O'Bryant v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION - For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the administrative record and memoranda of the parties, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying OBryants claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits is AFFIRMED and this action DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Magistrate Judge John H England, III on 3/28/2018. (KEK)

FILED
2018 Mar-28 AM 11:32
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
CASSANDRA O’BRYANT,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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Case Number: 7:17-cv-00060-JHE

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Plaintiff Cassandra O’Bryant (“O’Bryant”) seeks review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
§ 205(g) of the Social Security Act, of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner”), denying her application for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”). (Doc. 1). O’Bryant timely pursued and exhausted her administrative
remedies. This case is therefore ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The
undersigned has carefully considered the record and, for the reasons stated below, the
Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
I. Factual and Procedural History
O’Bryant filed her application for a period of disability and DIB on December 10, 2013,
alleging she became unable to work beginning on August 1, 2010. (Tr. 116-17). The Agency
initially denied O’Bryant’s application, and O’Bryant requested a hearing where she appeared on
July 24, 2015. (Tr. 29-50). After the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied

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In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 73, the parties have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge
conduct any and all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment. (Doc. 16).

O’Bryant’s claim on August 27, 2015. (Tr. 16-28). O’Bryant sought review by the Appeals
Council, but it declined her request on November 14, 2016. (Tr. 1-6). On that date, the ALJ’s
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. On January 13, 2017, O’Bryant initiated
this action. (See doc. 1).
O’Bryant was a fifty-seven-year-old female at the time of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 116).
O’Bryant has a high school education and past relevant work as a lunchroom worker and safety
inspector. (Tr. 48, 142).
II. Standard of Review2
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is narrowly circumscribed. The
function of this Court is to determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 390 (1971); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). This Court must
“scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported
by substantial evidence.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Id. It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id.
This Court must uphold factual findings supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial
evidence may even exist contrary to the findings of the ALJ, and [the reviewing court] may have
taken a different view of it as a factfinder. Yet, if there is substantially supportive evidence, the
findings cannot be overturned.” Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 230 (11th Cir. 1991). However,

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In general, the legal standards applied are the same whether a claimant seeks DIB or
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). However, separate, parallel statutes and regulations exist
for DIB and SSI claims. Therefore, citations in this opinion should be considered to refer to the
appropriate parallel provision as context dictates. The same applies to citations for statutes or
regulations found in quoted court decisions.
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the Court reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo because no presumption of validity attaches
to the ALJ’s determination of the proper legal standards to be applied. Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d
528, 531 (11th Cir. 1993). If the court finds an error in the ALJ’s application of the law, or if the
ALJ fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning for determining the proper legal analysis
has been conducted, it must reverse the ALJ’s decision. Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143,
1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991).
III. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
To qualify for disability benefits and establish his or her entitlement for a period of
disability, a claimant must be disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and the Regulations
promulgated thereunder.3 The Regulations define “disabled” as “the inability to do any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of not less than twelve (12) months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To establish entitlement to disability
benefits, a claimant must provide evidence of a “physical or mental impairment” which “must
result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508.
The Regulations provide a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The Commissioner must determine in sequence:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

whether the claimant is currently employed;
whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an impairment listed
by the [Commissioner];
whether the claimant can perform his or her past work; and
whether the claimant is capable of performing any work in the national

The “Regulations” promulgated under the Social Security Act are listed in 20 C.F.R. Parts
400 to 499.
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economy.
Pope v. Shalala, 998 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing to the formerly applicable C.F.R.
section), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Apfel, 189 F.3d 561, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1999);
accord McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986). “Once the claimant has satisfied
steps One and Two, she will automatically be found disabled if she suffers from a listed
impairment. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment but cannot perform her work, the
burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant can perform some other job.” Pope,
998 F.2d at 477; accord Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995). The Commissioner
must further show such work exists in the national economy in significant numbers. Id.
IV. Findings of the Administrative Law Judge
After consideration of the entire record and application of the sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ made the following findings:
At Step One, the ALJ found O’Bryant last met the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act on March 31, 2015 (her date last insured or “DLI”), and that O’Bryant had not engage
in substantial gainful activity from her alleged onset date of August 1, 2010, through March 31,
2015, her DLI. (Tr. 21). At Step Two, the ALJ found O’Bryant has the following severe
impairments: cystocele, status post transvaginal mesh, osteopenia. (Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ
found O’Bryant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr.
22).
Before proceeding to Step Four, the ALJ determined O’Bryant’s residual functioning
capacity (“RFC”), which is the most a claimant can do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ determined that, through her DLI, O’Bryant had the RFC to perform a

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limited range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). Specifically, the ALJ found that
O’Bryant could perform “light work” except she could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally
and ten pounds frequently, no limitation in standing, sitting, or walking; she could frequently
balance, and occasionally stoop kneel, crouch, or crawl; she could occasionally climb ramps and
stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; she had no manipulative, environmental, or
communicative limitations. (Tr. 22-24).
At Step Four, the ALJ determined, through the date last insured, O’Bryant was capable of
performing past relevant work as a safety inspector as generally performed in the national economy
because it did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the O’Bryant’s
RFC. (Tr. 24). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded O’Bryant was not under a disability during the
relevant period. (Id.). The ALJ did not reach Step Five of the sequential evaluation process.
V. Analysis
Although the court may only reverse a finding of the Commissioner if it is not supported
by substantial evidence or because improper legal standards were applied, “[t]his does not relieve
the court of its responsibility to scrutinize the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial
evidence supports each essential administrative finding.” Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838
(11th Cir. 1982) (citing Strickland v. Harris, 615 F.2d 1103, 1106 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court,
however, “abstains from reweighing the evidence or substituting its own judgment for that of the
[Commissioner].” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination O’Bryant failed to
demonstrate a disability, and the ALJ applied the proper standards to reach this conclusion.
O’Bryant challenges the Commissioner’s decision on two specific grounds, contending: (1) the
ALJ failed to pose a hypothetical question to the Vocational Expert (“VE”) that comprehensively

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described O’Bryant’s limitations and restrictions (doc. 9 at 7-9); and (2) the ALJ’s RFC assessment
is not supported by substantial evidence, (id. at 9-14). Neither of these grounds supports reversal.
A. Vocational Expert Testimony is Not Required at Step Four
O’Bryant contends the ALJ erred when he did not pose a hypothetical question to the
vocational expert (“VE”). At Step Four of the Sequential Evaluation Process, the ALJ determined
that, through the date last insured, O’Bryant was capable of performing her past relevant work as
a safety inspector as generally performed in the national economy because it did not require the
performance of work-related activities precluded by the O’Bryant’s RFC. (Tr. 24). Accordingly,
the ALJ concluded O’Bryant was not under a disability during the relevant period. (Id.). Because
of this finding, the ALJ did not reach Step Five of the sequential evaluation process. (See id.).
At Step Five, the ALJ determines whether a significant number of jobs exist in the national
economy that a claimant can perform. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.
2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). An ALJ may make this determination by either applying
the Medical Vocational Guidelines or by obtaining testimony of a VE. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 123940. For a VE’s testimony to constitute substantial evidence on the issue of whether a significant
number of jobs exist in the national economy that someone with the claimant’s limitations could
perform, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question that comprises all of the complaints
impairments. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
When evaluating O’Bryant’s claim, the ALJ did not reach Step Five. Instead, at Step Four
of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found O’Bryant could perform her past relevant work
as generally performed in the national economy. (Tr. 24). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. As the
Eleventh Circuit has explained, an ALJ is not required to consult a VE in determining whether a
claimant can perform her past relevant work. Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1573 n.2 (11th Cir.

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1990). Therefore, any failure to present a hypothetical to the VE was not an error.
Moreover, the ALJ did ask the VE to evaluate O’Bryant’s past relevant work, and the VE
reported O’Bryant’s past work as a safety inspector was a light, skilled position as listed in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) # 168.167-062.

(Tr. 48). The DOT provides

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that O’Bryant’s past relevant work as generally
performed did not exceed her RFC. (Tr. 23). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). Accordingly,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion O’Bryant could perform her past relevant work
and was therefore not disabled.
B. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Determination
O’Bryant next challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination, contending the ALJ substituted
his opinion for those of her treating and examining sources. (Doc. 9 at 9-14). This contention is
not supported by the record.
Before proceeding to Step Four of the Sequential Evaluation Process, the ALJ evaluated
the relevant evidence in the record and determined O’Bryant’s RFC, which is the most she can do
despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). At the hearing level, the responsibility
of assessing a claimant’s RFC falls on the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546, 416.946. The ALJ is
not required to (and generally does not) adopt the opinion of any one medical source, but considers
the totality of the evidence in arriving at a conclusion on the ultimate question of disability. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
1. It is the ALJ’s Responsibility to Determine a Claimant’s RFC Based on the
Relevant Evidence, Which Includes But is Not Limited to Medical Opinions.
To the extent O’Bryant argues the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial

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evidence because it does not reflect the findings of an examining doctor (doc. 9 at 13),4 her
argument is without merit. The responsibility for assessing a claimant’s RFC belongs to the ALJ;
it is not a medical assessment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). The ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s
RFC is “based on all the relevant evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” and not simply on a
doctor’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). Thus, although a doctor may express an opinion
regarding what a claimant can still do, such an opinion is different from an ALJ’s assessment of a
claimant’s RFC and is not determinative. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b)(2), 404.1513(b), (c),
404.1527, 404.1545, 404.1546(c). The ALJ’s RFC determination must be based on substantial
evidence, it does not require a matching medical opinion. Green v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 223 F.
App’x 915, 923 (11th Cir. May 2, 2007).
Moreover, the ALJ did not, as O’Bryant alleges, (see doc. 9 at 13), substitute his own
opinion for those of the medical sources of record. The ALJ simply carried out his responsibility
to consider the medical and other evidence of record in assessing O’Bryant RFC. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1513(b), 404.1527, 404.1545. Furthermore, an opinion stating that a claimant is disabled
or assessing the claimant’s RFC is not a medical opinion, as such issues are reserved for the
Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e); Bell v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (11th Cir.
1986).
2. The ALJ Lifting Requirement is Supported by Substantial Evidence
O’Bryant also challenges the ALJ’s finding regarding her lifting requirements and argues

O’Bryant argues as follows: “Essentially, in reaching his RFC conclusion, the ALJ
rejected every medical opinion of record and substituted his judgment for that of the experts.”
(Doc. 9 at 13).
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she is limited to sedentary work5 rather than light work,6 based on her treating urologist’s, Dr.
Wilson, report from January 2010. (Doc. 9 at 11; see tr. 217-18).
O’Bryant fails to show the ALJ erred when he found she did not have a ten-pound lifting
restriction and therefore could perform light work (as opposed to being limited to sedentary work,
which includes a ten-pound lifting restriction). The ALJ expressly recognized that following
surgery in January 2010, Dr. Wilson reported O’Bryant could return to work but could not lift over
ten pounds. (Tr. 23, 217-18). The ALJ also noted O’Bryant improved following the surgery. (Tr.
23). Treatment notes from O’Bryant’s primary care physician, Dr. Grubbs, do not include a tenpound lifting limitation, and only indicate O’Bryant must avoid heavy lifting. (Tr. 23, 244, 246,
249, 251, 274, 276, 278, 280). Specifically, O’Bryant refers to Dr. Grubb’s notes stating: “[s]he
is not able to do work which requires lifting/stooping/straining per her urologist. (Doc. 9 at 12)

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Sedentary work is defined as

lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles
like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as
one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often
necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are
required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
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Light work is defined as

lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects
weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job
is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it
involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg
controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work,
you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can
do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there
are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for
long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
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(Tr. 295). However, the ALJ reviewed the urology record and found those records show that the
urologist gave no other limitations other than “no heavy lifting” (and the one-time ten-pound
limitation). (Tr. 23, 217-224). Additionally, O’Bryant’s self-reporting contradicts the claim that
she is limited to sedentary work. In January 2014, O’Bryant reported to the consulting examiner,
Dr. Robertson, that Dr. Wilson had given her “about a 30-pound weight restriction.” (Tr. 291,
294). Such a weight restriction is consistent with light work, not sedentary work.
Finally, according to the July 2015 Medical Source Statement form Dr. Grubbs completed,
O’Bryant can work, but cannot do work requiring lifting per her urologist. (Tr. 295). He then
clarified that she risks incontinence of her bladder if she does any heavy lifting. (Tr. 296). Dr.
Grubb’s report, therefore, supports the ALJ’s RFC finding, which restricts O’Bryant from “heavy
lifting.” O’Bryant has failed to demonstrate the ALJ erred in assessing her RFC.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, and upon careful consideration of the administrative record
and memoranda of the parties, the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying
O’Bryant’s claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits is AFFIRMED and
this action DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DONE this 28th day of March, 2018.

_______________________________
JOHN H. ENGLAND, III
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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