Woodruff v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 1/24/2018. (JLC)
FILED
2018 Jan-24 AM 11:01
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
KANDY WOODRUFF,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) Case No.: 6:16-CV-0593-VEH
)
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, ACTING )
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
)
SECURITY,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Kandy Woodruff (“Woodruff”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). Woodruff seeks a review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”), who denied her application for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”).
Woodruff filed her application on June 25, 2012. After that, Woodruff exhausted the
administrative remedies available before the Commissioner. This case is now ripe for
judicial review under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
After reviewing the entire record, this Court REVERSES and REMANDS the
Commissioner’s decision.
II.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Woodruff was 33 years old at the time of her hearing with the ALJ. (Tr. 14-16).
Her education is limited, but she can read and write in English. (Id. at 38-39, 56, 203).
Most of her past work is in retail and fast food. (Id. 214). The vocational expert
analyzed Woodruff’s past work experience as a cashier, fast food worker, and
managerial fast food worker. (Id. at 37-38). Woodruff claims disability based on
rheumatoid arthritis. (Id. at 204).
The alleged onset date is August 2, 2009. (Id. at 50). On June 25, 2012,
Woodruff filed an application for DIB and SSI. (Id.). The Social Security
Administration denied that application on September 7, 2012. (Id.). On April 21,
2014, Administrative Law Judge Cynthia W. Brown held a video hearing. (Id.). The
ALJ issued her decision on June 12, 2014, which was unfavorable to Woodruff. (Id.
at 50-58). The ALJ determined that Woodruff suffers from “chondromalicia; chronic
pain syndrome; morbid obesity; and sciatica.” (Id. at 53) (emphasis omitted). In her
opinion, the ALJ found that Woodruffs’s impairments did not meet the severity of the
ones included in the Code of Federal Regulations. (Id.). Woodruff requested the
Appeals Council review her claim. (Id. at 1-3). They refused. (Id.).
Woodruff filed her Complaint in the Northern District of Alabama on April 13,
2
2016. (Doc. 1). Woodruff filed her brief in support of her Complaint on June 26,
2017. (Doc. 11). The Commissioner responded on July 21, 2017. (Doc. 12).
III.
STANDARDS
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.
The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner
is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,
1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). This court will
determine that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence if it finds “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Id. Factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence must
be upheld by the court.
The ALJ’s legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo, because no
presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal
standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the
court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide
3
the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has
been conducted, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.
2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
IV.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a
period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act
and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.1 The Regulations define “disabled” as
“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to
disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence about a “physical or mental
impairment” that “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant
is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in
1
The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R.
Parts 400 to 499.
4
sequence:
(1)
whether the claimant is currently employed;
(2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3)
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment
listed by the [Commissioner];
(4)
whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and
(5)
whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the
national economy.
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable
C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 56263 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will
automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment.
If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her
work, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant
can perform some other job.
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy
in significant numbers. Id.
V.
FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
After considering the record, the ALJ made the following findings:
5
1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through March 31, 2015.
2.
The claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity during the
following periods: the second quarter of 2011 (Exhibit 5D) (20
CFR 404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.971 et
seq.).
3.
However, there has been a continuous 12-month period during
which the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity.
The remaining findings address the period(s) the claimant did not
engage in substantial gainful activity.
4.
The claimant has the following severe impairments:
chondromalicia; chronic pain syndrome; morbid obesity; and
sciatica (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
5.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
6.
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except the claimant must have the option to sit or
stand thirty (30) minutes at a time in performance of her duties.
She can occasionally reach overhead with the right upper
extremity.
7.
The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20
CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
8.
The claimant was born on [Redacted] and was 28 years old, which
is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged
disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
6
9.
The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate
in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
10.
Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of
disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a
framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,”
whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR
82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
11.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform
(20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
12.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from August 2, 2009, through the date of this
decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
(Tr. 12-17) (emphasis omitted).
VI.
ANALYSIS
A.
The ALJ’s Credibility Determination
“Where an agency's decision concerns specific persons based upon
determination of particular facts and the application of general principles to those
facts, courts ‘expect the parties to present specific evidence and closely reasoned
arguments, and ... demand that the decisionmaker's opinion indicate an appropriate
consideration of the evidence and arguments presented.’” Tieniber v. Heckler, 720
F.2d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Harborlite Corp. v. ICC, 613 F.2d 1088,
1093 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). “[W]here proof of a disability is based upon subjective
7
evidence and a credibility determination is, therefore, a critical factor in the
Secretary's decision, the ALJ must either explicitly discredit such testimony or the
implication must be so clear as to amount to a specific credibility finding.” Id.
Further, “[t]he evidence from the hearing is required to be recited in detail in
the ALJ's written decision.” Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 1985)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 404.953; Coward v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d
731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)). “[T]he ALJ should state the weight he accords to each
item of impairment evidence and the reasons for his decision to accept or reject that
evidence, including all testimony presented at the previous hearing or any subsequent
hearings.” Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing other
sources).
In this case, the Court is disturbed by the ALJ’s characterization of the
evidence. First, the ALJ states in her decision: “Despite the claimant’s allegations of
disabling pain, the claimant has not had any treatment since 2012 for any
impairment.” (Tr. 54) (emphasis added).2 However, the record clearly shows
treatment on February 19, 2013, by Dr. Lee. (Tr. 367) (noting that Woodruff was
there, in part, to follow up on her rheumatoid arthritis). Further, the hearing transcript
2
The Commissioner’s brief attempts to soften this broad statement by stating that
“[Woodruff] has had little to no treatment since 2012 for any impairment.” (See Doc. 12 at 10).
8
states the following:
[ALJ] All right, and then - - and then you went to Dr. Ali. When did you
start going to Dr. Ali?
[Woodruff] This month, April the 2nd.
(Tr. 33). The hearing took place on April 21, 2014. (Tr. 14). Thus, the record directly
contradicts the ALJ’s statement. It is one thing to discredit evidence, it is another to
ignore it, and it is yet another thing to say it does not exist. This is one reason that the
Court cannot determine if the ALJ did her job in reviewing the evidence in this case
and applying the correct law.
Second, the ALJ stated that “[t]he only limitation ever noted by her treating
physician is that her ability to sleep is affected by the pain.” (Tr. 54) (citing Exhibit
2F, page 2; Exhibits 1F-2F and 6F-7F). It is true that several of the reports list trouble
sleeping as an effect from pain. (See e.g., Tr. 277). However, on June 15, 2010, Dr.
Laubenthal noted in the “History Of Present Illness” that “[t]he pain is worse at all
times and [s]he states the pain does not radiate. She reports loss of motion. . . She is
unable to forward flex and externally rotate.” (Tr. 258). Even the same report that the
ALJ pincited to support her assertion, Exhibit 2F at page 2, notes that “[Woodruff]
has pain with range of motion of left knee. . . . She has pain with range of motion of
the right shoulder.” (Tr. 275). Also, Woodruff points out that Dr. Raquib noted
9
limitations in her ability to walk, stand, and sit. (Doc. 11 at 10) (citing Tr. 346). The
ALJ’s sweeping generalization is contradicted by the evidence.
Third, the ALJ notes that Woodruff claimed that “she has been unable to afford
treatment since getting a divorce and losing her insurance coverage.” (Tr. 54).
However, the ALJ does not adequately state how she considered that piece of
evidence in her overall analysis. (See Doc. 11 at 9-10). The Commissioner failed to
respond to Woodruff’s arguments on this point.
Fourth, there is some evidence indicating that Woodruff needed to “alternate
among sitting, standing, and walking every thirty minutes.” (Doc. 11 at 8); (c.f. Tr.
32, 346). The vocational expert’s testimony indicates that this is a crucial fact to
whether Woodruff could work in any job with those limitations:
[Woodruff’s Attorney] I need to make sure that I clearly understand your
testimony regarding the alternating sitting, standing, and walking every
30 minutes. Are you - - are you saying that there are no jobs that would
accommodate such a restriction, or were you saying something different
from that?
[Vocational Expert] No, I would - - I would say there are no jobs in
which she would - - you’d have to sit 30 minutes, walk 30 minutes, and
stand 30 minutes. I’d say that would erode the base considerably.
(Tr. 41-42). The ALJ noted the alleged limitations in walking, standing, and sitting
(Tr. 53), but she did not make a clear credibility finding on Woodruff’s purported
need to walk. The ALJ did determine that Woodruff “should be able to sit and stand
10
thirty (30) minutes at a time in an effort to reduce her pain from staying in one
position.” (Tr. 56). However, the Court cannot discern why the ALJ credited
Woodruff’s testimony on sitting and standing but not walking.3 Given the vocational
expert’s testimony, this is a crucial point.
Fifth, without citation, the ALJ wrote that, at the hearing, Woodruff stated that
“she is unable to do anything.” (Tr. 55) (emphasis added). However, that assertion is
not supported by the record. For example, at the hearing, Woodruff noted that she
tries to do the dishes. (Tr. 28-30). However, she cannot “stand[ ] in one place”
“without a break” for more than “three minutes” to wash dishes. (Id.). She doesn’t
dust. (Id.). She mops sometimes, “but it’s the same [problem] with washing dishes.”
(Id.).
The Court should not have to go back and check citations to the record to see
if they actually support the assertions in the ALJ’s decision. The fact that the Court
3
The Commissioner attempts to shore up the ALJ’s deficiencies in her brief. (Doc. 12 at
11). In doing so, the Commissioner cites to the entirety of finding of fact/conclusion of law
number 6, and more specific parts of the record, to assure the Court that the ALJ did the work she
was supposed to do. (See id.). However, this Court will not “affirm based on a post hoc rationale
that ‘might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion.’” Watkins v. Commissioner, 457 F. App’x 868,
872 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984)).
On a related note, Woodruff argues that “the ALJ did not incorporate the side effects of
Woodruff’s medications into her RFC finding,” namely her complaints of drowsiness. (See Doc.
11 at 9). The ALJ noted the drowsiness, but did not say why she does not credit it. (Tr. 54-55).
Counsel for the Commissioner makes a more defined argument on drowsiness. (See Doc. 12 at
11-12). This is essentially a post hoc rationale. Upon remand, the ALJ should determine the side
effects of Woodruff’s medication.
11
felt compelled to do so erodes its confidence in the ALJ’s decision to the point where
a remand is the only appropriate course of action. Woodruff may not be disabled,4 but
for the ALJ to determine that, the ALJ “is required to build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to his or her conclusion.” See Flentry-Tennant v. Astrue,
No. 3:07-cv-101-J-TEM, 2008 WL 876961, at *8 (M.D. Fla. March 27, 2008) (citing
Baker v. Barnhart, No. 03 C 2291, 2004 WL 2032316, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2004)).
For the aforementioned reasons, the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is REVERSED and REMANDED.
B.
The ALJ’s Duty to Develop the Record
Having determined that the ALJ improperly considered the evidence in the
record, the Court declines to reach the issue of whether the ALJ breached her duty to
fully and fairly develop the record. However, on remand, the ALJ is advised to further
develop the record as necessary to determine the issues pertinent to Woodruff’s
potential disability.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court declines to state that Woodruff is disabled based on the record
4
The Commissioner argues that “the ALJ articulated a number of other factors
supporting the credibility determination, most of which [Woodruff] does not dispute or discuss in
her brief.” (Doc. 12 at 12). Even if this is true, Woodruff does not have to challenge every single
piece of the ALJ’s decision, and her failure to do so does not mean that her appeal is without
merit. Woodruff is entitled to appeal her case based upon her winning arguments without
disputing every single possible point.
12
before the Court. However, before ruling adversely to her, the ALJ must address her
allegations fully and fairly. Based upon the Court’s evaluation of the evidence and
the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in her consideration of the
evidence in this case. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED and
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of January, 2018.
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?