Holt v. Domec et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/11/2018. (KAM)

FILED
2018 Jul-11 PM 04:15
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION

JOE DANIEL HOLT, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
TERESA DOMEC, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 7:17-cv-01736-RDP-JEO

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(Doc. # 17), filed on May 17, 2018. In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge
screened Plaintiff’s Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and recommended that the court
dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
(Doc. # 17 at 2, 37). Plaintiff timely filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc.
# 18).
I.

Standard of Review
The court reviews objected-to factual and legal rulings in a Magistrate Judge’s report and

recommendation de novo. Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 (11th Cir. 1989). The court
reviews those portions that are not specifically objected to under the plain error standard. See
11th Cir. R. 3-1. (See also Doc. # 17 at 37) (warning Plaintiff that his failure to object would bar
further review, except for plain error). Objections must identify the portions of the Report and
Recommendation being challenged and the specific basis for the objections. Heath, 863 F.2d at
822.

II.

Analysis of Objections
After careful review, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s objections all are due to be

overruled.1
First, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge overstepped his authority under § 1915A
because he addressed arguments against Plaintiff’s claims that were not raised by the Defendants
themselves. (Doc. # 18 at 1-2, 6, 8). These objections misapprehend the court’s statutory
obligations when screening a prisoner’s complaint before service on a governmental entity,
officer, or employee. The Prison Litigation Reform Act directs the court to identify cognizable
claims in a prisoner’s complaint and to dismiss all claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to
state a claim for relief, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.

28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b). The Act also “gives courts greater liberty in dismissing prisoner lawsuits asserted
against governmental entities or employees” than the court possesses in other contexts.
Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997). To be sure, the court cannot dismiss
a claim sua sponte based on an affirmative defense unless the affirmative defense appears on the
face of the complaint. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). But, the
Magistrate Judge properly analyzed Plaintiff’s claims to determine whether any of them stated a
plausible claim for relief that is not moot or barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus,
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Some of Plaintiff’s objections are due to be overruled without substantial discussion. Throughout his
objections, Plaintiff asserts that the court must conduct a de novo review of the entire Complaint without identifying
a specific deficiency in the Magistrate Judge’s review of the Complaint. (Doc. # 18 at 1-3). Plaintiff also argues
that the Magistrate Judge should have determined whether the claims in the Complaint provided fair notice to
Defendants without stating which claim(s) the Magistrate Judge failed to properly review. (Id. at 2). These
objections offer no specific challenge to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation that is appropriate for
the court to review. Cf. Heath, 863 F.2d at 822. In any event, the Magistrate Judge liberally construed Plaintiff’s
allegations in the pleadings and, in the court’s view, discerned every possible claim raised therein. Similarly,
Plaintiff raises no reviewable objection to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the court lacks authority to
demote or transfer Defendants. (See Docs. # 17 at 15; 18 at 5).
Finally, some of Plaintiff’s objections challenge clerical errors in the Report and Recommendation. (See
Doc. # 18 at 3) (stating that the Report and Recommendation should have cited Section 5.4.6.3 of a classification
manual, rather than Section 5.4.G.3). (See also id. at 4) (stating that the Report and Recommendation should have
cited Ala. Code § 14-3-13, rather than § 14-3-3). These errors are immaterial to the merits.

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the court will overrule Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s identification of
deficiencies sua sponte during the screening process.
Second, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s failure to acknowledge that his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims are being brought against individual defendants in their individual
capacities. (Doc. # 18 at 1, 5). That argument is off the mark. The Magistrate Judge thoroughly
discussed the reasons why Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims fail as a matter of law after
recommending the dismissal of his official-capacity claims under the Eleventh Amendment.
And, the Magistrate Judge limited his immunity recommendation to official-capacity claims.
(See Doc. # 17 at 17) (applying Eleventh Amendment immunity “to the extent the plaintiff sues
the corrections personnel in their official capacities”).2 Therefore, these objections are due to be
overruled.
Third, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s purported lack of neutrality in
describing Defendant Teresa Domec’s investigation of a Facebook account. (Doc. # 18 at 3).
The court finds that the Magistrate Judge fairly laid out Plaintiff’s factual allegations about the
investigation and his assertions of innocence. (See Doc. # 17 at 5-6). And, the Magistrate Judge
correctly determined that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Domec’s purported identity fraud are
nothing more than conclusory allegations lacking any reasonable support. Cf. Franklin v. Curry,
738 F.3d 1246, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2013).

Therefore, this factual objection is due to be

overruled.
Fourth, Plaintiff summarily references 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) three times in his objections.
(Doc. # 18 at 3, 6, 9). Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a district judge or magistrate judge must recuse
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Generally, “judicial

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To be clear, Plaintiff sued the individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (Doc. # 1

at 14-15).

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rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Draper v.
Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555 (1994)).

Unsupported and conclusory allegations also do not warrant a judge’s

disqualification. Giles v. Garwood, 853 F.2d 876, 878 (11th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff’s conclusory
allegations that the Magistrate Judge acted improperly in making his recommendations present
no basis for disqualification. Therefore, all objections that rely upon § 455(a) are due to be
overruled. Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff’s objections liberally can be construed as a motion
to disqualify, that motion is due to be denied.
Fifth, Plaintiff claims that the Report and Recommendation misconstrues a prior
complaint he filed with this court. (Doc. # 18 at 4) (discussing Doc. # 17 at 6 n. 2). To the
extent Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s reference to another complaint Plaintiff filed
with this court, the Magistrate Judge’s discussion of that complaint is not material to the claims
here because Plaintiff’s procedural and substantive due process fail for the reasons stated in the
Report and Recommendation, which have nothing to do with the discrepancies between
Plaintiff’s current complaint and his earlier complaint. (See Doc. # 17 at 20-24). The Report and
Recommendation accurately recounts Plaintiff’s current allegation that no one confiscated a
phone from him at the Bibb County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”).

(Doc. # 17 at 6).

Therefore, this objection is due to be overruled.
Sixth,

Plaintiff

objects

to

the

Magistrate

Judge’s

characterization

of

minimum-community custody as a status “he desired.” (Docs. # 17 at 9; 18 at 4). Rather,
Plaintiff argues that he was eligible for the minimum custody status. (Doc. # 18 at 4). Plaintiff
cites no authority for his contention that he was eligible for community custody at the time
Defendant Angela Baggett denied it to him. (See id.). Additionally, although Plaintiff alleges in

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an amendment to the Complaint that Baggett abused her authority, he has not alleged in a
pleading that he was eligible for community custody in March 2018. (See Docs. # 12 at 1-2, 14
at 1-2). In any event, Plaintiff has not explained how this mischaracterization affected the
Magistrate Judge’s review of any of the constitutional claims. As the Magistrate Judge correctly
explained, a violation of a state policy or procedure, standing alone, usually does not amount to a
constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. # 17 at 18). For these reasons,
Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s description of the events in March 2018 is due to
be overruled.
Seventh, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that all injunctive
claims are moot because the Alabama Department of Corrections has transferred Plaintiff from
the BCCF to the Hamilton Aged & Infirm Correctional Facility. (Docs. # 17 at 14-15; 18 at 4-5).
Plaintiff contends his transfer did not moot his injunctive claims because he previously has been
transferred from other prisons to the BCCF and could be transferred back to the BCCF again.
(Doc. # 18 at 4-5). Essentially, Plaintiff argues that his claims are capable of repetition, yet
evade review. This exception to the mootness doctrine applies where (1) the challenged action is
too short in duration to be litigated fully before it ceases, and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. Arcia v.
Fla. Sec’y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir 2014).

This exception “requires a

‘demonstrated probability’ that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining
party.” Watkins v. Broward Cty. Sheriff, 677 F. App’x 622, 623 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982)).
Here, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief center on conditions at the BCCF and actions
committed by BCCF employees. (See Doc. # 1 at 17-19). Plaintiff’s transfer to a different

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facility deprives this court of any ability to give him meaningful relief on those claims for
injunctive relief.

Watkins, 677 F. App’x at 623.

While Plaintiff states that he has been

transferred to the BCCF twice in the last twelve years, this averment is insufficient to show a
“demonstrated probability,” as opposed to a mere possibility, that he will be incarcerated in the
BCCF again. See id. Therefore, Plaintiff’s injunctive claims are moot and are not subject to the
“capable of repetition” exception. Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s mootness
recommendation is due to be overruled.3
Eighth, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations to dismiss his claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1988.

Plaintiff’s conclusory objections to these

recommendations present no specific basis for the court to address. Heath, 863 F.2d at 822. The
court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations on these claims and finds no error.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections to dismissing the §§ 1981, 1985, and 1988 claims are due to
be overruled.
Ninth, Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge failed to acknowledge that Defendants
acted under color of state law. (Doc. # 18 at 6). This objection is meritless because the
Magistrate Judge considered the merits of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and did not recommend
dismissing them for failure to allege conduct under color of state law. Indeed, the Magistrate
Judge correctly explained that violations of state laws and regulations -- such as prison grievance
procedures, jail policies, and state employment statutes -- do not automatically result in
constitutional violations. Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1177-78; Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,

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In any event, Plaintiff’s injunctive claims are due to be dismissed because the purported constitutional
violations on which Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief fail as a matter of law. The court notes that Plaintiff’s request
for a disciplinary violation to be removed from his record might not be mooted by his transfer to a different prison.
(See Doc. # 1 at 18). Nevertheless, that injunctive claim is due to be dismissed because the purported constitutional
violations for which Plaintiff seeks such relief are meritless.

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817 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987); Fischer v. Ellegood, 238 F. App’x 428, 431 (11th Cir.
2007). This objection is due to be overruled.
Tenth, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss any
Fourth Amendment search claim essentially provides him “no constitutional rights” with regard
to his personal information. (Doc. # 18 at 6). The Magistrate Judge liberally construed a Fourth
Amendment claim from Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Domec stole his identity by
accessing his institutional files. (See Doc. # 1 at 4, 31). Plaintiff offers no authority to counter
the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517 (1984). (See Doc. # 18 at 6). Additionally, Plaintiff cannot plausibly claim that he has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in correctional files created and maintained by third parties
(i.e., state employees). See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (holding that collection of cell tower location information fell under the third-party
doctrine because the defendant did not own or possess the records at issue), abrogated in part,
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on the Fourth Amendment search claim is due to be
overruled.
Eleventh, Plaintiff claims that the due process claims are due to go forward because he
has alleged that Defendants lacked evidence of an infraction when they disciplined him. (Doc. #
18 at 6). Plaintiff has not claimed that Defendants denied him advance written notice of the
claimed violation, a written statement of the evidence they relied upon and the reasons for the
disciplinary action, or an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence in his defense. (See
id.). See also Young v. Jones, 37 F.3d 1457, 1459-60 (11th Cir. 1994) (listing these elements as
procedural due process requirements for prisoner disciplinary proceedings). Nor has Plaintiff

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alleged or argued that the disciplinary ruling in September 2017 was not supported by some
evidence. (See Docs. # 1 at 5-6; 18 at 6). Instead, he argues that the disciplinary proceedings
violated his due process rights because Defendants lacked evidence that he committed a
social-media related infraction at the BCCF. (See Doc. # 1 at 5-6). But, Plaintiff has failed to
allege whether Defendant Domec charged him with using social media at the BCCF. The court
is not convinced that this claim -- even when liberally construed -- states a plausible due process
claim. See Young, 37 F.3d at 1459 (analyzing a due process claim based on the purported lack of
“some evidence” to support the hearing officer’s findings).

Plaintiff’s objection to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendations for the due process claims is due to be overruled.
Twelfth, Plaintiff reiterates that he is eligible for community custody and work-release
status. (Doc. # 18 at 7). After careful review, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that
Plaintiff cannot pursue any § 1983 claim on this theory because he lacks a liberty or property
interest in work-release status or community custody. See Francis v. Fox, 838 F.2d 1147, 114950 (11th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judgment on a due process claim concerning workrelease status in light of the discretionary nature of work-release under Alabama law); Smith v.
Governor for Ala., 562 F. App’x 806, 817 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We find no due process violation
here because classifications used by prisons do not constitute liberty interests.”). This objection
is due to be overruled.
Thirteenth, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the § 1983
conspiracy claims fail because Plaintiff has not pled an underlying constitutional violation he
suffered. (Docs. # 17 at 25-27; 18 at 7). As explained above, the court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that no constitutional violation has been asserted in Plaintiff’s pleadings.
Moreover, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s pleadings present nothing

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more than a conclusory allegation of an agreement between the Defendants. (Doc. # 17 at 27).
For both reasons, Plaintiff’s objection to the recommended dismissal of his § 1983 conspiracy
claims is due to be overruled.
Fourteenth, Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of his Thirteenth Amendment claim. (Doc. #
18 at 7-8). He contends that the disciplinary actions taken against him deprived him of paid
employment because he lost work-release status.

(Id.).

As explained in the Report and

Recommendation, however, Plaintiff’s Thirteenth Amendment claim is barred by binding
precedent because he has been convicted and imprisoned for a crime. Omasta v. Wainwright,
696 F.2d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 1983). The Thirteenth Amendment claim is due to be dismissed,
and Plaintiff’s objection is due to be overruled.
Fifteenth, Plaintiff argues that his access-to-courts claim should proceed because “the
First Amendment provides plaintiff standing to bring the cognizable access to courts claim.”
(Doc. # 18 at 8). The court disagrees. An access-to-courts claim must state an “actual injury”
suffered due to the denial of law library access or adequate legal assistance. Al-Amin v. Smith,
511 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, a prisoner pursuing such a claim must allege how
the denial of access to the courts “impeded the inmate’s pursuit of a nonfrivolous,
post-conviction claim or civil rights action.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Blakenship, 163 F.3d 1284,
1290 (11th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff has not identified -- in his Complaint or his objections -- what
post-conviction or civil rights claim he was impeded from pursuing due to the alleged
deficiencies at the BCCF. Therefore, his access-to-courts claim is due to be dismissed, and this
objection is due to be overruled.
Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that any recovery of
damages for mental or emotional injuries in this action is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The

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Magistrate Judge accurately described the damages limitation in § 1997e(e) and

correctly

observed that Plaintiff has not sought nominal damages in his pleadings. (Doc. # 18 at 35-37).
See also Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307-09 (11th Cir. 2015). This final objection is
meritless and is due to be overruled.
III.

Conclusion
Having carefully reviewed and considered all the materials in the court file, including the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff’s objections, the court is of the
opinion that the Magistrate Judge’s findings are due to be and are hereby ADOPTED. The
Magistrate Judge’s recommendations are ACCEPTED. Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. # 18) are
OVERRULED. Accordingly, all claims in this action are due to be dismissed without prejudice
for failure to state a claim. To the extent Plaintiff’s objections contain a motion to disqualify the
Magistrate Judge, that motion is due to be denied. A separate Final Order will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this July 11, 2018.

_________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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