Pike v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 08/07/2013. (MSN)

FILED
2013 Aug-07 PM 02:04
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
ELIZABETH TAYLOR PIKE,
Plaintiff;
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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6:12-cv-2733-LSC

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction
The plaintiff, Elizabeth Taylor Pike, appeals from the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying her
application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Ms. Pike timely pursued and
exhausted her administrative remedies and the decision of the Commissioner is ripe
for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
Ms. Pike was forty-eight years old at the time of the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ’s”) decision, and she has a seventh grade education, as well as training to be
a certified nurse’s aide. (Tr. at 46-47.) Her past work experiences include employment

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as a nurse’s aide and briefly as a boat assembler. (Id.) Ms. Pike claims that she became
disabled on October 15, 2007, due to head, neck, back, foot, hand, and side pain,
dizziness, incontinence, and memory loss. (Tr. at 11; 52-59 )
When evaluating the disability of individuals over the age of eighteen, the
regulations prescribe a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920; see also Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The
first step requires a determination of whether the claimant is “doing substantial
gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he or she is, the
claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If he or she is not, the
Commissioner next considers the effect of all of the physical and mental impairments
combined. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). These impairments
must be severe and must meet the durational requirements before a claimant will be
found to be disabled. Id. The decision depends on the medical evidence in the record.
See Hart v. Finch, 440 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1971). If the claimant’s impairments
are not severe, the analysis stops. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
Otherwise, the analysis continues to step three, which is a determination of whether
the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),

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416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments fall within this category, he or she
will be found disabled without further consideration. Id. If they do not, a
determination of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) will be made
and the analysis proceeds to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
The fourth step requires a determination of whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent him or her from returning to past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still do his or her past
relevant work, the claimant is not disabled and the evaluation stops. Id. If the claimant
cannot do past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth step. Id. Step five
requires the court to consider the claimant’s RFC, as well as the claimant’s age,
education, and past work experience in order to determine if he or she can do other
work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v) 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can do other
work, the claimant is not disabled. Id.
Applying the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Ms. Pike meets
the nondisability requirements for a period of disability and DIB and was insured
through the date of his decision. (Tr. at 14.) He further determined that Ms. Pike has
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of her disability. (Id.)
According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s lumbosacral radiculopathy, cervical spondylosis,

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parethesias/numbness, peripheral neuropathy, anemia/folate deficiency, other
demyelinating disease of the cervical nervous system, headaches, hypertension, and
dysthymia are considered “severe” based on the requirements set forth in the
regulations. (Id.) However, he found that these impairments neither meet nor
medically equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Tr. at 18.) The ALJ did not find Ms. Pike’s allegations to be totally
credible, and he determined that she has the following residual functional capacity:
light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that she is limited to simple,
repetitive, non-complex tasks; can occasionally bend and stoop but do no
pushing/pulling with lower extremities; no climbing or driving; cannot work at
unprotected heights; no more than mild to moderate pain and depression with their
mild to moderate effect on her ability to to concentrate and have the requisite
persistence and pace necessary to perform job tasks. (Tr. at 20-21.)
According to the ALJ, Ms. Pike is unable to perform any of her past relevant
work, she is a “younger individual,” and she has a “limited education,” as those
terms are defined by the regulations. (Tr. at 26.) He determined that Plaintiff’s
“[t]ransferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because
using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the

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claimant is ‘not disabled,’ whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.”
(Id.) Even though Plaintiff cannot perform the full range of light work, the ALJ used
Medical-Vocation Rule 204.00 as a guideline, and testimony from a vocational expert,
Dr. Kessler, in concluding that there are a significant number of jobs in the national
economy that Plaintiff is capable of performing, such as general office clerk,
inspector/tester, and receptionist/information clerk. (Tr. at 27.) The ALJ concluded
his findings by stating that Plaintiff “has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from October 15, 2007, through the date of this decision.” (Id.)
II.

Standard of Review
This Court’s role in reviewing claims brought under the Social Security Act is

a narrow one. The scope of its review is limited to determining (1) whether there is
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the findings of the
Commissioner, and (2) whether the correct legal standards were applied. See
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d
1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court approaches the factual findings of the
Commissioner with deference, but applies close scrutiny to the legal conclusions. See
Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court may not decide facts,
weigh evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. “The

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substantial evidence standard permits administrative decision makers to act with
considerable latitude, and ‘the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.’” Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1181 (11th Cir.
1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,
620 (1966)). Indeed, even if this Court finds that the evidence preponderates against
the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400. No decision is automatic, however, for
“despite this deferential standard [for review of claims] it is imperative that the Court
scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the decision
reached.” Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 622, 624 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, failure to
apply the correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. See Bowen v. Heckler, 748 F.2d
629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984).
III.

Discussion
Ms. Pike alleges that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed and remanded

because the ALJ did not properly assess the credibility of her testimony in accordance
with the Eleventh’s Circuit Pain Standard. (Doc. 10 at 7.) In particular, Plaintiff
asserts that the ALJ’s evaluation of her subjective complaints was improper and that

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the ALJ’s conclusions are “irrational,” “wholly inconsistent with the record,” and
“not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.)
Subjective testimony of pain and other symptoms may establish the presence
of a disabling impairment if it is supported by medical evidence. See Foote v. Chater,
67 F.3d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish disability based upon pain and other
subjective symptoms, “[t]he pain standard requires (1) evidence of an underlying
medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity
of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined
medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise
to the alleged pain.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Landry v. Heckler, 782
F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986).
The ALJ is permitted to discredit the claimant’s subjective testimony of pain
and other symptoms if he articulates explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Wilson
v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996
WL 374186 (1996) (“[T]he adjudicator must carefully consider the individual’s
statements about symptoms with the rest of the relevant evidence in the case record
in reaching a conclusion about the credibility of the individual’s statements.”).

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Although the Eleventh Circuit does not require explicit findings as to credibility,
“‘the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court.’” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210
(quoting Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562). “[P]articular phrases or formulations” do not have
to be cited in an ALJ’s credibility determination, but the determination cannot be a
“broad rejection which is “not enough to enable [a reviewing court] to conclude that
[the ALJ] considered her medical condition as a whole.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause some symptoms. (Tr. at 23.) However, the ALJ
also found that “the claimant’s statements . . . concerning the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of those symptoms are not fully credible to the extent they are
inconsistent with the above residual capacity.” (Id.) The ALJ discredited Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints because no treating or examining physician reported the
existence of limitations as severe as Plaintiff alleged and because Plaintiff’s complaints
were inconsistent with her reported daily activities. (Tr. 23-25.)
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decisions were not supported by substantial
evidence. (Doc. 10 at 7.) Plaintiff further alleges that the ALJ disregarded substantial
medical evidence and substituted in its place his own medical opinion. (Doc. 10 at 10.)

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When discrediting a plaintiff’s subjective pain testimony, it is required “that such
articulation or reasons by the Secretary be supported by substantial evidence.” Hale
v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1012 (11th Cir. 1987). Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, the
ALJ relied heavily on the evidence in the record, including Plaintiff’s objective
medical history, medical records and her testimony regarding her daily activities,
when assessing her subjective complaints of disabling pain. (Tr. at 23–27.) Although
Plaintiff alleges that her disability began in October 2007, the ALJ properly recognized
that there is no medical evidence of record prior to April 2010. (Tr. at 23.)
Additionally, Plaintiff’s eventual treating physician, Dr. Hogan, reported in December
2010 that extensive evaluation had revealed a normal Lumbar Puncture (LP) and
Multiple Sclerosis (MS) profile as well as a normal Visual Evoked Potential (VEP),
revealing that it was very possible that changes in Plaintiff’s brain MRI were vascular.
(Tr. at 325-336.) Dr. Hogan has not diagnosed Plaintiff with MS and, while he has
provided a limited supply of pain medications, has never reported that Plaintiff had
disabling pain or limitations from any of her impairments or combinations of
impairments. (Tr. at 237-250, 325-336, 376-378.)
Plaintiff testified that she had experienced significant side effects from her
medication. (Tr. at 24.) As the ALJ noted, however, Plaintiff’s medical records do not

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support this allegation. There is no medical evidence that Plaintiff ever reported
adverse side effects from the medication to Dr. Hogan, nor is there evidence that she
reported side effects or disabling pain or limitations to the medical professionals at the
Good Samaritan Clinic. (Tr. at 337-359, 373-378.) When Dr. Meleth examined
Plaintiff, he neither reported that she had complained of side effects to medications,
nor that she had disabling pain or limitations. (Tr. at 251-255.)
Plaintiff further alleges she suffers from memory and concentration
impairments, social and stress difficulties, and confusion. (Tr. at 25.) These
allegations are also inconsistent with the medical records. Dr. Hogan consistently
reported that Plaintiff’s mood and affect were normal and he never reported any
disabling mental limitations. (Tr. at 237-250, 325-336, 376-378.) While Dr. Gragg
reported that Plaintiff did have a mild case of dysthymia, he also reported that
Plaintiff’s social skills, intellectual functioning, and ability to respond to supervision
were adequate so that her condition did not rise to a level that affected her
employability. (Tr. at 259-260.) Dr. Gragg also noted that Plaintiff was able to handle
work-related stress effectively and that he did not believe that there were any
intellectual or psychological features that would interfere with Plaintiff’s ability to
function in a work environment. (Id.)

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The ALJ also relied on Plaintiff’s daily activities in discrediting Plaintiff’s
subjective pain testimony. Plaintiff’s daily activities consisted of walking around,
making the bed, doing housework with the help of her husband, going to church, going
to her parents’ home, and cooking supper. (Tr. at 202-209.) Further, Plaintiff
reported at the Good Samaritan Clinic that she used walking for exercise, pain control,
and weight loss. (Tr. at 374.) The ALJ properly noted that these activities are not
consistent with allegations of disabling pain and impairment such as the giving way of
legs, dizziness, and balance problems that Plaintiff had alleged. (Tr. at 24-25.) Finally,
when asked to consider Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, Dr.
Kessler, the vocational expert, testified that Plaintiff would be able to perform the
representative light unskilled occupations of general office clerk. (Tr. at 87-89.)
Plaintiff also argues that the simple failure of Dr. Hogan to use the word
“disabled” or set forth specific limitations in his report does not necessarily mean that
Dr. Hogan did not believe that Plaintiff suffered from severe symptoms. (Doc. 10 at
11.) The ALJ, however, did not solely rely on the records from Dr. Hogan, but rather
incorporated these records into a larger set of medical records and reports that
consistently indicate that Plaintiff did not have any disabling pain or limitations. (Tr.
at 25.) Again, as the ALJ noted, none of the claimant’s treating physicians have

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reported that she has disabling pain or limitations. (Id.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ not only did not “play doctor” or
make his own independent medical findings, but instead relied upon the objective
medical records and reports of the several treating and examining physicians that
Plaintiff visited. The ALJ specifically addressed Plaintiff’s allegations of pain in his
opinion, and he provided explicit and reasonable reasons for rejecting her testimony.
The reasons articulated are not “irrational or wholly inconsistent with the record” as
Plaintiff claims.
The objective medical and other evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
Plaintiff’s condition did not cause disabling limitations and instead shows that she
could perform a reduced range of light work. The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s
testimony of her disabling pain was not credible is supported by substantial evidence.
This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ’s when, as here, it is
supported by substantial evidence.
IV.

Conclusion
Upon review of the administrative record, and considering all of Ms. Pike’s

arguments, the Court finds the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and in accord with the applicable law. A separate order will be entered.

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Done this 7th day of August 2013.

L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
[170956]

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