Amiri v. Gupta et al

Filing 60

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 7/24/2019. (KAM)

FILED
2019 Jul-24 AM 11:52
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
ALI AMIRI.,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA,

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Case No.: 7:18-cv-00425-RDP

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on pro se Plaintiff Ali Amiri’s Motion to Stop Detention and
Deportation by Homeland Security (Doc. # 58), which the court construes as a motion for a
preliminary injunction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. The court heard argument on the motion by
telephone on July 23, 2019. After careful consideration, and for the reasons explained below, the
court concludes that the motion is due to be denied.
I.

Background
Plaintiff is an Iranian national who began a PhD program in physics at the University of

Alabama in August 2011. (Doc. # 28 at ¶ 5). Following the spring 2017 academic semester,
Plaintiff was dismissed from the physics graduate program based on his “demonstrated lack of
progress in research and disrespectful conduct towards faculty advisers, colleagues and members
of the academic community.” (Doc. # 45-6 at 45). Plaintiff subsequently sued the Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama, claiming that the University failed to afford him
procedural due process in dismissing him from the PhD program. (Doc. # 28).
Plaintiff and the University have been litigating this lawsuit since March 2018. The
University moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, but the court denied the

motion and held that Plaintiff had plausibly alleged a procedural due process violation. (Doc.
# 33 at 7-8). The parties have since engaged in discovery, and the Board has filed a motion for
summary judgment that is currently pending before the court. (Doc. # 43). The parties have
briefed the summary judgment motion and submitted evidence in support of their positions.
(Docs. # 44, 45, 48, 50, 52, 53, 56).
On July 17, 2019, after briefing on the summary judgment motion was complete, a
federal agent from the Department of Homeland Security contacted Plaintiff regarding his
immigration status. (Doc. # 58 at ¶ 2). On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff met with the Homeland
Security agent to review his immigration documents. (Id. at 1, ¶ 3). Plaintiff represents that all of
his immigration documents were valid and up to date except for one document issued by the
University—Immigration and Customs Enforcement Form I-20. (Id. at 1-2, ¶ 3). That form is
used to show that Plaintiff is an enrolled student at the University of Alabama, a status which is a
condition of his continued lawful presence in the United States. (Id. at 11). Plaintiff’s Form I-20,
however, expired on July 31, 2018—just over a year after Plaintiff was dismissed from his PhD
program, and about four months after he filed this lawsuit. (Id.). The Homeland Security agent
informed Plaintiff that, unless he presents documentation showing that he has been reinstated as
a student at the University of Alabama, he will be detained without bond beginning Friday, July
26, 2019, and subsequently removed from the United States. (Id. at 2, ¶ 5).
The day after his meeting with Homeland Security, Plaintiff filed the emergency motion
currently before the court. (Doc. # 58). The court interprets the motion to seek a court order
directing the University of Alabama to provisionally reinstate him as a student at the University
pending a final determination regarding whether the University violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment when it dismissed him from his PhD program. (Doc. # 58 at 2-3).

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Further, the court deems the motion to seek this preliminary relief so that Plaintiff may avoid
being arrested and deported before the court adjudicates his procedural due process claim on the
merits. Given the highly time-sensitive nature of Plaintiff’s motion, the court treats his request as
a motion for a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.
II.

Legal Standard
The posture of Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is somewhat unique.

Motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are typically filed at the
outset of a case, before a court has much of an evidentiary record before it. Plaintiff’s motion, by
contrast, comes after the completion of initial discovery and summary judgment briefing in this
case. Given the unique posture of this case, it is especially important to review the governing
legal standard.
“A district court may grant injunctive relief only if the moving party shows that: (1) it has
a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the
injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the
proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be
adverse to the public interest.” FF Cosmetics FL, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 866 F.3d 1290,
1298 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy and should not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes
the burden of persuasion as to each of the four prerequisites.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Importantly, a preliminary injunction provides for extraordinary relief. If entered, it
awards a plaintiff injunctive relief before that plaintiff carries his burden of proof to show he is
entitled to any relief at all. For this reason, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must

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establish he is entitled to that extraordinary relief, including making the merits showing required
to obtain a preliminary injunction. That showing is significantly higher than what is required to
survive a motion for summary judgment. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must
show that he “has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Id. (emphasis added). By
contrast, to survive a summary judgment motion and get to a jury on a claim, a plaintiff need
only offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor. Hinson v.
Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1115 (11th Cir. 2019). Thus, even where a plaintiff creates a genuine issue
of material fact for a jury to resolve, he may still fall short of showing that it is substantially
likely a jury would resolve the issue in his favor. And, in that circumstance, the plaintiff is not
entitled to a preliminary injunction.
III.

Analysis
Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is due to be denied because he cannot

establish the first required showing: that he is substantially likely to prevail on his claim that the
University of Alabama denied him procedural due process when it dismissed him from the
physics graduate program.
“[A] § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three
elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state
action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232
(11th Cir. 2003). The University concedes that it is a state actor. (Doc. # 44 at 19). Additionally,
the University does not dispute that Plaintiff had a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest in continued enrollment in his PhD program, and the court assumes Plaintiff had such an
interest for purposes of its decision. However, Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood of

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success on the third element of his procedural due process claim: that the University of Alabama
gave him constitutionally inadequate process when it dismissed him from the physics program.
The amount of process the Fourteenth Amendment requires when a public educational
institution dismisses a student depends on whether the dismissal was for academic or disciplinary
reasons. “[A] student dismissed from a public educational institution for academic reasons is
entitled to less process than a student dismissed for disciplinary reasons.” Rollins v. Bd. of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ala., 647 F. App’x 924, 929 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Haberle v. Univ. of
Ala., 803 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986)). When a student is dismissed for academic reasons,
due process simply requires that the school engage in a “careful and deliberate” decisionmaking
process. Haberle, 803 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 85 (1978)). It does not require a pre-dismissal hearing at which the student may
contest the basis for an academic dismissal. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87-90. By contrast, when a
student is dismissed for disciplinary reasons based on alleged misconduct, a pre-dismissal
hearing typically is required. See Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2012)
(due process required that student who was expelled from university for longer than ten days
receive notice of the charges against him and a hearing prior to his dismissal); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (explaining that in the context of high school student suspensions, “due
process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given
oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story”); Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir. 1961) (“[D]ue process requires notice and
some opportunity for hearing before a student at a tax-supported college is expelled for
misconduct.”).

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In this case, the evidence in the summary judgment record amply supports the conclusion
that the University afforded Plaintiff constitutionally adequate process if his dismissal was for
academic reasons. A committee of five faculty concluded that Plaintiff should be dismissed from
the physics program based on his “demonstrated lack of progress in research and disrespectful
conduct towards faculty advisers, colleagues and members of the academic community.” (Doc.
# 45-6 at 45). Prior to the committee’s meeting to review Plaintiff’s academic standing, they
were made aware of the breakdown in the research relationship between Plaintiff and his
advisors, including: (1) Plaintiff’s requests to use lab equipment without adequate justification;
(2) his intellectual property claims for a “memory device”; (3) his claims that Dr. Gupta was
harming his career; and (4) other general claims of misconduct by faculty, including “a plot to
destroy” Plaintiff’s work. (Doc. # 45-13 at 18, ¶ 6). As the Supreme Court observed in Horowitz,
“[t]he educational process is not by nature adversary; instead it centers around a continuing
relationship between faculty and students, one in which the teacher must occupy many roles—
educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute.” 435 U.S. at 90 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiff’s disrespectful behavior1 toward his faculty advisers doubtless
contributed to the breakdown of their working relationship and impaired his ability to succeed
academically in his PhD program. Though, as discussed below, some of Plaintiff’s actions might
be labeled as “misconduct,” any alleged misconduct by Plaintiff (for example, using academic
resources and equipment for non-academic reasons while he should have been working on his
PhD program work, rudeness to his advisers, and false accusations leveled against his advisers)
was thoroughly intertwined with his academic endeavors at the University. The committee was

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To be clear, in the telephonic hearing, Plaintiff asserted he was not disrespectful. But the record evidence
is to the contrary.

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justified in concluding that, in addition to his lack of research progress, this other conduct by
Plaintiff would impair his ability to succeed academically in his PhD program.
Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood that the committee’s decision to
recommend his dismissal, which was made after an in-person meeting to review Plaintiff’s
academic good standing (id. at 40-41), was the result of anything other than a “careful and
deliberate” decisionmaking process. Haberle, 803 F.2d at 1539. Additionally, the committee’s
conclusion is reinforced by Plaintiff’s own statements and other record evidence. As early as
April 2016, Plaintiff himself stated, “I have got not much scientific results.” (Doc. # 45-13 at 5).
Moreover, Plaintiff was informed that he had the right to appeal his dismissal through the
University’s academic grievance procedures, but he chose not to avail himself of that process.
(Docs. # 45-6 at 44; 45-1 at 53-54). The faculty committee’s careful and deliberate decision to
dismiss Plaintiff, in combination with the availability of a post-dismissal grievance hearing,
afforded Plaintiff sufficient procedural protections if his dismissal was for academic reasons.
If, however, Plaintiff’s dismissal was in fact for disciplinary reasons rather than academic
ones, there is a substantial question whether the University failed to provide constitutionally
adequate process. That is so because it is undisputed that Plaintiff was not given notice and at
least an informal opportunity to be heard before he was dismissed. The question is thus whether
Plaintiff is likely to show that he was in fact dismissed for non-academic, disciplinary reasons
(e.g., alleged misconduct), rather than for reasons related to his academic performance. A predismissal hearing was required only if he was dismissed for non-academic, disciplinary reasons.
There is certainly evidence in the summary judgment record from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that the University believed that, in his academic pursuits, Plaintiff engaged
in forms of misconduct. On Friday, April 21, 2017, Plaintiff accused Dr. Arun Gupta and Dr.

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Patrick LeClair (both University faculty members who were on Plaintiff’s dissertation committee
and who served as his advisers) of committing “plagiarism and fabrication” of his works, and
submitted those allegations to the Office of Research Compliance. (Doc. # 45-3 at 5, ¶ 16). The
following week, on the afternoon of Thursday, April 27, 2017, Dr. LeClair (the chair of the
physics department), sent the following email to the members of the physics department’s
graduate advising committee: “The graduate advising committee needs to meet before lunchtime
on Monday to discuss an urgent and serious matter. I will brief as many of you as I can on it
individually.” (Doc. # 45-6 at 38). The committee members responded that they could meet the
following day, April 28, 2017, at 10:00 am. (Id. at 39). At about 10:00 pm that evening, Dr.
LeClair responded that he would “drop by for the start of the meeting to give some background
information, but should not be part of the discussion for reasons that will quickly become
obvious.” (Id. at 39).
A few hours later, at 1:37 am on April 28, 2017, Dr. LeClair sent another email to Dr.
Luoheng (the Senior Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences), Tanta Myles (Director
and Research Compliance Officer), and Dr. Conor Henderson (the Graduate Director of the
physics department and a member of the graduate advising committee). (Id. at 40). The email
read, in pertinent part:
My departmental graduate advising committee will meet Friday morning 4/28 to
discuss Ali Amiri’s situation. They will specifically consider recent
correspondence he has had with his advisors (including myself) and
administrators, as well has [sic] his progress in research thus far. Their task is in
short to determine if Ali is currently in good academic standing in our department,
and make a recommendation regarding his financial support. I will not be a part of
this review.
I will brief the committee on the basic and documented facts of the situation, but
will recuse myself at that point from their discussion and decision process. I am
not offering them any opinion of the situation, as chair I am only charging them

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with coming up with an independent recommendation of Mr. Amiri’s standing in
the department. . . .
The committee is charged with considering three matters: (1) is Ali in good
academic standing in our department right now, (2) if not, should he continue to
be supported by the department financially . . . , and (3) if they do not suggest
supporting him financially, does the committee recommend he be removed from
the program, or is he allowed to continue if he can provide his own funding.
I have given the committee a hard copy (and no electronic copy) of recent email
correspondences between Ali and myself, Arun Gupta, Takau Suzuki, and later
forwards to Tanta Myles and Carl Pinkert. They will also interview parties that
were present at recent meetings, including grad students and faculty members in
our department. I will have no part in this process either, I only informed them
who was present at the most recent meetings that they might want to talk to.
...
I should also say that I passed the email exchanges noted above along to March
Huey, Compliance, Ethics, and Regulatory Affairs Coordinator . . . . I am
deferring to the judgment of A&S and Research Compliance as to whether legal
council [sic] should be involved, I’m clearly out of my depth.
I do want to point out some relevant text in our department’s graduate handbook:
. . . “The maintenance of good academic standing with the Department also
requires that graduate students conduct themselves responsibly and respectfully
towards other members of our academic community. Indeed, the University has a
vital interest in the character of its students, and therefore regards behavior at any
location (on-campus or off-campus) as a reflection of a student’s character and
fitness to be a member of the student body. Accordingly, in addition to the
relevant academic thresholds, a student’s standing with the Department is also
contingent on compliance with the Code of Student Conduct and adherence to the
Capstone Creed.”
This last paragraph is of particular relevance, and it is one factor the committee
will consider.
(Id. at 40-41) (emphasis added).
The following morning, at 8:50 am on April 28, 2017, Myles responded to the email
chain by asking Dr. LeClair: “Is the meeting scheduled only to discuss Mr. Amiri’s status or a
meeting to discuss support and standing for all students?” (Id. at 42). A few minutes later, Myles
sent the following email to Dr. Carl Pinkert, Vice President for Research and Economic
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Development: “Based on Mr. Amiri’s reporting of possible misconduct, unless this meeting is to
discuss the status of all graduate students or was scheduled prior to our notification about the
matter this could be considered retaliation based on the timing.” (Id.). Ten minutes after that
email, at 9:12 am, Dr. LeClair sent the following email to Dr. Henderson, the leader of the
graduate advising committee who would be reviewing Plaintiff’s academic standing in
approximately 45 minutes: “Conor, just as a reminder this is a normal end-of-semester meeting
of the grad advising committee to discuss the support and standing of all students in their 5th or
6th year who are getting close to their PhD deadline. You should also discuss anticipated
graduation dates for these students so we can predict how many grad offers we might need to
make the in the spring.” (Id. at 43).
As scheduled, the committee met at 10:00 am on April 28, 2017. Later that day, Dr.
Henderson submitted a letter to Dr. LeClair reporting the results of the meeting. (Id. at 45).
According to the letter, the committee recommended that Plaintiff be dismissed from the physics
graduate program “based on the student’s demonstrated lack of progress in research and
disrespectful conduct towards faculty advisers, colleagues and members of the academic
community. (Id.). The letter also stated: “We are aware that [Plaintiff] has made allegations of
research misconduct by faculty members. If UA’s Office of Research Compliance finds there is
merit to these allegations, then the Physics Department Graduate Advising Committee may
review the above recommendation.” (Id.).
The Office of Research Compliance ultimately found that Plaintiff’s allegations of
plagiarism and fabrication against Dr. Gupta and Dr. LeClair were unfounded. (Doc. # 45-6 at
60). Shortly thereafter, Dr. LeClair notified Plaintiff that the graduate advising committee had
recommended his dismissal from the physics program, and that he was obliged to follow the

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committee’s recommendation. (Id. at 44-45). The Graduate School became aware of Plaintiff’s
dismissal in June, and on June 29, 2017, Susan Carvalho (Associate Provost and Dean of the
Graduate School) informed Plaintiff that, as a result of his dismissal from the physics
department, he had been suspended from the Graduate School. (Doc. # 45-11 at 3).
Given the timing of events and the email correspondence between Dr. LeClair and other
University employees, a reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the real reason the
graduate advising committee recommended that Plaintiff be dismissed from the physics program
was not his failure to make academic progress, but instead that he falsely accused their
colleagues of plagiarism and fabrication. If the real reason Plaintiff was dismissed was false
accusations of plagiarism and fabrication, then he would be entitled to notice of that charge and
at least an informal opportunity to present his side of the story before being dismissed. See
Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d at 1305-06; Goss, 419 U.S. at 581; Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158. But
though the court concludes that a reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor on this point, it
cannot conclude that Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood that a jury would find that the
real reason for his dismissal was false accusations of plagiarism and fabrication.
As discussed above, there is ample evidence supporting the committee’s conclusion that
Plaintiff was failing to make satisfactory academic progress toward his PhD program. At the
telephone hearing on July 23, 2019, Plaintiff admitted that, despite having been in the program
for six years, he never submitted a dissertation to his faculty advisers. Indeed, he told his
advisers he was able to defend his dissertation without ever submitting it. Further, the committee
expressly stated that its recommendation of dismissal was contingent on the University
determining that there was no merit to Plaintiff’s accusations of research misconduct by
University faculty, and Plaintiff was not notified of his dismissal until after the University

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determined that his accusations were unfounded. (Doc. # 45-6 at 44-45). A careful review of the
evidence before the court reveals that the reasons Plaintiff was dismissed from the program were
his failure to make satisfactory academic progress, his inability to accept constructive feedback
from his advisers, and his unwillingness to work cooperatively with faculty.
A physics PhD program occupies a spot at the highest levels of education. Academic
progress at that level is not measured simply by grade point average or the completion of
assignments. Rather, a PhD candidate must also work collaboratively with his faculty advisers in
completing the program requirements. Here, the evidence indicates that Plaintiff did not even
complete a draft dissertation. But it also shows that he failed to work with his advisers who were
trying to shepherd him through the program. That failure is clearly intertwined with his lack of
progress, and the record evidence indicates it is part and parcel of his academic failure. Because
Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood that the University’s real reasons for dismissing
him were other than academic, he is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.
IV.

Conclusion
After careful review, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary

injunction (Doc. # 58) is due to be denied. An order consistent with this memorandum opinion
will be entered.
DONE and ORDERED this July 24, 2019.

_________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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