Chapman v. State of Alabama, The et al
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING 5 MOTION to Dismiss and GRANTING Plaintiff's implied motion for leave to amend. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 7/3/2018. (AFS)
FILED
2018 Jul-03 AM 11:21
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MARQUETTE CHAPMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE STATE OF ALABAMA,
and THE ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants.
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7:17-cv-01631-LSC
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
brings suit
alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Before the
Court is Alabama Department of Transportation
L
and the State of
motion to dismiss. (Doc. 5.)
Plaintiff, Marquette Chapman
has timely filed her
opposition. (Doc. 10.) The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the
1
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
race, color, religion, sex, or national
42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a).
Page 1 of 13
reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is due to be denied, and Plaintiff should
be granted leave to amend.
I.
BACKGROUND2
Chapman, an African American resident of Cottondale, Alabama, was
employed by ALDOT beginning in March of 2004.
In December of 2015,
Chapman took a test seeking a promotion to Transportation Technologist and was
ranked number one in the state of Alabama. Thereafter, Plaintiff informed her
, of her ranking and made an
inquiry to the 5th Division Personnel Manager
about the procedure to obtain the promotion. Following the release of her test
results and her application for promotion, four Caucasian employees who scored
lower than Plaintiff were promoted to the Transportation Technologist position.
Two of the Caucasian employees actually took the promotional test on the same
day as Chapman. All four employees who received the promotion were, according
to Chapman,
2
Johnson v. Midland
Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). The following facts are, therefore, taken
the Complaint, and the Court makes no ruling on their
veracity.
Page 2 of 13
. 1 at 3.)
Chapman continued to make
inquiries as to why she had not yet received a promotion.3
In March of 2016,
Defendants learned that P
transferred
her to an outside inspector position where she was to work on construction
projects.
The new position required her to possess
According to Chapman, she competently performed her job duties in both her old
office position and the new outside inspector position. However, ALDOT fired her
a pretextual reason for her termination and the real reason was on account of her race.
On February 23, 2017, she timely filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commiss
) alleging racial discrimination. (Doc. 5-1 at 3-
3
-1 at 3.) She lists November 2016 as the month in
which she asked her supervisor, Kevin Williamson about her application for promotion and was
told it was still under review. Subsequently, she made more formal requests for promotion and
inquiries about her application.
Page 3 of 13
4.) After receipt of her EEOC right-to-sue letter (doc. 5-1 at 1), which is dated June
22, 2017, Plaintiff brought suit in this Court on September 21, 2017.4
Because Plaintiff consented to dismissal of count two of her complaint,5 this
Opinion
smiss as to
the only remaining claim, Count One, Title IIV claim for failure to promote and
wrongful termination of employment.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, in
order to withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a
[for] relief that is plausible on
Ray v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 836 F.3d 1340, 1347 48 (11th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
4
(Doc. 5 at 1.) However, as evidenced in the docket on CM/ECF, Plaintiff initiated her lawsuit on
the 21st of September not the 22nd.
5
89, 100
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants asserted an Eleventh Amendment immunity
1981 claim. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
n. 1.)
Page 4 of 13
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Stated another way, the factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to
Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602
F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).
will survive a motion to dismiss.
, 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal quotation marks omitted).
that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
[
Id. Review of the complaint is
-specific task that requires [this Court] to draw on its judicial experience
Id.
of Indus. Orgs. v. City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Roe v.
Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 84 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Page 5 of 13
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a), a party may amend their
complaint once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after service of a
response by answer or motion. Otherwise, the party may amend their pleading
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a).
Id.
to amend, the discretion of the di
Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Dussouy v.
Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1981)). Reasons for denying leave
to amend include
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . , [and] futility of amendment.
Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
III. DISCUSSION
A.
of the last discriminatory
act
her termination.
Because Defendants lodged their jurisdictional challenge in their motion to
dismiss before Plaintiff attempted to amend her complaint, the Court will first
address the jurisdictional issue. Under Title VII, an aggrieved person must file an
Page 6 of 13
EEOC charge
42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(e).
The limitations
periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who
promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defending
claims arising from employment decisions that are long past.
Del. State Coll. v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980) (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 463 464, (1975)). Defendants assert that
claim in Count
One is due to be dismissed under FRCP Rule 12(b)(6) on account of it being
untimely.
In her EEOC charge, Chapman alleges the earliest date the discrimination
took place was on March 1, 2016 and the latest was January 25, 2017. 6 (Doc. 5-1 at
3-4.) Defendants argue that
discriminated against on the basis of race concerning a promotion that occurred
within 180 days of the filing of the EEOC charge in her complaint. (Doc. 5 at 6.)
In addition, they argue that the only specific date Chapman provides to the Court is
December of 2015 when the named comparators took the promotional test, which
is well outside the 180 day time period. Chapman did not indicate on her EEOC
6
The EEOC charge is central to the complaint and this Court may properly consider it on a
motion to dismiss. Lambert v. Ala. Dept. of Youth Servs., 150 Fed. Appx. 990, 991- 992 (11th Cir.
2005).
Page 7 of 13
charge that a continuing violation occurred. In her complaint Plaintiff alleges that
she was persistent in her inquiries regarding promotion and continuously denied
the promotion she sought between February of 2016 and January of 2017.
Defendants cite Welty v. S.F. & G., Inc.,
termination cannot serve as the last discriminatory act. 605 F. Supp. 1548 (N.D.
Ala. 1985). The Welty decision explained that when the notice of termination of
employment is given, and termination of employment is the alleged discriminatory
act, the 180-day time period begins on notice of termination. Id. at 1554-55 (citing
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981)); see also Ricks, 449 US. at 255 (holding
that the time period for filing begins at notice of termination)). Both Ricks and
Chardon establish that the date of notice of termination . . . is the operative date
from which the 180-
Elliott v. Grp. Med. &
Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 1983); see also McWilliams v. Escambia
Cty. Sch. Bd., 658 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Ricks as holding that when the
challenged act is an individual employment decision, the discrimination occurs and
the 180-day filing period begins when the employer communicates their decision).
Though Plaintiff does not provide a specific date between when the
discrimination began and when it ended regarding the failure to promote, she
clearly claims that her termination in January of 2017 was due to her race and that
Page 8 of 13
-textual reason for her firing. (Compl.
¶ 28, 31-33.) Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Chapman, her
termination is a discriminatory act; and, because she filed her EEOC charge on
February 23, 2017, less than two months after the last allegedly discriminatory act
(termination), the Courts finds that her EEOC charge was not untimely.
Defendants assert that the filing
discriminatory acts, not [at] the time at which the consequences of the acts
[become] most painful
Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258.
However, Ricks involved a
termination of tenure decision that was communicated to the plaintiff, who was
then offered a 1-year terminal contract while his grievance was pending. Id. at 255,
258. The plaintiff did not file within 180 days of the notice of denial of tenure,
which the university asserted was a final decision, but asserted that the date his
grievance was denied was the start of the 180-day filing period. The court reasoned
that the denial of tenure was the u
180-day timeframe began when the employer expressed its official position to the
employee. Id. at 262. By contrast, in the present case,
employer
expressed its decision to terminate her in January 2017, which is well within 180
days of the filing of the EEOC charge, February 23, 2017.
(Doc. 5-1 at 3.)
Defendants have neither argued nor provided any evidence that they gave
Page 9 of 13
Chapman notice of her impending termination at any time prior to her termination
in January 2017. Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge within 180 days of the last alleged
discriminatory act
the termination7 of her employment
therefore,
motion to dismiss is due to be denied.
As further detailed below, the amended complaint cures deficiencies
surrounding the merits of Chapman s failure to promote claim
as she clarified the
over for promotion. As such, Plaintiff
has alleged facts sufficient to survive a 12(b) motion to dismiss and her failure to
promote claim may proceed.
B.
omplaint
The Court will now address whether Chapman should be allowed to amend
her complaint. Defendants assert that Plaintiff should not be permitted to amend
because this Court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint, and amending
the complaint would create jurisdiction where there is none. (Doc. 11. at 5-7.)
However, as discussed above, the Court does possess jurisdiction because
.
7
Indeed
or adverse, employment action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Page 10 of 13
Allowing the amendment would not unduly prejudice Defendant; it has not
been unduly delayed, and there is no evidence it was made in bad faith or with a
dilatory motive. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
amended complaint was filed
on February 1, 2018,
dismiss (doc. 10-1), which was filed
motion to dismiss on January 16, 2018. See
may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within : . . . 21 days after service
of a motion under Rule 12(b) ). Therefore, the only remaining inquiry is whether
the amendment would be futile.
As explained above, in her complaint Plaintiff alleges that she was persistent
in her inquiries regarding promotion and was continuously denied promotion
between February of 2016 and January of 2017 and that her termination serves as a
discriminatory act, which falls within the ambit of the 180 day timeframe.
amendment adds specificity to her Title VII claim and drops the § 1981
claim as she conceded its dismissal in her response. Paragraphs 11-14 of the
amended complaint include facts supporting her claim for non-promotion and
clarify the promotional process. (Doc. 10-1 ¶ 11-14.) Additionally, paragraphs 16-
Page 11 of 13
19 establish that Chapman was denied promotion8 after she made a formal request
in November of 2016 (doc. 10-1 ¶ 16-19), which is within 180 days of filing of her
EEOC charge. Other added paragraphs provide extra details supporting
-textual to her
termination. In all, the additional paragraphs serve to clarify
give Defendants additional notice of the claims against them
jurisdiction where none existed. The Court finds no
claims and
it does not confer
substantial reason
to
disallow the amendment. Thomas, 847 F.2d at 773.
IV. CONCLUSION
qualifies as an act of discrimination which fell within the 180 day period
making
her claims timely, and conferring jurisdiction on this Court. Additionally, both
Title VII failure to promote and termination claims may proceed on the
merits. For the reasons stated above,
denied, and
implied motion for leave to amend is granted.
8
Failure to promote is a discrete act of discrimination.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002).
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(doc. 5) is
DONE and ORDERED on July 3, 2018.
_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge
190685
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