Clark v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Magistrate Judge John E Ott on 2/27/2019. (KAM)

FILED
2019 Feb-27 AM 11:29
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
JASPER DIVISION
KATHY ANN CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 6:18-cv-0378-JEO

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Kathy Ann Clark appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”) denying her application
for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act.

(“the Act”). 1

(Doc. 1).2

Clark timely pursued and exhausted her

administrative remedies, and the Commissioner’s decision is ripe for review

1

Clark filed earlier applications for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits and
SSI on October 12, 2012. (Tr. 15). These applications were denied and the appeals council
denied request for review. (Id.). The decision became final and Clark did not further appeal.
Because the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the evidence in the instant case was not
new and material, no clerical error was made, the evidence that was considered does not clearly
show an error, and Plaintiff did not lack the mental capacity to understand the procedures for
requesting a review, the ALJ only considered evidence from the period beginning February 14,
2014. (Id.).
2

References herein to “Doc(s). __” are to the document numbers assigned by the Clerk of the
Court to the pleadings, motions, and other materials in the court file, as reflected on the docket
sheet in the court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system.

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

For the reasons discussed below, the

Commissioner’s decision is due to be affirmed. 3
I. Procedural History
Clark was forty-seven years old as of the date of her current application for
SSI. (R. 96, 161). 4 She completed the seventh grade and did not obtain a GED.
(R. at 40-41). She can read and write, add and subtract, and make change. (R. at
41-42). Her past work history includes factory work. (R. 188, 193-203). Plaintiff
last worked in 2000 and claimed she could no longer work due to a variety of
issues, including a stroke, deep vein thrombosis, a broken tail bone with bone
spurs, hip pain, a torn ligament in her right shoulder, left ear deafness, high blood
pressure, thyroid problems, arthritis, leg issues, vision issues, and acid reflux. (R.
at 187). After her claims were denied, Clark requested a hearing before an ALJ.
(R. at 114-19, 31-71). At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to
be her application date, September 23, 2015. (R. at 35). Following a hearing, the
ALJ denied Clark’s claim. (R. at 12-30). After the Appeals Council declined to
review the ALJ’s decision, (R. at 1-5), that decision became the final decision of
the Commissioner, see Frye v. Massanari, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1251 (N.D. Ala.

3

The parties have consented to the exercise of full dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 8).
4

References herein to “R. __” are to the administrative record found at Docs. 7-1 through 7-15
in the court’s record.
2

2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). Thereafter,
Clark initiated this action. (Doc. 1).
II. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To establish her eligibility for disability benefits, a claimant must show “the
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1)(A), 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). SSI is not payable prior to the month following the month
in which the application was filed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.335; Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The Social Security
Administration employs a five-step sequential analysis to determine an individual’s
eligibility for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
First, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.” Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). “Under the first step, the
claimant has the burden to show that she is not currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity.” Reynolds-Buckley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 862,
863 (11th Cir. 2012). 5 If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
Commissioner will determine the claimant is not disabled.
5

20 C.F.R. §

Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not considered binding
precedent; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
3

404.1520(a)(4)(i) and (b). At the first step, the ALJ determined Clark has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since her application date of September 25,
2015. (R. at 17).
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the
Commissioner must next determine whether the claimant suffers from a severe
physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted or is
expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An impairment “must result from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. at § 404.1508. Furthermore, it “must be
established by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory
findings, not only by [the claimant’s] statement of symptoms.” Id.; see also 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

An impairment is severe if it “significantly limits [the

claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(c).6 “[A]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a

6

Basic work activities include:
(1) [p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) [c]apacities for seeking, hearing, and
speaking; (3) [u]nderstanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
(4) [u]se of judgment; (5) [r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers
and usual work situations; and (6) [d]ealing with changes in a routine work
setting.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b).
4

slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would
not be expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of
age, education, or work experience.” Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th
Cir. 1984); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). A claimant may be found disabled
based on a combination of impairments, even though none of her individual
impairments alone is disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. The claimant bears the
burden of providing medical evidence demonstrating an impairment and its
severity. Id. at § 404.1512(a) and (c). If the claimant does not have a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, the Commissioner will determine the
claimant is not disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c).
At the second step, the ALJ determined Clark has the following severe
impairments: degenerative disc disease of the spine; diabetes mellitus; and obesity.
(R. at 17-21). The ALJ specifically excluded the following medically determinable
impairments because she found none of them causes more than minimal functional
limitations: hearing loss not treated with cochlear implants; chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease; deep vein thrombosis; gastroesophageal reflux disease;
hypertension; and osteoarthritis. (R. at 18-19).
If the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the
Commissioner must then determine whether the impairment meets or equals one of
the “Listings” found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §
5

404.1520(a)(4)(iii); see also id. at § 404.1525-26. The claimant bears the burden
of proving her impairment meets or equals one of the Listings. Reynolds-Buckley,
457 F. App’x at 863. If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the
Listings, the Commissioner will determine the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii) and (d). At the third step, the ALJ determined Clark did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal
the severity of one of the Listings. (R. at 21).
If the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal one of the Listings, the
Commissioner must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
before proceeding to the fourth step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); see also id. at §
404.1545. A claimant’s RFC is the most she can do despite his impairment. See
id. at § 404.1545(a)(1). At the fourth step, the Commissioner will compare her
assessment of the claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the
claimant’s past relevant work. Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) and (e), 404.1560(b).
“Past relevant work is work that [the claimant] [has] done within the past 15 years,
that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant]
to learn to do it.” Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). The claimant bears the burden of proving
that her impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work.
Reynolds-Buckley, 457 F. App’x at 863. If the claimant is capable of performing

6

her past relevant work, the Commissioner will determine the claimant is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1560(b)(3).
Before proceeding to the fourth step, the ALJ determined Clark has the RFC
to perform a limited range of light work. (R. at 21-22). More specifically, the ALJ
found the following limitations to light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b):
lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently;
stand and/or walk with normal breaks for a total of six hours in an
eight-hour workday; sit with normal breaks for six hours in an eighthour workday; same limitations for pushing and pulling as for lifting
and carrying; frequently climb ramps and stairs; occasionally climb
ladders, ropes and scaffolds; frequently balance and kneel;
occasionally stoop, crouch, and crawl; occasionally reach overhead
with the bilateral upper extremities; avoid concentrated exposure to
hazards including dangerous moving machinery and unprotected
heights; tolerate a noise level of two; and hear and understand normal
conversation.
(Id. at 21-22). At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Clark had no past relevant
work. (Id. at 24).
If the claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work, the
Commissioner must finally determine whether the claimant is capable of
performing other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy
in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1), 404.1560(c)(1).

If the claimant is capable of

performing other work, the Commissioner will determine the claimant is not
disabled. Id. at § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) and (g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of
7

performing other work, the Commissioner will determine the claimant is disabled.
Id.
At the fifth step, considering Clark’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC, the ALJ determined Clark can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy, such as those of label marker, small product assembler
and poultry boner. (R. at 25). Therefore, the ALJ concluded Clark has not been
under a disability as defined by the Act since September 25, 2015, the date her
application was filed. (R. at 26).
III. Standard of Review
Review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to a determination
whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
Commissioner applied correct legal standards. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004).

A district court must review the

Commissioner’s findings of fact with deference and may not reconsider the facts,
reevaluate the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007);
Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, a district court
must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the decision reached is
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703
F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted).
8

Substantial

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” Id. A district court must uphold factual findings supported by
substantial evidence, even if the preponderance of the evidence is against those
findings. Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Martin v.
Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).
A district court reviews the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo.
Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). “The [Commissioner’s]
failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient
reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted
mandates reversal.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir.
1991).
IV. Discussion
On appeal, Clark makes two arguments. First she contends the ALJ erred by
failing to consider her complaints regarding her blurred vision in the RFC
determination. (Doc. 12 at 10-12). Second, Clark argues the ALJ did not properly
evaluate her subjective complaints of pain with regard to her complaints of lower
extremity pain, in particular her left leg and hips.

(Id. at 12-13).

The

Commissioner argues the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s RFC and subjective

9

complaints and that the decision is due to be affirmed. (Doc. 14 at 5-14). The
court agrees with the Commissioner for the following reasons.
A. RFC Determination
Clark argues that “[t]he ALJ erred in failing to consider the claimant’s
blurred vision, even as a non-severe impairment, in his determination of her
residual functional capacity.” (Doc. 10 at 10). Clark contends that although she
testified about her blurred vision and the treatment notes specifically address her
vision, the ALJ “failed to mention anything about her blurred vision.” (Id.). She
concludes that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination with an
ophthalmologist “because the record does not contain sufficient evidence about
[her] blurred vision for the ALJ to make an informed decision.” (Id. at 11).
1. Medically Determinable Impairment
As discussed in detail above, before the ALJ can determine a claimant’s
RFC, the ALJ must first determine whether the claimant has a medically
determinable impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). The burden of showing that an impairment or
combination of impairments is “severe” rests at all times with Plaintiff. Turner v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 182 F. App’x 946, 948 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Jones v.
Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff bears the burden
of proving she had a severe impairment, she thus had the burden of establishing the
10

prerequisite for finding a severe impairment, i.e., the existence of a medically
determinable impairment. See Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278.
“In claims in which there are no medical signs or laboratory findings to
substantiate the existence of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, the individual must be found not disabled at step [two] of the
sequential evaluation process.” Mathis v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 366623, at *3 (N.D.
Ala. Jan. 30, 2019) (quoting SSR 96-4p). The record must include evidence from
acceptable medical sources to establish the existence of a medically determinable
impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), 404.1508 (an “impairment must result
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be
shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. A
physical or mental impairment must be established by medical evidence consisting
of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [individuals’]
statement[s] of symptoms”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528 (defining symptoms,
signs, and laboratory findings). “[U]nder no circumstances may the existence of an
impairment be established on the basis of symptoms alone.” Mathis, 2019 WL
366623, at *3 (quoting SSR 96-4p).
Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have considered her blurred vision in the
RFC determination, or at the very least, ordered a consultative exam with an
ophthalmologist.

However, a review of the medical record shows Plaintiff’s
11

blurred vision is a symptom, not a medically determinable impairment. There are
no signs, symptoms, or medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques from acceptable medical sources establishing Plaintiff had anatomical,
physiological, or psychological abnormalities that established the existence of a
medically determinable impairment related to her vision. Instead, the record shows
that her doctor’s assessment of her blurred vision was based solely on her
subjective complaints and that it was a side effect of a particular medication. (R,
503, 519). Plaintiff no longer takes this medication because of that side effect.
(R.255, 503). The last treatment note to mention Plaintiff’s blurry vision does so
only as a matter of reciting her medical history. (Id.). Her most recent treatment
notes show no blurred vision or complaints thereof. (R. 495-513, 580-600, 60234).
Additionally, Plaintiff is incorrect in her assertion that the ALJ did not
mention anything about her blurred vision. In fact, the ALJ recited the results of
Plaintiff’s eye exam in explaining the reasoning behind the RFC findings. (R. 2223). The consultative examiner performed an eye exam, found Plaintiff’s vision
was at worst 20/50 without any correction, and determined her vision changes were
due to age. (R. 487). There was certainly no evidence that Plaintiff’s vision could
not be corrected. “A medical condition that can reasonably be remedied either by
surgery, treatment, or medication is not disabling.” Dawkins v. Bowen, 848 F.2d
12

1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1988). As such, the court finds the ALJ did not err in failing
to find Plaintiff’s blurred vision was an impairment.
2. Consultative Examination
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative exam
with an ophthalmologist. (Doc. 12 at 11). The court disagrees. The law in this
Circuit is clear that the ALJ is charged with developing a fair and full record. Todd
v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 641, 642 (11th Cir. 1984). The ALJ must assess a claimant’s
RFC “based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence[,]” and, in general,
the claimant will be responsible for providing the evidence used to make a finding
about the RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). While a consultative examination
may be helpful to the ALJ in making an RFC determination, a consultative
examination will be ordered only when the evidence as a whole, both medical and
non-medical, is not sufficient to support a decision on the claim. See 20 CFR §
404.1519a; see also Holladay v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1988) (the
ALJ is not required to order consultative examination, and has discretion to order
such an exam only when necessary); Turner v. Califano, 563 F.2d 669, 671 (5th
Cir. 1977) (“To be very clear, ‘full inquiry’ does not require a consultative
examination at government expense unless the record establishes that such an
examination is necessary to enable the administrative law judge to make the
disability decision.”).

Indeed, “[t]he administrative law judge has a duty to
13

develop the record where appropriate but is not required to order a consultative
examination as long as the record contains sufficient evidence for the
administrative law judge to make an informed decision.” Ingram v. Comm'r of
Social Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, the ALJ had sufficient evidence in the record on which to make the
RFC determination. Plaintiff’s vision was specifically assessed by a consultative
examiner, Dr. Boyd Harrison. (R. 487). He did not cite any reason for sending
Plaintiff for additional testing and stated that the changes to her vision were a
result of her increasing age. (Id.). Based upon this evidence, as well as the other
medical evidence regarding her vision discussed above, the ALJ did not err by
failing to send Plaintiff to an ophthalmologist.
B. Subjective Complaints of Pain
A claimant bears the burden of proving that he or she is disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 419.912(a) & (c); Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1203, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005); Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278.
Specifically, a claimant must provide evidence of an underlying medical condition
and either objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged
symptoms or that the medical condition could be reasonably expected to give rise
to the alleged symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 419.929; Dyer, 359 F.3d at 1210;
Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225-26; Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 (11th Cir.
14

1991). In analyzing the evidence, the focus is on how an impairment affects a
claimant’s ability to work, and not on the impairment itself. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.929(c)(1); McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1986) (severity
of impairments must be measured in terms of their effect on the ability to work, not
from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality).
In addressing Plaintiff’s subjective description of pain and symptoms, the
law is clear:
In order to establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other
symptoms, the claimant must satisfy two parts of a three-part test
showing: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2)
either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the
alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition
can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain. See Holt
v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). If the ALJ
discredits subjective testimony, he must articulate explicit and
adequate reasons for doing so. See Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007,
1011 (11th Cir. 1987). Failure to articulate the reasons for
discrediting subjective testimony requires, as a matter of law, that the
testimony be accepted as true. See Cannon v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541,
1545 (11th Cir. 1988).
Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929.

In

determining whether substantial evidence supports an ALJ’s credibility
determination, “[t]he question is not . . . whether the ALJ could have reasonably
credited [the claimant’s] testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to
discredit it.” Werner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir.
2011).
15

When evaluating a claimant’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence,
or limiting effects of her symptoms, the ALJ considers all the evidence – objective
and subjective. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2). A plaintiff cannot simply allege
disabling symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) (“statements about your pain and
other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled”). The ALJ may
consider the nature of a claimant’s symptoms, the effectiveness of medication, a
claimant’s method of treatment, a claimant’s daily activities, measures a claimant
takes to relieve symptoms, and any conflicts between a claimant’s statements and
the rest of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) & (4). The ALJ is not
required explicitly to conduct a symptom analysis, but the reasons for his or her
findings must be clear enough that they are obvious to a reviewing court. See
Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995). “A clearly articulated
credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record will not be
disturbed by a reviewing court.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the ALJ found that Clark’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to produce her alleged symptoms, but that her statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects were not credible to the
extent they conflicted with her RFC for a modified range of light work. (R. 2224).

The ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and gave

specific reasoning for discounting Plaintiff’s statements, including: (1) her
16

essentially normal physical consultative examination that showed no difficulty
walking, full range of motion and normal strength, and his opinion that Plaintiff
had no limitations, (R. 187-88); (2) the state agency physician’s opinion that she
could perform up to medium work. (R. 108-11); and (3) the treatment notes
showed no acute osseous abnormality or degenerative changes to her lumbar spine,
normal musculoskeletal and neurological examinations, and improvement in her
diabetes with treatment, (R. 482, 632, 635, 640, 654, 661); and (4) her daily living
activities, (R. 207-08).
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to acknowledge her pain and her treatment
with injections and medications, as well as the diagnostic imaging of her lumbar
spine that bolsters her testimony regarding her alleged disabling pain. (Doc. 12 at
12-13). This argument is without merit. The ALJ specifically acknowledged the
evidence Plaintiff contends was ignored, including that she reported pain in her left
leg and both hips, pain in both areas upon examination, the receipt of injections,
and the abnormal lumbar spine imaging with reports of pain. (R. 18-19, 22). That
being said, the ALJ found that the medical evidence as a whole showed Plaintiff’s
pain did not prevent her from performing a reduced range of light work, including
the consultative examination by Dr. Harrison showing a normal range of motion in
her joints, normal gait, and squatting and rising without difficulty. (R. 18, 23-24,
487-88).

Additional records showed her musculoskeletal and neurological
17

examinations were essentially normal. (R. 635, 640, 654, 661). The fact that some
evidence supports Plaintiff’s complaints does not establish that the ALJ erred in
the determination.

“The question is not . . . whether the ALJ could have

reasonably credited [Clark’s] testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to
discredit it.” Werner, 421 F. App’x at 939.
The record also shows that Clark’s activities of daily living support the
ALJ’s determination that Clark can perform light work, as modified by the ALJ.
Her reported activities included cooking, light cleaning with the help of her
mentally disabled son, shopping at the grocery store, watching television. (R. 20304). She walked from the parking lot to the hearing and stated she could lift a
gallon of milk. (R. 23, 50-51.) One of her doctors recommended that Plaintiff
“stay active and exercise” to aid in the control of her diabetes. (R. 23, 632).
In sum, the evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms by the ALJ is
supported by specific evidence in the record and the ALJ provided a reasonable
basis for discrediting her allegations regarding her left leg and hip pain. “A clearly
articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record
will not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Foote, 67 F.3d 1553 at 1562.
V. Conclusion
Having reviewed the administrative record and considered all of the
arguments presented by the parties, the undersigned finds the Commissioner’s
18

decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with applicable
law. Therefore, that decision is due to be AFFIRMED. A separate order will be
entered.
DATED this 27th day of February, 2019.

_________________________________
JOHN E. OTT
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

19