a Title VII claim, but the standard for
an EEOC charge should be the same regardless of the type of discrimination alleged, especially
since the rationale behind a requiring an EEOC charge is the same for all types of discrimination.
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based on a protected characteristic of the employee; (4) that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and
create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is
responsible for such environment. Miller v. Kentworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269,
1275 (11th Cir. 2002). For age discrimination, the protected group is people between
the ages of 40 and 70 years old. Mitchell v. Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co., 967 F.2d
565, 566 (11th Cir. 1992).
In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support her hostile work
environment claim. First, Plaintiff plead that she was 45 at the time of the alleged
discrimination. (Doc 28-1 at 3.) Second, she explained that she was the victim of
unwelcome harassment by alleging that the similarly-situated younger employees
received “better treatment, more patient visits (which result[ed] in greater pay), better
working conditions, less criticisms, and were not required to report schedules . . . to
different persons daily.” (Doc. 28-1 at 6.) Third, Plaintiff alleged that the harassment
was based on her age, pointing out that the employees who were treated differently
than her were also white females but were not older than 40. (Doc. 28-1 at 3.) Fourth,
Plaintiff plead that the employer was “putting economic pressure on Plaintiff to quit”
by reducing her patients. (Doc. 28-1 at 5.) Finally, Plaintiff has alleged that the
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employer was responsible for these actions. (Doc. 28-1 at 5.) As Plaintiff has set forth
the minimum required allegations, Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is due to
be denied.
Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to state an actionable claim
for retaliation. (Doc. 38 at 12.) “In order to state claims for discriminatory retaliation,
a plaintiff must present evidence that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected conduct;
(2) he was adversely affected by an employment decision; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the statutorily protected conduct and the adverse employment
decision.” Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff alleges that
the adverse treatment started after she complained about changes to the company’s
401(k) plan and annual cost of living raises. (Doc 28-1 at 4.) At his point, the court
must make all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. It is plausible that the changes
to the 401(k) plan were discriminatory towards older workers as older workers have
larger incomes and would be retiring sooner. Cost of living raises are often percentage
based and would put a larger burden on those with larger incomes, i.e., the older
workers. Since Plaintiff has satisfied the minimum pleading requirements, Defendant’s
motion to dismiss the retaliation claim is due to be denied.
In the alternative, Defendant has requested that this Court order Plaintiff to
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provide a more definite statement. In the court’s opinion, Plaintiff has given
Defendant adequate facts for this stage of pleading. As such, Defendant’s request for
a more definite statement is denied.
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is due to be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages is due to be GRANTED. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims of hostile work environment and retaliation under the ADEA is due
to be DENIED. A separate order will be entered consistent with this Opinion.
Done this 5th day of December 2012.
L. SCOTT COOGLER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
171032
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