Edwards v. United States of America

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION. Signed by Judge L Scott Coogler on 6/5/2024. (MEB2)

FILED
2024 Jun-05 PM 04:06
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
WESTERN DIVISION
KEVIN KENTRELL,
EDWARDS
Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Respondent.

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7:22-cv-08041-LSC
(7:18-cr-00460-LSC-TMP)

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
I.

Introduction
Before this Court is a motion by Kevin Kentrell Edwards (“Edwards” or

“Petitioner”) to vacate, set aside, or otherwise correct his sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“§ 2255”). (Doc. 1.) The United States (“Government”)

responded in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 3.) For the reasons set forth
below, Edwards’s § 2255 motion (doc. 1) is due to be denied and the present
action dismissed.
II.

Background
A. Charges and Sentencing

On April 26, 2019, a grand jury indicted Edwards, charging him with

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being a felon 1 in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

(Cr. Doc. 1 at 1.) 2 Stuart D. Albea represented Edwards in the subsequent
proceedings. (See Cr. Doc. 5.) Edwards ultimately entered into a plea agreement
and pled guilty to the charge on November 15, 2018. (Cr. Doc. 7.)

Pursuant to his agreement, Edwards stipulated that the factual basis

therein was “substantially correct.” (Cr. Doc. 7 at 7.) Specifically, Edwards

acknowledged that he had admitted to possessing the firearm at issue and that
he had previously accrued five felony convictions. (Id. at 7.) The Government,

in turn, agreed to recommend a term of incarceration on the low end of the

sentencing guideline range. (Id. at 8.) Additionally, Edwards waived his right to

challenge his conviction and/or sentence through an appeal or a motion
pursuant to § 2255 unless (a) this Court imposed a sentence greater than the

applicable statutory maximum sentence and/or (b) the guideline sentencing
range, or (c) Edwards received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at 9–10.)

At Edwards’s sentencing hearing, this Court adopted the findings of

For purposes of this Opinion, the term “felony” refers to “a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and “felon” refers to an individual convicted
of such a crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 578
(1990) (“Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a person who has been convicted
previously [of] a felony to possess a firearm.”).
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“Cr. Doc.” refers to an entry on the docket sheet in the underlying criminal case, United
States v. Edwards, No. 7:18-cr-00460-LSC-TMP.
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Edwards’s pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) and determined that his

advisory guideline imprisonment range was 110 months to 120 months. (Cr.

Doc. 12 at 22.) Accordingly, on April 2, 2019, this Court sentenced Edwards to
120 months of imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. (Cr.

Doc. 14 at 2–3.)

B. § 2255 Proceedings

Edwards filed the present § 2255 petition on November 18, 2022. 3 (Doc.

1.) Edwards argues that his sentence should be vacated due to a claim arising

from the United States Supreme Court ruling in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). (Doc. 1 at 5.)
III.

Non-Successiveness of Edwards’s § 2255 Motion

Edwards is bringing his first § 2255 motion, so it is not “second or

successive'' within the meaning of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. at §§ 2255(h), 2244(b)(3)(A).
IV.

Standard of Review

Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the

grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Applying the “mailbox rule,” the Eleventh Circuit deems a prisoner’s § 2255 motion as filed
upon the “date that he delivered it to prison authorities for mailing, presumptively, . . . the
day that he signed it.” Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1038 n.7 (11th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam).

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are limited. A petitioner is entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a
sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2)

exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4)
is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v.
Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d
811, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is reserved for

transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other
injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned,

result in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d

1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965,
966 (11th Cir. 1988)).

In litigation stemming from a § 2255 motion, “[a] hearing is not required

on patently frivolous claims or those which are based upon unsupported
generalizations. Nor is a hearing required where the petitioner’s allegations are

affirmatively contradicted by the record.” Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d

1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Guerra v. United States, 588 F.2d 519,
520–21 (5th Cir. 1979)). However, an evidentiary hearing is appropriate if,

“accept[ing] all of the petitioner’s alleged facts as true,” the petitioner has
“allege[d] facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief.” Diaz v. United
States, 930 F.2d 832, 834 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d
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1337, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987) and Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1483, 1485 (11th
Cir. 1989)).
V.

Discussion
A. Timeliness of Edwards’s § 2255 Motion

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), there is a one-year statute of

limitations starting from “the date on which the judgement of conviction
becomes final” for § 2255 motions. Since Edwards did not file a notice of appeal,

the District Court’s judgment became final on April 16, 2019, fourteen days
after judgment was entered on April 2, 2019. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i)

(“a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days
of . . . the entry of the judgment or order being appealed”); see also Murphy v.

United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “when a

defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of
conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.”).

Edwards filed the instant § 2255 motion on November 18, 2022, which is over
two years after the one-year period on which his conviction became final. See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Thus, this motion is due to be dismissed as untimely.4

Although 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) allows the statute of limitations to also run one year from
“the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court,” this
Court, as discussed below, does not find a new right has been asserted that would apply to
Edwards.
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B. Appeal Waiver
Edwards’s challenge alleged in his § 2255 motion is precluded by the

appeal waiver he signed in his plea agreement with the Government.

“A criminal defendant who wishes to plead guilty can waive the right to

challenge his conviction and sentence in exchange for a better plea deal.” King
v. United States, No. 20-14100, 2022 WL 2980490, at *1 (11th Cir. July 28,
2022). “A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the government and

a criminal defendant.” United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir.

1999). “Among the considerations that a defendant may offer as a part of such

a contract is waiver of his right to appeal, provided that the waiver is made
knowingly and voluntarily.” Id. “With limited exceptions, a valid waiver of the

right to appeal bars habeas claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” King, at *1.

“[A] waiver is not knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to

specifically question the defendant concerning the waiver provision of the plea
agreement during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates the defendant

did not otherwise understand the full significance of the waiver.” United States

v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). “For an appeal waiver to bar
claims raised in a § 2255 motion, at a minimum, the would-be petitioner must

know at the time of the guilty plea that the right to federal habeas review exists,
and she must realize she is giving up that right as part of her plea bargain.” Stone
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v. United States, No. 20-10666-A, 2020 WL 4933699, at *1 (11th Cir. June 9,
2020).

As part of his plea agreement, Edwards expressly waived the right to

challenge his conviction or sentence in a § 2255 motion:

In consideration of the recommended disposition of this case, I,
KEVIN KENTRELL EDWARDS, hereby waive and give up my right
to appeal my conviction and/or sentence in this case, as well as any
fines, restitution, and forfeiture orders, the court might impose.
Further, I waive and give up the right to challenge my conviction
and/or sentence, any fines, restitution, forfeiture orders imposed
or the manner in which my conviction and/or sentence, any fines,
restitution, and forfeiture orders were determined in any postconviction proceeding, including, but not limited to, a motion
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

(Cr. Doc. 7 at 9–10.)

The only three rights reserved by the defendant to contest his conviction

are: “(a) Any sentence imposed in excess of the applicable statutory maximum
sentence(s); (b) Any sentence imposed in excess of the guideline sentencing

range determined by the court at the time sentence is imposed; and (c) Any
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id. at 10.) The record clearly
demonstrates that Edwards was sentenced within the guideline sentencing
range. (See Cr. Doc. 12 at 22.)

Because of this waiver he signed as part of his plea agreement, Edwards’s

claim on ground one cannot be brought. Ground one alleges a violation of the
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Supreme Court ruling in Bruen. (Doc. 1 at 4.) This claim does not fall into any of

the three exceptions listed above that he can bring despite his agreement with
the Government. This claim is not based on his sentence being in excess of the

statutory maximum, his sentence being in excess of the guideline sentencing

range, or ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, Edwards’s § 2255 motion
is due to be dismissed as waived.
C. Procedural Default

As well as being precluded by an appeal waiver as detailed above,

Edwards’s claim that the United States Supreme Court ruling in Bruen entitles
him relief is procedurally defaulted. Edwards’s claim is procedurally defaulted

because he failed to raise it in the district court or on direct appeal. Nor did
Edwards allege any actual prejudice or cause in his § 2255 motion. (See Doc. 1).

“Procedural bar” and “procedural default” have distinct meanings, and a

petitioner cannot overcome them in the same manner. See Seabrooks v. United
States, 32 F.4th 1375, 1383–84 (11th. Cir. 2022). “A procedural bar prevents a

defendant from raising arguments in a § 2255 proceeding that he raised and
[the Eleventh Circuit] rejected on direct appeal. A defendant can overcome a

procedural bar when . . . there is an intervening change in the law.” Id. at 1383
(citations omitted) (citing Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2014), and Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974)).
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“By contrast, a ‘procedural default’ occurs when a defendant raises a new

challenge to his conviction or sentence in a § 2255 motion.” Id. at 1383–84

(citing Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004)). “If a

defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal, he may not present the issue

in a § 2255 proceeding unless his procedural default is excused. To overcome a
procedural default, a defendant must show either (1) cause and prejudice, or
(2) a miscarriage of justice, or actual innocence.” Id. at 1384 (citation omitted)
(citing McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011)).

Edwards contends that the United States Supreme Court ruling Bruen

entitles him to relief because it undermines the previous decision that was
made on his case by violating his Second Amendment right. (Doc. 1 at 13–16.)

Edwards’s claim, however, is procedurally defaulted because he failed to

raise the claim on direct appeal. “Under the procedural default rule, a defendant

generally must advance an available challenge to a criminal conviction or
sentence on direct appeal or else the defendant is barred from presenting that

claim in a § 2255 proceeding.” Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234. Edwards failed to
advance any claim on direct appeal. As a result, Edwards can overcome the
procedural default only if one of the two exceptions to the procedural default

rule applies. See McKay, 657 F.3d at 1196. “Under the cause and prejudice
exception, a § 2255 movant can avoid application of the procedural default bar
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by ‘show[ing] cause for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal and actual

prejudice from the alleged error.’” Id. (quoting Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234). “Under

the actual innocence exception[,] . . . a [petitioner]'s procedural default is
excused if he can show that he is actually innocent.”

1. Cause and Prejudice Exception

Edwards cannot establish cause and prejudice. “The novelty of a claim

may constitute cause for excusing the procedural default, but only when the

claim is truly novel, meaning that ‘its legal basis [was] not reasonably available
to counsel.’” United States v. Bane, 948 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)) (alteration in original). There are
three ways a defendant can prove a claim was novel and therefore demonstrate

cause: 1) “when a decision of the Supreme Court explicitly overrules one of its

precedents,” 2) “when a Supreme Court decision overturns a “longstanding and
widespread practice to which the Supreme Court has not spoken,” or 3) “when
a Supreme Court decision disapproves of a practice [the Supreme Court]

arguably has sanctioned in prior cases.”” Granda v. US, 990 F.3d 1272, 1286
(11th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted).

Although no binding court has made the novelty determination about

Bruen, the Eleventh Circuit has decided that “Rehaif was not ‘truly novel’ in the
sense necessary to excuse procedural default.” US v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077,
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1084 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, Edwards, likely cannot utilize the “novelty”
exception to excuse his procedural default in this scenario either. Just as with

Rehaif, a novelty argument for Bruen does not meet any of the paths to
establishing novelty articulated in Granda. 990 F.3d at 1286. The Bruen

decision, as further discussed below, does not affect any Eleventh Circuit
precedent in the way Edwards attempts to utilize it.
2. Actual Innocence Exception

Edwards cannot establish actual innocence. The actual innocence

exception is exceedingly narrow. McKay, 657 F.3d at 1198; see also Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (stating that the actual innocence standard
“ensures that petitioner’s case is truly ‘extraordinary’”) (citation omitted). A

petitioner must “show that ‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in
the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (quoting

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). “‘Actual innocence’ means factual

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623; e.g., McKay,

657 F.3d at 1198. “To establish actual innocence, [a] petitioner must

demonstrate that, ‘in light of all the evidence,’ ‘it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him.’” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623 (quoting

Schlup 513 U.S. at 327–28). “The petitioner thus is required to make a stronger
showing than that needed to establish prejudice.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
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A petitioner alleging actual innocence on an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

conviction “must show that he had no knowledge of being a convicted felon
when he possessed the firearm.” Whittle, 2023 WL 3071092, at *2 (citing Rehaif,

139 S. Ct. at 2200, and Hatcher v. United States, No. 19-cv-8053, 2022 WL
4474915, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 26, 2022) (“To be actually innocent under Rehaif,
. . . [the] [p]etitioner would have to be unaware that he is a felon.”)). Notably,
though, “[i]n felon-in-possession cases where the defendant was in fact a felon

when he possessed firearms, the defendant faces an uphill climb in trying [to
argue] . . . that he did not know he was a felon. The reason is simple: If a person

is a felon, he ordinarily knows he is a felon. ‘Felony status is simply not the kind

of thing that one forgets.’” Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2097 (2021)
(quoting United States v. Gary, 963 F.3d 420, 423 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J.,

concurring)); see also, e.g., United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th

Cir. 2020) (“[M]ost people convicted of a felony know that they are felons.”).

Multiple felony convictions and serving a term of imprisonment for longer than

one year can provide circumstantial evidence that a petitioner knew he was a
felon. See United States v. Reed, 941 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“[S]omeone who has been convicted of felonies repeatedly is especially likely

to know he is a felon.”); Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1083 (“[S]erving more than a year
in prison provides circumstantial evidence of knowledge of felon status.”);
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Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097–98 (discussing the defendants’ multiple felonies;

failure to dispute the fact of their prior convictions; stipulations to their felon

status at trial and upon pleading guilty, respectively; and failure to argue on
appeal “that they would have presented evidence at trial that they did not in
fact know they were felons when they possessed firearms” as “substantial
evidence that [the defendants] knew they were felons”).

Edwards fails to meet the demanding standard required to establish

actual innocence. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 332 (1995). In addition to
never filing a direct appeal, Edwards offers no reason for excusal from his
claims under the procedural default rule, nor does he make any claims of actual

innocence. (See Doc. 1.) Considering Edwards’s extensive criminal record, this

Court finds no evidence supporting Edwards’s contention that he is serving an
unconstitutional sentence. (See Cr. Doc. 12.) Therefore, Edwards’s § 2255
motion is due to be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.
D. Merits of Edward’s Petition

Even if Edwards’s claim is not procedurally defaulted, Bruen applies to

law-abiding citizens, thus having no effect on the present case. The Second

Amendment states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of

a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme
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Court explained that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not

unlimited,” and reiterated the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of

firearms by felons.” 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).

In Bruen, the Supreme Court struck down a state law requiring law-

abiding citizens to demonstrate a special need for self-defense before issuance
of a public-carry license. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 71. The Court held that a state may

not enforce a law that “prevents law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense

needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms.” Id. Notably, Bruen
protected the firearm rights of law-abiding citizens without abrogating the
longstanding prohibitions outlined in Heller. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at 87.

It follows that the holding in Bruen has no effect on Edwards’s case here.

Id. The Second Amendment protections afforded to law-abiding citizens do not

apply to Edwards, an individual with prior felony convictions. United States v.
Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that “statutory restrictions

of firearm possession… are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second

Amendment right of certain classes of people,” including individuals with
felony convictions). (See Cr. Doc. 12.) Thus, this Circuit’s ruling stating “§

922(g)(1) is a constitutional restriction on [a defendant’s] Second Amendment
right” still applies, warranting no relief for Edwards. Rozier, 598 F.3d. at 772.
VI.

Conclusion

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For the foregoing reasons, Edwards’s § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside,

or correct a sentence is due to be denied and this case dismissed with prejudice.

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings requires the Court to

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse
to the applicant. See Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. This Court

may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a “petitioner must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000), or that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement

to proceed further.” Miller-EL v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). This Court finds that Edwards’s claims do not satisfy
either standard.

A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

DONE and ORDERED on June 5, 2024.

_____________________________
L. Scott Coogler
United States District Judge

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