Doe v. Avid Life Media Inc et al

Filing 1

COMPLAINT against Avid Dating Life Inc, Avid Life Media Inc, filed by John Doe.(PSM)

FILED
2015 Aug-26 AM 10:53
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JOHN DOE (an alias)
On behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated
Plaintiffs,
v.
AVID LIFE MEDIA, INC. a corporation, and
AVID DATING LIFE, INC. d/b/a ASHLEY
MADISON
Defendants.

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CASE NO:
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class action against Defendants AVID LIFE
MEDIA, INC. and AVID DATING LIFE, INC., d/b/a Ashley Madison (“Defendants”) on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated. Except as to his own actions, Plaintiff avers the
following allegations upon information and belief of the investigation of his counsel and the facts
that are a matter of public record:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff brings this class action as a result of Defendants failure to adequately protect
AshleyMadison.com members’ private personal and financial information from being
disseminated to the public. Defendants allowed a group of hackers, known as “The Impact Team,”
to access, download, and make public Plaintiff’s personal and financial information. Such personal
information included, but is not limited to, the putative Class Members’ names, addresses, credit
or debit card information, the card’s expiration date, and/or the card’s security code, as well as
how much each Class Member spent purchasing services at AshleyMadison.com.

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The Plaintiff and putative Class Members assert claims against the Defendants for breach
of federal statute, state statute, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, fraud, negligence,
bailment, and conversion. Plaintiff and the Class he intends to represent seek to recover damages,
including actual, statutory, punitive damages, and equitable relief, including injunctive relief to
prevent the recurrence of this security breach and resulting injury, restitution, disgorgement and
reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which

confers upon this Court original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the laws of the
United States, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2707. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §1367.
2.

Further, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1332(d)(2)(A) because this case is a class action where the aggregate claims of all Members of
the putative Classes are in excess of $5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, and many of
the Members of the putative Classes are citizens of different states than Defendant. This Court has
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(d).
3.

Venue is properly set in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) since

Defendant transacts business within this judicial district. Likewise, a substantial part of the events
giving rise to the claim occurred within this judicial district.

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PARTIES
4.

Plaintiff John Doe is an adult male domiciled in Marion County, Alabama and is a

citizen of Alabama. John Doe provided both personal and financial information to Defendants in
order to access Defendants’ services. John Doe’s information was compromised as a result of
Defendants’ lack of adequate security measures. As a result of this compromise, Doe has suffered
losses and damages in an amount not yet quantifiable.1
5.

Upon information and belief, Defendants Avid Life Media, Inc. and Avid Dating

Life, Inc. are organized under Canadian law and their principal places of business are located in
Toronto, Canada.
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS

6.

Ashley Madison is a Canadian-based online dating service and social networking

service marketed to people who are married or in a committed relationship. Its slogan is “Life is
short. Have an affair.” Its website, AshleyMadison.com, is owned by Avid Dating Life, Inc., a
subsidiary of Avid Life Media, Inc., both of which are privately held Canadian corporations.
7.

Defendants market AshleyMadison.com to consumers in the United States as well

as fifty-two (52) other countries. In total, the website has approximately thirty-nine (39) million
customers. It is rated the twentieth most popular adult website in the United States, and is marketed
through television, radio, billboard, and internet advertisements.
8.

The website’s business model is based upon credits, which users purchase in order

to facilitate a contact with another member. Anyone is permitted to create a “free” account at

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At this time, Plaintiff brings this litigation under an alias to prevent public disclosure of his
identity and to protect information highly sensitive and personal to him and to prevent further
invasion of privacy. Plaintiff will disclose his identity to Defendants’ counsel and/or this Court
upon demand and pursuant to a protective order entered by the Court.
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AshleyMadison.com, even someone who desired to create an account using a friend or
acquaintance’s email account. AshleyMadison.com does not verify emails to ensure that the person
applying for an account was the actual owner of the offered email address.
9.

On or about July 15, 2016, and at other times prior to this date, Defendants’

customer databases were compromised, which resulted in personal information of the Plaintiff and
Class Members being used, or at risk of being used, in fraudulent transactions around the world,
as well as the disclosure to the public that each Class Member had an account with Ashley
Madison.
10.

Upon information and belief, the personal information of approximately 39 million

subscribers was taken from Defendants, and Defendants’ failure to protect the Plaintiff and Class
Members credit/debit card information affected hundreds of thousands, if not millions of
customers worldwide.
11.

On or about July 19, 2015, The Impact Team made public that it possessed personal

and financial information for AshleyMadison.com subscribers. The Impact Team team gave
AshleyMadison.com an ultimatum – shut down the site or risk the release of all of your customers’
personal and financial information.
12.

AshleyMadison.com, who prides itself as a 100% discrete service and guarantees

that member information is protected, did not heed The Impact Team’s ultimatum, and on August
20, 2015, millions of current and former account holders at AshleyMadison.com had their personal
and financial information released to the public.
13.

Published reports indicate that the personal and financial information of millions of

Defendants’ current and former customers from around the United States has been compromised
as a result of this data/security breach. The ongoing aftermath reveals that AshleyMadison.com

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failed to follow common security protocols and lacked any meaningful policies and procedures
related to the protection of customer data.
14.

Although Ashley Madison’s lapse in any meaningful security protocols was/is a

grave injustice and has caused damage to millions worldwide, it gets worse. AshleyMadison.com
was not like other websites that allowed a user to delete one’s account if he were dissatisfied or no
longer used the account. Rather, AshleyMadison.com only allowed a member to either make
his/her account invisible to the public or pay $19 dollars to have his/her account and all correlating
information deleted forever. The Impact Team’s recent revelations have revealed that this $19
service was a complete scam.
15.

Moreover, upon learning of the data/security breach, Defendants failed to notify the

Plaintiff and/or the putative Classes within a reasonable time and failed to inform the Plaintiff and
Classes of the nature and extent of the breach. As a result, Defendants deprived the Class Members
of the ability to protect themselves and mitigate their damages to prevent further personal and
financial injuries.
16.

The disclosure of Plaintiff’s and the putative Class Members’ private personal

information, not to mention the fact that an AshleyMadison.com account existed, is likely to and
has caused the Plaintiff and Class Members extreme emotional distress/embarrassment, disruption
of/interference with Plaintiff’s personal and social life, and/or economic loss.
17.

The disclosure of Plaintiff’s and the putative Class Members’ private financial

information subjects the Classes to a heightened risk of fraud, fraudulent charges, and/or identity
theft. Both the personal and financial information is at serious and ongoing risk of misuse because
anyone with a computer can obtain this private information because of Defendants’ failure to
protect their customers’ data.

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18.

If a member is unsatisfied or no longer interested in having an account with

AshleyMadison.com, they are permitted to hide their account at no cost. However, if a member
wants assurance that their account had been permanently erased, he/she must pay a $19 fee
(referred to herein as “Paid-Delete”). The Paid-Delete option claimed to remove user profiles, all
messages sent and received, site usage history, personally identifiable information and photos from
the site. Unfortunately, the recent disclosures provided by The Impact Team reveal that the Paid
Delete feature was a fraud, and all data existed and was recoverable.
Account Creation

19.

To create an account on AshleyMadison.com, users are required to select a

username and password, personalize a greeting, indicate location (by country), zip code, date of
birth, type of affair sought – the options provided are short term, long term, cyber affair/erotic
chat, or other – height, weight, body type, ethnicity and email.
20.

Below the box where users are asked to enter their “email,’ the website promises:

“This email will never be shown or shared.”
21.

The website also asks each user to upload a “discrete photo” and offers options of

either placing a mask over the user’s eyes on the photo or blurring the photo.
22.

In the “Manage Profile” section, users may enter information relating to “My

Intimate Desires” “My Perfect Match” and “My Personal Interests,” among other information.
23.

Upon information and belief, Defendants store the users’ personal information they

collect in an unencrypted format at the database level.2 Despite these security threats that may have

2

http://mashable.com/2015/08/20/ashleymadison-hack-security/ (last visited August 24, 2015)
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even been internally discovered by Defendants’ internal officers and/or directors, Defendants
published on the internet a statement calling itself “the last truly secure space on the Internet.”
Allegations Specific to Plaintiff Doe
24.

On or about July 2012, Plaintiff created an account with AshleyMadison.com. As

part of the process of creating his account, Plaintiff created a username and password and entered
his personal information into the website’s system. Plaintiff subsequently purchased credits with
his credit card and utilized Ashley Madison’s services.
25.

On August 21, 2015, Plaintiff Doe became aware that his information had been

released to the public and had friends, customers, and neighbors apprise him of their awareness
that he had an account with AshleyMadison.com. Plaintiff and his fiancée have also received
countless embarrassing messages from friends and family on Facebook and through other social
media forums.
26.

Plaintiff was not in a relationship at the time he accessed the site, however, he is

now in a committed relationship with his soon to be wife, and they have suffered much
embarrassment and emotional distress as a result of Ashley Madison’s failure to protect Plaintiff’s
private information.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

27.

Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as

a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 23, and seeks to represent the following National
Classs and Alabama sub-Class:
a. National Class 1: All individuals in the United States who created an
account at AshleyMadison.com, or had accounts created on their behalf,
and whose information was downloaded and leaked to the public.

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b. National Class 2: All individuals in the United States who created an
account at AshleyMadison.com and took advantage of the Paid-Delete
function, and whose information was leaked to the public.
Alternatively, if the Court determines that class certification is not feasible on a national
basis:

c. Alabama Class 1: All individuals residing in Alabama who created an
account at AshleyMadison.com, or had an account created on their
behalf, whose information was downloaded and leaked to the public.
d. Alabama Class 2: All individuals residing in Alabama who created an
account at AshleyMadison.com and took advantage of the Paid-Delet
function, and whose information was leaked to the public.
28.

The “Class Period” is from the date of the breach to date.

29.

Excluded from the proposed Class are governmental entities, Defendants, officers,

directors, and employees of Defendant, and the Judge assigned to this action and his staff.
30.

This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action

under Rule 23 because it satisfies the class action prerequisites of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy:

a. Numerosity: Individual joinder of the Class members would be wholly
impracticable. There are in excess of thirty-nine (39) million individuals who
created accounts with AshleyMadison.com and whose information was
disclosed by The Impact Team.
b. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common for each Class that
predominate over questions affecting only individual class members. The
wrongs suffered and remedies sought are premised upon deceptive and

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unlawful conduct on the part of all Defendants. The principal common issues
include, but are not limited to, the following:
a. Whether Defendants engaged in the wrongful or negligent conduct
alleged herein;
b. Whether Defendants’ conduct was deceptive, unfair, and/or unlawful;
c. Whether Defendants used reasonable security measures to protect its
users and Class Members’ personal and financial information
d. Whether Defendants breached their duty to provide timely and
accurate notice of the security breach to Plaintiff;
e. Whether Defendants knew or should have known that its security
measures were inadequate and vulnerable to cyber-attack;
f. Whether Defendants misrepresented the security of their systems;
g. Whether Defendants caused private facts about Plaintiff and Class
Members to be publicly revealed;
h. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to recover actual
damages, statutory damages, and/or punitive damages; and
i. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to restitution,
disgorgement, and/or other equitable relief.
c. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiff and
all Class Members were injured through the uniform misconduct described
above and assert the same claims for relief.
d. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is a member of the Class and will fairly
and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members.
Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with those of Class Members. Counsel who
represent the Plaintiff are competent and experienced in litigating class actions,
and will devote sufficient time and resources to the case and otherwise
adequately represent the Class.

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e. Superiority of Class Action: A class action is superior to other available means
for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Individual joinder of
all Class Members is not practicable, and questions of law and fact common to
the Class predominate over any questions affection only individual members of
the Class. Even if it were economically feasible, requiring hundreds of
thousands of injured plaintiffs to file individual suits would impose a high
burden on the court system and almost certainly lead to inconsistent judgments.
Alternatively, class treatment will present fewer management difficulties and
provide the benefits of a single adjudication, economies of scale, and
comprehensive supervision by a single court.
31.

Class certification is also appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Defendants

have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate as to the Classes as a whole.
32.

Finally, all members of the proposed Classes are readily ascertainable. Defendants,

as well as the public at large, have access to addresses and other contact information for members
of the Classes, which can be used to identify Class members.
CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT ONE
(Negligence)
33.

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

34.

Upon receiving Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal private information and

financial information, Defendant had (and continues to have) a duty to exercise reasonable care in
safeguarding and protecting member information from being accessed and/or stolen

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35.

Defendants also had a duty to timely disclose to the Plaintiff and Class Members

that a data/security breach had occurred and that their personal information, as well as their
financial information had been compromised, or was reasonably believed to be compromised.
36.

Defendants also had a duty to put into place internal policies and procedures

designed to detect and prevent the access to and/or dissemination of Plaintiff’s and Class
Members’ personal information.
37.

Defendants, by and through the above negligent acts and/or omissions, breached its

duty to the Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to exercise reasonable care in protecting and
safeguarding personal information in Defendants’ possession, custody, and control.
38.

Defendants, by and through the above negligent acts and/or omissions, further

breached its duty to the Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to put into place meaningful internal
policies and procedures designed to detect and prevent the unauthorized dissemination of
Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal information.
39.

Defendants, by and through the above negligent acts and/or omissions, breached its

duty to timely disclose the fact that Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ private information had been
or was reasonably believed to have been compromised.
40.

Plaintiff’s and Class Member’s personal information was compromised and/or

stolen as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach of its duties as set forth herein.
41.

The Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered actual damages including, but not

limited to, having their personal information disseminated to the public, incurring time and
expenses in cancelling their debit/credit cards, activating new credit cards and re-establishing
automatic payment authorizations from their new cards, and other economic and non-economic
damages, including irrecoverable losses due to unauthorized charges on their credit/debit cards.

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COUNT TWO
(Violation of the Federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §2702)

42.

The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) provides consumers with redress if a

company mishandles their electronically stored information (“ESI”). The SCA was designed, in
relevant part, “to protect individuals’ privacy interests in personal and proprietary information.”
S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986)
43.

Section 2702(a)(1) of the SCA provides that “a person or entity providing an

electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity
the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.” 18 U.S.C. §
2702(a)(1)
44.

The SCA defines “electronic communication service” as “any service which

provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” Id. at
§2510(15)
45.

Defendant provides an “electronic communication service to the public” within the

meaning of the SCA because it provides consumers at large with credit and debit card payment
processing capability that enables them to send or receive wire or electronic communications
concerning their private financial information to transaction managers, card companies, and/or
banks.
46.

By failing to take commercially reasonable steps to safeguard private financial

information, even after Defendants became aware that customers’ personal information had been
compromised, Defendants knowingly divulged customers’ financial information that was
communicated to financial institutions solely for customers’ payment verification purposes, while
in electronic storage in Defendants’ payment system.

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47.

Section 2702(a)(2)(A) of the SCA provides that “a person or entity providing

remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the
content of any communication which is carried or maintained on that service on behalf of, and
received by means of electronic transmission from (or created by means of computer processing
of communications received by means of electronic transmission form), a subscriber or customer
of such service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2)(A)
48.

The SCA defines “remote computing service” as “the provision to the public of

computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communication system.” 18
U.S.C. § 2711(2).
49.

An “electronic communications systems” is defined by the SCA as “any wire, radio,

electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or
electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the
electronic storage of such communications.” 18 U.S.C. §2510(4).
50.

Defendant provides remote computing services to the public by virtue of its

computer processing services for consumer credit and debit card payments, which are used by
customers and carried out by means of an electronic communications system, namely the use of
wire, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectric facilities for the transmission of wire or
electronic communications received from, and on behalf of, the customer concerning the
customer’s private financial information.
51.

By failing to take commercially reasonable steps to safeguard private financial

information, Defendant knowingly divulged customers’ financial information that was carried and
maintained on Defendants’ remote computing service solely for the customers’ payment
verification purposes.

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52.

As a result of Defendants’ conduct described herein and its violations of Section

2702(a)(1) and (2)(A), Plaintiff and putative Class Members have suffered injuries, including lost
money and the costs associated with the need for persistent credit monitoring to protect against
additional identity theft. Plaintiff, on his behalf and that of the putative classes, seek an order
awarding themselves and the Classes the maximum statutory damages available under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2707 in addition to the cost for three (3) years of credit monitoring services.

COUNT THREE
(Violation of Alabama’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act)
53.

Plaintiff adopts and realleges all preceding paragraphs as if fully incorporated

54.

Defendants violated the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ala. Code §8-19-

herein.

5, and the substantially similar statutes of other states in which it conducts business by failing to
properly implement adequate, commercially reasonable security measures to protect customers’
private financial information.
55.

Pursuant to the Act, it is unlawful to:
(2) Caus[e] confusion or misunderstanding as to the source sponsorship,
approval, or certification of goods or services
(7) Represent[] that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.
(27) Engaging in any other unconscionable, false, misleading, or deceptive
act or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce

Ala. Code §8-9-15
56.

Defendants fraudulent and deceptive omissions and misrepresentations as to the

security measures taken to protect Members’ personal and financial information was intended to

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deceive and induce the Plaintiff and Class Members’ to rely on Defendants’ misrepresentations
that the his/her personal and financial information was secure.
57.

Moreover, Defendants failure to delete member information after members paid

$19 to ensure deletion is unconscionable.
58.

Defendants’ unlawful misrepresentations and omissions occurred in the course of

conduct involving trade and commerce.
59.

Defendants’ unlawful misrepresentations and omissions were material because

Plaintiff and the other putative Class Members would not have risked compromising their private
financial information by using their debit or credit cards for Defendants’ services. Plaintiff and the
other putative Class Members would consider the omitted and misrepresented material facts
important in making their purchasing decisions.
60.

Defendants’ unlawful misrepresentations and omissions damaged Plaintiff and

other putative Class Members because Plaintiff and Class Members would not have chosen to
expose their private financial information to a security breach and subsequent exploitation by
Defendants.

COUNT FOUR
(Breach of Implied Contract)
61.

Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs as if fully stated herein.

62.

When Plaintiff and the Class members provided their private personal and financial

information to Defendants, they entered into implied contracts by which Defendants agreed to
protect their personal and financial information and to timely notify them in the event of a data
and/or security breach.

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63.

An implicit part of the agreement regarding Defendants’ use of the personal and

financial information was that Defendants would safeguard the information using reasonable or
industry-standard means and would timely notify Plaintiffs in the event of a data breach.
64.

Based upon this implicit understanding, Plaintiff and the Classes provided

Defendants with their personal and financial information
65.

Plaintiff and the Class Members would not have provided their personal and

financial information to the Defendants had they known that Defendants did not have proper
safeguards in place as promised or would not timely provide notice of a data/security breach.
66.

The Plaintiff and Class Members fully performed their obligations under the

implied contracts with the Defendants.
67.

Defendants breached the implied contracts by failing to safeguard the Plaintiff’s

and Class Members’ personal and financial information and by failing to provide them with timely
and accurate notice when the personal and financial information was compromised by the
data/security breach.
68.

The losses and damages that Plaintiff and the Class Members have sustained were

the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breaches of its implied contracts with them.

COUNT FIVE
(Breach of Contract)
69.

Plaintiff adopts and realleges all preceding paragraphs as if fully incorporated

70.

In exchange for payment of a fee, Defendants agreed to delete or erase a customer’s

herein.

personal and financial information from its systems/records

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71.

Class members paid the fee to have their information deleted or erased from

Defendants’ systems/records
72.

Defendant breached the contract with the Class Members by not deleting or erasing

their personal information as agreed.
73.

Class Members had their personal and financial information stolen as a result of the

data/security breach.
74.

Class Members have been damaged as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’

breach of contract.
COUNT SIX
(Bailment)
75.

Plaintiff adopts and realleges all preceding paragraphs as if fully incorporated

76.

Plaintiff and the Class Members delivered and entrusted their private information

herein.

to Defendants for the sole purpose of receiving services from Defendants.
77.

During the time of bailment, Defendant owed Plaintiff and Class Members a duty

to safeguard this information properly and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
to protect such information. Defendants breached this duty.
78.

As a result of this breach of duty, Plaintiff and the Class Members have suffered

79.

Plaintiff seeks actual damages on behalf of himself and the Classes.

harm

COUNT SEVEN
(Conversion)
80.

Plaintiff adopts and realleges all preceding paragraphs as if fully incorporated

herein.

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81.

Plaintiff and Class Members were the owners of their private information. As a

result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Defendants have interfered with the Plaintiff and Class
Members’ rights to possess and control such property, to which thy had a superior right of
possession and control at the time of conversion.
82.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class

Members suffered injury, damage, loss, and harm and therefore seek compensatory damages.
83.

In converting the Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal, private information,

Defendants have acted with malice, oppression and in conscious disregard of the Plaintiff’s and
Class Members’ rights. Resultantly, Plaintiff seeks an award of punitive damages on behalf of the
Class.
COUNT EIGHT
(Fraud and Misrepresentation)
(on behalf of National Class 2, or alternatively, Alabama Class 2)

84.

Plaintiff adopts and realleges all preceding paragraphs as if fully incorporated

85.

The Defendants represented to the Members of National Class 2 that if they paid

herein.

$19, that AshleyMadison.com would delete all account date and correlating personal and financial
information. Such representations were false at the time they were made. The Defendants knew
said representations were false and the representations were made in order to induce the Plaintiff
to pay monies to erase their account.
86.

As a result of the fraud and misrepresentation of the Defendants, the Members have

lost the benefit of the bargain and have been further damaged by recent data/security breach.

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87.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff demands judgment against the

Defendants in an amount of compensatory and punitive damages to be determined by a jury at a
trial of this cause.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Plaintiffs and the putative class members demand a jury trial as to all claims and issues triable of
right by a jury.

PRAYER FOR REILIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Members of the proposed Classes pray that this Court do
the following:
A. Certify the instant action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and order that notice be provided to all Class Members;
B. Designate Plaintiffs as representative of the Classes and the undersigned counsel as
Class Counsel;
C. Award Plaintiffs and the Classes compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to
be determined by the tier of fact;
D. Award Plaintiffs and the Classes statutory interest and penalties;
E. Award Plaintiffs and the Classes appropriate injunctive and/or declaratory relief;
F. Award Plaintiffs and the Classes their costs, prejudgment interest, and attorneys fees;
and
G. Any further relief the Court deems just.

Respectfully Submitted,

s/Thomas E. Baddley, Jr.
THOMAS E. BADDLEY, JR.

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s/Jeffrey P. Mauro
JEFFREY P. MAURO

s/John Parker Yates
JOHN PARKER YATES
BADDLEY & MAURO, LLC
850 Shades Creek Parkway, Ste. 310
Birmingham, AL 35209
205-939-0090
[e-mail]
[e-mail]
[e-mail]

Defendants’ address:
Avid Life Media, Inc.
Avid Dating Life, Inc.
20 Eglinton Avenue West
Ste. 1200, Box 2055
Toronto, On M4R 1K8

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