Hunnicutt v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala on 1/30/2015. (KEK)

FILED
2015 Jan-30 AM 09:59
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION
Susan Beams Hunnicutt,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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Case No.: 7:13-CV-01719-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Susan Beams Hunnicutt filed this action on September 17, 2013,
pursuant to Title XVI of Section 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act. Ms.
Hunnicutt seeks judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of
the

Social

Security

Administration.1

The

Commissioner

affirmed

the

Administrative Law Judge’s denial of Ms. Hunnicutt’s claims for a period of
disability and supplemental security income. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). After
careful review, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.

1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013.
Therefore, she should be substituted for Commissioner Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this
suit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in
an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending.
Later opinions should be in the substituted party’s name, but any misnomer affecting the parties’
substantial rights must be disregarded.”).

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The scope of review in this matter is limited. “When, as in this case, the

ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review,” the Court “review[s]
the ALJ’s ‘factual findings with deference’ and [his] ‘legal conclusions with close
scrutiny.’” Riggs v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm’r, 522 Fed. Appx. 509, 510-11 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)).
The Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record
to support the findings of the Commissioner. “Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d
1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004).

In making this evaluation, the Court may not

“reweigh the evidence or decide the facts anew,” and the Court must “defer to the
ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence even if the evidence may
preponderate against it.” Gaskin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 Fed. Appx. 929, 930
(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)).
With respect to the ALJ’s legal conclusions, the Court must determine
whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. If the Court finds an error in
the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide
sufficient reasoning to demonstrate that the ALJ conducted a proper legal analysis,

2

then the Court must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d
1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
II.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Hunnicutt alleges that her disability began on February 27, 2010. (Doc.

8-6, p. 2). She applied for social security income benefits under Title XVI on
Mach 1, 2010. (Doc. 8-4, p. 2). The Social Security Administration denied Ms.
Hunnicutt’s application on August 9, 2010.

(Doc. 8-5, pp. 5–9).

At Ms.

Hunnicutt’s request, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a video hearing on
February 23, 2012. (Doc. 8-5, pp. 12–14; Doc. 8-3, pp. 36–63). At the time of the
hearing, Ms. Hunnicutt was 48 years old. (Doc. 12, p. 2). Ms. Hunnicutt has a
GED. (Doc. 8-3, p. 43). Her past relevant work experience is as a cashier and a
cook. (Doc. 8-3, p. 44; Doc. 8-7, pp. 29–36).
On April 26, 2012, the ALJ denied Ms. Hunnicutt’s request for disability
benefits, concluding that Ms. Hunnicutt is not disabled under section
1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 8-3, pp. 18–32). In his 12-page
decision, the ALJ described the Social Security Administration’s “five-step
sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled.”
(Doc. 8-3, pp. 20–23). The ALJ explained that “[i]f it is determined that the
claimant is or is not disabled at a step of the evaluation process, the evaluation will
not go on to the next step.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 20).
3

The ALJ found that Ms. Hunnicutt “has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since March 1, 2010, the application date.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 23). In addition,
the ALJ concluded that Ms. Hunnicutt has “the following severe impairments: left
carotid occlusion, migraines, status post cardiovascular accident, hypertension, and
obesity.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 23).

The ALJ did not find Ms. Hunnicutt’s mental

impairments of adjustment disorder with mildly depressed mood and anxiety to be
severe impairments. (Doc. 8-3, p. 23). Using the four broad functional areas set
out in the disability regulations, the ALJ found that Ms. Hunnicutt: (1) has mild
limitation in activities of daily living; (2) has no limitation in social functioning;
(3) has mild limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) has
experienced no episodes of decompensation which have been of extended duration.
(Doc. 8-3, pp. 23–24).

The ALJ concluded that Ms. Hunnicutt’s severe

impairments, when considered individually and in combination, do not meet or
equal the criteria of a listed impairment. (Doc. 8-3, p. 24).
Next, the ALJ calculated Ms. Hunnicutt’s residual functional capacity
(RFC). The ALJ determined that Ms. Hunnicutt has the RFC “to perform light
work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) except that she is limited to occasional
climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling.” (Doc. 8-3, p.
24). The ALJ also stated that Ms. Hunnicutt “must avoid concentrated exposure to

4

extreme heat, cold or noise” and “is precluded from exposure to unprotected
heights, hazardous machinery, and open water.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 24).
In making his findings, the ALJ examined the record, which revealed that on
February 26, 2010, Ms. Hunnicutt went to Northport Medical Center with
complaints of a headache, left facial drooping, and difficulty talking. (Doc. 8-8, p.
120). She rated her pain at a 10 out of 10, noted that her pain had been present for
a week, and stated that she had treated her pain with 9 Goody’s powders. (Doc. 88, p. 120).

Upon examination, Ms. Hunnicutt was diagnosed with sinusitis,

dysarthia, and confusion. (Doc. 8-8, p. 125).
Ms. Hunnicutt returned to the Northport Medical Center on February 27,
2010, with worsening symptoms. (Doc. 8-8, p. 4). Ms. Hunnicutt was diagnosed
with an acute stroke and treated with Coumadin. (Doc. 8-8, p. 4). Northport
Medical Center discharged Ms. Hunnicutt on March 4, 2010. At that time, Dr.
Charles Abney reported that Ms. Hunnicutt’s face was symmetric and her speech
was not slurred. (Doc. 8-8, p. 5). Dr. Abney informed Ms. Hunnicutt that she
could resume her usual activities as tolerated. (Doc. 8-8, p. 5). The ALJ gave
great weight to the findings of Dr. Abney because he was a treating physician and
because his conclusions were consistent with the weight of the medical evidence.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 29).

5

The ALJ considered the treatment notes of Dr. Jim Allen, who saw Ms.
Hunnicutt twice in March 2010. (Doc. 8-3, p. 26). On March 12, 2010, Dr. Allen
found it difficult to see any post-stroke drooping. (Doc. 8-8, p. 47–48). On March
19, 2010, Dr. Allen noted that Ms. Hunnicutt complained of comprehension
problems with written material, but she was able to read her prescription labels and
her physical examination was normal. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 44–45). The ALJ gave great
weight to the findings of Dr. Allen because he was a treating physician and
because his findings were consistent with the weight of the medical evidence.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 29).
The ALJ also considered the notes of Dr. Long, who began treating Ms.
Hunnicutt in April 2010. (Doc. 8-3, p. 26). On April 27, 2010, Dr. Long noted
that Ms. Hunnicutt was pale and agitated, but she had no neurological or motor
defects. (Doc. 8-8, p. 36). Dr. Long opined that Ms. Hunnicutt had made a
remarkable recovery. (Doc. 8-8, p. 36). On May 25, 2010, Dr. Long noted Ms.
Hunnicutt’s complaints of headaches and muscle pain. (Doc. 8-8, p. 35). On June
22, 2010, Ms. Hunnicutt complained of headaches, forgetfulness, and intermittent
anger, but Dr. Long noted no neurological or motor deficits. (Doc. 8-8, p. 34).
The ALJ then examined the treatment notes of Dr. Larry O. Skelton, who
saw Ms. Hunnicutt on June 28, 2010. (Doc. 8-3, pp. 27–28). His examination did
not reveal any physical abnormalities, and he determined that she had a full range
6

of motion. (Doc. 8-8, p. 51). Dr. Skelton noted that Ms. Hunnicutt seemed
anxious and depressed, but her mood and affect were appropriate and her decisionmaking was normal. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 50, 52). He reported that Ms. Hunnicutt had
essentially no residual effects from her cardiovascular accident (CVA). (Doc. 8-8,
p. 52). The ALJ gave great weight to this opinion because he found it consistent
with the objective medical findings of Ms. Hunnicutt’s treating physicians. (Doc.
8-3, p. 30).
The ALJ looked to treatment notes from Dr. H. Jerry Gragg, a consultative
psychological examiner who evaluated Ms. Hunnicutt on July 31, 2010. (Doc. 8-3,
p. 27). Dr. Gragg’s notes reflect that there was no indication of cognitive loss
secondary to the stroke. (Doc. 8-8, p. 58). Dr. Gragg opined that Ms. Hunnicutt
would be able to respond appropriately to social situations and supervision. (Doc.
8-8, p. 58).

He also stated that Ms. Hunnicutt “has adequate intellectual

functioning to be able understand [sic], remember, and carry out instructions and
should be able to perform the types of tasks she has performed in the past.” (Doc.
8-8, p. 58). The ALJ gave great weight to this opinion because it was consistent
with the objective medical evidence in the record. (Doc. 8-3, p. 30).
The ALJ also considered the notes of Dr. Robert Estock, a non-examining
state agency psychiatric consultant, who opined on August 6, 2010 that Ms.
Hunnicutt’s psychiatric impairments were not severe. (Doc. 8-8, p. 59). The ALJ
7

examined findings from non-examining state medical agency consultant Dr. Robert
H. Heilpern.

Dr. Heilpern’s notes reflect that Ms.

(Doc. 8-3, pp. 27–28).

Hunnicutt’s June 2010 exam showed no residual side effects from her CVA and
report that she generally was independent in her activates of daily living. (Doc. 88, p. 78). Dr. Heilpern also opined that in an 8-hour workday, Ms. Hunnicutt could
stand and/or walk with normal breaks for 6 hours and sit with normal breaks for 6
hours. (Doc. 8-8, p. 74). The ALJ assigned the opinions of Dr. Estock and Dr.
Heilpern great weight because their findings were consistent with the medical
evidence of record. (Doc. 8-3, p. 30).
The ALJ noted that Ms. Hunnicutt returned to the ER on August 12, 2010
with complaints of low back pain.

(Doc. 8-8, p. 110).

Doctor Jimmy Tu

diagnosed chronic low back pain with lumbar radiculopathy, prescribed Lortab,
and instructed Ms. Hunnicutt to follow up with her primary care physician. (Doc.
8-8, p. 119). Ms. Hunnicutt saw Dr. Long again on September 7, 2010, at which
time Ms. Hunnicutt requested back x-rays. (Doc. 8-8, p. 101). Dr. Long did not
find abnormalities of Ms. Hunnicutt’s joints or back. (Doc. 8-8, p. 101). When
Ms. Hunnicutt returned to Dr. Long on October 5, 2010, he did not note complaints
of back pain. (Doc. 8-8, p. 100).
The ALJ also considered the treatment notes of Dr. Damon E. Patterson, a
neurologist who examined Ms. Hunnicutt on November 1, 2010. (Doc. 8-3, p. 28).
8

Dr. Patterson found that all of the symptoms from Ms. Hunnicutt’s ischemic stroke
had resolved, and she had made a good neurological recovery but had some severe
stenosis of the left ICA and incidental findings of a suspected 2cm aneurysm.
(Doc. 8-8, p. 84). On November 12, 2010, Ms. Hunnicutt underwent a cerebral
angiogram which Dr. Patterson reported to be normal, with no evidence of
occlusion or stenosis. (Doc. 8-8, p. 87). The ALJ gave controlling weight to the
findings of Dr. Patterson because he was Ms. Hunnicutt’s treating neurologist.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 29).
Finally, the ALJ considered Ms. Hunnicutt’s continuing treatment at
Whatley Health Services. (Doc. 8-3, p. 28). On April 1, 2011, Dr. Long noted Ms.
Hunnicutt’s headaches were better and that she had no physical abnormalities.
(Doc. 8-8, p. 96). On August 23, 2011, Dr. Long noted no physical or neurological
abnormalities and instructed Ms. Hunnicutt to take over-the-counter medication for
recurrent headaches.

(Doc. 8-8, p. 93).

On November 15, 2011, Dr. Long

performed a routine checkup of Ms. Hunnicutt. He found that post CVA, Ms.
Hunnicutt made a complete recovery, and she had a questionable right cerebral
aneurysm, chronic headache, chronic back pain, and obesity. (Doc. 8-8, p. 141).
Also on November 15, 2011, Dr. Long completed a questionnaire in which he
stated that he saw Ms. Hunnicutt for treatment every three months, that pain was a
symptom of Ms. Hunnicutt’s impairments, and that her medications could
9

reasonably be expected to produce drowsiness. (Doc. 8-8, p. 135). Dr. Long
stated that in an eight-hour workday, Ms. Hunnicutt could sit about two hours and
stand and walk about four hours. (Doc. 8-8, p. 135). He also stated that Ms.
Hunnicutt would rarely need to take unscheduled breaks, but that her impairments
would produce good days and bad days, and that Ms. Hunnicutt would likely be
absent from work three days per month because of her impairments or treatment.
(Doc. 8-8, pp. 135–136).
The ALJ gave great weight to the findings of Dr. Long because he was a
treating physician and because his findings were generally consistent with the
weight of the medical evidence of record. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29). However, after
careful consideration, the ALJ determined that Dr. Long’s assessed limitations in
his November 15, 2011 source report were inconsistent with his own treatment
records. (Doc. 8-3, p. 30). The November 15, 2011 source report states that Ms.
Hunnicutt would be expected to miss 3 days per month due to her conditions or
treatment.

(Doc. 8-8, p. 136).

Dr. Long’s treatment records show that Ms.

Hunnicutt only received treatment once a month or less. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 93–102).
The ALJ also concluded that Dr. Long’s assessment seemed largely based on Ms.
Hunnicutt’s subjective complaints of pain, which were not supported by objective
medical evidence of abnormality. (Doc. 8-3, p. 30). Thus, the ALJ gave little

10

weight to the functional limitations assessed by Dr. Long on November 15, 2011.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 30).
After examining the entirety of the medical evidence, the ALJ concluded
that although Ms. Hunnicutt’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause some of her alleged symptoms, Ms. Hunnicutt’s
statements concerning intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms
were not consistent with the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29). The ALJ
noted that the headache pain Ms. Hunnicutt alleged was not fully consistent with
the medical evidence, pointing out that on August 23, 2011, Dr. Long prescribed
over-the-counter medication for headache pain. (Doc. 8-8, p. 93). Regarding back
pain, the ALJ stated that the record revealed only isolated complaints with no
objective evidence to support the severity of the pain alleged. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29).
Ms. Hunnicutt’s subjective testimony regarding problems with balance,
concentration, and comprehension were undermined by Dr. Patterson’s conclusion
that Ms. Hunnicutt had made a good neurological recovery. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29). The
ALJ also determined that Ms. Hunnicutt’s obesity was consistent with the
exertional requirements of the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29).
The ALJ found, consistent with the vocational expert’s testimony, that Ms.
Hunnicutt was able to perform her past relevant work as a cashier. (Doc. 8-3, p.
30). The ALJ also made the alternative finding that there are other jobs that exist
11

in significant numbers in the national economy that Ms. Hunnicutt can perform.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 30). In support, the ALJ noted that Ms. Hunnicutt was defined as a
“younger individual” on the date she filed her application; that Ms. Hunnicutt has a
high school education and can communicate in English; and that transferability of
job skills is not an issue because Ms. Hunnicutt’s past relevant work is unskilled.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 30). The ALJ also relied on the testimony of the vocational expert,
William Green. (Doc. 8-3, p. 31). Mr. Green testified that given Ms. Hunnicutt’s
age, education, work experience, and RFC, Ms. Hunnicutt could perform the
requirements of the following jobs:
fast food worker, with 14,000 such jobs in Alabama and 1 million
nationally; sales attendant, with 2,500 such jobs in Alabama and
90,000 nationally; and cleaner, with 1,600 such jobs in Alabama and
130,000 nationally.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 31). Having determined that Ms. Hunnicutt was capable of making a
successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the
national economy, the ALJ found that Ms. Hunnicutt is not disabled. (Doc. 8-3, p.
31).
This became the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration on August 30, 2013, when the Appeals Council refused to review
the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 8-3, pp. 2–5). Having exhausted all administrative
remedies, Ms. Hunnicutt filed this action for judicial review pursuant to § 405(g)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1, p. 1).
12

III.

ANALYSIS:
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a claimant must be disabled.

Gaskin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 Fed. Appx. 929, 930 (11th Cir. 2013). “A
claimant is disabled if he is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity by
reason of a medically-determinable impairment that can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at
least 12 months.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).
A claimant must prove that he is disabled. Id. (citing Ellison v. Barnhart,
355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003)). To determine whether a claimant is
disabled, the Social Security Administration applies a five-step sequential analysis.
Gaskin, 533 Fed. Appx. at 930.
This process includes a determination of whether the claimant (1) is
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and
medically-determinable physical or mental impairment; (3) has such
an impairment that meets or equals a Listing and meets the duration
requirements; (4) can perform his past relevant work, in the light of
his residual functional capacity; and (5) can make an adjustment to
other work, in the light of his residual functional capacity, age,
education, and work experience.
Id. (citation omitted).

“The claimant’s residual functional capacity is an

assessment, based upon all relevant evidence, of the claimant’s ability to do work
despite his impairments.” Id. (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th
Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)).

13

Ms. Hunnicut asserts that she is entitled to relief from the ALJ’s decision
because: (1) the ALJ erred in failing to follow the opinion of treating physician Dr.
Long; (2) the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider Ms. Hunnicutt’s subjective
complaints of pain; and (3) the ALJ erred in failing to consider the side effects of
Ms. Hunnicutt’s medication. (Doc. 10, pp. 7, 10, 13). These contentions are
without merit.
A.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Rejection of the Treating
Physician’s RFC Assessment.
Ms. Hunnicutt contends that the ALJ did not give proper weight to her

treating physician’s RFC assessment and that the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Dr.
Long’s RFC assessment are not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 10, p. 7).
The Court disagrees.
The opinion of a treating physician “must be given substantial or
considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Phillips v.
Barnhart, 357 F. 3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125
F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)). “[G]ood cause exists when the (1) treating
physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a
contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent
with the doctor’s own medical records.” Id. at 1240–41; see also Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2004). “The ALJ must
clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to a treating physician’s
14

opinion, and the failure to do so constitutes error. Moreover, the ALJ must state
with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons
therefor.” Gaskin, 422 Fed. Appx. at 931 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
In this case, the ALJ articulated specific reasons for his rejection of treating
physician Dr. Long’s RFC assessment. The ALJ stated:
Dr. Long’s assessed limitations are inconsistent with his own
treatment records, which reveal the claimant generally only received
medical treatment once a month or less, and do not document
complaints of or treatment for pain of the severity alleged. Further,
Dr. Long’s assessed limitations appear to be based solely upon the
claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, as they are not supported by
any objective medical evidence of abnormality.
(Doc. 8-3, p. 30). A comparison of Dr. Long’s RFC assessment and Dr. Long’s
treatment records lends support to the ALJ’s analysis. In the RFC assessment, Dr.
Long diagnosed Ms. Hunnicutt with CVA, cerebral aneurysm, and back pain, and
stated that pain was a symptom of Ms. Hunnicutt’s impairments. (Doc. 8-8, p.
135). When asked if Ms. Hunnicutt’s rating of her daily pain at 7/10 to 8/10 was
reasonably consistent with her impairments and medication, Dr. Long answered
that it was difficult to say. (Doc. 8-8, p. 135). Dr. Long opined that Ms. Hunnicutt
could sit for about 2 hours and stand or walk for about 4 hours in an 8-hour
workday. (Doc. 8-8, p. 135). Dr. Long also opined that Ms. Hunnicutt would need
to take unscheduled breaks during an 8-hour day, that her impairments were likely
to produce good days and bad days, and that she was likely to be absent from work
15

3 days per month as a result of the impairments or treatment. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 135–
36).
In contrast, Dr. Long’s examinations of Ms. Hunnicutt rarely revealed
neurological or motor deficits. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 34, 36, 94–98, 101). On April 27,
2010, Dr. Long noted that Ms. Hunnicutt had made a remarkable recovery from
her stroke. (Doc. 8-8, p. 36). On April 1, 2011, Dr. Long found no abnormalities
of Ms. Hunnicutt’s back and noted improvement regarding Ms. Hunnicutt’s
headaches. (Doc. 8-8, p. 96). Dr. Long treated Ms. Hunnicutt conservatively,
typically prescribing over-the-counter medication for her headaches. (Doc. 8-8,
pp. 93, 96).2 Ms. Hunnicutt’s headaches continued to improve after Dr. Long’s
RFC assessment took place. (Doc. 8-8, p. 146). Because Dr. Long’s medical
records are inconsistent with his RFC assessment, the ALJ did not err in
disregarding Dr. Long’s RFC assessment.
The ALJ’s decision to disregard Dr. Long’s RFC assessment is also
supported by the other objective medical evidence in the record. In July 2010,
examining psychologist Dr. Jerry Gragg stated that there was “no indication of any
cognitive loss secondary to” Ms. Hunnicutt’s stroke.

(Doc. 8-8, p. 58).

In

November 2010, Dr. Patterson, an examining neurologist, stated that all of Ms.
Hunnicutt’s symptoms from her stroke had resolved and that she had good
2

Ms. Hunnicutt points to only one instance in which Dr. Long prescribed her prescription
headache medication. (Doc. 13, p. 3).
16

neurological recovery. (Doc. 8-8, p. 84). Later in November 2010, Ms. Hunnicutt
had a cerebral angiogram which was essentially normal with no evidence of
occlusion or stenosis. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 90–91).
Ms. Hunnicutt counters that the ALJ failed to consider the fact that she does
not have health insurance and has a limited income. (Doc. 10, p. 8). However,
Ms. Hunnicutt testified at the hearing that her lack of insurance affected her ability
to get treatment “[u]ntil Dr. Long.” (Doc. 8-3, p. 53). Ms. Hunnicutt points to Dr.
Long’s treatment notes from February 9, 2011, which state that Ms. Hunnicutt “has
not been able to get her headache medicine filled” and that “she could not afford to
take Plavix.” (Doc. 8-8, p. 97). However, at Ms. Hunnicutt’s next appointment on
April 1, 2011, Dr. Long wrote that her “headaches are better” and that Dr.
Patterson’s examination revealed “no evidence of obstruction or aneurism.” (Doc.
8-8, p. 96). There is no other evidence in the record that Ms. Hunnicutt was unable
to obtain treatment when necessary.
Considering the record as a whole, the Court finds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision to discount the RFC from Ms. Hunnicutt’s treating
physician.
B.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility Finding.
Next, Ms. Hunnicutt asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider

her subjective complaints of pain. (Doc. 10, p. 10). When a claimant attempts to
17

prove disability based on her subjective testimony of pain, she must provide
“evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (1) objective medical
evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain or (2) an objective
determination that the medical condition could reasonably be expected to give rise
to the alleged pain.” Hamby v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 480 Fed. Appx. 548,
551 (11th Cir. 2012). If the ALJ decides not to credit the claimant’s testimony,
then the ALJ must articulate adequate reasons for doing so. Id.; see also Wilson v.
Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2002).
The ALJ provided reasons supported by objective medical evidence for
rejecting Ms. Hunnicutt’s subjective complaints of pain. First, the ALJ stated that
the severity of headache pain Ms. Hunnicutt alleged was not fully consistent with
the medical evidence in the record. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29). Ms. Hunnicutt correctly
points out that she consistently complained of chronic headaches. (Doc. 8-8, pp.
50, 78, 93–95, 100–102, 139). In fact, of the 16 visits to Dr. Long documented in
the record, at least 13 of those reflect that Ms. Hunicutt complained of a headache.
(See Doc. 8-8, pp. 93–102, 139, 141, 146–49). Nevertheless, there is no evidence
in the record that Ms. Hunnicutt’s headaches are so severe that they preclude her
from work. Ms. Hunnicutt’s headaches typically were treated conservatively with
over-the-counter medication such as Excedrin Migraine or Tylenol. (Doc. 8-8, pp.

18

78, 93). On at least two occasions, Ms. Hunnicutt reported that her headaches
were better. (Doc 8-8, pp. 96, 146).
The ALJ also considered Ms. Hunnicutt’s testimony that she had difficulty
with walking, balance, concentration, and comprehension. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29). The
ALJ found that these complaints were inconsistent with the records of Dr.
Patterson who concluded that Ms. Hunnicutt’s symptoms were resolved and that
she had made a good neurological recovery. (Doc. 8-8, p. 84). Dr. Patterson’s
notes reflect that Ms. Hunnicutt “denies any neurological symptoms” since her
CVA and “does recognize that her speech and ability to understand have improved
in a significant fashion.” (Doc. 8-8, p. 83). Dr. Allen at Whatley Health Services
noted that even though Ms. Hunnicutt complained of comprehension issues, she
was able to read the labels of her prescriptions to him. (Doc. 8-8, p. 45). In June
2010, Dr. Skelton observed that Ms. Hunnicutt’s MRI showed good collateral
blood flow to the side of her brain where she previously had an occlusion and
stated that “[s]he has essentially no residual effects of her CVA at this time.”
(Doc. 8-8, p. 52).
Regarding Ms. Hunnicutt’s allegation of back pain, the ALJ determined that
the medical evidence in the record did not support the level of pain Ms. Hunnicutt
described. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29). The ALJ noted that the medical record revealed only
isolated complaints of back pain and did not contain any objective medical
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evidence to support the severity of the pain alleged. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 101, 116).
Although Ms. Hunnicutt complained to Dr. Long of back pain in September 2010,
when she returned to Dr. Long in October 2010, he did not note complaints of back
pain. (Doc 8-8, pp. 100–101).
The ALJ articulated various reasons supported by objective medical
evidence for disregarding Ms. Hunnicutt’s subjective complaints of pain.
Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence.
C.

The ALJ Properly Considered the Side Effects of Ms. Hunnicutt’s
Medication.
Finally, Ms. Hunnicutt contends that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the

side effects of her medication. (Doc. 10, p. 13). Ms. Hunnicutt testified that her
medications cause drowsiness during the day, which causes her to need to lie
down. (Doc. 8-3, p. 57). Ms. Hunnicutt maintains that if the ALJ had properly
considered this side effect along with the testimony of the vocational expert, the
ALJ would have concluded that there are no jobs in the national economy that Ms.
Hunnicutt can perform. (Doc. 10, p. 14).
The ALJ has a duty to elicit testimony and make findings regarding the
effect of prescribed medications upon the claimant’s ability to work. Cowart v.
Schweiker, 622 F.2d 731, 737 (11th Cir. 1981). This duty “does not relieve the
claimant of the burden of proving she is disabled.

Thus, the claimant must

introduce evidence supporting her claim that her symptoms (including any
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medication side effects) make her unable to work.” Walker v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 404 Fed. Appx. 362, 366 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). Ms.
Hunnicutt testified at the hearing that her medications cause drowsiness and
nausea. (Doc. 8-3, p. 57). Ms. Hunnicutt also testified that the medication she
took for nausea was effective. (Doc. 8-3, p. 57). The ALJ noted this testimony in
his decision and ultimately determined that Ms. Hunnicutt’s testimony as to the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects from her symptoms was not entirely
credible. (Doc. 8-3, pp. 25, 29).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. The only evidence
in the record that supports Ms. Hunnicutt’s allegations of drowsiness is Dr. Long’s
RFC assessment, which the ALJ gave little weight because it was inconsistent with
Dr. Long’s treatment records. (Doc. 8-3, p. 29; Doc. 8-8, p. 135). Additionally,
Dr. Long’s report only states that the medications Ms. Hunnicutt takes can cause
drowsiness; the report does not indicate whether the medications actually are
causing drowsiness or whether Ms. Hunnicut’s alleged drowsiness is so severe that
it precludes her from working. (Doc. 8-8, p. 135). Dr. Long’s treatment records
do not reflect that Ms. Hunnicutt complained of significant drowsiness from her
medications. (Doc. 8-8, pp. 34–36, 93–102). The ALJ’s determination also is
supported by the notes of other examining physicians who described Ms.
Hunnicutt as alert; those physicians did not note problems with drowsiness. (Doc.
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8-8, pp. 51, 84). Therefore, the ALJ properly considered the side effects of Ms.
Hunnicutt’s medication. See Walker, 404 Fed. Appx. at 366–67 (holding that ALJ
adequately developed the record as to medication side effects where the ALJ asked
claimant about side effects, noted this testimony and claimant’s complaints to
physicians, and determined that claimant’s testimony regarding symptoms was not
entirely credible).
After reviewing, weighing, and discussing the evidence in the record, the
ALJ determined that Ms. Hunnicutt is not disabled under section 1614(a)(3)(A) of
the Social Security Act. (Doc. 8-3, p. 31). Because substantial evidence supports
this conclusion, the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, the Court concludes the ALJ’s decision is
based on substantial evidence and consistent with applicable legal standards.
Therefore, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
DONE and ORDERED this January 30, 2015.

_________________________________
MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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