Truitt v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins on 2/28/2018. (JLC)
FILED
2018 Feb-28 PM 12:54
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
KAINNON TRUITT,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
) Case No.: 6:16-CV-2053-VEH
)
)
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Kainnon Truitt (“Truitt”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Truitt seeks a review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (“Commissioner”), who denied his application for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). Truitt filed two
applications; the first was on application on June 7, 2013 (for SSI), and the second
1
Nancy A. Berryhill was named the Acting Commissioner on January 23, 2017. See
https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), "[a]ny action
instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive notwithstanding any change in the
person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security or any vacancy in such office."
Accordingly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court has substituted Nancy A. Berryhill for Carolyn W. Colvin in the case
caption above and HEREBY DIRECTS the clerk to do the same party substitution on CM/ECF.
was on July 23, 2013 (for DIB). (Tr. 72). After that, Truitt pursued and exhausted the
administrative remedies available before the Commissioner. He filed his Complaint
in the Northern District of Alabama on December 21, 2016. (Doc. 1). He filed his
brief in support of his position on July 6, 2017. (Doc. 12). The Commissioner
responded on July 31, 2017. (Doc. 13). This case is now ripe for judicial review under
section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Upon review, the Court AFFIRMS the ALJ’s decision.
II.
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The alleged onset date is November 1, 2012. (Tr. 72). Truitt suffers from
“lumbar degenerative disease (DDD) with radioculopathy, left knee internal
derangement, borderline personality disorder (BPD), and major depressive disorder
(MDD).” (Id. at 74) (emphasis omitted). The Social Security Administration denied
both of his applications on August 30, 2013. (Id. at 72). Administrative Law Judge
George W. Merchant held a video hearing on April 29, 2015. (Id. at 72, 83). The ALJ
issued his decision on July 29, 2015, which was unfavorable to Truitt. (Id. at 72-83).
In that opinion, the ALJ found that Truitt did not meet the disability standard at Steps
Three and Five. (Id.). Truitt requested the Appeals Council review his claim. (Id. at
1-3). They refused. (Id.).
2
III.
STANDARDS
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed.
The function of this court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner
is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219,
1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine
if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.”
Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). This court will
determine that the ALJ’s opinion is supported by substantial evidence if it finds “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Id. Factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence must
be upheld by the court.
The ALJ’s legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo, because no
presumption of validity attaches to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal
standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the
court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the ALJ fails to provide
the court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has
been conducted, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.
3
2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
IV.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a
period of disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act
and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.2 The Regulations define “disabled” as
“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death
or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish an entitlement to
disability benefits, a claimant must provide evidence about a “physical or mental
impairment” that “must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant
is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in
sequence:
(1)
whether the claimant is currently employed;
2
The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R.
Parts 400 to 499.
4
(2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3)
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment
listed by the [Commissioner];
(4)
whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and
(5)
whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the
national economy.
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to formerly applicable
C.F.R. section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 56263 (7th Cir. 1999); accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).
The sequential analysis goes as follows:
Once the claimant has satisfied steps One and Two, she will
automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed impairment.
If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her
work, the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant
can perform some other job.
Pope, 998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Commissioner must further show that such work exists in the national economy
in significant numbers. Id.
V.
FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
After considering the record, the ALJ made the following findings:
1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through June 30, 2013.
5
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
November 1, 2012, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et
seq., 416.971 et seq.).
3.
The claimant has the following severe impairments: lumbar
degenerative disease (DDD) with radioculopathy, left knee
internal derangement, borderline personality disorder (BPD), and
major depressive disorder (MDD) (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and
416.920(c)).
4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
5.
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except limited to no use of foot control operations on
the left side, occasional climbing of ramps or stairs, kneeling
crouching or crawling, and no climbing of ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. Additionally, no commercial driving, and no exposure
to unprotected heights or uneven grades. Also, work that requires
no more than understanding, remembering, and carrying out
simple instructions; activity can [be] sustained for two hours, with
normal midmorning, lunch, and mid-afternoon breaks, and can be
sustained over and eight-hour day; and decisionmaking, changes,
and interaction with coworkers and supervisors on no more than
an occasional basis.
6.
The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20
CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7.
The claimant was born on [REDACTED] and was 21 years old,
which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the
alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
6
8.
The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9.
Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the
claimant’s past relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 404.1568 and
416.968).
10.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform
(20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
11.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from November 1, 2012, through the date of
this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
(Tr. 74-82) (emphasis omitted).
VI.
ANALYSIS
A.
The ALJ Properly Developed the Record
Truitt argues that “[t]he ALJ failed in this case to fully and fairly develop the
record concerning the severity of [his] alleged knee and back impairments, and the
concomitant effects of those conditions on his ability to work.” (See Doc. 12 at 9).
This argument stems from the fact that Truitt’s MRI from 2013 was compromised.
(See id. at 10). The Court infers that Truitt is arguing that without that MRI scan, the
record is complete, leaving the ALJ’s decision unsupported by substantial evidence.
(See id.).
In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ was under no heightened
7
duty to develop the record because Truitt had counsel and there was no prejudice
because the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. (See Doc. 13 at 910). The Court agrees.
“It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair
record.” Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.912(d); Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934 (11th Cir. 1995)). “Nevertheless,
the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is
responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §
416.912(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(c)). “However, a showing of prejudice must be made
before [a court] will find that a hearing violated claimant's rights of due process and
requires a remand to the Secretary for reconsideration.” Kelley v. Heckler, 761 F.2d
1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985).3
Here, the ALJ fulfilled his duty to develop the record. The ALJ did not have
to order another MRI when there was other ample evidence on which to base his
decision, and there is some indication that the December 2013 MRI was a failure
because Truitt could not keep still. (See Doc. 12 at 10); (Doc. 13 at 10); (Tr. 78). The
3
The Court notes that “[w]hen a claimant who has not waived his right to counsel
represents himself in a hearing, the hearing examiner's obligation to develop a full and fair record
rises to a special duty.” Smith v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 1982). However, Truitt
was represented by counsel. (Tr. 72).
8
Commissioner correctly notes that Truitt cannot shift the burden to prove his
disability to the ALJ. (See Doc. 13 at 8-9).
Truitt’s citation to Sims v. Astrue is unpersuasive. (See Doc. 12 at 10) (citing
Sims v. Astrue, No. 3:09cv366-CSC, 2010 WL 2952686, *4 (M.D. Ala. July 26,
2010)). That case stands for the proposition that “pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.917,
the ALJ is required to order additional medical tests when the claimant's medical
sources do not give sufficient medical evidence to make a determination as to
disability.” Sims, 2010 WL 2952686, *4. However, in this case, the existing medical
sources gave more than enough medical evidence to determine disability.
The ALJ’s thorough opinion contains a recitation of the evidence in this case.
(Doc. 77-81). It notes the numerous unremarkable medical records. (See Tr. 78-81).
In particular, “[a] May 25, 2013[,] CT scan of [Truitt’s] lumbar spin at Princeton
Emergency Department showed no abnormality.” (Id. at 78) (citing Exhibit 11F/11).
In November 2012, a knee MRI “was largely normal” and records noted Truitt’s
noncompliance with wearing a knee immobilizer. (Id. at 79). However, in the wake
of these two tests, Truitt argues the ALJ erred when he did not order another. The
Court cannot agree.
The ALJ also notes Truitt’s “noncompliance with treatment.” (Id. at 78-80).
Notably, Truitt makes no argument that the ALJ has in any way mis-characterized,
9
or selectively presented, the evidence. (See Doc. 12 at 9-13). Truitt has not given the
Court any indication of what “gap” another MRI would fill.4
In conclusion, the ALJ did not err in developing the record.
B.
The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment is Supported
by Substantial Evidence
Next, Truitt contends that “[t]he ALJ’s decision that [he] is capable of
performing light work is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Doc. 12 at 11).
Upon review, the Court does not agree.
Truitt’s brief provides citations only to his and his attorney’s testimony at the
hearing. (See Doc. 12 at 11-12). This is insufficient to have the Court say that the
ALJ’s opinion is unsupported by substantial evidence.5 Truitt does not directly tackle
4
The Court is persuaded by the following passage from the Sarria case:
The administrative law judge was not required to order an additional medical
examination to develop a full and fair record. See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d
1272, 1276 (11th Cir.2003). We have remanded for further development of the
evidentiary record when the claimant was proceeding pro se and the record
contained “evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness or clear prejudice,” Brown
v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), but Sarria fails to identify any gaps in the evidence. . . . Sarria's
disagreement with the interpretation of [the] evidence does not warrant a remand
of her case.
Sarria v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 579 F. App’x 722, 724 (11th Cir. 2014).
5
Here is the Eleventh Circuit “pain standard”:
This court has established a three part “pain standard” that applies when a
claimant attempts to establish disability through his or her own testimony of pain
or other subjective symptoms. The pain standard requires (1) evidence of an
10
the real reasons why the ALJ found the way he did. (See id.).
The ALJ gave a detailed explanation of why “[Truitt’s] allegations are not
supported by the objective medical evidence.” (Tr. 78-79). In his argument, Truitt has
not pointed to any medical record showing this to be erroneous. (See Doc. 12 at 1112). The ALJ noted that Truitt had issues complying with treatment. (Tr. 79) (“The
claimant’s record of noncompliance with treatment reflects poorly upon the
credibility of his allegations of pain and disability regarding his knee.”). Truitt
completely ignored that in his brief. (See Doc. 12 at 11-12). The ALJ noted the lack
of evidence of borderline personality disorder and major depressive disorder. (Tr. 80).
Truitt did not address this. (See Doc. 12 at 11-12). Truitt has not adequately engaged
with the ALJ’s decision, through use of the medical records, to show the Court why
it is unsupported.
Again, the Court notes that Truitt has not argued that the ALJ mischaracterized the record, or selectively presented the evidence. (See Doc. 12 at 11-
underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that
confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (3) that the
objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be
reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain. See Landry v. Heckler, 782
F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir.1986). The standard also applies to complaints of
subjective conditions other than pain. Jackson v. Bowen, 873 F.2d 1111, 1114 (8th
Cir.1989).
Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991).
11
12). To the contrary, the ALJ made a reasonable decision based on the facts before
him. He noted the unremarkable medical records that undermined Truitt’s claims. (Tr.
78-80). He noted the noncompliance. (Id. at 79-80). He noted the record that
indicated, at least in part, that Truitt went to the doctor at his lawyer’s encouragement.
(Id. at 78). On these facts, the Court cannot say that the ALJ erred.
In conclusion, the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial
evidence.
VII. CONCLUSION
Upon review of Truitt’s arguments, the Court concludes that none of them
merit a reversal. There is no basis on which to disturb the ALJ’s decision.
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
DONE and ORDERED this the 28th day of February, 2018.
VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS
United States District Judge
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?