Matson v. Steve's Truck & Trailer Repairs Inc et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 10/6/17. (SAC )

FILED
2017 Oct-06 PM 03:55
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
NATHAN MATSON, as the
Administrator of the Estate of
JORDAN ALEXA MAYS
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVE’S TRUCK &
TRAILER REPAIRS, INC., et
al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

7:17-cv-01166-LSC

Memorandum of Opinion
Plaintiff Nathan Matson (“Plaintiff”), the legally appointed Administrator
of the Estate of Jordan Alexa Mays, brought this action against Steve’s Truck &
Trailer Repairs, Inc. (“Steve’s Truck”), Billy Joe Carney, Jr. (“Carney”), and BIR
Truck & Trailer Repair, LLC (“BIR”) (collectively “Defendants”). Before the
Court is BIR’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. (Doc. 9.) For
the reasons stated below, BIR’s Motion to Dismiss is due to be granted.
I.

Background
On October 20, 2015, Jordan Alexa Mays was riding in a vehicle when it was

struck at the intersection of U.S. Highway 280 and County Road 280 in Shelby
Page 1 of 15

County, Alabama by a tractor trailer driven by Chassidy Renae Garner-James
(“Garner-James”), a Mississippi Resident. (Doc. 1 ¶ 7; Doc. 9 ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff
alleges that at the time of the collision, the braking system of the tractor did not
work and Garner-James’ inability to stop caused the crash. Ms. Mays subsequently
died from the accident, and Plaintiff, as administrator of her estate, filed suit
against the Defendants.
Defendants had been hired to repair the tractor’s braking system prior to
Mays’ death. Plaintiff alleges Carney and Steve’s Truck worked on the tractor’s
brakes in York, Alabama on July 31, 2015. (Doc. 9 ¶ 4.) The tractor subsequently
failed a Department of Transportation (“DOT”) inspection because it did not
comply with DOT braking regulations. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 8.) Miller & Son Trucking, Inc.
(“Miller”), a Mississippi resident and the owner of the tractor, then hired BIR to
inspect the tractor and to ensure that it complied with all braking regulations. (Id.)
BIR has its principal office in Tennessee, but also has a repair shop in Franklin,
Kentucky. (Id. at ¶ 4.) BIR performed the requested inspection and repairs to the
tractor on a “road call” in Franklin, Kentucky on August 3, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff alleges that these repairs were negligently performed and insufficient to fix
the underlying braking issue, which persisted until October 20, 2015, where the
faulty brakes caused the collision that led to Ms. May’s death.
Page 2 of 15

II.

Personal Jurisdiction
A.

Standard of Review

In a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
plaintiff generally “bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
jurisdiction over the movant, non-resident defendant.” Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843
F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills
Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 1988)). “A prima facie case is established
if the plaintiff presents enough evidence to withstand a motion for directed
verdict.” Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). The Court must
treat facts alleged in the complaint as true if they are not controverted by affidavits
submitted from the defendant. Id. However, if the defendant submits affidavits, the
plaintiff must produce additional evidence supporting jurisdiction unless the
defendants’ affidavits are only conclusory. Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort &
Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006). When the plaintiff’s
evidence conflicts with the defendant’s evidence, the Court must “construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.
B.

Discussion

“A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise personal
jurisdiction to the extent authorized by the law of the state in which it sits and to
Page 3 of 15

the extent allowed under the Constitution.” Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels,
Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746, 753 (2014) (“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the
bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”). Personal jurisdiction is generally a
two-step inquiry, as the Court must consider whether personal jurisdiction is
consistent with the forum state’s long-arm statute and whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mut. Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.
2004). However, for federal courts in Alabama “the two inquiries merge, because
Alabama’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the
fullest extent constitutionally permissible.” Sloss Indus. Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d
922, 925 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Ex Parte Edgetech I.G., Inc., 159 So. 3d 629, 633
(Ala. 2014). Thus, the Court need only consider the limits of the Due Process
Clause. Mut. Serv. Ins. Co., 358 F.3d at 1319.
“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
Page 4 of 15

(1940)). There are two types of personal jurisdiction—general jurisdiction and
specific jurisdiction—but both are based on the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state.
i.

General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction exists over defendants “when their affiliations with the
State are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the
forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2851 (2011). The general jurisdiction inquiry “is not whether a foreign
corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and
systematic,’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so
“continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.’” Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear,
131 S. Ct. at 2851). The contacts must be sufficient that a suit in the subject state,
even on unrelated dealings, is justified. See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318. For
example, a foreign mining corporation whose mining activities ceased entirely, but
whose general manager and president maintained an office in Ohio to conduct
activities on behalf of the company by keeping files, holding meetings, and
distributing paychecks, was subject to general personal jurisdiction in Ohio because
the corporation, through its president was “carrying on in Ohio a continuous and
Page 5 of 15

systematic, but limited, part of its general business.” Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min.
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952). However, a defendant with no place of business,
employees, bank accounts, advertisements, or manufacturing facilities in North
Carolina, but which had other companies distribute its products in North Carolina
was not subject to general personal jurisdiction there. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A., 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (“[The defendant’s] attenuated connections to
the State fall far short of the ‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’
necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against [the defendant] on
claims unrelated to anything that connects [it] to the State.” (citations omitted)).
BIR’s contacts with Alabama are not sufficient to provide general
jurisdiction over it, a point that Plaintiff does not seriously contest. BIR is a limited
liability company organized under Tennessee law and has its principal place of
business in Parsons, Tennessee, but operates a repair shop in Franklin, Kentucky.
Plaintiff has shown no “continuous and systematic” contacts between BIR and
Alabama. BIR has no offices, employees, real estate, or bank accounts in Alabama.
(Kumar Aff. ¶ 5-6.) Nor has BIR ever serviced or inspected vehicles in Alabama, or
affirmatively sued any party there. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-8.) BIR does not have any affiliation
with Steve’s Truck or Carney outside of being co-defendants. Given the absence of

Page 6 of 15

any activity to show a “continuous and systematic presence” in Alabama, the
Court finds BIR is not subject to Alabama’s general jurisdiction.
ii.

Specific Jurisdiction

The parties’ dispute focuses on whether Alabama has specific jurisdiction
over BIR. “Where a forum seeks to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant, due process requires the defendant have ‘fair warning’ that
a particular activity may subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”
Madara, 916 F.2d at 1516. The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant focuses on “the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770, 775 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). Specific
jurisdiction does not require a large volume of contacts with the forum state, as
even a single purposeful contact may give rise to personal jurisdiction. See McGee v.
Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); see also Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544
F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Court has made clear . . . that ‘[s]o long as
it creates a “substantial connection” with the forum, even a single act can support
jurisdiction.’” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 n.18
(1985))).

Page 7 of 15

For a state to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the
defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the
forum state. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014). The contacts with the
forum state must also be purposeful and created by the “defendant himself.”
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 (“We have consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the
defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between
the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.”). Due process requires that a
defendant be subjected to specific jurisdiction of a State “based on his own
affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’
contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.”
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). Related to
purposefulness, the Court must determine whether the defendant has a sufficient
connection to the forum “that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
If the Court finds that sufficient contacts exist to subject an out-of-state
defendant to the forum state’s courts, the Court must also consider whether the
exercise of jurisdiction would “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316). This
Page 8 of 15

analysis requires weighing various factors: the burden placed upon the defendant,
the interests of the forum state in deciding the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in
litigating in that forum, the interests of the interstate judicial system in an efficient
resolution of disputes, and the interests of fundamental social policies. See WorldWide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare
Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2000).
The overwhelming lack of contacts between BIR and Alabama in this case
compels the Court to conclude that Alabama lacks specific jurisdiction over BIR.
As an initial matter, BIR, a Tennessee limited liability company with a repair shop
in Kentucky, has a connection to the Plaintiff only indirectly by its contact with
Miller, a Mississippi resident. (Doc. 23 at 5-7.) There is no question that BIR did
not reach out and form any direct contacts with the Plaintiff. The conduct which
led BIR to be sued by Plaintiff—the alleged failure to repair the tractor—occurred
in Kentucky. There has been no showing that BIR ever intended or knew that the
tractor would one day end up in Alabama. BIR’s sole connection to Alabama is
based on “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts caused by third parties and
not by BIR itself. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475. Plaintiff has failed to show how BIR
“purposefully directed” conduct towards Alabama. Id. at 476.

Page 9 of 15

Plaintiff argues that while BIR has formed no direct contacts with Alabama,
it was foreseeable to BIR that the tractor it repaired would eventually leave
Kentucky to return to Mississippi and other states in the Southeast. Because of the
geographical proximity between Mississippi and Alabama, Plaintiff argues that BIR
could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” for the repairs that it did
for Miller. To support his argument, Plaintiff relies on Ex parte American Timber &
Steel Co., which held that an out-of-state defendant was subject to the specific
jurisdiction of Alabama when it hired a tractor trailer to transport lumber from
Texas to Florida, and a vehicle accident occurred between the driver of the trailer
and the plaintiffs in Alabama. 102 So. 3d 347, 359 (Ala. 2011). Because defendant
could reasonably expect its shipment to at some point traverse Alabama, American
Timber held that it was foreseeable to defendants to be sued there. Id.
American Timber differs materially from Plaintiff’s case and thus is wholly
unhelpful to his argument. The defendant in American Timber “purposefully
directed” its timber and the carrier from Texas through Alabama to Florida and
could reasonably expect to be haled into an Alabama court for torts committed
there. BIR, on the other hand, repaired the tractor in Kentucky at Miller’s request,
but had no control over where Miller directed the tractor following the transaction.
While BIR could foresee that the tractor would end up in Alabama or indeed any
Page 10 of 15

other state, “‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction,” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, as “a local
California tire retailer could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout
occurs there.” Id. at 296 (citations omitted); see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 486
n.17 (“[T]he Court has held that the Due Process Clause forbids the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state automobile distributor whose only tie to
the forum resulted from a customer’s decision to drive there.”).
Because the Court has found that there are insufficient contacts to subject
BIR to personal jurisdiction in Alabama, the Court need not evaluate whether
jurisdiction over BIR would be fair. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254
(1958); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294 (“Even if the
defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate
before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.”). The exertion of personal jurisdiction over BIR does not comport with
due process and, as such, BIR cannot be made to defend this action in Alabama.
iii.

Transfer of Claims against BIR
Page 11 of 15

Plaintiff argues that if BIR is not subject to Alabama personal jurisdiction,
which it is not, then it would not be proper to transfer this case in whole or part to
another jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (If the “court finds that there is a want of
jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or
appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been
brought at the time it was filed or noticed . . . .”). Specifically, Plaintiff states that
the same personal jurisdiction issue would arise in Kentucky concerning Steve’s
Truck and Carney, since these remaining Defendants repaired the tractor in
Alabama, and do not have any contacts with Kentucky. BIR only argues that the
inability of the Court to transfer the action intact with all Defendants should not
affect its dismissal of BIR, but does not argue that transfer is proper in this case.
(Doc. 25 at 15-16.) As neither party has moved to transfer, and because the Court
finds that it would not be “in the interest of justice” to do so because similar
jurisdictional issues would arise in Kentucky, the Court declines to transfer
Plaintiff’s claims against BIR. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
III. Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery
In his opposition to BIR’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff requests leave to
conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiff seeks: “to depose BIR’s
corporate representative in an effort to determine the full extent of BIR’s minimum
Page 12 of 15

contacts with Alabama, and with their business that repairs trucks that are
consistently operating within interstate commerce.” (Doc. 23 ¶ 28.) Plaintiff
believes this discovery will support Alabama’s personal jurisdiction over BIR in
conjunction with American Timber. Id. ¶ 27.
“[W]hen facts that go to the merits and the court’s jurisdiction are
intertwined and genuinely in dispute, [a] part[y] ha[s] a ‘qualified right to
jurisdictional discovery,’” unless that party unduly delayed in seeking leave to
initiate discovery. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 859 F.3d
1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 730
(11th Cir. 1982)). In such cases, it is an abuse of discretion for a Court to deny a
timely brought motion for jurisdictional discovery. Id. Here, Plaintiff has failed to
identify any jurisdictional facts in dispute and only argues that if BIR repaired other
tractors that later entered Alabama this would subject BIR to Alabama’s specific
jurisdiction. This argument is meritless. See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Ct. of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (Where there is no affiliation between
a defendant’s act and the forum state, “specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of
the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”).
Plaintiff further failed to move the Court for jurisdictional discovery, first
making the request in his opposition as an alternative to BIR’s dismissal. Plaintiff’s
Page 13 of 15

request is thus untimely and need not be granted. United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556
F.3d 1260, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that the district court did not err in
not allowing jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff “never formally moved the
district court for jurisdictional discovery but, instead, buried such request in its
briefs as a proposed alternative to dismissing [the defendant]” and failed to “take[]
every step possible to signal to the district court its immediate need for such
discovery”); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999)
(untimely request for jurisdictional discovery need not be granted). Because
Plaintiff has not shown why such discovery would be fruitful and has failed to
formally move for jurisdictional discovery, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request. The
Court has before it sufficient facts to find BIR cannot be made to defend this case in
Alabama.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, BIR’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

against BIR for lack of personal jurisdiction is due to be GRANTED. A separate
Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Page 14 of 15

DONE and ORDERED on October 6, 2017.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
190485

Page 15 of 15