Matthews v. Faurecia Automotive Seating Inc et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 6/19/2018. (PSM)

FILED
2018 Jun-19 AM 10:29
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MARILYN MATTHEWS
Plaintiff,
v.
FAURECIA AUTOMOTIVE
SEATING, INC.,
Defendant.

7:16-cv-01937-LSC

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
or

Plaintiff , a 44 year old

female, brought the instant action against her former employer, Faurecia
Automotive Seating, Inc.

and others, alleging claims for gender

discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the
1

only remaining Defendant.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Faurecia is the
motion for summary

judgment (doc. 39). For the reasons stated below, the motion is due to be granted.

1

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

C. § 2000e-2[a][1].

I.

BACKGROUND2
Faurecia is a first-tier supplier of automotive equipment and parts; they

specialize in manufacturing seating.

After working on a nonpermanent basis,

Matthews began her employment on January 13, 2014 at the Cottondale, Alabama
location of Faurecia as a full-time Production Operator.
pulling leather over seats for Mercedes Benz vehicles. On January 21, 2014,
approximately one week after she began work, Matthews received an injury to her
hand. She reported the injury to her supervisor at the time.3 According to
Matthews, she filed numerous complaints and grievances with her Union not only
for the improper handling of her injury, but also incidents she claims prevented
Faurecia from being a conducive working environment. 4

submissions of facts
s own examination of the evidentiary record. These are
See Cox v.
Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir. 1994). The Court is not
required to identify unreferen
s position. As such, review is
limited to exhibits and specific portions of the exhibits specifically cited by the parties. See
Fla. Dept. of Corr.
istrict court judges
are not required to ferret out del
(internal
quotations omitted).
2

The facts set out in this Opini

3

Matthews worked under a number of different supervisors during her time as a Faurecia
employee.
4

Page 2 of 26

As a part of the orientation process, Faurecia requires new hires to sign a
Receipt and Acknowledgment form demonstrating that they have read and
the

Matthews

signed the form indicating her receipt and understanding of its contents on
December 12, 2013. (Doc. 41-1 at 10, Ex. 1G.) The Handbook includes
attendance policy, which provides that
consecutive days without reporting will result in voluntary termination of
(Doc. 41-1 at 12-14, Ex. 1C, Employee
Handbook.)

The attendance policy assesses points and partial points for
(Id. at 12-13.) It specifies that
termination

is warranted after an employee has

accumulated 10 attendance points during a 12-month rolling calendar period. (Id.
at 13.)

against Michael Hamilton
. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Additionally, she filed two complaints
against Shavonte Bonner
over several instances of harassment and physical contact
Bonner had with her, including Bonner
carts from
hands and pulling
them to the other side of the line. (Id. ¶ 39.) She also made two reports of repeated incidents of
harassment and hostility from Raven Christine
(Id. ¶ 35.) The Union
filed a grievance on
-worker she was having trouble with was placed on
another shift. (Id. ¶ 37.) She was fired within 24 hours of filing her grievance against Bonner. (Id.
¶ 41.) Finally, she filed a grievance for wrongful termination with the Union before contacting
the EEOC. (Id. ¶ 52.) The last grievance is the only one in the record. (Doc. 41-1, Ex. H.)

Page 3 of 26

As of the end of June, Matthews had accrued 12.5 points during a 12-month
rolling calendar period. On July 1, 2014, instead of terminating Matthews, Faurecia
gave her a one-day suspension and issued a written warning apprising her of the
fact that receiving any further points would result in dismissal from Faurecia. (See
Suspension Letter, Doc. 41-1 at 21, Ex. 1F.) Thereafter, in the wake of her
suspension and warning, between June 29, 2014 and August 1, 2014, Matthews
received an additional 4.5 attendance points.
Declaration, Ex. 1.) Bowlin, a Faurec

(Parrish Bowlin
to

whom all Shift Supervisors directly reported, terminated Matthews effective
August 21, 2014, for her violation of the attendance policy. (Termination Letter,
Doc. 41-1 at 23, Ex. 1G.) At the time of her discharge, Matthews had received a
total of 17 attendance points.5

5

Matthews alleges that Bowlin fraudulently documented she had accumulated attendance
points which she had not, and that most of the points should have been excused under the terms
of the attendance policy. Other points were due to when she was marked absent from third shift
after being changed to second shift and the system had not been updated, even though Faurecia
had been notified of her shift change. Additionally, Matthews insists that Jeremy Akins
(Compl. ¶ 44-46.) Matthews also avers that most of her absences were related to pain or medical
Other absences she
insists were excused as vacation, sick days, or approved leave. In one instance, Mathews was
caught in inclement weather and rescued by law enforcement, who called Faurecia to report the
incident and explain the reason for her tardiness. (Compl. ¶ 31-35.)

Page 4 of 26

According to Matthews, on the day Bowlin fired her, she had written out a
grievance against her female co-worker Shavote Bonner

who was

physically threatening her. Immediately thereafter, Akins, her supervisor at the
time, told her that Bowlin wanted to see her in his office. Matthews complied and
brought the union shop stewardess
office with her. Akins accompanied them as well. Austin
statement in hand; upon their entering Bow

,

then looked at Matthews and said that her services were no longer needed. Bowlin
then refused to give the grievance back to either Matthews or Austin

though they

both pointed out that Matthews had the right to make her complaint and present it
to union representatives.
rights, and also about whether or not Matthews had actually exceeded the allowable
attendance points. (See Pl. Dep. at 78- 80, 127.)
On August 22,

. After

review, Faurecia
denied the grievance request for reinstatement owing to the fact that
termination was in conformance with Fa
violate the labor agreement between it and the union. (Doc. 41-1 at 26, Ex. 1H.)

Page 5 of 26

The union subsequently withdrew its grievance by letter dated November 6, 2014.
(Doc. 41-1 at 28, Ex. 1I.)
On November 4, 2014, Matthews filed two Unfair Labor Practice Charges
with the National Labor Relations Board, in which she alleged her discharge was on
6

that her union grievance was not considered

rbitrary or discriminatory

(Doc. 41-2 at 2.) Both of the Charges were withdrawn in
letters dated November 20, 2014. (Pl. Dep. at 111-12.)
Matthews filed her Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commiss

, alleging age

discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination
Matthews did not allege discrimination based on
sex or gender in the first section of her EEOC charge. She did, however, briefly
reference how gender played a role in the discrimination she experienced in the
explanation section located below the heading. She specifically alleged that she
complaints with the union
6

On several occasions as Ms. Matthews spoke with a union representative with regard to
, [a Faurecia supervisor] would follow her and watch
the conversation, making eye contact with Ms. Matthews to intimidate her and prevent her
participation in Union activity and furtherance of her claim. (Compl. ¶ 24.)

Page 6 of 26

about being subjected to adverse treatment that employees not of [her] protected
(Doc. 41-4 at 2, EEOC Charge.) Matthews also averred
that she had lodged complaints to Faurecia Supervisor Chris James (
regarding an incident in which her co-worker, Hamilton stated to Matthews that

(Id.) James refutes that Matthews ever specifically complained to him about
discriminatory practices, discrimination or harassment on the basis of her age or
gender. There were also other incidents which Matthews avers contributed to her
claims. Some female co-workers, Bonner and Rudolph allegedly assaulted her,
dropped parts on the floor and stared at her. On September 15, 2015, the EEOC

Matthews filed the present action in December of 2016, alleging gender
discrimination, hostile work environment based on gender, and retaliation in
violation of Title VII. Her Complaint makes no reference to any allegations of
discrimination based on age which were raised in her EEOC charge. Though

Page 7 of 26

Matthews was initially represented, her counsel was terminated on July 10, 2017,
and she now precedes pro se.7
II.

STANDARD

genuine dispute as to any material fact8 and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Id. A

evidence such that a reasonable factfinder co
Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir.
2001)). The trial judge should not weigh the evidence, but determine whether
there are any genuine issues of fact that should be resolved at trial. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
7

8

Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2015).

Page 8 of 26

Urquilla-Diaz v.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give
deference to the non-moving party by

w[ing] the materials presented and all
Animal
, 789 F.3d 1206, 1213 14 (11th Cir. 2015)

(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)).

However,

Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.
1987).
nonmovi
Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Young
v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004)). In making a motion

McGee v.
Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the
trial courts must use caution when granting motions for summary judgment,

procedural shortcut, but rather as a
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
Page 9 of 26

III.

DISCUSSION

however, this Court is nonetheless obligated to determine whether Faurecia is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts. 9 See Trs. of Cent.
v. Wolf Crane
Serv., Inc., 374 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (A district court

(internal
quotation marks omitted)).

As such, the Court will address the merits of

s motion.
A. TITLE VII GENDER DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Matthews avers that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex by
decision to discharge her.

A plaintiff can prove her Title VII

discrimination claim by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Quigg v. Thomas
Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2016). Matthews has presented
the Court with no direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence is before the Court

9

Matthews

undisputed.

Page 10 of 26

in the form of her deposition testimony submitted by Faurecia. When analyzing a
claim of discrimination by way of circumstantial evidence, the Court applies the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework. Id. at 1238 n.7; see
also Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam).
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff carries the initial burden of producing
circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir.
1999). If the plaintiff meets her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Trask
v. Shulkin, 137 S. Ct. 1133, 197 L. Ed. 2d 176 (2017). If the defendant is successful,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to pro
proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

Id. (quoting Alvarez v. Royal

Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010)).
In order to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, Matthews
must prove that she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the
position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was treated less
Page 11 of 26

favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside her protected class. Wilson v.
B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). Matthews satisfies the
first three components of her gender discrimination claim. To meet the similarlysituated element, Matthews is required
situated in all relevant respects

to herself in order

prevent courts from second-guessing a reasonable decision by the employer. Id.
(citing Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997)). Matthews has not
pointed to any male employee who was suspended, placed on a probationary
agreement, and thereafter accumulated 4.5 additional attendance points that was
not subsequently discharged. The identification of a comparator is an essential
component to the establishment of her prima facie case

and Matthews has failed

to provide one.
Nonetheless,

[, as here,] a

plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly situated employee, summary
judgment is appropriate where no other eviden
Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562 (citing Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179,
182 (1st Cir. 1989)).

In her complaint, Matthews attempts to show gender

discrimination by alleging that Faurecia

engag[ed] in, tolerat[ed], or fail[ed] to

prevent the harassment of various employees and failing to take affirmative and
Page 12 of 26

corrective action to correct and redress unlawful employment practices[;] and by
se of
her opposition to the unsolicited and unwelcome contact forced upon her in the
(Compl. ¶ 58.) The contact Matthews references presumably has to
do with the physical contact that Bonner made and the eye contact Shepherd made
with her. However, in her deposition, Matthews admitted that the conduct had
ing to do with her being female

but instead was on account of animosity
(Pl. Dep. at 102; 82.) The

only other allegation Matthews makes regarding discrimination based on her
gender is the single comment Hamilton made to her about how women were a
distraction and were just in the way.
Though the above mentioned incidents formed the basis for many of the
complaints and grievances Matthews filed, the evidence before the Court does not
present a convincing argument that gender was indeed the basis for any
discrimination. In sum, the evidence before the Court is insufficient to create a
prima facie case of gender discrimination or a dispute of material fact surrounding
those allegations. As such, summary judgment is due to be granted on
Title VII gender discrimination claim.
B. TITLE VII HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIM
Page 13 of 26

To establish a prima face case for a hostile work environment claim under
Title VII, Matthews

a protected group; (2)

she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a
protected characteristic of the employee; (4) the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms and conditions of employment and
create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) the employer is
responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of direct
lia

Cheatham v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 682 Fed. Appx. 881, 887 (11th Cir.

2017)10 (citing Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff answered in the affirmative when asked if her hostile work
environment claim was based on her allegation that she suffered a hand injury to
which Faurecia failed to adequately respond. (Pl. Dep. at 91-92, 101.) She insists
that the failure of supervisors to report her injuries and the delay in treatment
interfered with her ability to perform her duties in an efficient manner, which then
engendered demeaning comments about her needing to be in a nursing home, thus
creating a hostile work environment. (Pl. Dep. at 92.)

be cited as

10

-2.

Page 14 of 26

Matthews also alleges that her female co-workers, Bonner and Rudolph
contributed to a hostile work environment by assaulting her, dropping parts on the
floor and staring at her. (Pl. Dep. at 76-78, 94-95, 98.) However, she admitted that
(Pl. Dep. at 102.)
According
amount to a hostile environment. See Trask, 822 F.3d at 1195 (comments or actions
that are offensive and belitting, but not based on a protected category, cannot be
used to establish hostile work environment claim); see also See Bryant v. Jones, 575
F.3d 1281, 1297 (11th Cir. 2009)
ones that do not relate to the [sex or gender] of the actor or the offended party (the
plaintiff), are not coun
more than one occasion, was allegedly physically threatening, and would have

account of her gender, and thus cannot form the basis for a hostile work
environment claim.
In its motion, Faurecia argues that the alleged conduct was neither severe
nor pervasive enough to amount to a modification in Matthews employment. To
satisfy the fourth element of this claim, Matthews must present evidence that is
subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive.
Page 15 of 26

must subjectively

perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms or
conditions of employment, and the objective severity of harassment should be
judged from the perspective of a rea
considering all the circumstances.

position,

Palmer v. McDonald, 624 Fed. Appx. 699, 703

(11th Cir. 2015) (citing Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 F.3d 1240, 1248 49
(11th Cir. 2014)); see also Mendoza v. Bordon, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir.
1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1068 (2000).

Plaintiff herself must

subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive and the harassing behavior
must also render the work environment one that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive.

Id. at 1245 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22).

When

ive severity of the harassment, this [C]ourt looks at the

of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4)
whet
Gowski, 682 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan,
Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff contends that comments Hamilton made about her various injuries
created a hostile work environment based on the injuries she sustained. (Pl. Dep. at
Page 16 of 26

93.)

which she has

not alleged as a basis for her discrimination in this lawsuit. In her deposition,
Matthews admitted that Hamilton only once mentioned that women were a
[her]
that his

conceding
(Pl. Dep. at 86-

88, 104.)
referencing [her] age and sex [] sufficiently interfered with [her] work
performance and induced co-workers not of [her] protected class to laugh at [her],
call [her] crazy, call [her] slow, and say [she]
41-3 at 47.)

(Pl. Dep. at 72-73; Doc.
While the comment

may have prompted a number of other unwelcomed remarks, even when
considered in the aggregate and in a light most favorable to Matthews, the offensive
statements do not rise to the requisite level of severity sufficient to establish a
hostile work environment claim. See Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir.
2012) (workplace must be so

midation,

that the very terms and conditions of

employment

are altered for a work place to be considered an abusive environment).
In sum, the majority of the treatment Plaintiff experienced which affected
her working environment was not caused by her being female; and the single
Page 17 of 26

comment by Hamilton, though based on her gender, falls far short of the severe and
pervasive threshold. As such, she cannot survive summary judgment on her Title
VII hostile work environment claim.
C. TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIM
Matthews maintains that Faurecia retaliated against her because she suffered
a workplace injury to which Faurecia failed to adequately respond, she reported the
harassment, and filed grievances with her union. (Pl. Dep. at 105-06, 108, 112-113.)
Retaliation claims that rely on circumstantial evidence are analyzed using the
burden-shifting paradigm established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 793 (1973). See Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1307. Under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff
first bears the burden of establishing her prima facie case. To make out a prima
facie case for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was
engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1310 (11th Cir.
2016) (citations omitted).
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated her prima facie case, McDonnell Douglas
mate, nonDenney v. City of
Page 18 of 26

Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1183 (11th Cir. 2001).
produced, a plaintiff then has the ultimate burden of proving the reason to be a
pretext

Id.
i. PRIMA FACIE CASE

There is no dispute that Plaintiff suffered a materially adverse employment
action

she was terminated. Consequently, the two prongs Plaintiff must establish

are that she engaged in statutorily protected activity, and there was a causal
connection between that activity and her termination.
Matthews has presented no evidence that would satisfy either

Fauercia avers that
the Court agrees.

1. STATUTORILY PROTECTED ACTIVITY
In its motion, Faurecia
claim is because she suffered a workplace injury to which Faurecia failed to
adequately respond; and because she reported harassment to and filed grievances
with her union. In her complaint, Matthews av
had grievances and complaints about other employees or practices within the
company, however very few ever followed through with actual formal grievances or
(Pl. Compl. ¶ 49.)
Pursuant to Eleventh Circuit precedent,
her a union does not qualify as protected activity within the ambit of Title VII.
Page 19 of 26

nfair treatment, absent discrimination based on sex, or national origin, is not an
Coutou v. Martin Cty. Bd. Cty.
, 47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (emphasis in original)
(finding that plaintiff failed to prove that a grievance she filed constituted
statutorily protected activity as she made no allegation, nor presented any proof of
discrimination based on a protected category during her grievance hearing). The
substance of most of

complaints and grievances is unknown to the

Court because Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to summary judgment or any
accompanying evidentiary submissions.

The only grievance on record is one
which Plaintiff filed after her

termination. It

ause
...

(Doc. 41-1 at 25.)

In her deposition, Matthews confirmed that one of her
opposed discriminatory employment practices by filing
(Pl. Dep. at 60.) However, nowhere does she allege

that any of her complaints were based upon a protected category; as such she did
not engage in statutorily protected activity and cannot establish a prima facie case
of retaliation under Title VII.
2. CAUSAL LINK
Page 20 of 26

The Court also finds that Matthews cannot succeed in showing a causal link.
In order to establish a causal link, Matthews must show that
retaliate was the but-

Cheatham,

682 Fed. Appx. at 886 (citing Booth v. Pasco Cty., Fla., 757 F.3d 1198, 1207 (11th
Cir. 2014)). A plaintiff can meet this element by offering sufficient evidence that
the employer knew of the statutorily protected activity and that there was a close
temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse employment actions.
Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); see Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (holding that the temporal proximity must be

grievance. (Pl. Dep. at 100.) Certainly, being fired on the same day of voicing a
Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273. Even so,

activity under Title VII and Matthews has failed to provide evidence of Bowlin
knowledge.
Bowlin asserts
with her Union regarding alleged discriminatory practices prior to her
(Bowlin Decl., Ex. 5.) Matthews testified in her deposition to the
veracity of the claims she asserted in one of her EEOC complaints, in which she
Page 21 of 26

grievance protesting the accumulation of points against [her] during periods of
approved vacations and transfer . . . . [T]he investigation into [her] complaint had

(Pl. Dep. at 56-57.) However, Matthews provides the Court with no evidence or
testimony specifically as to how Bowlin would have possessed such knowledge.
She provides only unsubstantiated assertions which are conclusory, and altogether
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
ii. LEGITIMATE NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON & PRETEXT
Assuming, arguendo that Matthews had established her prima facie case, the
burden of production would then shift to Faurecia to produce a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for firing her.

The burden Faurecia bears here is

Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., Inc., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th
Cir. 1983).

Id. (quoting Lee v. Russell Cty. Bd. of Educ., 684
F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 1982)).

Here, Faurecia stated that Matthews was

suspended and subsequently discharged on account of her violation of its

Page 22 of 26

attendance policies.
Id.
The burden then shifts back to Matthews to show that

proffered

reason is mere pretext for unlawful retaliation. See Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light
Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998). To demonstrate pretext, Matthews
must cast sufficient doubt on

proffered non-discriminatory reasons

to allow a reasonable factfinder to determine that the proffered legitimate reasons
Hawkins v. BBVA Compass
Bancshares, Inc., 613 Fed. Appx. 831, 837 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Silvera v.
Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations
omitted). Pretext can be shown
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
Kragor v.
Takeda Pharm. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Texas Dept.
of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).

whether the employer gave an honest explanation o
Here, Matthews opposes

Id. at 1310 11.
thus

ned to whether Faurecia gave a legitimate reason.
Page 23 of 26

C

declaration, the attendance policies in the

Handbook, and Matthews acknowledgement of her receipt and understanding of
the Handbook along with its contents,

proffered reason

for terminating Matthews to be reasonable.
Accordingly,

Matthews

must

proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538
(11th Cir. 1997). She also must show
for firing her were ill-founded but that unlawful discrimination was the true
Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010)
(citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)).
Matthews argues that the attendance points assessed to her were inaccurate,11 and
that the reason she was terminated was because of the complaints she raised and

11

Even if Faurecia was mistaken, Matthews must still prove that its reason for terminating
her was an illegal one. See Flowers v. Troup Cty.
frankly, employers are free to fire their employees for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based
on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory

Page 24 of 26

the union grievances she filed. Bowlin, the person who terminated Plaintiff, was in
charge of assessing attendance points.
The testimony Matthews provided in her deposition about the day she was
terminated certainly casts Bowlin in a negative light.
knowing anything about Matthe

Indeed, Bowlin denies

grievances with her Union prior to

her termination. Yet under

he dismissed her

immediately after he found out that she was filing another union grievance, and he
did so in the presence of the union shop stewardess who had the complaint in hand.
However, that grievance was based upon the conduct of Bonner and Shepherd
action that Matthews admitted had nothing to do with her gender. (Pl. Dep. at 102;
82.)

Consequently, Matthews cannot show that an

unlawful discriminatory
.

Damon v.

Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999). In sum,
summary judgment on
IV.

Title VII retaliation claim is due to be granted.

CONCLUSION

(doc. 39) is due to be GRANTED as

, and the case

dismissed in its entirety. An Order consisted with this Opinion will be entered
contemporaneously herewith.
Page 25 of 26

DONE and ORDERED on June 19, 2018.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
190685

Page 26 of 26