Dye v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 7/26/2016. (JLC)

FILED
2016 Jul-26 PM 04:43
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
BRANDY LEIGH DYE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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) Case No.: 6:15-CV-00237-VEH
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Brandy Leigh Dye (“Ms. Dye”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act. She seeks review of a final
adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”), who denied her application for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”). Ms. Dye timely pursued and exhausted her administrative remedies available
before the Commissioner. The case is thus ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
For the following reasons, the court AFFIRMS.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Dye was forty years old at the time of her hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Compare Tr. 171 with Tr. 43 . She has completed

the ninth grade. Tr. 50. Her past work experience includes employment as a grinder
and furniture sander. Tr. 88. She claims she became disabled on August 1, 2011, due
to back and neck problems. Tr. 171, 102. Her last period of substantial work ended
in August 2008, though she continues to clean offices on a part-time basis. Tr. 218,
68-69. On July 10, 2012, Ms. Dye protectively filed a Title II application for a period
of disability and DIB. Tr. 28. On August 28, 2012, the Commissioner initially denied
her application. Id. Ms. Dye timely filed a written request for a hearing on October
5, 2012. Id. The ALJ conducted a hearing on the matter on June 5, 2013. Id. On July
24, 2013, she issued her opinion concluding Ms. Dye was not disabled and denying
her benefits. Tr. 25. Ms. Dye timely petitioned the Appeals Council to review the
decision on August 6, 2013. Tr. 24. On January 9, 2015, the Appeals Council issued
a denial of review on her claim. Tr. 1.
Ms. Dye filed a Complaint with this court on February 9, 2015, seeking review
of the Commissioner’s determination. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner answered on June
18, 2015. (Doc. 8). Ms. Dye filed a supporting brief (Doc. 10) on August 12, 2015,
and the Commissioner responded with her own (Doc. 11) on September 1, 2015. With
the parties having fully briefed the matter, the court has carefully considered the
record and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.
The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner
is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,
1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence
is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id
This court must uphold factual findings that are supported by substantial
evidence. However, it reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no
presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal
standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the
court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide
the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has
been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d
1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).

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STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a
period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act
and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.1 The Regulations define “disabled” as
“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to
disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence about a “physical or mental
impairment” that “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant
is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)

whether the claimant is currently employed;

(2)

whether the claimant has a severe impairment;

1

The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. Parts
400 to 499, revised as of March 26, 2015
4

(3)

whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed
by the [Commissioner];

(4)

whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and

(5)

whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national
economy.

Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable
C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 56263 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will automatically be
found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment If the claimant does not
have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the burden shifts to the
[Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy
in significant numbers. Id
FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
After consideration of the entire record, the ALJ made the following findings:
1.

Ms. Dye met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2011. Tr. 30.

2.

She had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2011,
the alleged disability onset date, through her last insured date of
December 31, 2011. Id.
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3.

She had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of
the cervical and lumbar spine, history of acute episodes of bronchitis,
and anxiety disorder. Tr. 31

4.

She did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id.

5.

She had the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) to occasionally lift
and carry up to twenty pounds and frequently lift and/or carry up to ten
pounds. She can stand and/or walk in combination, with normal breaks,
for at least six hours during an eight hour workday and sit, with normal
breaks, for up to eight hours during an eight hour workday. She can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs and should never climb ladders,
ropes or scaffolds. The claimant can frequently balance, occasionally
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She should not be required to perform
push/pull movements or operate foot controls. She should avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme cold and working in areas of
vibration. She should avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary
irritants. She should avoid exposure to industrial hazards. She can
perform simple routine tasks requiring no more than short simple
instructions and simple work related decision making with few workplace changes. She can have frequent interactions with co-workers and
supervisors and members of the general public. Tr. 32.

6.

She was unable to perform any past relevant work. Tr. 36.

7.

She was 39 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 1849, on the date last insured. Id.

8.

She has a limited education and is able to communicate in English. Id.

9.

Transferability of job skills was not material to the determination of
disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework
supported a finding that she was “not disabled,” whether or not she had
transferable job skills. Id.

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10.

Considering her age, education, work experience, and residual
functioning capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers
in the national economy that she could perform. Id.

11.

Ms. Dye had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, from August 1, 2011, through the date last insured. Tr. 37.
ANALYSIS

I.

INTRODUCTION
The court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “This does not relieve the court of its
responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial
evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672
F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th
Cir. 1980)).2 However, the court “abstains from reweighing the evidence or
substituting its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).
Ms. Dye urges this court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision to deny her
benefits on three grounds. First, she claims that the ALJ improperly discounted her
personal testimony of her pain level. (Doc. 10 at 11-12). Second, she claims that the
hypothetical questions posed to the VE were improper because they failed to take into

2

Strickland is binding precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d
1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former
Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981).
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account her back brace and her bladder problems. (Doc. 10 at 13-14). Third, Ms. Dye
claims that the ALJ failed to develop the record by not ordering an additional
consultative examination before making her decision to exclude Ms. Dye’s claimed
bladder impairment in the hypothetical questions. (Id. at 14).
II.

THE ALJ’S DECISION TO DISCOUNT MS. DYE’S SUBJECTIVE
LEVEL OF PAIN AND OTHER SYMPTOMS IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
In determining whether to credit a claimant’s subjective testimony of pain or

other symptoms, the Eleventh Circuit pain standard requires:
(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective
medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising
from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical
condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give
rise to the alleged pain.
Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Holt v. Sullivan, 921
F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)).
A claimant’s statements about pain or other symptoms do not alone establish
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (“[T]here must be medical signs and
laboratory findings which show that you have a medical impairment(s) which could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which,
when considered with all of the other evidence . . . would lead to a conclusion that
you are disabled.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) (same). However, “[a] claimant’s
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subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the pain standard
is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561 (citing
Holt, 921 F.2d at 1223). When an impairment that could reasonably be expected to
produce the symptom(s) alleged has been shown, the intensity and persistence of the
symptom(s), such as pain, will be evaluated based on all the evidence. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c) (setting forth factors that can be used in evaluating pain); 20
C.F.R. § 4016.929(c) (same). Further, “[i]f the ALJ decides not to credit a claimant’s
testimony as to her pain, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing
so.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561-62.
Ms. Dye reportedly suffered from chronic cervical and lumbar pain. (Tr. 255,
259). In applying the Eleventh Circuit pain standard, the ALJ confirmed the existence
of degenerative disc disease that would cause some degree of cervical and lumbar
pain, but concluded that objective medical evidence did not confirm the alleged
severity of Ms. Dye’s pain and her other subjective symptoms. See Tr. 33 (“The
objective medical evidence . . . is inconsistent with allegations of disabling levels of
pain and other subjective complaints prior to the expiration of her insured status.”).
The ALJ discounted Ms. Dye’s claimed disabling pain level on several
different grounds. One factor she relied upon was medical evidence that contradicted
the degree of Ms. Dye’s subjective symptoms. For example, on December 7, 2011,
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a nerve connection test was performed by Farouk Raquib, M.D. (“Dr. Raquib”) (Tr.
288-94, 259) and the results were “essentially . . . normal” for Ms. Dye’s upper
extremities. See Tr. 33 (ALJ’s relying upon results of nerve connection study); see
also Tr. 308 (Dr. Raquib’s indicating on August 16, 2012, that “[n]erve conduction
study was essentially unremarkable on December 7, 2011”). When physically
examined by Dr. Raquib on November 29, 2011, Ms. Dye had a tenderness in her
lumbar muscles, but generally was not “in distress” and the review of her neck was
“unremarkable.” Tr. 254; see Tr. 33 (ALJ’s referencing physical examination results).
In fact, in contrast to Ms. Dye’s pain testimony during her June 2013 hearing,
the record reveals a downward trend in Ms. Dye’s pain intensity as reported to Dr.
Raquib. Ms. Dye’s self-evaluation of her pain was a 6 of 10 on August 6, 2012 (Tr.
310), improved to a 4 of 10 on October 8, 2012 (Tr. 326), and improved to a 3 of 10
on March 29, 2013. Tr. 357. See also Tr. 34 (ALJ’s inclusion of Ms. Dye’s selfevaluation of pain in decision). Though unmentioned by the ALJ, on December 4,
2012, Dr. Raquib reported that Ms. Dye had “increased cervical muscle tone” and
“full range of neck movement without significant pain.”3 Tr. 336. All of this medical
evidence substantially supports the ALJ’s discounted pain determination.

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Despite this observation concerning Ms. Dye’s insignificant level of pain in her neck, Dr.
Raquib nonetheless conclusorily indicated on this same report that her “[p]ain is disabling[.]” Tr.
336.
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Evidence of other inconsistencies supports the ALJ’s application of the
Eleventh Circuit pain standard as well. For example, Ms. Dye testified during her
hearing in 2013 that she was able to work for at least 1.5-2 hours per day cleaning
offices for a lumber yard, including dusting and emptying garbage cans. Tr. 58, 6869, 182; see Tr. 34 ([T]he claimant testified at the hearing that she was able to start
cleaning offices for 9-10 hours per week starting in April 2013 . . .”)4 Though not
constituting substantial gainful employment, this part-time work is still a relevant
factor to consider in evaluating Ms. Dye’s reported level of pain. See Wolfe v. Chater,
86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996) (cleaning mobile homes part of substantial
evidence supporting decision to discount subjective pain evidence).
Prior to this part-time cleaning work, Ms. Dye testified that she applied for and
received unemployment compensation until exhausting it in June 2011. Tr. 83. The
ALJ pointed out that, in applying for unemployment benefits, Ms. Dye was required
under Alabama law to certify that she “was ‘physically and mentally able to perform
work of a character which [s]he is qualified to perform by past experience or training
and [s]he is available for such work . . . ’” Tr. 35. As this court has previously held,
4

The ALJ relied on Ms. Dye’s hearing testimony to note that she worked at least “9-10 hours
per week” (Tr. 34, 35), but at other points in the record it appears that Ms. Dye may have been
working more. At different points, she reported to Dr. Raquib that she was working 20 hours per
week (Tr. 353) and 50 hours per week. See Tr. 266 (“She is having more breakthrough pain as she
is now working 50 hours a week.”). The court’s conclusions are based on the lower amount that the
ALJ used.
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while receipt of unemployment benefits standing alone is not sufficient to discredit
a claimant’s subjective complaints about pain and other symptoms, it is a relevant
factor “if unemployment compensation is not the only reason supporting the ALJ’s
negative credibility finding.” Sasnette v. Colvin, No. 5:14-CV-0362-VEH (Doc. 13
at 17) (N.D. Ala. July 21, 2015) (emphasis omitted).
Ms. Dye also took care of her three-year old granddaughter. Tr. 62; see Tr. 34
(ALJ’s observing that Ms. Dye “has been the primary caregiver for her infant
granddaughter”). Evidence that Ms. Dye performed household chores such as
laundry, shopped for groceries and household items weekly, and experienced no
problems with handling her personal care also supports the ALJ’s pain conclusion.
See Tr. 208-210 (detailing daily activities); see Tr. 34 (ALJ’s pointing out that Ms.
Dye “was able to live independently in her own residence and care for her personal
needs without assistance”). It is reasonable to conclude, as the ALJ does, that if her
level of pain was as high as she claimed, Ms. Dye would not have been able to
perform these physically-demanding tasks on a sustained basis. See Tr. 34 (“The
claimant’s daily activities are . . . inconsistent with disabling levels of pain and other
subjective complaints.”). Though such daily actions–in short duration–are not
sufficient evidence alone to discount a claimant’s subjective pain testimony, Lewis
v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1997), they can still be considered as part
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of the overall substantial evidence inquiry. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1226-27 (using
daily activities, with other factors, as sufficient evidence to discount subjective
evaluation of pain). Thus, considering both the medical and non-medical evidence,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s discrediting of Ms. Dye’s claimed level of
pain and other subjective symptoms.
III.

THE ALJ’S DECISION TO EXCLUDE THE BACK BRACE AND
BLADDER PROBLEMS IN HER HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS TO
THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT WAS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence,

the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question that comprises all of the claimant’s
impairments. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227 (11th Cir. 2002). An ALJ, however, is “not
required to include findings in the hypothetical that the ALJ ha[s] properly rejected
as unsupported.” Crawford v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir.
2004); see also Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“The characteristics that the administrative law judge omitted are among
those that Ingram alleged to suffer but were either not supported by her medical
records or were alleviated by medication.”).
Ms. Dye reported on her functional assessment signed on August 6, 2012, that
she was prescribed a back brace “about 6 months ago” or in February 2012. Tr. 213.

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Ms. Dye’s medical record reflects that the back brace was actually prescribed by Dr.
Raquib on November 6, 2012 (Tr. 333), nearly a year after her date last insured of
December 31, 2011. Tr. 30. When the ALJ questioned Ms. Dye about the brace, she
indicated that it was prescribed after she fell in the latter part of 2012. Tr. 70. While
Ms. Dye was not wearing the brace during her hearing, she testified that she wears it
when she “wash[es] a load of clothes” or “when [she] work[s] in the evening.” Tr. 70.
The ALJ appropriately omitted any reference to a back brace from the
hypothetical questions as this medical evidence falls significantly beyond the date last
insured, including even the apparent triggering event resulting in Ms. Dye’s need for
the back brace. Cf. Saxon v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-782-VEH, 2015 WL 4999700, at
*6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 21, 2015) (finding no error in ALJ’s foregoing request for medical
records post-dating period of disability by five years); id. (“Mrs. Saxon has . . . failed
to give any explanation of how testing conducted in 2011 would have yielded
information about her mental condition five to ten years prior (i.e. in the period
between her alleged onset of disability and her date last insured).”); cf. also Leiter v.
Astrue, No. 5:08-CV-1453-VEH, (Doc. 16 at 15) (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2009) (“While
these records [post-dating the ALJ’s decision] may impact any future claims to
benefits by Ms. Leiter, they are not chronologically relevant to her previously filed
DIB and SSI claims.”).
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Ms. Dye does not cite to any record evidence establishing that a medical
provider considered possibly fitting her for a back brace prior to her date last insured
or at any other time until it was formally prescribed by Dr. Raquib in November 2012.
Ms. Dye also does not explain why the prescription for the brace–tied to a fall
occurring around that same time–is indicative of a declining lumbar condition before
her date last insured nearly one year earlier. Cf. Ward v. Astrue, No. 300-CV-1137-JHTS, 2008 WL 1994978, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2008) (“Evidence post-dating an
individual’s insured status may be relevant and properly considered if it bears upon
the severity of the claimant’s condition before the expiration of his or her insured
status.”) (emphasis added); cf. also Tr. 35 (ALJ’s pointing out that “there is little to
any evidence of a significant deterioration in the claimant’s medical condition since
that layoff and the claimant’s date last insured of December 31, 2011.”). Therefore,
the record does not substantiate that Ms. Dye’s back brace is relevant to the period
before her date last insured and the ALJ did not err when she omitted it from her
hypothetical questions.
The ALJ also found that Ms. Dye had not shown that she was suffering from
a prolapsed bladder at any time and, therefore, certainly not by the date last insured.
Tr. 31. As such, the ALJ was not required to include a diagnosis of prolapsed bladder
in her hypothetical questions. Her decision to omit it is supported by substantial
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evidence; more accurately, it is supported by the complete lack of medical evidence
within the record that confirms its existence. Though Ms. Dye reported that her
bladder had “fallen” (Tr. 77), the ALJ found that no doctor in her medical record had
diagnosed this or found any problem with Ms. Dye’s bladder. In fact, prior to her
administrative hearing, Ms. Dye routinely reported the absence of any urinary
problems. See, e.g., Tr. 270 (“patient denies frequency, urgency. . .”); see also 254,
258, 262, 266, 274 (other examples of similar reports to her doctors); but see Tr. 77
(Ms. Dye’s testimony before ALJ about having urinary issues). Further, when Ms.
Dye was examined by Wilton R. Holman III, M.D. (“Dr. Holman”), he expressly
found her “bladder [to be] unremarkable.” Tr. 319. Therefore, in the absence of any
medical documentation indicating that Ms. Dye had a prolapsed bladder, especially
during the period before the date last insured, the ALJ did not err by excluding this
claimed but undiagnosed condition from her hypothetical questions to the VE.
IV.

THE ALJ DID NOT NEGLECT HER DUTY TO DEVELOP THE
RECORD BY NOT ORDERING AN ADDITIONAL CONSULTATIVE
EXAMINATION.
Ms. Dye alternatively argues that even if the ALJ did not err by failing to

include a prolapsed bladder in the hypothetical questions, the ALJ still should have
sent her for an additional consultative examination to determine the validity and
vocational impact of her claimed bladder condition. (Doc. 10 at 14). The ALJ has a
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duty to develop the record fully and fairly. Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citing Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422-23(11th Cir. 1997)). In order
to be supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ must have before her sufficient facts
upon which to make an informed decision. Ford v. Sec. of Health & Human Serv.,
659 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Regulations permit the ALJ to order a consultative examination when the
claimant’s medical sources cannot or will not give sufficient medical evidence
regarding the claimant’s impairment to make an informed decision about disability.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. Further, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “[i]t is
reversible error for an ALJ not to order a consultative examination when such an
evaluation is necessary for him to make an informed decision.” Reeves v. Bowen, 841
F.2d 383, 385 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Ford, 659 F.2d at 69); see also Caulder v.
Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 878 (11th Cir. 1986) (requiring the ALJ to order a consultative
examination when it is recommended by a physician and fills a gap in the material
facts). However, the Eleventh Circuit also has held that the ALJ’s duty to develop the
record does not include ordering a consultative examination when the record contains
sufficient evidence upon which the ALJ can make an informed decision. Ingram, 496
F.3d at 1269.
For the same reasons the ALJ did not err in omitting Ms. Dye’s claimed
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prolapsed bladder in her hypothetical questions, there was no duty to develop the
record concerning this dubious condition. There was sufficient evidence in the record
that the ALJ relied on to make an informed decision about Ms. Dye’s disability claim,
including specifically the ALJ’s finding that the record did not substantiate “the
claimant’s allegations of a prolapsed bladder to be a medically determinable
impairment . . . .” Tr. 31. Prior to her date last insured, Ms. Dye denied having any
urinary issues on several different doctor visits. See, e.g., Tr. 270. Further, a doctor
examining Ms. Dye’s bladder prior to the date last insured found that it was
“unremarkable.” Tr. 319. In sum, the record is devoid of a prolapsed bladder
diagnosis or even confirmation of any bladder difficulties from an acceptable medical
source. Given this unambiguous medical information already in the record, the ALJ
was under no obligation to order a further medical examination to make an informed
decision. The record was developed sufficiently and the ALJ’s disability decision was
based on substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the court’s evaluation of the evidence in the record and the parties’
submissions, the court finds that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence and that she applied proper legal standards in arriving at it.
Accordingly, the decision will be affirmed by separate order.
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DONE and ORDERED this the 26th day of July, 2016.

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge

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