McGuire v. 3M Company

Filing 34

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 8/1/2016. (PSM)

FILED
2016 Aug-01 PM 03:05
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
ARZEALAR M. MCGUIRE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
3M COMPANY,
Defendant.

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6:14-cv-02015-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant 3M
Company (“3M”). Plaintiff Arzealar M. McGuire (“McGuire”) filed this suit
making an employment discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (“Title VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. McGuire’s
claim stems from the termination of her employment with Defendant 3M on
August 8, 2012, which she claims was based on race. For the reasons stated below,
3M’s Motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
Arzealar McGuire began working for 3M’s Guin, Alabama manufacturing

facility in February 1991 and was eventually fired on August 8, 2012. During her
employment, McGuire worked in the Specialty Additives/Bubbles factory where
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she held the positions of Flame Former/Warehouse Service Operator, Team Lead
of the Flame Former/Warehouse Service Operators, and Mill Operator. During
her approximately twenty years at 3M, McGuire received corrective action for
multiple conduct issues, and 3M provided McGuire with many opportunities to
improve upon those issues.
Specifically, her disciplinary history includes an incident report for falling
asleep on the job, a five day suspension for both making sexually charged comments
in the workplace and falsifying 3M’s overtime records, a verbal warning for poor
attendance, a three day suspension for continued poor attendance, a verbal warning
for violating 3M’s badge policy, a verbal warning for unsatisfactory job
performance, and a five day suspension for leaving work without proper
permission. McGuire disputes the facts relating to some of these incidents. She
claims that she did not violate the badge policy, that she did not falsify documents,
and that she was not required to receive permission to leave her job. However, she
does not dispute being disciplined regarding these actions, and she does not argue
that these actions were motivated by discrimination.
The incident that ultimately led to McGuire’s termination occurred on July
15, 2012. McGuire was asked to work in the Bubbles factory from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00
p.m. after another employee said he was not going to work his shift. Tony Crump,
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another 3M employee, was on the schedule at the same time to work at the Maker
23 position at the Pavement Marking factory. What happened when Crump arrived
at the facility is in dispute. 3M claimed that McGuire told Crump that he could not
work in the Maker 23 position, saying, “Hell no. You can’t come in on no marker
[sic] … You have to go to the mill or we have to go home. One of us [will] have to
go home.” 1 (Doc. 24-1 at 13). This prompted Crump, “based on McGuire’s
unauthorized instruction,” to work in the Bubbles factory rather than in the
Pavement Marking factory where he was scheduled to work. Because of McGuire’s
“unauthorized interference,” 3M claims that it suffered “coverage issues that
disrupted production” through a temporary shutdown of machines. Additionally,
3M says it was forced to find a replacement equipment operator in the Pavement
Marking factory, incurring overtime expenses in the process.
McGuire, however, claims that when she encountered Crump, she told him,
“‘no, you can’t come in on the maker,’ — or I said, ‘Hell, no. You can’t come in
on no maker.’ And he — I said, ‘You have to go to the mill or we have to go home.’
One of us have to go home. And he said, ‘Why?’ I said, well because we forcing
somebody in — said somebody in the department. I said, ‘So one of us have to go

1

McGuire does not dispute saying this. Instead, she disputes what this statement meant and how
Crump interpreted it.
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home,’ and I said take it up with the leader, and I left it like that and went and got
dressed.” McGuire does not characterize what she said as an instruction to Crump.
McGuire additionally submitted an affidavit from Crump in which he stated
that McGuire did not instruct him to go to another position. Rather, he says that he
used his “own judgment based on 3M Company’s past customs, practices, and
policies” in going to a different location. (Doc. 27-1 at 4). Further, Crump states
that 3M did not experience any work stoppage or productions shutdown.
After this incident with Crump, 3M, in accordance with its normal policy,
held a fact finding meeting to determine what happened. A team made up of Plant
Manager Rodney Northam, Product Manager Mike Turner, Production Supervisor
Eric Estill, Product Manager Richard Wates, and Human Resources Manager
Matthew Collins began to investigate McGuire’s conduct. The team took
statements from McGuire, Crump, Team Leads in the Bubbles and Pavement
Marking factories, Aleta Dozier, Lisa Thompson, and other employees. According
to 3M, this investigation yielded statements from Crump, Dozier, and Thompson
that McGuire instructed Crump to work in the Bubbles factory and that her
interference caused the company to incur overtime expenses and to suffer a
temporary shutdown of machinery. The team decided to terminate McGuire on
August 8, 2012 for unsatisfactory job performance. 3M explained that this decision
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was the product of McGuire’s disciplinary history, which included numerous
incidents of disciplinary action in the twenty-six moths prior to her termination,
including three suspensions.
McGuire testified in her deposition about fourteen white employees whom
she claims were disciplined less severely than her. However, she either admitted
that she did not know the disciplinary history of thirteen of those employees or she
did not provide any evidence of their disciplinary histories. The closest statement
she made regarding one employee’s disciplinary history was that Pat Roberts called
in multiple times and told her supervisor that she could not work. Yet, McGuire
did not know Roberts’s reasons for being unable to work.
Finally, McGuire also submitted an affidavit from Gerry Whitman, a 3M
employee and former Union Representative at 3M. Whitman stated that he sat in a
meeting with Nina Thompson, another 3M employee, while she discussed
performance issues with 3M management. During the meeting, Whitman states
that Nina Thompson said that she heard Estill use racial comments when referring
to African-Americans.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). There is a “genuine dispute” as to a material fact “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The trial judge should not weigh the evidence
but must simply determine where there are any genuine issues that should be
resolved at trial. Id. at 249.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give
deference to the non-moving party by “considering all of the evidence and the
inferences it may yield in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” McGee
v. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Ellis
v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005)). In making a motion for summary
judgment, “the moving party has the burden of either negating an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact
necessary to the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. Although the trial courts must use
caution when granting motions for summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather
as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
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III.

DISCUSSION

McGuire argues that her termination from 3M was based on race in violation
of both Title VII and § 1981. The analysis for Title VII and § 1981 is the same, as
“the legal elements of the claims are identical.” Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d 1431,
1433 (11th Cir. 1985). The standard in a given discrimination case differs depending
on whether a plaintiff produces direct evidence of discrimination or circumstantial
evidence sufficient to allow an inference of discrimination. See Carter v. Three
Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641–643 (11th Cir. 1998). McGuire has
produced no direct evidence that she was fired because of her race, and relies
instead on circumstantial evidence that similarly situated white coworkers were
treated with more leniency than she was afforded.
In Title VII and § 1981 cases where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence, the Eleventh Circuit generally applies the burden-shifting scheme first
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under
McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff carries the initial burden of producing circumstantial
evidence sufficient to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. See Turlington v.
Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998). If the plaintiff meets
this burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Id. If the defendant
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produces evidence of a legitimate reason, then “the plaintiff must establish that the
employer’s articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext to mask
unlawful discrimination.” Id. The plaintiff’s burden to establish pretext applies to
all of the defendant’s proffered reasons. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012,
1024 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, when a defendant proffers more than one reason, a
plaintiff fails to meet this prong if she only establishes pretext as to one of those
reasons. Id.
A.

The Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case, McGuire must show that: (1) she is a member
of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was
qualified to perform the job; and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her
protected class were treated more favorably. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555,
1562 (11th Cir. 1997). The parties do not dispute that McGuire is a member of a
protected class, that she suffered an adverse employment action, or that she was
qualified for her job. However, the parties dispute whether similarly situated
employees of other races were treated more favorably.
McGuire presented evidence of fourteen other employees whom she
maintains engaged in similar misbehavior but were not disciplined as severely. Even
viewing the evidence of these fourteen employees in the light most favorable to
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McGuire, they are not sufficient comparators. The only evidence McGuire
presents on these fourteen employees is her deposition testimony. However,
McGuire either admits she does not know the disciplinary histories of thirteen of
the employees or she does not provide any evidence of their disciplinary histories.
Specifically, McGuire has not provided any evidence of an employee who was
disciplined for sleeping on the job, making sexually inappropriate comments,
falsifying overtime records, engaging in sustained attendance misbehavior, violating
company badge policy, and leaving work in violation of the company’s relief policy.
Because McGuire had an extensive disciplinary history and it contributed to her
termination, a proper comparator should likewise have an extensive disciplinary
history. Although she does not have to prove that a comparator engaged in identical
misbehavior, she is required to show, at least, that her comparator was “similarly
situated in all relevant respects.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.
1997).
McGuire did testify in her deposition that the fourteenth employee, Pat
Roberts, called in multiple times and told her supervisor that she could not come to
work. Even if this was evidence of Roberts’s disciplinary history, McGuire fails to
show how Roberts’s actions were comparable to hers. McGuire does not know
what reasons Roberts gave for not coming to work, and thus, she has not shown
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why Roberts’s conduct violated 3M policies. Having failed to present evidence of a
sufficient comparator, McGuire has failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Accordingly, 3M’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be
GRANTED on Plaintiff’s Title VII and Section 1981 claim.
B.

Proffered Legitimate Reasons and Pretext

Even if McGuire could establish a prima facie case of discrimination, she has
failed to show that 3M’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her
were pretextual. 3M’s proffered reasons for terminating McGuire are her “longstanding poor performance and misconduct,” including the July 15, 2012 incident.
Because 3M met the burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for termination, the burden shifts back to the McGuire to show that 3M’s
proffered reason is mere pretext for illegal discrimination. See Turlington, 135 F.3d
at 1432. Pretext can be demonstrated “either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Kragor v.
Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). “When a
plaintiff chooses to attack the veracity of the employer’s proffered reason, ‘[the]
inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its
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behavior.’” Kragor, 702 F.3d at 1310–1311.
McGuire argues that 3M’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for
terminating her are pretextual for five reasons. Four of these reasons are an attempt
by McGuire to contest 3M’s version of the July 15, 2012 incident, and the fifth
reason is an allegation that her supervisor made inappropriate racial comments in
the past. First, McGuire denies that she instructed Crump to work in a different
area, which would have overstepped her authority. Second, she alleges that her
supervisors were aware of her actions on July 15, 2012 shortly after they occurred
and tacitly sanctioned them. Third, McGuire asserts that 3M improperly
disciplined her for the July 15, 2012 incident. Fourth, she disputes 3M’s claim that
it incurred work stoppage from the July 15, 2012 incident. Finally, she claims that,
according to a coworker, one of the decision makers involved in her firing used
racial epithets to refer to African-Americans.
However, even if McGuire’s characterization of the July 15, 2012 incident is
correct, she has still not demonstrated that the management team who investigated
it was not truthful in finding that she overstepped her authority. 3M submitted the
following as an undisputed fact:
During their investigation, Northam, Turner, Estill, Wates, and
Collins obtained statements from McGuire, Crump, Aleta Dozier (a
Team Lead in the Bubbles factory), Lisa Thompson (a Team Lead in
the Pavement Marking factory), and other employees. Crump, Dozier,
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and Thompson reported that McGuire instructed Crump to work in
the Bubbles factory and that her interference forced the Company to
temporarily shut down machinery and to incur overtime expenses.
(Doc. 24-1 at 14, ¶ 37). McGuire disputes the facts in this paragraph, but she does
not provide a basis for her dispute. 2 In later paragraphs, she cites to an affidavit
from Crump in which he states that McGuire did not instruct him on where to
work and the incident caused no shut down, but she does not provide any evidence
contradicting 3M’s assertions as to Dozier and Lisa Thompson. Without
evidentiary support for her dispute as to Dozier and Lisa Thompson’s accounts of
the incident, the Court cannot find that it is in dispute. Accordingly, those two
employees undisputedly reported that McGuire instructed Crump to work in the
Bubbles factory and that her actions caused a machinery shutdown.
As such, McGuire has not cast doubt on 3M’s veracity when it relied on
these employees’ reports in terminating McGuire. To show pretext, McGuire must
show that 3M was not truthful when it says that it relied on the July 15, 2012
incident to terminate her. McGuire failed to do this. At most, McGuire disputes
what actually happened in the incident, but what actually happened is not
necessarily relevant to pretext. She did not dispute that 3M got statements from
2

The Court’s Uniform Initial Order (Doc. 9) requires that “[a]ny statements of fact that are
disputed by the non-moving party must be followed by a specific reference to those portions of
the evidentiary record upon which the dispute is based.” McGuire neither explained her dispute
nor provided a citation to the evidentiary record.
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Dozier and Thompson evidencing that McGuire overstepped her authority, and as
a result, she did not show that their reliance on this statements is “unworthy of
credence.” Kragor, 702 F.3d at 1308.
Finally, although McGuire provides evidence that Estill used a racial epithet
at some point in time, it is inadmissible hearsay. The evidence is an affidavit from
Whitman in which he recounts hearing Nina Thompson say that she heard Estill
use a racial epithet.

3

Although the alleged statement by Estill is potentially not

hearsay—either because it is not being offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted or because it is an opposing party’s statement, see Fed. R. Evid. 801—Nina
Thompson’s statement to Whitman is hearsay. McGuire is offering Nina
Thompson’s statement, which was made outside of court, to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, that Estill made this statement. Because a party may not use
inadmissible hearsay to defeat summary judgment, the Court will not consider
Estill’s alleged use of a racial epithet. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (“A party may
object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence.”); Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316,
1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The general rule is that inadmissible hearsay ‘cannot be
3

McGuire does not even state what this racial epithet was. Even if it was not hearsay, the Court
would be very reluctant to rely on some unknown statement that may have been racial in nature
to show pretext—particularly when Estill was only one person on the five person team
investigating the matter.
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considered on a motion for summary judgment.’”) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug,
Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990)).
C.

Reasonable Inference of Discrimination

Finally, McGuire argues that the Court should not use the McDonnell
Douglas framework in this case. Instead, she argues that the Court should deny
summary judgment even in the absence of a comparator because enough
circumstantial evidence has been presented to create a “reasonable inference of
intentional discrimination.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 28
(11th Cir. 2011) (allowing a claim to survive summary judgment when a plaintiff
“presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the
employer’s discriminatory intent”). Even if the Court followed this approach,
McGuire has only presented one argument concerning the facts. She disputes 3M’s
characterization of the July 15, 2012 incident, specifically whether she instructed
Crump to work elsewhere and whether this caused work stoppage. However, this
alone is not enough to create a reasonable inference of intentional discrimination
because, as stated above, this dispute does not show that 3M was untruthful when
it terminated McGuire for the July 15, 2012 incident and her long disciplinary
history. Further, the only evidence of any type of racial animus is inadmissible
hearsay. Accordingly, McGuire has not presented enough evidence to create a
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reasonable inference of discrimination to persuade the Court to stray from the
McDonnell-Douglas framework.
IV.

CONCLUSION

McGuire failed to both prove a prima facie case of discrimination and
demonstrate pretext as to 3M’s proffered reasons for terminating her. Further,
McGuire has not presented evidence to create a reasonable inference of
discrimination. As a result, 3M’s motion for summary judgement is GRANTED,
and McGuire’s claims are dismissed. A separate order will be entered.
Done and Ordered this 1st day of August 2016.

L. SCOTT COOGLER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
182185

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