Amiri v. Gupta et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge R David Proctor on 9/4/2019. (KAM)
FILED
2019 Sep-04 PM 01:40
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
ALI AMIRI.,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA,
}
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Case No.: 7:18-cv-00425-RDP
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is before the court on pro se Plaintiff Ali Amiri’s Motion to Rule on the
Existing Deficiencies in the SEVIS System (Doc. # 62) filed on August 28, 2019. The court
construes Plaintiff’s Motion as a motion to amend the pleadings. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). In his
Motion, Plaintiff requests that the court order the University of Alabama to obtain student
signatures before processing Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (“SEVIS”)
termination paperwork. (Id. at 6). After careful consideration, and for the reasons explained
below, the court concludes that the motion is due to be denied.
I.
Background
Plaintiff is an Iranian national who began a Ph.D. program in physics at the University of
Alabama in August 2011. (Doc. # 28 at ¶5). Following the spring 2017 academic semester,
Plaintiff was dismissed from the physics graduate program based on his “demonstrated lack of
progress in research and disrespectful conduct towards faculty advisers, colleagues and members
of the academic community.” (Doc. # 45-6 at 45). Plaintiff subsequently sued the Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama, claiming that the University failed to afford him
procedural due process in dismissing him from the Ph.D. program. (Doc. # 28). Plaintiff and the
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University have been litigating this lawsuit since March 2018. (Doc. #1).
Plaintiff amended his complaint twice. In the first instance, in April 2018, the court
required Plaintiff to amend his complaint in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
(Docs. # 3, 4). In the second, in July 2018, Plaintiff was required to re-plead his due process
claim. (Doc. # 27, 28). The parties completed initial discovery and a motion for summary
judgment is currently pending before the court. (Doc. # 43). The summary judgment motion is
fully briefed, and the parties submitted evidence in support of their positions. (Docs. # 44, 45, 48,
50, 52, 53, 56).
After the summary judgment briefings and evidentiary materials were submitted, Plaintiff
filed a Motion to Stop Detention and Deportation by Homeland Security (Doc. # 58), which the
court construed as a motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. # 60 at 1). After careful
consideration, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion. (Id. at 12). Subsequently, Plaintiff was
detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and is currently being held at
LaSalle Detention Center in Jena, Louisiana. (Id. at 1, n. 1).
II.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amendments to pleadings and provides that,
after any responsive pleading has been filed, subsequent amendments are permitted only with the
leave of the district court. Specifically, Rule 15(a) provides:
A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course . . . . In all other cases,
a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or
the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires . . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 15. The decision of whether to grant leave to amend is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and is not automatic. Best Canvas Prod. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof
Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 622–23 (11th Cir. 1983); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330–33 (1971) (“It is [well] settled that the grant of leave to amend
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the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within the discretion of the trial court.”).
However, “‘[d]iscretion’ may be a misleading term, for [R]ule 15(a) severely restricts the
judge's freedom [to deny a motion], directing that leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when
justice so requires.’” Best Canvas, 713 F.2d at 622–23 (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv.
Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597–98 (5th Cir.1981)). Accordingly, “‘[u]nless there is a substantial
reason to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit
denial.’” Best Canvas, 713 F.2d at 622–23 (quoting Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598).
Having said that, when exercising its discretion, the trial court may consider factors such
as “‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue
of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.’” Best Canvas, 713 F.2d at 622–23
(quoting Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir.1981)).
III.
Analysis
In considering Plaintiff’s Motion, the record does not reflect “bad faith or dilatory motive
on the part of the movant . . . .” Best Canvas, 713 F.2d at 622–23 (quoting Gregory v. Mitchell,
634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir.1981)). However, there is clear evidence of “undue delay,” as
Plaintiff did not request relief regarding the SEVIS system in his initial complaint, first amended
complaint, or second amended complaint. Id. This delay in pleading, indicates Plaintiff’s
“repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed . . .” Id.; see, e.g., Best
Canvas, 713 F.2d at 622–23 (“The primary reason for disallowing [Defendant’s] motion to
amend[ ] was [Defendant’s] undue delay in submitting the motion.)
Moreover, the danger of “undue prejudice to [Defendant] by virtue of allowance of the
amendment is high . . . ” Id. The deadline for initial discovery passed on March 1, 2019, and all
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dispositive motions were due on March 22, 2019. (Doc. # 36 at 2). Currently, there is a fully
briefed motion for summary judgment, and accompanying evidentiary exhibits, pending before
the court. (Docs. # 43. 44, 45, 52, 53, 56). At this stage, allowing Plaintiff to amend his
complaint, yet again, would require the parties to start back at square one, at least on this
significant claim. Defendant would be forced to engage in additional discovery and re-draft
dispositive motions. See, e.g., Best Canvas, 713 F.2d at 622–23 (“The court emphasized that
[Defendant] had waited until after the entry of an adverse summary judgment and after the close
of a two-year discovery period.”).
Finally, there is a substantial question as to whether the relief sought in the instant motion
will redress Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff is currently in ICE custody. He requests injunctive relief
seeking a “[c]ourt order that the universities must get a signature of the international student on a
SEVIS termination form, before the university closes[s] the SEVIS account of the student in the
SEVIS system.” (Doc. # 62 at 11).
When considering the likely futility of Plaintiffs’ allegations, the danger of undue
prejudice to the Defendant is high. Here, Plaintiff’s delay in raising the SEVIS claim constitutes
a “substantial reason to deny leave to amend.” See Best Canvas, 713 F.2d at 622–23 (quoting
Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598). Accordingly, the interests of justice do not indicate that the court
should grant Plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings.
IV.
Conclusion
After careful review, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion to amend the pleadings
(Doc. # 62) is due to be denied. An order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be
entered.
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DONE and ORDERED this September 4, 2019.
_________________________________
R. DAVID PROCTOR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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